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Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran

Type Regulation
Publication 2011-04-14
Last updated 2026-07-24
State In force
Department Council of the European Union
Source EUR-Lex
articles 20
Reform history JSON API
Entities
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
1. Cyber Police Location: Tehran (Iran) Website: http://www.cyberpolice.ir The Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) is a unit of the Islamic Republic of Iran Police. It is tasked with policing online activity and plays a key role in monitoring social media and prosecuting citizens on the basis of digital content. FATA frequently targets dissidents and regime opponents, as well as important cultural figures who do not conform to strict social and gender roles, such as female artists. FATA suppresses freedom of expression and enforces censorship by shutting down social media pages or by arresting individuals voicing or promoting opinions not supported by the regime. FATA is headed by Vahid Majid, who has repeatedly publicly warned citizens that even ordinary discussions with relatives regarding developments in the country and regarding politics will be monitored, stoking a climate of intimidation and fear. FATA is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.3.2013
2. Evin Prison Address: Tehran Province, Tehran, District 2, Dasht-e Behesht (Iran) Evin Prison is a detention centre where political prisoners have been held and severe human rights abuses, including torture, have repeatedly taken place over the past years and decades. November 2019 protesters were, and at least to some extent still are, detained in Evin Prison as political prisoners. Prisoners in Evin Prison are being deprived of basic procedural rights, and are sometimes held in solitary confinement or overcrowded cells with poor hygienic conditions. There are detailed reports of physical and psychological torture. Detainees are denied contact with family and lawyers as well as adequate health treatment. In the context of the 2022/2023 protests, cases of torture are still being reported. The cause of the fire that led to several deaths and injuries in October 2022 has not been made public and the prison refuses any international inquiries. In the context of the fire, it also became clear that the prison uses internationally condemned landmines to prevent prison escapes. Several third-state nationals have been arbitrarily detained in Evin Prison. 12.4.2021
3. Fashafouyeh Prison (a.k.a. Greater Tehran Central Penitentiary, Hasanabad-e Qom Prison, Greater Tehran Prison) Address: Tehran Province, Hasanabad, Bijin Industrial Zone, Tehran, Qom Old Road (Iran) Telephone: +98 21 5625 8050 Fashafouyeh Prison is a detention centre designated originally to detain offenders of drug-related crimes, recently also holding political prisoners and, in some cases, forcing them to share cells with drug addicts. The living and hygienic conditions are very poor, lacking basic needs like clean drinking water. During the November 2019 protests, several protesters were detained in Fashafouyeh Prison, including minors. Reports indicate that November 2019 protesters were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment at Fashafouyeh Prison, for example by deliberately wounding them with boiling water and through denial of medical treatment. According to an Amnesty International report on the crackdown of the November 2019 protests, children as young as 15 have been detained alongside adults in Fashafouyeh Prison. Three November 2019 protesters who are currently being held in Fashafouyeh Prison were sentenced to death by a court in Tehran. Since the beginning of the 2022/2023 protests, it has been reported that 3 000 persons were transferred to Fashafouyeh prison and that 835 are currently still there. Several cases of torture and forced confessions have been reported. 12.4.2021
4. Rajaee Shahr Prison (a.k.a. Rajai Shahr Prison, Rajaishahr, Raja’i Shahr, Reja’i Shahr, Rajayi Shahr, Gorhardasht Prison, Gohar Dasht Prison) Address: Alborz Province, Karaj, Gohardasht, Moazzen Blvd (Iran) Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826 Rajaee Shahr Prison has been known for the deprivation of human rights, including severe physical and psychological torture of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience as well as mass executions without fair trial, ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Hundreds of detainees, including children, were severely mistreated in Rajaee Shahr Prison in the aftermath of the November 2019 protests. There are credible reports about numerous cases of torture and other forms of cruel punishment, including cases involving minors. Since the beginning of the 2022/2023 protests, numerous opponents have been arbitrarily jailed there in conditions that some inmate journalists have described as dangerous and hardly liveable. 12.4.2021
5. Iran’s Morality Police (a.k.a. Gasht-e-Ershad; Islamic Guidance Patrol; Guidance Patrols) غشتى إرشاد Address: Vozara Street, corner of 25th Street, District 6, Tehran (Iran) The Morality Police is part of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture. On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police’s headquarters for an ‘educational and orientation class’. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police’s abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented. The Morality Police is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 17.10.2022
6. Basij Resistance Force (a.k.a. Basij-e Mostazafan) بسیج مستضعفین The Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with branches throughout Iran. The security forces’ response to the September 2022 protests in Iran was particularly harsh, resulting in the deaths of multiple people. The Basij Resistance Force was one of the forces ordered by the government to quell those protests. It injured and killed several protesters. The Basij Resistance Force is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 17.10.2022
7. Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC) قرارگاه دفاع سایبرى Address: Tehran (Iran) Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826 The Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC) monitors websites, e-mails and online activities of individuals deemed to be political opponents. During the September 2022 protests in Iran, the CDC took an active role in the Iranian government’s repressive policies, including by identifying and arresting protesters. The CDC is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 17.10.2022
8. Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA) فرماندهی انتظامی جمهورﻯ اسلامی ایران Address: Tehran (Iran) The Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) is a uniformed police force. The LEF’s blatant and severe human rights violations, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds were seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. The LEF is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 17.10.2022
9. The Basij Cooperative Foundation (a.k.a. Bonyad-eh Ta’avon-eh Basij) بنیاد تعاون بسیج Address: Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Foundation/Corporation Network Other associated entities: IRGC, Basij Resistance Force The Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF) is one of the affiliates of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). The BCF was established in 1996 and its mission includes promoting and supporting the Basij. The activities of the BCF include the funding of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). Therefore, the BCF is associated with the Basij Resistance Force, an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022
10. Press TV پرس تو Address: 4 East 2nd St., Farhang Blvd., Saadat Abad, 19977-66411 Tehran, Iran Telephone number: Tel. +98 21 230 66 660 Email: Presstv@presstv.ir Type of entity: State Television Broadcaster Press TV is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Therefore, Press TV is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022
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12. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) سازمان صدا و سيماﻯ جمهورﻯ اسلامی ايران Address: Jamejam Street, Valiasr Avenue, 19395 - 3333 Tehran, Iran Type of entity: state-owned broadcasting company Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is a state-owned broadcasting company notorious for being a regime mouthpiece. IRIB is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, and persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, thereby violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. IRIB is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022
13. Ravin Academy آکادمی راوین Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Date of registration: 2019 Registration number: 49135 Principal place of business: Second Floor, No 36, Naqdi Street, North Sohrevardi Street, Shahid Ghandi-Niloufar Neighbourhood, Tehran, Iran Ravin Academy is an Iran-based cyber security company which provides cyber security education and training in both defensive and offensive fields as well as hacker training. In addition, Ravin Academy operates on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and supports them in recruiting hackers. Hackers trained at the Ravin Academy have been involved in directly disrupting the communication of those protesting against the Iranian regime, thereby repressing the protests. Therefore, Ravin Academy is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
14. Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company شرکت سامان گستر سحاب پرداز با مسئولیت محدود a.k.a. Sahab Pardaz سحاب پرداز Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Principal place of business: Tehran, No 22, Khorramshahr Street Tehran, North Shohvardi Street, Korramshahr Street, Number 24, Floor 1 Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company is an Iran-based company providing social-media filtering services. It is engaged in censorship and surveillance activities for the Government of Iran, including during the 2022 protests, that prohibit, limit or penalise the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media. Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
15. Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) ارتباطات و مقررات تنظیم سازمان رادیویی a.k.a. Communication Regulation Authority (CRA) Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Associated entity: Iranian Ministry for Information and Communications Technology (ICT) The Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) is under the authority of the Iranian Ministry for Information and Communications Technology (ICT). The CRA enforces the Iranian government’s requirements to filter internet content through a spyware called SIAM. During the 2022 protests, the CRA used its control of internet access and mobile phones to track protestors and create a detailed picture of dissidents’ and protesters’ activities for the authorities to use at their will. The CRA is therefore responsible for supporting the repression of peaceful demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights. The CRA is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
16. Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil ستاد امر به معروف و نهی از منکر a.k.a. Office for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil; Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice; Setad-PV ستاد پو Type of entity: government institution Place of registration: Iran Principal place of business: Iran Associated individuals: GOLPAYEGANI Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi, head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil Other associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is a government institution, responsible for determining and enforcing excessively strict behavioural models in society. In 2022, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil was instrumental in setting new and stricter morality codes for women that are in clear violation of their human rights. Additionally, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil plays a central role in setting up the monitoring and often brutal sanctioning of women and men who do not respect these codes. These strict codes are subsequently brutally enforced by the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (and specifically its Morality Police). The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
17. Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company شرکت ایمن صنعت زمان فرا Address: Shahrak-e-Jafar Abad-e-Jangal Rd, Naseriyeh, Tehran, Iran; Number 16, Kolezar alley, Farsian Street, Shahid Rezaiee Street, Azadegan Autobahn, Tehran, Iran; Number 16, Gholshan 14, Golestan Boulevard, Negarestan Boulevard, Sham Abad, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: private company Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 2010 National ID no: 103201991293 (Iran) Business registration no: 369541 (Iran) Principal place of business: Iran Associated individuals: Mohammad Zandi Aliabadi, chairman of the Board of directors; Hossein Zandi Aliabadi, Vice chairman of the Board of directors; Fatemeh Haghshenas, CEO Other associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company is an Iranian company manufacturing and importing security equipment for Iranian security forces. Its equipment is used by Iranian security forces to violently suppress peaceful protests, including the protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in 2022, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children. Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
18. Iranian Special Police Forces نیروﻯ ویژه پاد وحشت a.k.a. NOPO; Iran’s Counter-Terror Special Forces; Niroo-ye Vizhe Pasdar-e Velayat; Supreme Leader's Guardian Special Forces; Provincial Special Forces; Special Counter-Terrorism Force Address: Iran Type of entity: police force Place of registration: Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Associated individuals: Mohsen Ebrahimi (Commander) Other associated entities: Iran’s Special Unit Forces, Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) The Iranian Special Police Forces (NOPO) are a subdivision of Iran’s Special Unit Forces and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF). NOPO is a highly trained, specialised unit often called upon to dissolve protests. During the 2022 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, NOPO used excessive violence and lethal force against unarmed protestors, including women and children, e.g. by firing automatic weapons at protestors. The Iranian Special Police Forces (NOPO) are therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
19. Radis Vira Tejarat Co شرکت رادیس ویرا تجارت Address: Tehran, Pasdaran St., West Gilan St., No 5, Unit 1, Corner of Mohed Dou Alley Type of entity: physical security provider, private enterprise Principal place of business: Iran Associated individuals: Abbas Azarpendar, CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co and regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (customers), Pars Ertebat Afzar Co (distributor) Radis Vira Tejarat Co is the Iranian representative of the company Tiandy Technologies. The close ties between the companies are illustrated by the fact that the CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co, Abbas Azarpendar, is also regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies. Radis Vira Tejarat Co is a key intermediary in Iran providing some of the most advanced surveillance equipment to the Iranian government. During the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in mid-September 2022, its equipment has been used by the Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), to brutally suppress the nationwide protests, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children. Radis Vira Tejarat Co is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
20. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Shohada in West Azerbaijan شهداء سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: West Azerbaijan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: West Azerbaijan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Shohada operates in the province of West-Azerbaijan. EU-listed Brigadier General Habib Shahsavari is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, the IRGC Regional Corps Shohada conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, commencing 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the West Azerbaijan towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. IRGC operations in the towns of Mahabad and Bukan have killed at least four and 12 people, respectively, since 15 November 2022. The IRGC Regional Corps Shohada is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
21. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram in Kermanshah حضرت نبی اکرم سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Kermanshah, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Kermanshah, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram operates in the province of Kermanshah. EU-listed Brigadier General Bahman Reyhani is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC. The IRGC Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
22. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Quds in Gilan قدس سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Gilan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Gilan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Quds operates in the province of Gilan. EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Abdollahpour is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, Gilan province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC. The IRGC Regional Corps Quds is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
23. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Karbala in Mazandaran کربلاﻯ سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Mazandaran, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Mazandaran, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Karbala operates in the province of Mazandaran. EU-listed Brigadier General Siavash Moslemi is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, the entity conducted operations against protesters in Mazandaran province. In those operations, it used disproportionate force and violence against protesters. The IRGC Regional Corps Karbala is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
24. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada in Tehran province الشهداء سید سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada operates in the province of Tehran. EU-listed Brigadier General Ahmad Zulqadr is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, the violent repression of protests in Tehran province by Iranian security forces, including by the IRGC, has been particularly strong and excessive. The IRGC Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
25. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Karbala کربلا سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Southwest Iran (provinces of Khusestan, Lorestan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad) Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Karbala is the IRGC’s regional headquarters operating in Southwest Iran, covering the provinces of Khusestan, Lorestan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad. The IRGC Operational Base Karbala has repeatedly violently cracked down on protests in the region, working closely with Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and Basij forces. It has also monitored and targeted activities of ethnic minorities in the provinces. The IRGC Operational Base Karbala is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
26. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Quds قدس سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Quds is the IRGC’s regional headquarters in the southeast of Iran and oversees Kerman province and Sistan and Baluchestan province. EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami is the commander of this entity. Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed ‘bloody Friday’, when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued. The IRGC Operational Base Quds is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
27. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Najaf-e-Ashraf الاشرف نجف سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Najaf-e-Ashraf oversees the provinces of Kermanshah, Hamedan and Ilam. EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Nazar Azimi is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC. The IRGC Operational Base Najaf-e-Ashraf is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
28. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Valiasr in Khuzestan عصر ولی سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Khuzestan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Khuzestan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Valiasr operates in the province of Khuzestan. EU-listed Brigadier General Hassan Shahvarpour is the commander of this entity. The IRGC Regional Corps Valiasr is responsible for massacres of protesters in Khuzestan in November 2020. In addition, in the course of the 2022 protests in Iran, it has conducted operations against protesters in particular in the town of Izeh. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations, leading to the killing of protesters. The IRGC Regional Corps Valiasr is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
29. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl in Lorestan حضرت ابوالفضل سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Lorestan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Lorestan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl operates in the province of Lorestan. During the 2022 protests, it conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, operations were conducted in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters. The IRGC Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
30. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas in Kurdistan المقدس بيت سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Kurdistan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Kurdistan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas operates in the province of Kurdistan. EU-listed Brigadier General Sadegh Hosseini is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, this entity conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, commencing 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the Kurdistan towns and West Azerbaijan towns of Sanandaj, Kamyaran and Saqqez. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations. IRGC operations in the towns of Sanandaj, Kamyaran and Saqqez have killed at least seven, two and two people, respectively, since 15 November 2022. The IRGC Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
31. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Salaman in Sistan and Baluchestan سلمان سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی Address: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Salaman oversees the province of Sistan and Baluchestan. EU-listed Brigadier General Amanollah Garshasbi is the commander of this entity. Sistan and Baluchestan has seen some of the most violent crackdown by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed ‘bloody Friday’, when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against protesters has continued. The IRGC Regional Corps Salaman is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 23.1.2023
32. Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Cooperation Foundation بنیاد تعاون فراجا بنیاد تعاون ناجا (a.k.a. NAJA Cooperation Foundation) Address: Marzdaran Blvd, Teheran, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Cooperation Foundation associated with the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic Associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA) فرماندهی انتظامی جمهورﻯ اسلامی ایران Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Cooperation Foundation is an economic collaborative controlled by the EU-listed LEF (also known as NAJA) and is active in Iran’s energy, construction, services, technology, and banking industries. The LEF Cooperation Foundation is an important financing arm of the LEF, consists de facto of a financial holding that provides and channels funds and is used to circumvent sanctions. Additionally the Cooperation Foundation with its subsidiaries is one of the few suppliers exclusively involved in manufacturing and importing equipment that is used to suppress protests in Iran. The LEF Cooperation Foundation therefore provides financial resources and equipment for repression to the LEF which uses the support to commit serious human rights violations. The LEF Cooperation Foundation is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
33. Police Science and Social Studies Institute پژوهشگاه علوم انتظامی و مطالعات اجتماعی فراجا Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Address: QCC3+HPP District 3, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran Type of entity: Institute associated with the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic (LEF) Associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA) The Police Science and Social Studies Institute, affiliated with the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (also known as NAJA) produces ‘anti-riot drones’ that are used by law enforcement forces in suppressing peaceful protesters. Additionally, the institute promotes and conducts research on the use of drones for police forces. The Police Science and Social Studies Institute is associated to the Law Enforcement Forces of Iran and provides equipment that is used to commit serious human rights violations. It is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
34. Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution Associated individual: KHOSROU PANAH Abdol Hossein (chairman and secretary) The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is a regime policy body responsible for preparing and formulating strategic policies and plans in the fields of science, education, religion and research. It promoted several projects undermining the freedom of girls and women, setting limits on their clothing and education. Its decisions have also discriminated against minorities, such as the Baha’i. It is a vehicle for promoting the current regime’s policies. The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.3.2023
35. Ariantel Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran Website: http://www.ariantel.ir Type of entity: private company Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran. Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists. Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 24.4.2023
36. Student Basij Organisation (SBO) Image omitted; see official source (a.k.a Student and Talabeh Basij) Type of entity: branch of the Basij Organisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: November 1989 Associated individuals: Issa Zarepour Other associated entities: IRGC; IRGC Basij Organisation The Student Basij Organisation (SBO) is a branch within the Basij Organisation that acts as the IRGC’s violent enforcers on university campuses. The SBO consists of the youngest and most radical members of the Basij, who were particularly active in making university campuses where students staged protests some of the main theatres of repression in autumn 2022. During raids on a number of university campuses, including at Sharif University, Shahid Beheshti University and Amirkabir University security forces, including the SBO, used live ammunition and opened fire on students. This, alongside multiple reports of student abductions and torture linked to these raids, confirms that the SBO is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 22.5.2023
37. IRGC Cooperative Foundation Image omitted; see official source (a.k.a IRGC Cooperation Bonyad; Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-e; Sepah Cooperative Foundation) Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: foundation Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 1989 Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Seyyed Amin Ala; Emami Tabatabai; Ahmad Hasan Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The IRGC has been at the forefront of the crackdown on protests in Iran since September 2022, which according to independent sources has resulted in over 520 deaths, including the deaths of over 70 minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and is thus responsible for financing the regime’s brutal repression. It is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 22.5.2023
38. Tasnim Cultural Institution Organization (a.k.a. Tasnim News Agency) خبرگزارى تسنیم Type of entity: Media outlet Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: June 30, 2012 Tasnim News agency is the largest Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affiliated media outlet and serves as a propaganda machine for the Iranian regime whose coverage frequently reflects hard-line Iranian views. The news outlet is responsible for publishing false confessions by protesters on its website and social media accounts as well as for posting pictures of protestors on social media and asking readers to help identify them. Tasnim News is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 15.9.2023
39. Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) Type of entity: Government Entity Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 2012 The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) is responsible for restricting access to the internet for the Iranian population in order to prevent or oppress protests and limit access to open and free information, thereby violating the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The SCC is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 15.9.2023
40. Sanandaj Central Prison زندان مرکزى سنندج Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Kordestan, north-western Iran Sanandaj Central Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Divison of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that multiple executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Sanandaj Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 15.9.2023
41. Zahedan Prison زندان مرکزى زاهدان Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Zahedan, Iran Zahedan Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that mass executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Zahedan Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 15.9.2023
42. Isfahan Central Prison (a.k.a. Dastgerd Prison; Prison of Isfahan; Esfahan Prison; Isfahan Prison) Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Isfahan, Iran Isfahan Central Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that multiple executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Isfahan Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 15.9.2023
43. Kachui Prison (a.k.a. Kachouii Prison; Kechoui Prison; Kachuyi Prison; Fardis Prison) Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Karaj, Alborz Province, Iran Kachui prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Kachui Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 15.9.2023
44. Shiraz Central Prison (a.k.a. Adel Abad Prison) Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Shiraz, Fars province, Iran Shiraz Central Prison, Adel Abad, located in Shiraz, Fars province, Iran, is a prison in which detainees’ human rights are systemically violated and where numerous opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been executed, including based on collective punishment. Several hostages from European countries have been unlawfully detained in this prison, where their access to a fair trial has been denied and where they have experienced severe violations of their most basic rights. Furthermore, this prison is participating in the repression of ethnic and religious minorities in southern Iran (including Arabs, Kurds, Baluchs, semi-nomadic tribes and Baha’is) through almost systematic executions. 14.4.2025
45. 1st branch of the Revolutionary Court of Shiraz Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Shiraz, Fars province, Iran The 1st branch of the Revolutionary Court of Shiraz, located in Fars province, Iran, has been implicated in numerous human rights violations, in particular concerning the unjust trials and executions of political dissidents and persecution of individuals from minority communities (in particular the Baha’i community). These actions underscore the court’s role in perpetuating systemic human rights violations, utilising the judiciary as a tool for political repression and suppression of political dissent and minority communities in Iran. 14.4.2025
46. Iranian Audio-Visual Media Regulatory Authority (SATRA) سازمان تنظیم مقررات رسانه هاﻯ صوت و تصویر فراگیر در فضاﻯ مجازﻯ - ساترا Address: No. 234, Motahari St., Tehran, Iran PO Box:1588874611 Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 2016 The Audio-Visual Media Regulatory Authority (SATRA) is a government body that is responsible for monitoring online and video content published in Iran, including entertainment products shown on privately owned streaming platforms. SATRA operates under the supervision of the state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and is therefore associated with IRIB, an entity listed by the Union. As part of its activities, SATRA censors political and cultural content, such as dissenting political views expressed in television shows and in films, and depictions of alcohol consumption, smoking and the lack of hijab. By censoring media content, SATRA violates the rights to freedom of expression and information of the Iranian people and the freedom and pluralism of the media. SATRA is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 29.1.2026
47. Seraj Cyberspace Organization Place of registration: Fars, Iran Website: https://seraj.ir/ Date of registration: 2013 Seraj Cyberspace Organization was established by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to support the IRGC’s apparatus by recruiting, training and mobilising pro-regime internet users. Seraj Cyberspace Organization’s operations include trolling campaigns on social media, spreading disinformation and misinformation online, trending pro-regime hashtags and engineering divisions among the Iranian opposition. Accounts related to Seraj Cyberspace Organization are also used to spread abusive content against the Islamic Republic’s opponents and to attack political opponents online. Seraj Cyberspace Organization is hence violating the rights to freedom of information and expression of the Iranian people. Seraj Cyberspace Organization is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 29.1.2026
48. Working Group for Determining Instances of Criminal Content کارگروه تعیین مصادیق محتواﻯ مجرمانه a.k.a. WGDICC a.k.a. Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) a.k.a. The Filtering Committee a.k.a. Internet Blocking Censory Committee Address: Sure-Esrafil St, Tehran, Iran Place of registration: Sure-Esrafil St, Tehran, Iran Website: http://internet.ir The Working Group for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (WGDICC) is a judicial body that operates under the Iranian Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice. It is tasked with filtering and censoring the internet in Iran. To do so, it collaborates with several companies and media outlets to develop and deploy surveillance and censorship tools. Those include tools that aim to reduce bandwidth, block international social media platforms and block unauthorised VPNs. Furthermore, the WGDICC is involved with filtering information considered contrary to the values and security of the Iranian regime. In this way, the WGDICC is systemically limiting access to independent information and limiting Iranian citizens’ freedom to express their views, to communicate with each other and to organise themselves in order to give effect to the freedom of assembly, in particular through the use of online platforms such as social media. The WGDICC is thus responsible for severe violations of the rights to freedom of information, expression and assembly of the Iranian people. The WGDICC is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 29.1.2026
49. Yaftar Pazhohan Pishtaz Rayanesh Limited Company a.k.a. Yaftar a.k.a. Yaftar Company Address: No.37, Unit 13, Qasemi Street, Habibollah Street, Azadi Avenue, Tehran, 1576984418, Iran Address: No. 56, 4th and 5th floors, Ghasemi Alley, Shahid Akbari Boulevard, Azadi St, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Limited Company Registration number: 436501 National ID No: 10320862133 Yaftar is a company in Iran that collaborates with the Working Group for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (WGDICC). Yaftar contributes to the widespread disruption of access to the internet by developing surveillance and repression tools. Yaftar is one of the main contractors working on online censorship in Iran and is involved in website and app internet blocking and censoring. Specifically, Yaftar is developing systems to collect data from search engines in order to identify and censor content that is considered ‘criminal’ by the WGDICC. Yaftar has also cooperated with the Iranian Attorney General’s Office in blocking VPNs. Furthermore, Yaftar works on image analysis and facial recognition. Through its activities, Yaftar is significantly limiting access to independent information and Iranian citizens’ freedom of expression. Yaftar is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 29.1.2026
50. Douran Software Technologies گروه دوران a.k.a. Douran Group a.k.a. Douran Information Technologies a.k.a. Douran Software Address: No. 62, 1st floor, Shahid Farshad ayyazi (9th), Shahid Abdolhamid Sabunchi St., Shahid Beheshti Ave., Tehran, 1533763811, Iran Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 4.10.2004 Registration No: 231475 National ID No: 10102527140 Website: www.douran.ir Douran Software Technologies is an Iranian software company involved in internet blocking and censoring activities. It provides traffic analysis tools and censorship, internet filtering and blocking of VPN equipment to Iranian internet providers. Douran Software Technologies is involved in the National Information Network projects and cooperates among others with the Working Group for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (WGDICC) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to limit access to international websites. Douran Software Technologies is therefore violating the rights to freedom of information, assembly and expression of the Iranian people, by blocking vital internet access. Douran Software Technologies is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 29.1.2026
51. Masaf Institute Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: June 2011 The Masaf Institute is an organisation founded in 2011 by Ali Akbar Raefipour. The Masaf Institute plays a key role in silencing political opposition, by engaging in ‘doxxing’ and smear campaigns against anti-regime Iranians. It develops pro-regime cyber armies, orchestrates online attacks and disseminates disinformation, with the aim of identifying political dissenters. It has been involved in coordinated ‘doxxing’ campaigns led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), leading to the detention of political dissenters. The Masaf Institute serves as a propaganda outlet for the Islamic Republic through the use of multiple tools, such as video clips, documentaries, short films, games, software, music, graphics, cartoons, illustrations and analysis of political events. In doing so, the Masaf Institute is violating the rights to freedom of information, assembly and expression of the Iranian people. The Masaf Institute is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 29.1.2026
52. Naji Research and Development Company (NRDC) شرکت پژوهش و توسعه ناجی Address: Mirdamad Blvd, Tehran, Tehran Province, 1518964613, Iran Type of entity: Private Joint-Stock Company Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Date of registration: 2005 Website: www.epolice.ir Naji Research and Development Company (NRDC) is an Iranian IT-services and consultancy company that is responsible for developing the Nazer mobile application for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces. The Nazer mobile application is used as a surveillance tool to monitor and control citizens in Iran. It enables state-vetted individuals to report other individuals for hijab violations and for behaviour that goes against public morality. Individuals reported through the Nazer mobile application could be subjected to criminal trials and punishments, including fines, imprisonment and lashings. The NRDC is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 16.3.2026
53. Mohammad Rasulullah Corps Address: Niayesh Highway, Tehran, Iran The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps is responsible for coordinating Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij forces in Tehran. Those forces have been involved in the violent repression of demonstrations, including during the nationwide protests in Iran that began in December 2025 where IRGC and Basij forces opened fire on protesters, resulting in deaths and injuries. The Mohammad Rasulullah Corps is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 16.3.2026
54. Imam Reza Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a.k.a. Imam Reza Corps Address: Mashhad, Iqbal, Kohestan St., Iran The Imam Reza Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the local branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Khorasan Razavi Province, and therefore commands IRGC and Basij forces in Khorasan Razavi Province. Those forces have been involved in the violent repression of demonstrations, including during the nationwide protests in Iran that began in December 2025 where IRGC forces opened fire on protesters, resulting in deaths and injuries. The Imam Reza Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 16.3.2026

ANNEX II

Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the European Commission

BELGIUM

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

BULGARIA

https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions

CZECHIA

www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

DENMARK

https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/sanktioner/ansvarlige-myndigheder

GERMANY

https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html

ESTONIA

https://vm.ee/sanktsioonid-ekspordi-ja-relvastuskontroll/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid

IRELAND

https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/

GREECE

http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

SPAIN

https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

FRANCE

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

CROATIA

https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955

ITALY

https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

CYPRUS

https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/

LATVIA

https://www.fid.gov.lv/en

LITHUANIA

https://www.urm.lt/en/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-security-policy/international-sanctions/997

LUXEMBOURG

https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html

HUNGARY

https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato

MALTA

https://smb.gov.mt/

NETHERLANDS

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

AUSTRIA

https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/

POLAND

https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe

https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions

PORTUGAL

https://portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas

ROMANIA

http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

SLOVAKIA

https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

https://um.fi/pakotteet

SWEDEN

https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA)

Rue de Spa 2/Spastraat 2

B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel,

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

ANNEX III

List of equipment which might be used for internal repression as referred to in Article 1a

    1. Fire-arms, ammunition and related accessories therefor, as follows:
  • 1.1 Firearms not controlled by ML 1 and ML 2 of the Common Military List;
  • 1.2 Ammunition specially designed for the firearms listed in item 1.1 and specially designed components therefor;
  • 1.3 Weapon-sights not controlled by the Common Military List.
    1. Bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List.
    1. Vehicles as follows:
  • 3.1 Vehicles equipped with a water cannon, specially designed or modified for the purpose of riot control;
  • 3.2 Vehicles specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel borders;
  • 3.3 Vehicles specially designed or modified to remove barricades, including construction equipment with ballistic protection;
  • 3.4 Vehicles specially designed for the transport or transfer of prisoners and/or detainees;
  • 3.5 Vehicles specially designed to deploy mobile barriers;
  • 3.6 Components for the vehicles specified in items 3.1 to 3.5 specially designed for the purposes of riot control. Note 1

This item does not control vehicles specially designed for the purposes of fire-fighting. Note 2

For the purposes of item 3.5 the term ‘vehicles’ includes trailers.

    1. Explosive substances and related equipment as follows:
  • 4.1 Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosions by electrical or non-electrical means, including firing sets, detonators, igniters, boosters and detonating cord, and specially designed components therefor; except those specially designed for a specific commercial use consisting of the actuation or operation by explosive means of other equipment or devices the function of which is not the creation of explosions (e.g., car air-bag inflaters, electric-surge arresters of fire sprinkler actuators);
  • 4.2 Linear cutting explosive charges not controlled by the Common Military List;
  • 4.3 Other explosives not controlled by the Common Military List and related substances as follows:
  • a. amatol;
  • b. nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen);
  • c. nitroglycol;
  • d. pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
  • e. picryl chloride;
  • f. 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT).
    1. Protective equipment not controlled by ML 13 of the Common Military List as follows:
  • 5.1 Body armour providing ballistic and/or stabbing protection;
  • 5.2 Helmets providing ballistic and/or fragmentation protection, anti-riot helmets, antiriot shields and ballistic shields. Note: This item does not control:
  • — equipment specially designed for sports activities;
  • — equipment specially designed for safety of work requirements.
    1. Simulators, other than those controlled by ML 14 of the Common Military List, for training in the use of firearms, and specially designed software therefor.
    1. Night vision, thermal imaging equipment and image intensifier tubes, other than those controlled by the Common Military List.
    1. Razor barbed wire.
    1. Military knives, combat knives and bayonets with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm.

- 10. Production equipment specially designed for the items specified in this list.

- 11. Specific technology for the development, production or use of the items specified in this list.

ANNEX IV

Equipment, technology and software referred to in Articles 1b and 1c

General Note

Notwithstanding the contents of this Annex, it shall not apply to:

  • (a) equipment, technology or software which are specified in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 ([^E0001]) or the Common Military List; or
  • (b) software which is designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier and which is generally available to the public by being sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of:
  • (i) over the counter transactions;
  • (ii) mail order transactions;
  • (iii) electronic transactions; or
  • (iv) telephone order transactions; or
  • (c) software which is in the public domain.

The categories A, B, C, D and E refer to the categories referred to in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009.

The ‘equipment, technology and software’ referred to in Article 1b is:

  • A. List of equipment
  • — Deep Packet Inspection equipment
  • — Network Interception equipment including Interception Management Equipment (IMS) and Data Retention Link Intelligence equipment
  • — Radio Frequency monitoring equipment
  • — Network and Satellite jamming equipment
  • — Remote Infection equipment
  • — Speaker recognition/processing equipment
  • — IMSI ([^E0002]), MSISDN ([^E0003]), IMEI ([^E0004]), TMSI ([^E0005]) interception and monitoring equipment
  • — Tactical SMS ([^E0006]) /GSM ([^E0007]) /GPS ([^E0008]) /GPRS ([^E0009]) /UMTS ([^E0010]) /CDMA ([^E0011]) /PSTN ([^E0012]) interception and monitoring equipment
  • — DHCP ([^E0013]) /SMTP ([^E0014]), GTP ([^E0015]) information interception and monitoring equipment
  • — Pattern Recognition and Pattern Profiling equipment
  • — Remote Forensics equipment
  • — Semantic Processing Engine equipment
  • — WEP and WPA code breaking equipment
  • — Interception equipment for VoIP proprietary and standard protocol
  • B. Not used
  • C. Not used
  • D. ‘Software’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of the equipment specified in A above.
  • E. ‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of the equipment specified in A above.

Equipment, technology and software falling within these categories is within the scope of this Annex only to the extent that it falls within the general description ‘internet, telephone and satellite communications interception and monitoring systems’.

For the purpose of this Annex ‘monitoring’ means acquisition, extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis and archiving call content or network data.

[^E0001]: Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1).

[^E0002]: IMSI stands for International Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is a unique identification code for each mobile telephony device, integrated in the SIM card and which allows identification of such SIM via GSM and UMTS networks.

[^E0003]: MSISDN stands for Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number. It is a number uniquely identifying a subscription in a GSM or a UMTS mobile network. Simply put, it is the telephone number to the SIM card in a mobile phone and therefore it identifies a mobile subscriber as well as IMSI, but to route calls through him.

[^E0004]: IMEI stands for International Mobile Equipment Identity. It is a number, usually unique to identify GSM, WCDMA and IDEN mobile phones as well as some satellite phones. It is usually found printed inside the battery compartment of the phone. interception (wiretapping) can be specified by its IMEI number as well as IMSI and MSISDN.

[^E0005]: TMSI stands for Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is the identity that is most commonly sent between the mobile and the network.

[^E0006]: SMS stands for Short Message System.

[^E0007]: GSM stands for Global System for Mobile Communications.

[^E0008]: GPS stands for Global Positioning System.

[^E0009]: GPRS stands for General Package Radio Service.

[^E0010]: UMTS stands for Universal Mobile Telecommunication System.

[^E0011]: CDMA stands for Code Division Multiple Access.

[^E0012]: PSTN stands for Public Switch Telephone Networks.

[^E0013]: DHCP stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.

[^E0014]: SMTP stands for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.

[^E0015]: GTP stands for GPRS Tunnelling Protocol.

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