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Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons

Type Decision
Publication 2018-10-16
Last updated 2026-07-03
State In force
Department Council of the European Union
Source EUR-Lex
articles 9
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Article 1

‘Chemical weapons’ means chemical weapons as defined in Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Article 2

1.

Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:

as listed in the Annex.

2.

Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.

3.

Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:

4.

Paragraph 3 shall be considered as applying also in cases where a Member State is host country of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

5.

The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.

6.

Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings and those promoted or hosted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of the restrictive measures, including implementing the legal prohibitions against chemical weapons and the achievement of chemical weapons disarmament. Member States may also grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process.

7.

A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 6 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council members raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.

8.

Where, pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 6 or 7 a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through its territory of persons listed in the Annex, the authorisation shall be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons directly concerned thereby.

Article 3

1.

All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by:

as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.

2.

No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex.

3.

By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authority of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as it deems appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph.

4.

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph.

5.

Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a natural or legal person, an entity or body listed in the Annex from making a payment due under a contract entered into prior to the date on which such natural or legal person, entity or body was listed therein, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, received by a natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1.

6.

Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.

7.

Paragraph 2 shall not apply to organisations and agencies which are pillar-assessed by the Union and with which the Union has signed a financial framework partnership agreement on the basis of which the organisations and agencies act as humanitarian partners of the Union, provided that the provision of the funds or economic resources referred to in paragraph 2 is necessary for exclusively humanitarian purposes.

8.

In cases not covered by paragraph 7, and by way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of a Member State may grant specific or general authorisations, under such general or specific conditions as they deem appropriate, to release certain frozen funds or economic resources or to make available certain funds or economic resources, provided that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary for exclusively humanitarian purposes.

9.

In the absence of a negative decision, a request for information or a notification for additional time from the relevant competent authority within five working days of the date of receipt of a request for authorisation under paragraph 8, that authorisation shall be considered granted.

10.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under paragraphs 8 or 9 within two weeks of such authorisation.

Article 4

1.

The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish and amend the list in the Annex.

2.

The Council shall communicate the decision referred to in paragraph 1, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.

3.

Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review the decision referred to in paragraph 1 and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly.

Article 5

1.

The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

2.

The Annex shall also contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

Article 6

No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

Article 7

In order to maximise the impact of the measures set out in this Decision, the Union shall encourage third States to adopt restrictive measures similar to those provided for in this Decision.

Article 8

1.

This Decision shall apply until 16 October 2026. This Decision shall be kept under constant review.

2.

The exceptions referred to in Article 3(7), (8) and (9) as regards Article 3(1) and (2) shall be reviewed at regular intervals, and at least every 12 months, or at the urgent request of any Member State, of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or of the Commission, following a fundamental change in circumstances.

Article 9

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

ANNEX

A. NATURAL PERSONS

Name Identifying information Grounds for designation Date of listing
1. Tariq YASMINA a.k.a.: Tarq YasminaImage omitted; see official source Gender: male; Title: Colonel; Nationality: Syrian Tariq Yasmina acts as the liaison officer between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the Presidential Palace, and, as such, is involved in the use and preparations for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. 21.1.2019
2. Khaled NASRI a.k.a.: Mohammed Khaled Nasri; Haled Natsri;Image omitted; see official source Image omitted; see official source Gender: male; Title: Head of Institute 1000 of the SSRC; Nationality: Syrian Khaled Nasri is the Director of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. 21.1.2019
3. Walid ZUGHAIB a.k.a.: Zughib, Zgha'ib, Zughayb;Image omitted; see official source Title: Doctor, Head of Institute 2000 of the SSRC; Gender: male; Nationality: Syrian Walid Zughaib is the Director of Institute 2000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for mechanical development and production for Syria's chemical weapons programme. 21.1.2019
4. Firas AHMED a.k.a.: Ahmad;Image omitted; see official source Title: Colonel, Head of Security Office at Institute 1000 of the SSRC; Gender: male; Date of birth: 21 January 1967; Nationality: Syrian Firas Ahmed is the Director of the Security Office of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. He was involved in transferring and concealing chemical weapons related materials following Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 21.1.2019
5. Said SAID a.k.a.: Saeed, Sa’id Sa’id,Image omitted; see official source Title: Doctor, member of Institute 3000 (a.k.a. Institute 6000) of the SSRC; Gender: male; Date of birth: 11 December 1955 Said Said is a significant figure in Institute 3000 a.k.a. Institute 6000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) that is responsible for developing and producing Syria’s chemical weapons. 21.1.2019
6. Anatoliy Vladimirovich CHEPIGA Анатолий Владимирович ЧЕПИГА, a.k.a.: Ruslan BOSHIROV Gender: male; Dates of birth: 5 April 1979; 12 Apr 1978; Places of Birth: Nikolaevka, Amur Oblast, Russia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan GRU Officer Anatoliy Chepiga (a.k.a. Ruslan Boshirov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent (‘Novichok’). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Ruslan Boshirov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. 21.1.2019
7. Alexander Yevgeniyevich MISHKIN Александр Евгеньевич МИШКИН, a.k.a.: Alexander PETROV Gender: male; Date of birth:13 July 1979; Places of Birth: Loyga, Russia; Kotlas, Russia GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent (‘Novichok’). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. 21.1.2019
8. Vladimir Stepanovich ALEXSEYEV Владимир Степанович АЛЕКСЕЕВ Gender: male; Title: First Deputy Head of the GRU Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev is the First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU). Given his senior leadership role in the GRU, Alexseyev is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent ‘Novichok’ by officers from the GRU. 21.1.2019
9. Igor Olegovich KOSTYUKOV Игорь Олегович КОСТЮКОВ Gender: male; Title: Head of the GRU Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, given his senior leadership role as First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU) at that time, is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent ‘Novichok’ by officers from the GRU. 21.1.2019
10. Andrei Veniaminovich YARIN (Андрей Вениаминович ЯРИН) Gender: male; Date of birth: 13 February 1970; Place of birth: Nizhny Tagil; Nationality: Russian; Title: Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate Andrei Yarin is Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office in the Russian Federation. In this function, he is in charge of designing and implementing internal political orientations. Andrei Yarin was also appointed to a task force inside the Presidential Executive Office whose role was to counter Alexei Navalny’s influence in Russian society including through operations meant to discredit him. Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition. Alexei Navalny’s activities were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Andrei Yarin is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 15.10.2020
11. Sergei Vladilenovich KIRIYENKO (Сергей Владиленович КИРИЕНКО) Gender: male; Date of birth: 26 July 1962; Place of birth: Sukhumi; Nationality: Russian; Title: First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Kiriyenko is the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation. In this function, he is responsible for domestic affairs, including political groups and activities. Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition. Alexei Navalny’s activities were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. Given his senior leadership role in that Office, Sergei Kiriyenko is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 15.10.2020
12. Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO (Сергей Иванович МЕНЯЙЛО) Gender: male; Date of birth: 22 August 1960; Place of birth: Alagir; Nationality: Russian; Title: Head of North Ossetia-Alania. Sergei Menyailo is the Head of North Ossetia-Alania. He was the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District between 2016 and April 2021. In that capacity he was responsible for ensuring the implementation of the constitutional powers of the President including the implementation of domestic and foreign policy of the State. Sergei Menyailo was a member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation until August 2021. Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition. 15.10.2020
Alexei Navalny’s activities were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. In those circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office.
Given his senior leadership role as the former representative of that Office in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo is therefore responsible for inducing and providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
13. Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV (Александр Васильевич БОРТНИКОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 15 November 1951; Place of birth: Perm; Nationality: Russian; Title: Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Bortnikov is the Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and in this capacity he is responsible for the activities of the principal security agency in Russia. Alexei Navalny has been the target of systematic harassment and repression by State and judicial actors in the Russian Federation due to his prominent role in the political opposition. Alexei Navalny’s activities were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation during his journey to Siberia in August 2020. On 20 August 2020, he was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. In these circumstances and taking into account that Alexei Navalny was under surveillance at the time of his poisoning, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning was only possible with the involvement of the Federal Security Service. Given his senior leadership role in the Federal Security Service, Aleksandr Bortnikov is therefore responsible for providing support to the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 15.10.2020
14. Pavel Anatolievich POPOV (Павел Анатольевич ПОПОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 01 January 1957; Place of Birth: Krasnoyarsk; Nationality: Russian; Title: Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Pavel Popov is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and in this capacity he has overall responsibility for research activities. This includes the oversight and development of the Ministry’s scientific and technical capabilities, including the development of potential and modernisation of existing weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. On 20 August 2020, Alexei Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. As a consequence of the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Defence for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons, the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation could only be as a result of intent or negligence by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership. Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Pavel Popov is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 15.10.2020
15. Aleksei Yurievich KRIVORUCHKO (Алексей Юрьевич КРИВОРУЧКО) Gender: male; Date of birth: 17 July 1975; Place of Birth: Stavropol; Nationality: Russian; Title: Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Aleksei Krivoruchko is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation with the overall responsibility for armaments. This includes the oversight of the Ministry’s stocks of weapons and military equipment. He is also responsible for their elimination within the framework of the implementation of international treaties assigned to the Ministry of Defence. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. On 20 August 2020, Alexei Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. As a consequence of the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Defence for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons, the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation could only be as a result of intent or negligence by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership. Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Aleksei Krivoruchko is therefore responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 15.10.2020
16. Alexey Alexandrovich ALEXANDROV (Алексей Александрович АЛЕКСАНДРОВ) a.k.a. Alexey Andreevich FROLOV (Алексей Андреевич ФРОЛОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 16.6.1981 or 16.6.1980; Nationality: Russian Alexey Alexandrov is an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative. In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Alexey Alexandrov was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
17. Vladimir Alexandrovich PANYAEV (Владимир Александрович ПАНЯЕВ) a.k.a. Vladimir ALEXEEV (Владимир АЛЕКСЕЕВ) a.k.a. Vladimir ALEXEYEV (Владимир АЛЕКСЕЕВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 25.11.1980; Place of birth: Serdobsk, Russian Federation; Nationality: Russian Vladimir Panyaev is an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative. In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Vladimir Panyaev was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
18. Ivan Vladimirovich OSIPOV (Иван Владимирович ОСИПОВ) a.k.a. Ivan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOV (Иван Васильевич СПИРИДОНОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 21.8.1976 or 21.8.1975; Nationality: Russian Ivan Osipov is an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative. In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Ivan Osipov was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
19. Artur Aleksandrovich ZHIROV (Артур Александрович ЖИРОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 6.7.1961; Nationality: Russian Artur Zhirov is a chemical weapons expert and Director of SC Signal, a research institute that has been linked to Russia’s chemical weapons program. As Director of SC Signal, Artur Zhirov provided technical support to operations against Yulia Navalnaya and Alexei Navalny that took place in Kaliningrad on 6 July 2020 and to the planning of the subsequent poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Artur Zhirov was engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
20. Kirill Yurievich VASILIEV (Кирилл Юрьевич ВАСИЛЬЕВ) a.k.a. Kirill VASILYEV (Кирилл ВАСИЛЬЕВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 22.2.1973; Nationality: Russian; Tax-ID No.: 773721109701 (Russia) General Kirill Vasiliev is the Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which conducted operations to closely monitor the activities of Alexei Navalny over a long period of time, including during his journey to Tomsk where he was poisoned with a Novichok-type nerve on 20 August 2020. That poisoning constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Kirill Vasiliev, in his capacity as Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the FSB, provided the operational framework and direction to conduct the surveillance and the assassination attempt against Alexei Navalny. Therefore, he was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons, he is responsible for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
21. Konstantin Borisovich KUDRYAVTSEV (Константин Борисович КУДРЯВЦЕВ) a.k.a. Konstantin Yevgenievich SOKOLOV (Константин Евгеньевич СОКОЛОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 28.4.1980 or 28.4.1981; Nationality: Russian Konstantin Kudryavtsev is a chemical weapons expert and an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative. In that capacity, he was directly involved in the preparations for and the clean-up operations of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve agent in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Furthermore, he admitted to his involvement in at least one other poisoning attempt against Navalny in 2017. Therefore, Konstantin Kudryavtsev was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons as well as in the use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
22. Stanislav Valentinovich MAKSHAKOV (Станислав Валентинович МАКШАКОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 1966; Nationality: Russian Stanislav Makshakov is a military scientist and Deputy Director of the Criminalistics Institute of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which conducted operations to closely monitor the activities of Alexei Navalny over a long period of time. In his capacity as Deputy Director of the Criminalistics Institute, Stanislav Makshakov was the commander of the team of operatives involved in the preparations and execution of the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a Novichok-type nerve in Tomsk on 20 August 2020, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, Stanislav Makshakov was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons, he is responsible for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
23. Vladimir Mikhaylovich BOGDANOV (Владимир Михайлович БОГДАНОВ) Gender: male; Date of birth: 17.7.1958; Place of birth: Moscow, Russian Federation; Nationality: Russian Vladimir Bogdanov is the Head of Special Technology Centre of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is the parent entity of the Criminalistics Institute. In that capacity, Vladimir Bogdanov oversees and controls the activities of those entities. The FSB conducted operations to closely monitor the activities of Alexei Navalny over a long period of time, including during his journey to Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned with a Novichok-type nerve on 20 August 2020. That poisoning constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Vladimir Bogdanov, in his capacity as the Head of Special Technology Centre of the FSB, provided the operational framework and direction to conduct the surveillance and the assassination attempt against Alaxey Navalny. Therefore, he was involved in preparations for the use of chemical weapons, he is responsible for the use of chemical weapons and he provided technical and material support for using chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
24. Chadi HOURANIEH Gender: male; Date of birth: 29.5.1979; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Canadian Chadi Houranieh is the co-owner of MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co company, which operates in the metals industry and supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used in the manufacture of chemical weapons delivery systems. Therefore, Chadi Houranieh is responsible for providing material support for manufacturing chemical weapons and is engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and thus contributes to the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
25. Mohammad Nazier HOURANIEH Gender: male; Date of birth: 6.5.1976; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Canadian Mohammad Nazier Houranieh is the co-owner of MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co company, which operates in the metals industry and supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used in the manufacture of chemical weapons delivery systems. Therefore, Mohammad Nazier Houranieh is responsible for providing material support for manufacturing chemical weapons and is engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and thus contributes to the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
26. Igor Yuryevich BABKIN (Игорь Юрьевич БАБКИН) Gender: male DOB: 19.4.1978 POB: Cherkasy region, USSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian INN: 770170119783 Function: head of laboratory at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal, INN 7718813855) Igor Babkin is a scientist within the military sphere and head of laboratory at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal). Babkin previously worked with the chemical, radiological and biological defence structures within the Russian Ministry of Defence, including the 27th Scientific Centre and the Military Academy for Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence. Babkin led a group of researchers at the Signal Scientific Centre that researched and published articles on the synthesis of epibatidine, which was found in Alexei Navalny after his death. He is therefore involved in the development of epibatidine as a chemical weapon. Therefore, Igor Babkin is involved in the development of chemical weapons. Furthermore, he is associated with Artur Aleksandrovich Zhirov, who is the Director of SC Signal. 3.7.2026
27. Sergey Yevgenyevich GALAN (Сергей Евгеньевич ГАЛАН) Gender: male DOB: 13.6.1970 POB: Kramatorsk, USSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian Function: senior scientist at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal, INN 7718813855) Sergey Galan is a senior scientist within the military sphere working at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal). Galan previously worked with the chemical, radiological and biological defence structures within the Russian Ministry of Defence, including the 27th Scientific Centre, the State Scientific-Research Institute for Experimental Medicine and the Research Institute for Applied Acoustics. Together with colleagues at the Signal Scientific Centre, he has researched and published articles on the synthesis of epibatidine, which was found in Alexei Navalny after his death. He is therefore involved in the development of epibatidine as a chemical weapon. Therefore, Sergey Galan is involved in the development of chemical weapons. Furthermore, he is associated with Artur Aleksandrovich Zhirov, who is the Director of SC Signal. 3.7.2026
28. Irina Dmitriyevna DEREVYAGINA (Ирина Дмитриевна ДЕРЕВЯГИНА) Gender: female DOB: 24.3.1961 Nationality: Russian INN: 772815862404 Function: chemical research analyst at the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) Irina Derevyagina is a chemical research analyst at Russia’s State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT). She authored two research papers on the clinical applications and testing of epibatidine, which was found in Alexei Navalny after his death. She is therefore involved in the development of epibatidine as a chemical weapon. Therefore, Irina Derevyagina is involved in the development of chemical weapons. 3.7.2026
29. Mikhail Vasilyevich GUTSALYUK (Михаил Васильевич ГУЦАЛЮК) Gender: male DOB: 2.3.1968 Nationality: Russian INN: 460501189420 Function: colonel and head of the department for organising scientific work and preparing scientific and pedagogical staff for the Military Academy for Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Mikhail Gutsalyuk is a colonel and head of the department for organising scientific work and preparing scientific and pedagogical staff at the Military Academy for Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence. Together with chemists from the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal), he has conducted research on the synthesis of epibatidine, which was found in Alexei Navalny after his death. He is therefore involved in the development of epibatidine as a chemical weapon. Therefore, Mikhail Gutsalyuk is involved in the development of chemical weapons. Furthermore, he is associated with Artur Aleksandrovich Zhirov, who is the Director of SC Signal. 3.7.2026
30. Olga Petrovna YUDINA (Ольга Петровна ЮДИНА) Gender: female DOB: 24.11.1986 Nationality: Russian INN: 462601484461 Function: senior researcher at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal, INN 7718813855) Olga Yudina is a senior researcher at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal). She also receives a salary from the Research Institute for Applied Acoustics, which has been involved in procuring materials that could be used in the production of chemical weapon agents. Together with colleagues at the Signal Scientific Centre, she has researched and published articles on the synthesis of epibatidine, which was found in Alexei Navalny after his death. She is therefore involved in the development of epibatidine as a chemical weapon. Therefore, Olga Yudina is involved in the development of chemical weapons. Furthermore, she is associated with Artur Aleksandrovich Zhirov, who is the Director of SC Signal 3.7.2026
31. Aleksey Vadimovich AKSYONOV (Алексей Вадимович АКСЕНОВ) Gender: male DOB: 8.10.1978 Nationality: Russian INN: 366217317327 Function: researcher at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal, INN 7718813855) Aleksey Aksyonov is a researcher at the Signal Scientific Centre (also known as SC Signal). Together with colleagues at the Signal Scientific Centre, he has researched and published articles on the synthesis of epibatidine, which was found in Alexei Navalny after his death. He is therefore involved in the development of epibatidine as a chemical weapon. Therefore, Aleksey Aksyonov is involved in the development of chemical weapons. Furthermore, he is associated with Artur Aleksandrovich Zhirov, who is the Director of SC Signal. 3.7.2026
Name Identifying information Grounds for designation Date of listing
1. Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) a.k.a.: Centre d'Études et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS), Centre de Recherche de Kaboun Address: Barzeh Street, Po Box 4470, Damascus The Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) is the Syrian regime's principal entity for the development of chemical weapons. The SSRC is responsible for the development and production of chemical weapons, as well as the missiles to deliver them, operating at a number of sites in Syria. 21.1.2019
2. State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) (Государственный научно-исследовательский институт органической химии и технологии) Address: Shosse Entuziastov 23, 11124 Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Russia; Phone: +7 (495) 673 7530; Fax: +7 (495) 673 2218; Web: http://gosniiokht.ru E-mail: dir@gosniiokht.ru The State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) is a state research institute with the responsibility for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union. The institute in its original role before 1994 was involved in the development and production of chemical weapons including the toxic nerve agent now know as ‘Novichok’. After 1994, the same facility took part in the government’s programme for the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. On 20 August 2020, Alexei Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 August 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialised laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. The deployment of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group would therefore only be possible due to the failure of the Institute to carry out its responsibility to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons. 15.10.2020
3. MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co Address: Zoukak Al Jin Abed Al Rahman Bn Al Kassem Street. Damascus, Syria; Phone: (+963) 11-2210758, (+963) 11-2224349; Fax: (+963) 11-2235892; Web: https://houranieh.com/ Email: info@houranieh.com MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co is a company operating in the metals industry and supplies the Syrian Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) with materials used in the manufacture of chemical weapons delivery systems. Therefore, MHD Nazier Houranieh & Sons Co provides material support for manufacturing chemical weapons and is engaged in preparations for the use of chemical weapons and thus contributes to the continued threat posed by the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. 14.11.2022
4. Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Войска радиационной, химической и биологической защиты Министерства обороны Российской Федерации) Address: Corpus 2, Building 22, Frunze Embankment, 119160 Moscow, Russian Federation Website: https://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/ground/structure/rhbz.htm Registration number: 1037739635890 Taxpayer Personal Identification Number (INN): 7704195013 The Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops are the competent entity in the Russian Armed Forces in charge of chemical and biological warfare. In this capacity, the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops are involved in the Russian Federation’s use of chemical weapons. These include riot control agents, such as CS gas, which have been used as a method of warfare by Russian forces in Ukraine, in breach of Article I, paragraph 5, of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a State Party. The use of CS gas has been confirmed by reports published in November 2024 and February 2025 by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), following Technical Assistance Visits in Ukraine. Thus, the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops are involved in the use of chemical weapons. 20.5.2025
5. 27th Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (27-й Центральный научно-исследовательский институт Министерства обороны Российской Федерации) Address: 51 st Khoroshevsky Passage, 123007 Moscow, Russian Federation Phone: + 7 (495) 945 76 96 Taxpayer Personal Identification Number (INN): 7714676767 Website: http://eng.mil.ru/en/science/sro/information.htm?id=10992@morfOrgScience Email: fin27cnii@mail.ru Associated entity: Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation The Russian Ministry of Defence 27th Scientific Centre is a subordinate unit of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops. As a leading research entity within the Russian military, it belongs to the Russian military and is associated with the development and use of chemical agents. Thus, the Russian Ministry of Defence 27th Scientific Centre is associated with the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops. 20.5.2025
6. 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (33 Центральный научно-исследовательский испытательный институт Министерства обороны Российской Федерации) Address: 1 Ulitsa Krasnoznamennaya, Volsk-18/Shikhany, Saratov Oblast, Russian Federation; Krasnoznamennaya Street 1, Volsk-18, Saratov, 412918 Russian Federation Phone: + 7 (343) 255 99 88 Taxpayer Personal Identification Number (INN): 6441013942 / 644101001 Website: https://ens.mil.ru/science/SRI/information.htm?id=12027@morfOrgScience Email: 33cnii-fes@mil.ru Associated entity: Radiological Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation The Russian Ministry of Defence 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute is a subordinate unit of the Radiological, Biological and Chemical Defence Troops. As a leading chemical research and testing entity within the Russian military, it belongs to the Russian military and is associated with the development and use of chemical agents. Thus, the Russian Ministry of Defence 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute is associated with the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops. 20.5.2025

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