Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014 of 18 November 2014 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the European Union Text with EEA relevance

Article 1

The technical specification for interoperability (TSI) relating to the ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the entire European Union, as set out in the Annex, is hereby adopted.

Article 2

The TSI shall apply to the control-command and signalling, infrastructure, energy, operation, as well as rolling stock subsystems as described in  Annex II to Directive (EU) 2016/797 (¹).

The TSI shall apply to these subsystems in accordance with Section 7 of the Annex.

Article 3

The technical and geographical scope of this Regulation is set out in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of the Annex.

Article 4

Within six months of the entry into force of this Regulation, each Member State shall notify the other Member States and the Commission of:

(a) the national rules referred to in paragraph 1;

(b) the conformity assessment and verification procedures to be carried out to apply the national rules referred to in paragraph 1;

(c) the bodies designated to carry out the conformity assessment and verification procedures for the national rules relating to the specific cases set out in point 7.3 of the Annex.

Article 5

Member States shall notify to the Commission the following types of agreement within six months of the entry into force of this Regulation:

(a) national agreements between the Member States and railway undertakings or infrastructure managers, agreed on either a permanent or a temporary basis and required by the very specific or local nature of the intended transport service;

(b) bilateral or multilateral agreements between railway undertakings, infrastructure managers or safety authorities which deliver significant levels of local or regional interoperability;

(c) international agreements between one or more Member States and at least one third country, or between railway undertakings or infrastructure managers of Member States and at least one railway undertaking or infrastructure manager of a third country, which deliver significant levels of local or regional interoperability.

Article 6

In accordance with Article 9(3) of Directive 2008/57/EC, each Member State shall communicate to the Commission within one year of the entry into force of this Regulation the list of projects being implemented within its territory and that are at an advanced stage of development.

Article 8

Article 9

Decision 2008/163/EC is repealed with effect from 1 January 2015.

It shall however continue to apply to:

(a) subsystems authorised in accordance with that Decision;

(b) projects for new, renewed or upgraded subsystems which, at the time of publication of this Regulation, are at an advanced stage of development or are the subject of a contract which is being carried out.

Article 10

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

It shall apply from 1 January 2015.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

ANNEX

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1.   Technical scope

(a) This TSI concerns the following subsystems as defined in  Directive (EU) 2016/797: control-command and signalling (‘CCS’), infrastructure (‘INF’), energy (‘ENE’), operation (‘OPE’), and rolling stock (locomotives and passenger units ‘LOC&PAS’).

(b) The purpose of this TSI is to define a coherent set of tunnel specific measures for the infrastructure, energy, rolling stock, control-command and signalling and operation subsystems, thus delivering an optimal level of safety in tunnels in the most cost-efficient way.

(c) It shall permit free movement of vehicles which are in compliance with this TSI to run under harmonised safety conditions in railway tunnels.

(d) Only measures, designed to reduce specific tunnel risks, are prescribed in the present TSI. Risks related to pure railway operation, such as derailment and collision with other trains, are addressed by general railway safety measures.

(e) The existing safety level shall not be reduced in a country as stipulated in Directive 2004/49/EC Art 4.1. Member States can retain more stringent requirements, as long as these requirements do not prevent the operation of TSI compliant trains.

(f) Member States can prescribe new and more stringent requirements for specific tunnels in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC Art 8; such requirements shall be notified to the Commission before they are introduced. Such higher requirements must be based on a risk analysis and must be justified by a particular risk situation. They shall be the result of a consultation of the Infrastructure Manager and of the relevant authorities for emergency response, and they shall be subject to a cost-benefit assessment.

(a) This TSI applies to new, renewed and upgraded tunnels which are located on the  network of the Union rail system, and which are in accordance with the definition in clause 2.4 of this TSI.

(b) Stations that are in tunnels shall be in conformity with the national rules on fire safety. When they are used as safe areas, they shall comply only with the specifications for clauses 4.2.1.5.1, 4.2.1.5.2 and 4.2.1.5.3 of this TSI. When they are used as  evacuation and rescue points, they shall comply only with the specifications of clauses 4.2.1.7 (c) and 4.2.1.7 (e) of this TSI.

(a) This TSI applies to rolling stock which is in the scope of the LOC&PAS TSI.

(b) Rolling stock categorised ‘A’ or ‘B’ according to the previous SRT TSI (Decision 2008/163/EC) shall retain its category in this TSI as defined in clause 4.2.3.

This TSI applies to the operation of all units of rolling stock which are running in tunnels described in clause 1.1.1.

When each vehicle of a freight train or dangerous goods train as defined in clause 2.4 complies with the structural TSIs which apply to it (LOC&PAS, SRT, NOI, CCS, WAG) and when the dangerous goods wagon(s) comply with Annex II of Directive 2008/68/EC, the freight train or dangerous goods train operated according to the requirements of the OPE TSI shall be allowed to circulate in all tunnels of the  network of the Union rail system.

(a) This TSI covers only specific risks to the safety of passengers and on-board staff in tunnels for the subsystems above.

(b) Where a risk analysis comes to the conclusion that other tunnel incidents might be of relevance, specific measures to deal with these scenarios shall be defined.

(a) Risks not covered by this TSI are as follows: (1) Health and safety of staff involved in maintenance of the fixed installations in tunnels. (2) Financial loss due to damage to structures and trains, and consequently the losses resulting from non-availability of the tunnel for repairs. (3) Trespass into the tunnel through the tunnel portals. (4) Terrorism, as a deliberate and premeditated act, which is designed to cause wanton destruction, injury and loss of life. (5) Risks for people in the neighbourhood of a tunnel where collapse of the structure could have catastrophic consequences.

1.2   Geographical scope

The geographical scope of this TSI is the network of the Union rail system as described in Annex I of Directive (EU) 2016/797 with the exclusion of the cases referred to in Articles 1(3) and 1(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/797.

2. DEFINITION OF ASPECT/SCOPE

2.1.   General

(a) The line of defence for the promotion of safety in tunnels comprises four successive layers: Prevention, mitigation, evacuation and rescue.

(b) The largest contribution is in the area of prevention followed by mitigation and so on.

(c) The layers of safety combine to produce a low level of residual risk.

(d) A major feature of railways is their inherent ability to prevent accidents through the traffic running on a guide-way and generally being controlled and regulated using a signalling system.

2.2.   The risk scenarios

(a) This TSI provides measures which could prevent or mitigate the difficulty of evacuation or rescue operations following a tunnel-specific railway incident.

(b) Relevant measures have been identified, which will control or significantly reduce the risks arising from the tunnel-specific incident scenarios identified above.

(c) They have been developed, in the categories prevention/mitigation/evacuation/rescue; however they do not appear under these headings in this TSI but under the headings of the concerned subsystems.

(d) The measures prescribed can be considered as a response to the following three types of incident.

(a) The main danger is fire. Fire is understood as a combination of heat, flames and smoke.

(b) The fire starts on a train. The fire is detected, either by on-board fire detectors, or by persons on-board. The driver is notified of a problem, either that there is a fire by an automatic notification or that there is a problem in general by passengers using the passenger alarm. The driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances. Ventilation is shut down to prevent smoke distribution. For rolling stock of category B, the passengers in the affected area will move to a non-affected area of the train where they are protected from fire and fumes Whenever possible the train leaves the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area in the open air. If appropriate, the train may stop at a  evacuation and rescue point inside the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area. If a fire extinguishing system can extinguish the fire, the incident will become a ‘cold’ incident.

(c) The fire starts in the tunnel. If fire starts in a tunnel or in a technical room, the driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances in compliance with the tunnel-specific incident scenarios, described in the Emergency Plan.

(a) The tunnel specific measures concentrate on access/egress facilities to support evacuation and the intervention of the emergency response services.

(b) The difference compared to the hot incidents is that there is no time constraint due to the presence of a hostile environment created by a fire.

(a) Prolonged stop (an unplanned stop in a tunnel, without the occurrence of a hot or cold incident, for longer than 10 minutes) is not by itself a threat to passengers and staff.

(b) However it may lead to  panic and to spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation that exposes people to dangers present in a tunnel environment.

The scenarios that have not been dealt with are listed in clause 1.1.4.

2.3.   The role of emergency response services

(a) The definition of the role of the emergency response services is a matter for the relevant national legislation.

(b) The measures specified in this TSI for rescue are based on the assumption that the emergency response services intervening in a tunnel incident shall protect lives as a priority.

(c) It is assumed that they are expected to: (1) In a ‘hot’ incident type — Rescue people unable to reach a safe area — Provide initial medical support to evacuees — Fight a fire insofar as required to protect themselves and people caught in the incident — Conduct evacuation from safe areas  inside the tunnel to the final place of safety (2) In a ‘cold’ incident type — Rescue people — Provide initial help to people with critical injuries — Free trapped people — Conduct evacuation to the final place of safety

(d) No demands on time or performance requirements are included in this TSI.

(e) Considering that incidents in railway tunnels involving multiple fatalities are rare, it is implicit that there might be events, with an extremely low probability, for which even well-equipped emergency response services would be restricted, such as a major fire involving a freight train.

(f) If the expectations of the emergency response services expressed in emergency plans go beyond the assumptions described above, the need for additional measures or tunnel equipment can be considered.

2.4.   Definitions

For the purpose of this TSI the following definitions are used:

(a) Railway tunnel: A railway tunnel is an excavation or a construction around the track provided to allow the railway to pass for example higher land, buildings or water. The length of a tunnel is defined as the length of the fully enclosed section, measured at rail level. A tunnel in the context of this TSI is 0.1 km or longer. Where certain requirements apply only to longer tunnels, thresholds are mentioned in the relevant clauses.

(b) Safe area: a safe area is a temporary survivable space, inside or outside the tunnel, for passengers and staff to find refuge after they have evacuated from a train.

(b1) Final place of safety: the final place of safety is the place where passengers and staff will no longer be impacted by the effects of the initial incident (e.g. smoke opacity and toxicity, temperature). It is the termination point of the evacuation.

(c) Evacuation and rescue point: an evacuation and rescue point is a defined location, inside or outside the tunnel, where fire fighting equipment can be used by the emergency response services and where passengers and staff can evacuate from a train.

(d) Technical rooms: Technical rooms are enclosed spaces with doors for access/egress inside or outside the tunnel with safety installations which are necessary for at least one of the following functions: self-rescue, evacuation, emergency communication, rescue and fire fighting, signalling and communication equipment, and traction power supply.

(e) Freight train: A freight train is a train composed of one or more locomotive(s) and one or more wagon(s). A freight train including at least one wagon carrying dangerous goods is a dangerous goods train.

(f) All definitions related to rolling stock are defined in the LOC&PAS TSI and the WAG TSI.

(g) CSM on risk assessment: this term is used to designate the Annex I of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and repealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 (OJ L 121, 3.5.2013, p. 8).

3. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

(a) The following table indicates basic parameters of this TSI and their correspondence to the essential requirements as set out and numbered in Annex III to Directive (EU) 2016/797.

(b) For meeting the essential requirements, the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 shall apply.

3.1   Infrastructure and energy subsystems

(a) In order to meet the essential requirement ‘Safety’ applying to the Infrastructure and Energy subsystems, the CSM on risk assessment may be applied as an alternative to the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.

(b) Accordingly, for the risks identified in point 1.1.4 and the scenarios listed in point 2.2, the risk can be assessed by: (1) a comparison with a reference system; (2) an explicit risk estimation and evaluation.

(c) For meeting the essential requirements other than ‘Safety’, the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 shall apply. Element of the infrastructure sub-system Ref. Clause Safety Reliability Availability Health Environmental protection Technical compatibility Accessibility Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and technical rooms 4.2.1.1. 2.1.1 Fire resistance of tunnel structures 4.2.1.2. 1.1.4 2.1.1 Fire reaction of building material 4.2.1.3. 1.1.4 2.1.1

1.3.2

1.4.2 Fire detection 4.2.1.4. 1.1.4 2.1.1 Evacuation facilities 4.2.1.5. 1.1.5 2.1.1 Escape walkways 4.2.1.6. 2.1.1 Evacuation and rescue points 4.2.1.7 except (b) 2.1.1 Evacuation and rescue points 4.2.1.7 (b)

1.5 Emergency communication 4.2.1.8. 2.1.1 Electricity supply for emergency response services 4.2.1.9 2.1.1 Reliability of electrical systems 4.2.1.10 2.1.1 Sectioning of contact line 4.2.2.1. 2.2.1 Earthing of contact line 4.2.2.2. 2.2.1

3.2   Rolling stock subsystem

(a) For meeting the essential requirements, the corresponding parameters of section 4.2.3 shall apply.

Element of the rolling stock sub-system Ref. Clause Safety Reliability Availability Health Environmental protection Technical compatibility Accessibility Measures to prevent fire 4.2.3.1 1.1.4 2.4.1

1.3.2 1.4.2 Measures to detect and control fire 4.2.3.2 1.1.4 2.4.1 Requirements related to emergencies 4.2.3.3 2.4.1 2.4.2

1.5 2.4.3 Requirements related to evacuation 4.2.3.4 2.4.1

4.1.   Introduction

(a) The  Union rail system, to which  Directive (EU) 2016/797 applies and of which the subsystems are parts, has been developed to become an integrated system for which the consistency must be verified.

(b) This consistency has been checked in relation to the development of the specifications within this TSI, its interfaces with respect to the systems in which it is integrated and also the operating rules for the railway.

(c) Taking account of all the applicable essential requirements, the basic parameters related to safety in railway tunnels are set out for the subsystems infrastructure, energy and rolling stock in section 4.2 of this TSI. The operational requirements and responsibilities are set out in the OPE TSI and in section 4.4 of this TSI.

4.2.   Functional and technical specifications of the subsystems

In the light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the functional and technical specifications of those aspects specific to tunnel safety in the above-mentioned subsystems are as follows:

This specification applies to all tunnels.

(a) Unauthorised access to technical rooms shall be prevented.

(b) Where emergency exits are locked for security purposes, it shall always be possible to open them from inside.

This specification applies to all tunnels.

(a) In the event of fire, the integrity of the tunnel lining shall be maintained for a period of time that is sufficiently long to permit self-rescue, evacuation of passengers and staff and intervention of the emergency response services. That period of time shall be in accordance with the evacuation scenarios considered and reported in the emergency plan.

This specification applies to all tunnels.