Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1953 of 29 October 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel originating in the People's Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America

• (143) In view of the above, it is concluded that measures would lead to a significant further increase in import prices beyond those already seen in the post-IP period.

Conclusion on Union interest

• (144) It is concluded that definitive measures would allow the Union producers to return to sustainable profit levels. If no measures were imposed, it would become uncertain whether the Union industry would be able to make the necessary investments to develop further its high-permeability types of the like product which are both demanded by the users and genuinely needed to make transformers EcoDesign-compliant.

• (145) As regards the interest of users, the imposition of measures at the proposed level would have a negative effect on the prices of transformers and the employment in the user's industry, but this effect can, under market circumstances as observed in the IP, not be considered as disproportionate.

• (146) Therefore, based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, it is concluded that there are no compelling reasons against the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties against imports of the product concerned originating in the five countries concerned.

• (147) Following final disclosure, several interested parties noted that the Commission pointed inter alia to the steady and significant rise of prices of all types during the post-IP period and that the Union producers returned to a profitability of 1,1 % during the period January-May 2015. Therefore, it was alleged that the imposition of duties is against the Union interest. Another user alleged that due to the rise in prices large parts of EU transformer production are currently loss-making, and in particular the SMEs, while the EU GOES industry are making comfortable profits.

• (148) Concerning the profitability of the Union producers, reference is made to recital (116). As set out in detail in recitals (149) and (169) below, the significant rise of prices has inter alia led the Commission to change the form of measures to balance the interests of all parties. Also, as already mentioned above, the Commission recalls that the injury is assessed on the basis of verified IP data, whereas post-IP data was only used in the framework of the Union interest analysis.

• (149) In view of the post-IP developments and to limit any possible serious impact on the users that are heavily dependent on the supply of the product concerned, in particular of the top end high permeability types, the Commission considered it in line with the Union interest to change the form of the measures and not to impose ad valorem duties but instead variable duties. If a duty in the form of an ad valorem duty would be imposed on top of the post-IP price increases, users would be harmed disproportionally, which would negatively impact their competitiveness vis-à-vis their competitors outside the Union in view of the increased demand and the shortage on the market of in particular high permeability types. In addition, the objective set out in the EcoDesign Regulation to ensure sufficient supply of high permeability product types, would be undermined by the imposition of measures in the form of an ad valorem duty in view of the increased demand of in particular high permeability product types.

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES Injury elimination level (Injury margin)

• (150) Following provisional and final disclosure the Union industry contested the target profit used in order to determine the injury elimination level as set out in recital (245) of the provisional Regulation. This party argued again that a pre-tax profit margin of 14 % would be a reasonable and market-related profit level based on the pre-tax net profit margin achieved by the Union industry in 2010.

• (151) As explained in recital (243) of the provisional Regulation, the profit margin used to establish the injury elimination level corresponded to the profit margin the Union industry could reasonably expect to achieve under normal conditions of competition in the absence of dumped imports. This was the percentage used during the previous investigation when the Union industry's sales were profitable. As mentioned in recital (242) of the provisional Regulation, the average profit earned in 2010 was considered exceptionally high, taking into account the losses incurred from 2011 and the booming prices, even in 2010, of GOES on the world market. Therefore, it is considered reasonable to establish the target profit margin at a level of 5 %.

• (152) A Japanese exporting producer requested to be heard by the Hearing Officer for trade proceedings. The party challenged the application by the Commission of Article 2(9) for the injury calculations, stating that Article 2(9) appears under the dumping provisions of the basic Regulation and could not be used by analogy for calculating injury. This interested party also argued that the processing costs as a result of the slitting of the full coil by a related party on the Union market should not have been deducted and that the used post-importation costs were understated. This comment was reiterated following final disclosure. A Korean exporting producer had a similar request, arguing that the free circulation price should be based on the price actually charged by its related importers in the Union to the first independent customers in the Union.

• (153) The purpose of calculating an injury margin is to determine whether applying to the export price of the dumped imports a lower duty rate than the one based on the dumping margin would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumped imports. This assessment should be based on the export price at the Union frontier level which is considered to be a level comparable to the Union industry ex-works price. In the case of export sales via related importers, by analogy with the approach followed for the dumping margin calculations, the export price is constructed on the basis of the resale price to the first independent customer duly adjusted pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. As the export price is an indispensable element in the injury margin calculation and as this Article is the only Article in the basic Regulation which gives guidance on the construction of the export price, the application of this Article by analogy is justified. Article 2(9) also provides the basis for the deduction of processing costs as adjustments for all costs, incurred between importation and resale, shall be made. Therefore, the Commission considered that the approach followed was accurate and rejected these claims.

• (154) Another Japanese exporting producer claimed that the information disclosed in the provisional disclosure does not allow commenting on the correctness and relevance of the Commission's findings of injury. In this context, on 27 May 2015 the Japanese exporting producer requested clarifications on and disclosure of certain information omitted. It also argued that the Commission's reply of 4 June 2015 failed to properly address the request and did not allow the company to comment on the correctness and relevance of the injury findings. Following final disclosure, this Japanese exporting producer reiterated its arguments and alleged that the Hearing Officer recommended to disclose further information. Secondly, the company claimed for some of its exported products in a form of a full, untrimmed coil for which the export prices represented the value of the full coil with trimmed edges, that the adjustments for physical differences to its export prices for the purpose of calculating the injury margin did not fully take into account the market value of trimmed coils (compared to untrimmed coils) and are therefore not in line with applicable rules and corresponding case law. A Korean exporting producer also argued that its rights of defence were breached since an insufficient explanation was provided on the comparison of the different product types in the provisional disclosure.

• (155) As regards first the request to disclose further information, the Commission considered that it could not be fully accepted since it is bound to protect the confidentiality of the other interested parties, in this case of Union producers. Since there are no other means to protect the confidentiality and, at the same time, to provide parties with meaningful information, the ranges as they were used in the provisional disclosure are considered by the Commission as appropriate. The disclosure was consequently providing all necessary information, balancing the right on meaningful information on the one hand and the protection of confidentiality on the other hand.

• (156) Concerning the specific comments from the Japanese exporting producer, following final disclosure, the minutes of the hearing with the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings rather refer to the diverging opinions between the Japanese exporting producer and the Commission services, leading to his recommendation to continue the discussions. The Hearing Officer in trade proceedings also suggested to verify the Commission's calculations as an alternative to disclosing confidential data. A follow-up meeting with the Japanese exporting producer was held on 30 July 2015 with the aim to clarify and provide some additional information. Furthermore, additional information (such as the target price of a certain product type, the total Union sales values and volumes) was disclosed in the final disclosure to this Japanese exporting producer. Finally, the Hearing Officer also verified the injury calculations and did not find any irregularities or errors. This was communicated by the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings to the Japanese exporting producer.

• (157) As regards second the adjustments for trimming, a reasonable adjustment could be made based on adjusting the weight (Full untrimmed coils versus Full coil with trimmed edges). Following the imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures, the level of this adjustment has been corrected though, since at the provisional stage the percentages used to adjust the weight were not fully accurate. The percentage of the yield loss which was used for making the adjustment was based on the evidence collected during the on spot investigation at the Japanese exporting producer. Following final disclosure, the Japanese exporting producer reiterated its comments.

• (158) The Commission considered that this corrected adjustment accurately reflected the difference in market value between trimmed coils and untrimmed coils. The calculation submitted by the Japanese exporting producer was not considered accurate, as the net weight of trimmed products in the calculation of the difference between average prices of trimmed and untrimmed coils was not taken into account.

• (159) The same Japanese exporting producer also argued that the provisional disclosure contained some errors. Indeed, some minor calculation errors were identified in the provisional disclosure which were corrected. As a result of these corrections and the correction explained in the previous recital, the injury margin for this Japanese company was amended to 39,0 %. As set out above, the calculations were reviewed by the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

• (160) The Russian exporting producer argued that the cost of production values of the Union industry which were used for the underselling calculations were for some product types unrealistically high, when comparing to nearly identical product types. Following final disclosure, this argument was reiterated, alleging irregularities in the Commission's undercutting and underselling calculations, and pointing to a significantly different cost of production for two similar types of the product concerned.

• (161) The Commission established however that the cost of production data of the Union industry were accurate. In particular, the two similar types, to which the Russian exporting producer referred, were analysed and compared to the cost of production of other types. Any difference in cost of production values of some product types when comparing to nearly identical product types could be explained by the different mix of Union producers producing these types.

• (162) In addition, the Russian exporting producer claimed that there is a lack of symmetry between dumping and injury calculations in terms of the treatment of non-primary grades. The claim pointed to the fact that, as set out in recital (147) of the provisional Regulation, Russian ‘second and third choice’ product concerned was not compared with Union industry ‘first and second choice’ products.

• (163) The Commission considered that the fact that, for the purposes of a fair comparison of product types, the non-primary grades were not compared to the Union industry products, did neither affect the accuracy of the dumping calculations nor the accuracy of the injury calculations. On the contrary, in the latter only similar product types were compared in order to ensure a fair comparison. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (164) The Chinese exporting producers claimed that the underselling calculations in the provisional disclosure were flawed, in particular because the calculations were allegedly based on the average Union prices that were provided in the provisional Regulation.

• (165) This claim was rejected. The Chinese exporting producer produced and sold in the Union only part of the product types, which were then compared to the same product types produced and sold by the Union producers for the purposes of the underselling calculations. No average Union prices were used in these calculations.

• (166) In the absence of any other comments regarding the injury elimination level, and apart from the change in injury margin for one Japanese producer from 34,2 % to 39 %, as set out in recital (159), the conclusions reached in recitals (241) to (246) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

Definitive measures

• (167) In view of the definitive conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, and Union interest, anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury to the Union industry resulting from the dumped exports.

• (168) Anti-dumping measures may take different forms. While the Commission has a large discretion when choosing the form of measures, the purpose remains to remove the effects of the injurious dumping. An ad valorem duty set in accordance with the lesser duty rule, ranging between 21,5 % and 39 % was established, as follows:

• (169) As set out above in recital (149), it is appropriate to change the form of the measures. On the basis of the specific facts of the case, the Commission considered that a variable duty under the form of a minimum import price (MIP) duty would be the most appropriate form of measures in this case. On the one hand, such MIP would allow the Union producers to recover from the effects of injurious dumping. It would be a safety net to enable them to return to a sustainable profitability and incentivise them to make the necessary investments to produce proportionally more of the high-permeability product types of the like product. On the other hand, such MIP should also prevent any adverse effect of undue price increases after the investigation period which could have a significant negative impact on the users' business. It would also accommodate the concerns of users as they fear a shortage of the product concerned, in particular types with a maximum core loss of 0,90 W/kg and below which are highly needed to meet the tier 1 efficiency targets of the EcoDesign Regulation. More generally, it would prevent serious disturbances in the supply of the Union market.

• (170) Where imports are made at a CIF Union border price equal to or above the MIP established, no duty would be payable. If imports are made at a price below the MIP, the definitive duty should be equal to the difference between the applicable MIP and the net free at Union frontier price, before duty. In no event should the amount of the duty be higher than the ad valorem duty rates set in recital (168) and in Article 1 of this Regulation.

• (171) Accordingly, if imports are made at a price below the MIP, the lower of the difference between the applicable MIP and the net free at Union frontier price, before duty, and the ad valorem duty rates as detailed in the last column of the table in recital (168) would be payable.

• (172) As set out in detail in recital (19) above, the investigation covered the product concerned, as defined in recital (9) and therefore one comprehensive injury analysis, causation analysis and Union interest analysis was carried out. At the same time, when deciding about the form of the measure, the Commission considered the differences in quality as follows. For the purposes of the effective application of the MIP, and on the basis of the information collected during the investigation, the Commission decided to establish three different categories of the product concerned that are distinguished on the basis of their maximum core loss. A separate MIP was calculated for each of the three categories. The three categories are as follows:

• —Types with a maximum core loss not higher than 0,90 W/kg;

• —Types with a maximum core loss higher than 0,90 W/kg but not higher than 1,05 W/kg;

• —Types with a maximum core loss higher than 1,05 W/kg.

• (173) Types with a maximum core loss of 0,90 W/kg and below are the top subsection of the high permeability types of the product concerned. Types with a core loss higher than 0,90 W/kg up to and including 1,05 W/kg are not the top end but still high permeability types of the product concerned, which are mainly produced up to a maximum core loss of 1,05 W/kg. It also includes some of the better qualities of the conventional types of the product concerned. Types with a maximum core loss higher than 1,05 W/kg are mainly the conventional types of the product concerned. The core loss should be measured in Watts per kilogram at a frequency of 50 Hz and a magnetic induction of 1,7 Tesla.

• (174) A non-injurious price, or non-injurious MIP, had to be established in order to apply this rule. For the purpose of calculating the non-injurious price, account has been taken both of the dumping margins found and of the amounts of duties necessary to eliminate the injury sustained by Union industry as set out in the provisional Regulation.

• (175) The MIPs are equal to the weighted average of:

• —Where duties are based on the injury elimination level: the cost of production during the investigation period of the Union producers and a profit (5 %) as regards the USA, Japanese, Russian and one Chinese exporting producer(s) and;

• —Where duties are based on the dumping margin: the normal value, including transport (to arrive at a CIF border Union price) as regards the Korean and one Chinese exporting producer.

• (176) Based on this methodology, the MIPs are set at the following levels

• (177) Following final disclosure, the following comments were made by interested parties.

• (178) First, a user association alleged that the MIP proposal creates a market distortion, by decoupling the price levels in the Union from the world prices. This user association claimed that the Commission was locking the prices on all types of GOES at a level significantly higher than the average price levels that the Commission had calculated for the IP plus the duty levels established in the provisional Regulation. This association did not see any legitimate need for measures. The association also alleged that the MIPs were too high, and therefore should be adapted by reducing them on a yearly basis by 5 %.

• (179) Second, the Korean exporting producer also welcomed the proposal of a MIP which was considered to be more appropriate than ad valorem duties. Nevertheless, this exporting producer claimed that the Commission should revise its methodology and impose for each exporting producer MIPs that are set no higher than what is necessary to remove injurious dumping caused by the (Korean) exporting producer.

• (180) Third, another user alleged that the proposed MIPs are too high and in any case higher than the import prices during the IP period plus the ad valorem duty rates set in the final disclosure, at least for two of the countries (Korea and Russia) concerned. Moreover, this user alleged that the Commission should not accept all of the production costs as a basis for calculating the non-injurious level but rather accept any costs which would be borne by an effective and competitive GOES producer.

• (181) Fourth, another user commented that it appreciated the choice of a minimum import price duty instead of ad valorem duties. However, it requested the Commission to consider establishing one or two MIP levels. In the case of two levels, the separation should reasonably be at the approximate cut-off point between conventional GOES and high permeability types.

• (182) Fifth, the Union Industry supported a system of MIPs based upon the three product categories. However, the Union Industry opposed the methodology used for calculating these MIPs, since the result of the Commission's weighted average method was that the proposed MIPs are below the full injury elimination level and as such set at a too low level. It also claimed that the currently proposed MIPs are currently far below current market prices in the EU and third countries. Therefore, the Commission should revise its MIP calculations and base them entirely on the injury elimination levels for all exporting producers by adding a reasonable profit (for each type of the product concerned falling within the relevant product). Furthermore, the Union Industry reiterated its comment that the Commission should use a 14 % target profit which was the profit from the year 2010.

• (183) Sixth, the American exporting producer expressed serious doubts as to the usefulness and adequateness of the Commission's MIPs proposal in view of the fact that market prices of the relevant product are currently much higher than the MIPs.

• (184) Seventh, another user stated that it rather supports the imposition of minimum import price (MIP) on the whole product scope as a compromise solution to accommodate the conflicting demands of the GOES and transformer industries. This user stated though that the MIPs are too high (in particular for the second and third category, when comparing to the IP sales prices, on which the ad valorem duties were added) and create a concrete danger for the Union transformer industry that it will have to pay duties before the Union industry is able to supply its needs.

• (185) Eight, the Russian exporting producer welcomed the proposal of the Commission to adopt a variable anti-dumping duty in the form of a MIP, instead of ad valorem duties. However, this exporting producer alleged that the currently proposed methodology of calculating three different MIPs (only based on different ranges of maximum core loss) without distinguishing neither between individual exporting producers nor between individual countries of origin, is in breach of article 9(5) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, this exporting producer claimed that this method does not assess anti-dumping duties at an ‘appropriate amount’, and discriminated against imports from Russia. Similarly, the Russian exporting producer also requested that the Commission should create a fourth category of the product for the purposes of the minimum import price calculation, which should contain exclusively off-grade or subgrade types of the product concerned with physical characteristics comparable to those of the ‘second’ and ‘third choice’ exported types. The Russian exporting producer alleged that the MIPs, based exclusively on maximum core loss, would leave the Russian producer, and ultimately Russia as the only source of supplies of ‘second’ and ‘third choice’ exported types, in a substantially different position from any of the exporting countries concerned.

• (186) The Commission analysed in detail all comments made, will further explain below the methodology used in view of these comments, and came to the following conclusions.

• (187) The methodology used by the Commission to calculate the three MIPs was the following. Like in any anti-dumping investigation, the Commission collected data for the IP, which were verified, in order to establish normal values per product type and non-injurious target prices for the Union Industry, also per product type. The target prices for the Union industry consisted of the cost of production to which a reasonable profit was added. On the basis of these data, the methodology as set out in recital (169) and following was applied. The levels of the MIPs are therefore directly based on verified data for the IP. In addition, the lesser duty rule was taken into account. Where the ad valorem duties were based on the dumping margin, the normal values, to which transport costs were added to arrive at a CIF border Union price, were used in the calculation of the MIPs. Where the ad valorem duties were based on the injury elimination level, the non-injurious target price for the Union industry was used. The MIPs were then calculated as a weighted average of the normal values and non-injurious target prices used. The weighing factor was established on the basis of the proportion of the volume of the imports to the Union from the companies where the ad valorem duty is based on the dumping margins and on the proportion of the volume of the imports from the companies where the ad valorem duty is based on the injury elimination level. Each MIP is a weighted average of the prices (normal value and target prices) of the different product types within each of the three product categories.

• (188) The three MIPs for the three different product categories apply to all exporting producers and to all countries concerned, if the CIF Union border price is equal to or above the MIP (in which case no duty is payable). When duties are payable, i.e. when export prices are below the MIP, the applicable duty rate would be the lower of the difference between the applicable MIP and the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty and the ad valorem duty rates. Accordingly, individual duties apply to each exporting producer. In no event should the amount of the duty be higher than the ad valorem duty rates which are specific for each individual exporting producer of each country concerned. An alternative scenario, as suggested by several interested parties, would have been the introduction of different MIPs per exporting producer. However, this would mean at least 21 different MIPs (i.e. three 3 MIPs for the three different categories times the seven cooperating exporting producers), which would render the implementation of the measures very difficult, if not impractical, for customs authorities.

• (189) The MIPs were subsequently compared to the sales prices during the post IP period on the Union market. Data on these prices were obtained from the users and from the Union industry during the investigation following the provisional disclosure, as set out in recitals (5) and (6). This investigation revealed that overall the proposed MIPs, particularly the one for the high grades, for the three different product categories are below the post IP sales prices, in which case no duty would be payable. As set out in recitals (182) and (183), this finding of the investigation was corroborated by the statements of the Union industry, several users and the American exporting producer.

• (190) In view of the above, the Commission rejected all claims with regard to the methodology used and the level of the MIPs.

• (191) Concerning the allegation that the Commission is locking the prices, the Commission recalls that it has set three MIPs for three different product categories to remove the effects of injurious dumping and to prevent users from any adverse effect of undue price increases after the investigation period, as set out in recital (169) above. The Commission is not creating a market distortion for Union market prices which are generally above the proposed MIPs, as explained in recital (189). Moreover, the MIPs are not floor prices, so exporting producers, if they wish so, can still sell at prices below the MIPs. Therefore, exporting and Union producers still can compete with each other by differentiating their prices from each other, irrespective of the set MIPs.

• (192) Concerning the allegation that (one or) two MIPs would have been more appropriate than the three proposed MIPs, the Commission noted the objective price difference (about 170 euro per tonne, see recital (176) for the first and the second product category, all consisting of high permeability types of the product concerned. By having only 2 MIPs with a cut-off point between conventional and high permeability types of the product concerned, the price of the first product category (i.e. product types with a maximum core loss not higher than 0,9 W/kg) would basically be combined with the price of the second product category, which mainly consists also of high permeability types of the product concerned, though with a higher maximum core loss. If such a methodology would have been followed, the MIP of the top quality high permeability product types would become proportionally understated. Concerning the allegations that no individual duties apply to each exporting producer, reference is made to recital (187) above, which describes the methodology whereby individual duties apply in case an ad valorem duty has to be paid.

• (193) Concerning the allegation that the Commission should not accept all of the production costs as a basis for calculating the non-injurious level, but rather any costs borne by an effective and competitive producer, it is recalled that the calculation was based on verified data. In addition, as this claim was not substantiated and no alternative methodology was provided how such adjustment to the cost of production should be made, the Commission rejected it.

• (194) The suggestion to reduce every year the MIP by 5 % would not be in line with the objective of removing injurious dumping. Furthermore, no evidence was provided which would justify such reduction of 5 % annually.

• (195) Concerning the request to create a fourth product category, containing exclusively off-grade or subgrade types of the product concerned, the Commission considered that no clear benchmark is available to apply such further split. Also, the MIPs are based on a mixture of product types, irrespective of whether they were full or slit for example, and also irrespective of whether they were downgraded or not. The three different product categories are based on maximum core loss, which is an objective non-discriminatory criterion.

• (196) Two users also requested to limit the duration of the measures to a period shorter than five years, alleging that a safety net of more than 2-3 years is not required to provide the EU GOES industry with a sufficient incentive to invest into the production of high grade GOES.

• (197) However, the users did not substantiate their claim that a relatively short period of 2-3 years would be sufficient to invest and to achieve at least some return on investment. As set out in Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, a definitive anti-dumping duty shall expire five year from its imposition.

• (198) In case of a change of market circumstances, the basic Regulation provides several options. If the change is lasting, Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation provides that a review of the need for a continued imposition of measures can be requested, provided that a reasonable period of time of at least one year has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive measure. If the change is temporary, pursuant to Article 14 (4) of the basic Regulation measures may be suspended where market conditions have temporarily changed to an extent that the injury would unlikely to resume as a result of the suspension. The Commission will assess expeditiously the merits of any duly motivated request made under one of those two provisions, so as to maintain a balanced level of protection against injurious dumping.

• (199) Finally, the claim of the Russian exporting producer that the MIP should not be exclusively based on core loss_ was not accepted for the following reason. Maximum core loss is an objective criterion to distinguish different types of the product concerned from each other, whereas the distinction between first and second quality types of the product concerned is rather a very subjective assessment, which would complicate any monitoring of the implementation of the measures. Furthermore, the MIP does distinguish between individual exporting producers and the countries concerned, as set out in detail in recital (187) above.

• (200) The individual company anti-dumping measures specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflected the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These measures are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the measures applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping measures.

• (201) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping measures if it changes the name of its entity or sets up a new production or sales entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission ([^E0006]). The request must contain all the relevant information, including modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, the name change or the change in the production and sales entities. The Commission will update the list of companies with individual anti-dumping measures, if justified.

• (202) In order to minimise the risks of circumvention, it is considered that special measures are needed in this case to ensure the proper application of the anti-dumping measures. These special measures include the following: the presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice and a valid mill certificate which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Articles of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by such an invoice and a mill certificate shall be made subject to the applicable ad valorem duty rate for all other companies without reference to the minimum import prices.

• (203) Should a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation take place, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated and, provided the conditions are met, ad valorem duties may be imposed.

• (204) Furthermore, in order to best guard against any possible absorption of the measures, particularly between related companies, the Commission will immediately initiate a review under Article 12(1) of the basic Regulation and may subject importations to registration in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation, should any evidence of such behaviour be provided.

No collection of the provisional duties

• (205) The provisional duties in the form of ad valorem duties ranging between 21,6 % and 35,9 % for the imports of the product concerned which applied during the period from 13 May 2015 to 13 November 2015 shall not be collected. The Commission considered that, in the specific circumstances of the case, collection of the provisional duties, that took a different form from the definitive duties, would not be in line with the Union interest, given that prices during this period were generally above those of the established MIPs.

• (206) All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties. They were also granted a period of time within which they could make representations following this disclosure. The comments submitted by other parties were duly considered but were not such as to change the conclusions.

UNDERTAKINGS

• (207) The Russian and the Korean exporting producer offered price undertakings in accordance with Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation. The Korean exporting producer subsequently withdrew its undertaking offer.

• (208) The Russian exporting producer exports two types of GOES (‘prime’ and ‘non-prime’ types, the latter with e.g. surface defects) all falling within the lowest product range (products with a maximum core loss higher than 1,05 W/kg). Within this product category, it requested two MIPs in addition to those established for the duty, to make a distinction between the two types of the product concerned it is exporting to the Union. The Russian exporting producer has a number of related companies in the Union, though it sold so far the product concerned exclusively via its related trader in Switzerland.

• (209) The Commission assessed this offer, against the background of the form of the measures, i.e. MIPs that were established for three categories of product types, applicable to all exporting producers from all countries concerned, as set out above in recitals (175) and (176). The undertaking offer differs substantially from this approach and would require a company specific measure.

• (210) The distinction between prime and non-prime products appeared to be highly subjective for the purpose of implementing measures as it is proposed to distinguish the two product types with reference to a Russian standard. The Commission considered that this makes the undertaking impracticable, even more so as this standard would be additional to the distinction between product types based on core loss.

• (211) Moreover, the multitude of product types (its entire product range of the product concerned) it is selling in the Union as well as its company structure makes the offer difficult to monitor for the Commission services, in particular against the background of the form of the measures, i.e. the overall MIPs that were established for the three categories of product types instead of the more common ad valorem duties. Finally, in this particular case, the overall Union interest and the impact on the users have already been taken into consideration by the overall MIPs as set out in detail in recitals (149) and (169). So this constitutes another reason for rejecting the offered price undertaking.

• (212) On the basis of the above, and for reasons of general policy, the Commission rejected the undertaking offer of the Russian exporting producer.

• (213) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation did not deliver an opinion.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 763/2015 shall be released.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

ANNEX I

A declaration signed by an official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice, in the following format, must appear on the valid commercial invoice referred to in Article 1(6):

• —The name and function of the official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice.

• —The following declaration: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) and (core loss) of the grain oriented electrical steel sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’

Date and signature

ANNEX II

A declaration signed by an official of the entity issuing the mill certificate, in the following format, must appear on the valid mill certificate referred to in Article 1(6):

• —The name and function of the official of the entity issuing the mill certificate.

• —The following declaration: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the grain oriented electrical steel sold for export to the European Union covered by the mill certificate, showing the measurement of the maximum core loss in Watts per kilogram at a frequency of 50 Hz and a magnetic induction of 1,7 Tesla, and the size in mm was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this mill certificate is complete and correct.’

Date and signature

[^E0001]: OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

[^E0002]: Commission Regulation (EU) No 2015/763 of 12 May 2015 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (‘GOES’) originating in the People's Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation (‘Russia’) and the United States of America (OJ L 120, 13.5.2015, p. 10).

[^E0003]: Judgment of the General Court of 25 October 2011 in case No. T-192/08. Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ AO, paragraph 221.

[^E0004]: OJ L 160, 19.6.2007, p. 32, recital (20)

[^E0005]: OJ L 160, 19.6.2007, p. 31, recital (15).

[^E0006]: European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, 1049 Brussels, Belgium.