Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582 of 9 April 2021 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aluminium flat-rolled products originating in the People’s Republic of China

(373) The Union industry adapted its product mix in order to secure better margins on higher value added products over the period considered while keeping sufficient volume to dilute its fix costs. In this context, the costs of the Union industry naturally increased. Furthermore, the Union industry could not benefit from the increase in consumption in 2018-2019 and had to dilute its fix costs on a lower production volume (-11 %) leading to an overall increase in production costs (+ 1 %) while the LME 3-month aluminium price had decreased (-12 %). As far as sales prices are concerned, the Union industry also faced severe competition on the higher added value markets and could not increase its prices to the expected level (-4 %). In view of the cost and price developments, the profitability deteriorated progressively and turned to a loss-making situation already in 2019 before the situation aggravated in the investigation period.

(374) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(375) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. The following potential factors were identified: COVID-19 pandemic, contraction in demand, imports from third countries, commercial strategy of the Union industry, export performance of the Union industry, efficiency of the Union industry, imports from the country concerned by the Union industry and contractual obligations linked to the LME aluminium price.

(376) The deterioration in the situation of the Union industry coincided with the significant penetration by imports from China, which consistently undercut the Union industry’s prices and suppressed Union market price. As mentioned in recital (371), the import prices of the sampled exporting producers undercut Union prices by 7,5 % on average.

(377) The volume of imports from China increased (as shown in Table 4) from around 161 000 tonnes in 2017 to around 266 000 in the investigation period, an increase by 65 %. In terms of market share, the increase was of 81 %, from 6,2 % to 11,2 %. Over the same period (as shown in Table 7), the Union industry sales on the free market decreased by 14 % and its market share on the free market fell from 66,2 % to 62,7 %, a fall of 5 %. Pending the analysis of the imports into Greece under inward processing, the Commission looked at imports also excluding those imports. In such case, the trend would be similar and show an increase in Chinese imports by 41 % and an increase in market share by 54 % from 5,5 % to 8,5 %.

(378) The situation in the period 2017-2019 is even more telling as Chinese imports more than doubled (from 161 000 tonnes to 354 000 tonnes) reaching 13,2 % market share while the free market share of the Union industry had dropped to 61,5 % (-4,7 percentage points). Indeed, despite a decrease in consumption between 2018 and 2019, Chinese imports continued to increase and gain market share from the Union industry.

(379) The dumped imports increased steadily on a year-on-year basis in terms of both absolute and relative terms until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020 (this is analysed in the next section). As evident from Table 3 and 4, the increase in consumption in 2018 and 2019 was mainly beneficial to Chinese imports. The apparent ‘softening’ of the penetration of imports from China observed during the investigation period is misleading. A close look at the trends in the period considered makes the relationship between imports and the injury suffered by the industry quite apparent. Indeed, the picture seen during the investigation period is just a prolongation of the observed trend, slightly eased by the general impact of the pandemic on the Chinese production, exports to the Union and consumption in the EU.

(380) The prices of the dumped imports decreased by 9 % over the period considered (as shown in Table 5) from 2 437 to 2 205 EUR/tonne. In comparison, the Union industry prices decreased only by 4 % over the same period; i.e. from 2 792 EUR/tonne in 2017 to 2 680 EUR/tonne in the investigation period. Hence, although starting from a lower price level in 2017, Chinese prices decreased more (-232 EUR/tonne) than Union industry prices (-112 EUR/tonne) over the period considered. Also, in the period 2017-2019, the decrease in Chinese prices amounted to 11 % while the Union industry prices had decreased by 1 %.

(381) The imports under inward processing were made at lower prices than imports excluding inward processing. Prices of imports from China under inward processing were also much lower than the sales prices by the Union industry. Such prices developed erratically and appear to be completely disconnected from the evolution of world aluminium prices such as the LME. They decreased by 27 % over the period considered.

(382) The prices of the dumped imports excluding inward processing, which account on average for over 70 % of the imports from China, decreased steadily over the period considered from 2 391 EUR/tonne in 2017 to 2 237 EUR/tonne in the investigation period or by 6 % overall.

(383) The price development of the dumped imports shows significant price suppression. The Union industry was unable to raise prices at the same extent as costs were increasing because of the downward pressure caused by imports from China (both in terms of volumes and low prices). Indeed, throughout the period considered, Chinese prices were consistently low and significantly below Union industry prices, limiting price increases which would have been expected in the context of a growing demand (up to 2019) and change in product mix (more high value products). This resulted in price depression and decreasing profitability of the Union industry.

(384) Furthermore, the investigation revealed that the penetration of Chinese imports over the period considered has been achieved not only in the commodity parts of the market where short term contracts usually apply but also in other parts of the market where higher added value products are sold in the framework of medium/long term contracts. Price is not the only important element in such contracts but it is clear that the low prices (reflecting undercutting margins indicated above of 7,5 % on average) play a key role in the decision making of customers.

(385) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded that the imports from China caused material injury to the Union industry. Such injury had both volume and price effects.

(386) One importer, Airoldi, claimed that the decrease in consumption was related to a decrease in demand in the aerospace sector. Hence, this importer requested the inclusion of this sector in the injury analysis.

(387) As indicated in recital (57), products for use in the manufacturing of aircraft parts are excluded from this investigation. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(388) Another importer, Nova Trading S.A. (Nova Trading), claimed that the Union industry had increased its production capacity to meet an expected growth in the electric vehicle market that did not materialise leading to lower prices and lower profitability. However, AFPRs for use as body panels in the car industry are excluded from the product scope and therefore any injury suffered thereto is not covered or captured by this investigation. This claim was rejected.

(389) The exporting producer Xiamen Xiashun claimed that the increase in imports in 2019 was more moderate than the decrease in consumption in 2019 and that the Union industry was more affected by the decrease in consumption than by the increase in Chinese imports. The same exporting producer claimed that the macroeconomic indicators were stable until the half/the end of 2019 and that the decrease in demand was the cause of injury.

(390) The additional increase in imports from China in 2019, which took place in a period when consumption decreased, should be seen as another evidence of injury. Indeed, when demand is decreasing, one would normally expect all producers to be affected in a similar way or even exports to decrease more in comparison to domestic (Union sales) in view of the proximity between domestic producers and customers. Still, in 2019, the imports from China continued to increase in absolute terms leading to an increase in market share by 1,5 percentage points in relation to 2018 to the detriment of the Union industry. Indeed, when consumption decreased by around 113 000 tonnes, the sales of the Union industry decreased by around 76 000 tonnes. That means the Union industry absorbed 67 % of the decrease while imports from China increased by around 24 000 tonnes. In parallel, the already low Chinese import prices decreased further by 5 %.

(391) As far as the evolution of the macroeconomic indicators is concerned, the years 2018 and 2019 already showed signs of injury as sales, market share and employment had already deteriorated significantly. In any case, the injury analysis should not be based solely on the evolution of macroeconomic indicators but on an overall assessment of micro- and macroeconomic indicators. When looking at the year 2018 and 2019 as a whole, both types of indicators were already depicting an injurious situation.

(392) The COVID-19 pandemic that started in the first half of 2020 affected the situation on the EU market in various ways. There was a decrease in consumption in the EU market accompanied by a decrease in imports from China.

(393) As explained in recital (379), the dumped Chinese imports had already increased steadily on a year-on-year basis in the period 2017-2019 leading to an increase of over 100 % until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020. In other words, the material injury caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports had already materialised as evidenced by the negative development of most macro- and microeconomic indicators in the period 2017-2019 when the COVID-19 came into the equation.

(394) In this context, it cannot be denied that the COVID-19 pandemic, and the following decrease in consumption, contributed to further aggravate the already deteriorated Union industry’s situation.

(395) However, this development does not attenuate the causal link between the material injury found and the dumped imports from China. As noted above, the Union industry was materially injured by dumped imports from the PRC that more than doubled in a three-year period before the pandemic outbreak so it is clear that material injury already occurred before and regardless of the pandemic.

(397) The sampled exporting producer Xiamen Xiashun, indicated that imports from China had decreased in the investigation period to the benefit of the Union industry and other countries. It also indicated that import prices from China had increased in that period. Furthermore, it indicated that the Union industry itself acknowledged unfair competition from imports from countries like India, Egypt and Turkey.

(398) The user Company A claimed that the Chinese market share was low in comparison with that of the Union industry and requested an analysis of imports from other countries.

(399) Despite the decrease in volume, Chinese imports still accounted for 11,1 % market share in the investigation period, which corresponds to an 80 % increase over the period considered. Also, even though Chinese prices rose in the investigation period, Chinese export prices still undercut the Union industry prices by 7,5 % on average during the investigation period.

(400) Furthermore, imports from other countries decreased over the period considered by 14 %. In view of the decreasing consumption (-8 %), their corresponding market share also decreased from 27,6 % to 26,1 %. This means that imports from other countries also lost market share to the imports from China.

(401) In particular, imports from Turkey which were the second largest in volumes after imports from China to the EU increased by 12 % over the period considered and gained 1,2 percentage point market share. However, their prices remained much higher than Chinese import prices and followed the evolution of the LME.

(402) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the evolution of imports from other countries and the slight decrease of imports from China in the investigation period did not contribute to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(403) The exporting producer Xiamen Xiashun claimed that the Union industry’s focus on certain segments with higher priced products, where demand decreased over the period considered, was a factor capable of breaking the causal link. It also argued that, by focusing on higher priced products, the Union industry had reduced its capacity available for foil stock customers, which had to turn to other sources of supply. Furthermore, it claimed that, except for the Union industry, it was by far the main supplier to the EU market, and that Chinese and Union prices were comparable for AFRPs destined for foil stock.

(404) As far as the commercial strategy of the Union industry is concerned, as indicated in recital (355), the Union industry tried to keep the same production volume, which only decreased by 1 % between 2017 and 2019, while adapting its product mix to increase its sales of higher value added products.

(405) As showed in Table 3, the demand for AFPRs covered by this investigation remained stable or even increased in the period 2017-2019. Also, the investigation did not reveal that there was a drop in demand for products commanding higher prices. As indicated in recital (384), the investigation rather revealed that the Union industry also faced severe competition from Chinese imports in the high end part of the market. The dumped imports thus lead to decreasing sales without the possibility to achieve the expected higher prices. Consequently, the situation of the industry deteriorated significantly.

(406) As far as the foil sector is concerned, as indicated in recital (303) to (306), an analysis by segments was not found to be warranted and the same reasons mentioned in recital (405) also apply. In addition, the injury suffered by the Union industry also came from the injurious prices charged by Xiamen Xiashun, which only sold to the foil sector and undercut Union prices at a level similar to the average undercutting margin found of 7,5 % during the investigation period. Thus, the claim was rejected.

(407) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the commercial strategy followed by the Union industry did not contribute to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(409) Exports of the Union industry increased by 4 % over the period considered from 315 664 tonnes in 2017 to around 328 898 tonnes in the investigation period.

(410) The average price of these exports first increased by 5 % in 2018 before progressively decreasing to a lower level than in 2017 (-2 %). The average price of these exports remained consistently above the price that the Union industry could achieve on the EU market.

(411) One importer, Nova Trading claimed that the US-China trade war had a negative impact on the export performance of the Union industry.

(412) As shown in Table 14, exports by the Union industry were not affected negatively by the deterioration of the trade relations between the US and China. This claim was therefore rejected.

(413) Against the backdrop of their contribution to total production and sales of the Union industry, and bearing in mind the high price of the Union industry exports to third countries and their stable volume, the Commission provisionally concluded that the export performance did not contribute to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(415) While some Union producers may still be lagging behind in terms of equipment, the investigation revealed that the Union industry is dynamic and has increased significantly its investments in a difficult period in order to increase its capacity, adapt its production equipment to rationalize its production process and acquire the latest technology to continue meeting customer’s requirements. The analysis of capacity and capacity utilization in Table 6 shows that the Union industry increased its capacity and could achieve higher capacity utilization rates. With regard to hard alloys, no evidence was provided pointing to a lack of sufficient capacity. In any case, hard alloys accounted for 20-30 % of the sampled producers’ total sales on the EU market. Considering the size of the sample, its sales of hard alloys and in the absence of evidence provided by Airoldi, it was provisionally concluded that there was sufficient capacity for such products. As a result, this claim was rejected.

(416) As far as the situation in the foil segment in particular is concerned, a separate analysis of that segment was not found to be warranted. Indeed, as indicated in recitals (303) to (306) foil stock falls within the definition of the product scope and there are no clear dividing lines pertaining to the distribution channel or price of this product. Therefore, this claim was found to be without object.

(417) While it cannot be excluded that additional investments in the latest technology may be needed to ensure the long term sustainability of the Union industry, the Commission concluded that the state of the Union industry’s production equipment and the development of its operating costs do not attenuate the causal link established between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(418) The Commission found the alleged increase in service costs to be insignificant while the Union industry could keep its labour costs under control despite the impact of the restructuring expenses. Consequently, this claim was rejected.

(419) One importer, Nova Trading also claimed that the performance of the Union industry was affected by a cyberattack on Hydro and an environmental dispute in Brazil concerning the same producer.

(420) First, such elements do not concern the activities of the Union industry as they relate to the mother company of the Union producer based in Norway and to an affiliated company based in South America. In any event, given their nature, such elements relate to extraordinary expenses that are not taken into account when assessing the profitability of the Union industry. Consequently, this claim was rejected.

(421) Therefore, the Commission concluded that none of the factors above contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(422) The exporting producer Xiamen Xiashun claimed that the alleged injury suffered was caused by purchases of the product concerned by the Union industry itself.

(423) The imports by the Union industry were made by a company that was related to a Union producer and working on a semi-independent basis whereby it sourced a minor part of its needs from China. These imports were marginal and decreased over the period considered, representing only 1 to 4 % of the total imports from China during the investigation period. Given the low volume involved, the Commission concluded that these purchases could not have caused injury to the Union industry.

(424) The importer Nova Trading claimed that the decline in the LME price from July 2018 onwards to the pre-COVID-19 pandemic period had a direct influence on the profitability of the Union producers.

(425) The Union industry usually sells AFRPs using contracts whereby the most recent LME price or the 3-month LME price are quoted as a reference. Union producers then use hedging facilities to cover them against the difference between the aluminium price quoted in the contract and the actual purchase price of the aluminium.

(426) Bearing in mind the way that aluminium prices are set using contracts, and the fact that the Union industry protects itself against raw material fluctuations, the Commission provisionally concluded that decreases in raw material prices would not have caused injury to the Union industry.

(427) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. With the exception of the COVID-19 pandemic which aggravated the situation of the already materially injured Union industry, none of the factors contributed, alone or in combination, to the negative developments of the injury indicators observed in the period considered.

(428) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the COVID-19 pandemic did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(429) There are some 20 known groups of companies producing AFRPs in the Union. The imposition of measures would allow the Union industry to recover lost market share, while improving their profitability towards levels considered sustainable.

(430) The Union industry employs over 8 000 workers directly with many more relying on it indirectly. The producers are widely spread throughout the Union.

(431) The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price suppression, lower sales and further deterioration of the profitability at a time when the industry has invested significant amounts in order to ensure its sustainability. The measures will allow the Union industry to exploit its potential on the Union market, recover lost market share, and improve profitability to levels to be expected under normal conditions of competition.

(432) In addition to representing the Union industry, European Aluminium also represents a large part of the primary aluminium sector in the Union which supplies ingots/slabs to the Union industry. The primary aluminium sector is also a large employer in the Union and it relies on the health of its downstream customers. The viability of these upstream suppliers, which employ around 2 800 workers will also be put at risk if the Union industry contracts further.

(433) Consequently, the Commission concluded that the imposition of measures would be in the interest of Union industry and its upstream suppliers.

(434) From the importers, only 4 unrelated companies submitted a sampling form representing less than 2 % of Chinese imports. The importers also bought AFRPs from other sources.

(435) The sampled importers were operating in several activity sectors in and outside the Union. Overall, AFRPs accounted for less than 30 % of their turnover and for 10-15 % of their turnover on average. These importers were sourcing AFRPs from the country concerned, from third countries and from the Union industry. The importers expressed their opposition to the imposition of anti-dumping duties on the grounds that users and importers would be negatively affected by an artificial price increase for AFRPs.

(436) One importer, Nilo, referred to the situation in the US market and indicated that the introduction of anti-dumping duties on Chinese AFRPs led to a price increase and to a replacement of Chinese imports by imports from other countries such as the EU. It claimed that such scenario was likely to take place on the EU market. The same importer also claimed that prices on the EU market would increase in view of the lack of spare capacity of the Union industry.

(437) In light of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the imposition of measures would not necessarily be in the interest of importers. However, it further assessed their likely effects when weighing the different interests at stake (see Section 6.5).

(438) The product concerned is sourced by several user industries, mainly building and construction, automobile and transport, consumer durables, energy, technical and foil stock. AFRPs can be used directly in a finished product or processed and sold to another industrial user.

(439) As indicated in recital (46), five users provided questionnaire replies. These users accounted for only 12 % of the Chinese imports and were active in the following sectors: building and construction and more specifically production of coated products and ACPs, aluminium foil and more specifically flexible packaging, technical and more specifically automotive HEX. At provisional stage, only two companies have been verified through remote crosschecks. The Commission will further assess the completeness of the users’ replies and whether more companies would need to be subject to RCCs. This may impact the definitive findings regarding users.

(440) Two companies active in the construction sector provided a user questionnaire reply. One user, Multilaque SAS, purchased AFRPs exclusively from the Union industry and indicated that fair market prices should prevail.

(441) The other user, Company A purchased AFRPs from the country concerned, the Union industry and other countries. Company A expressed its opposition to the imposition of anti-dumping measures on the product concerned. Furthermore, as developed in Section 2.3.2, Company A requested the exclusion of aluminium coils for the production of coated coils and ACP. This request was accepted. The comments raised by Company A and pertaining to Union interest were addressed under such section. Other comments raised by this party were addressed where relevant.

(442) One user, Amcor Flexibles Singen GmbH (‘Amcor’), active in the flexible packaging sector provided a user questionnaire reply. However, it did not provide a position with regard to the imposition of measures and did not provide meaningful non-confidential comments.

(443) Based on its questionnaire reply, should this user not be able to transfer a cost increase, it would be in a position to absorb it in view of the profitability that it reported.

(444) Two companies, Valeo and TitanX, active in the automotive HEX sector provided user questionnaire replies. Both companies sourced AFRPs from the country concerned and from the Union. Valeo also sourced AFRPs from other countries. While Valeo opposed potential anti-dumping measures, TitanX did not express a position. Both companies filed exclusion requests as detailed in Section 2.3.1. These requests were rejected. The comments raised by these users and by other interested parties requesting the exclusion of automotive HEX AFRPs and pertaining to Union interest were addressed under such section.

(445) As detailed in Section 2.3.1 above, the Union industry has sufficient capacity to meet the current and future demand and that there is no risk of structural price increase in view of the conditions of competition and available capacities in the EU. The Commission also concluded that the level of profits achieved before the pandemic would allow the automotive HEX manufacturers to absorb extra costs in the form of anti-dumping duties or validation costs, should they wish to switch back to Union producers. As far as the impact of measures on supply chain is concerned, the Commission concluded that the transition from one AFRP supplier to another could be burdensome but that the Union industry would be in a position to quickly substitute Chinese imports and offer a secure alternative source of supply.

(446) In addition, it should be noted that apart from Mahle, another user in this sector, several other companies, representing over 50 % of the estimated consumption of automotive HEX AFRPs did not come forward to express their opposition to the investigation or to potential anti-dumping measures.

(447) Consequently, on the basis of the information provided by the users in question, the Commission provisionally concluded that the imposition of measures would not be against the interest of users active in automotive HEX sector.

(448) No verifiable data was received for the other user sectors, such as consumer durables and energy. It cannot be excluded, that some users, which have not cooperated with the investigation, may have certain detrimental effects resulting from the measures. However, there is no information on the case file to substantiate or quantify these effects.

(449) The Commission concluded that there is no uniform interest of users either in favour or against the imposition of measures. Those users, who spoke out against the imposition measures, may face, though, certain limited negative consequences.

(450) Aluminium is much lighter than steel and is regarded in the Union as a key raw material for making progress towards the meeting of emissions targets set by the Paris Agreement (2015) and the European Union’s own emission targets, as laid down in the European Council’s Conclusions of 10/11 December 2020. As an example, AFRPs falling within and outside the product scope are used increasingly in the automobile industry and they are key in the establishment of the electric vehicle industry in the Union. Both AFRPs falling within and outside the product scope and used in the automobile industry are produced by the Union industry. The absence of measures on in-scope AFRPs would also have a negative impact on the production of out-of-scope AFRPs as the fix costs would need to be diluted on a lower production volume leading to cost and price increases for such products as well.

(451) Furthermore, in the context of a clean and circular economy, the Union industry has been increasing the use of recycled materials in its production process to reduce its carbon footprint. This contributes to meeting the EU’s emissions targets. Also, as indicated in recital (78), aluminium production in the EU generates on average almost 3 times less CO2 than in the PRC.

(452) Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the imposition of measures contributes to the achievement of the Union’s policy on reducing CO2 emissions.

(453) In line with Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation the Commission assessed the competing interests and gave special consideration to the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition. It assessed in particular the claim of the importer Nilo that it would be disproportionately hit by the imposition of measures, as demonstrated by a similar development in the US market after the imposition of measures by the US government.

(454) The Commission noted in that respect that the economic operators (producers, users and importers) are not the same. Second, the US investigation did not have exactly the same product scope and the level of duties imposed in the US was much higher.

(455) As far as an increase in prices is concerned, the investigation revealed that Chinese prices were undercutting Union prices on average by 7,5 % and that the price suppression lead to a deterioration of the situation of the Union industry. Should prices rise again to sustainable levels and considering the significant market share of other countries, as indicated in Section 5.1.2.3, the Commission considered that such increase would be limited in view of the level of competition on the Union market. As already mentioned in Section 4.6.2.1, the Union industry has sufficient spare capacity. Accordingly, the negative effect on users would also remain limited.

(456) When assessing the significance of such negative effects for the importers, the Commission first noted that the level of cooperation was extremely low. Based on this limited information on file, in any event it provisionally considered that the importers will be able to pass on the duty to their customers given their profit margins of around 5 % to 8 % on the product concerned. They also have the possibility to find alternative sources of supply, including suppliers from other third countries and the Union industry with which they are already operating. Indeed, the sampled importers have a balanced supply structure and do not rely on Chinese imports exclusively. Also, the sampled importers have significant activities which are not related to the product concerned, and which are not affected by the imposition of the duties.

(457) Therefore, the Commission considered that unrelated importers would not be disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures thanks to their other activities, other sources of supply for the product under investigation and the ability to partially pass on the effect of the duties to their customers. In any case, the situation of the importers will be further assessed at definitive stage.

(458) Finally, one importer, Airoldi, claimed that the Union industry was using the anti-dumping instrument to obtain a dominant position, which is an abuse of rights under the Union Courts case law. However, there are no indications on the file about present or future anti-competitive behaviour or an abusive oligopoly by the Union industry. Consequently, the Commission did not identify any overriding interest to preserve effective competition in the Union as a reason not to impose measures.

(459) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded that there were no compelling reasons to conclude it is not in the Union interest to impose provisional measures on imports of AFRPs originating in China.

(460) In order to determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(461) In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry. Then it examined whether this amount of duty would be adequate to remove the injury taken into account the alleged presence of raw material distortions in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(462) The Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. In this case, the injury would be eliminated if the Union industry was able to cover its costs of production, including those costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia, and to obtain a reasonable profit (‘target profit’).

(464) Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(465) European Aluminium claimed that the target profit should be set at least 12 % given the capital intensive and innovation-driven nature of the sector. One producer, Hydro, referred to a profit margin ‘between 5 and 10 %’ and also referred to the profit achieved in another sector (0 – 15 %) where there were no dumped imports.

(466) At this stage of the investigation, none of the sampled producers provided evidence that it achieved the target profit as claimed by European Aluminium during the period considered or in the 10 years preceding the end of the investigation period. Furthermore, as indicated in Table 10, the average profit achieved by the sampled Union producers, remained lower than the target profit provided by Article 7(2c) during the investigation period. In addition, the Commission considered that using the profit achieved in another sector excluded from the scope of this investigation was not necessary.

(467) In view of the above considerations, the profit margin was established at 6 % in accordance with the provision of Article 7(2c).

(468) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). The Commission established an additional cost ranging from around EUR 0,5 to 8 per tonne which was added to the non-injurious price for the sampled Union producers concerned. A note to the file on how the Commission established this additional cost is available in the file for inspection by interested parties.

(469) These costs comprised the additional future costs to ensure compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional costs were calculated on the basis of the average estimated additional EU Allowances (EUA) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures (2021 to 2025). The EUAs used in the calculation were net of free allowances receivable and were adjusted to ensure they related solely to the like product. The additional costs also took account of indirect CO2 costs stemming from an increase in electricity prices over the period 2021 to 2025 linked to the EU ETS. Such indirect CO2 costs were also based on the EUA and net of any compensation received from national authorities.

(470) The costs of the EUAs were extrapolated to account for the expected price variation during the lifespan of the measures. The source for these projected prices is a Bloomberg New Energy Finance extraction dated 8 February 2021. The average projected price for EUAs for this period is 35,51 EUR/tonne of CO2 emitted.

(471) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of the like product for the Union industry.

(472) The Commission then determined the injury elimination level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the cooperating exporting producers, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(473) In terms of the residual margin, bearing in mind that cooperation of the Chinese exporters was not high, and other considerations explained in recital (289) above, the Commission considered it appropriate to set residual margin on the basis of facts available. This margin was set at the level of the highest underselling margin established for product types sold in representative quantities, on the basis of the data of the cooperating exporting producers. The residual underselling margin so calculated was set at a level of 46,7 %.

(475) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that it was necessary to assess whether there are distortions of raw materials with regard to the product concerned within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, which would render a duty lower than the margin of dumping insufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports of the product concerned.

(476) The complainant alleged that in the PRC, one of the raw materials used to produce the product concerned was subject to an export tax and therefore, distorted. The distorted raw material was aluminium ingots that according to the complainant accounts for more than 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned.

(477) Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined the alleged distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(478) The investigation confirmed that the PRC had, in the IP, an export tax on aluminium ingots. This tax amounts to 15 % of the export price of the ingots. The Commission therefore concluded that this measure falls under the list of measures amounting to a distortion of raw materials in the sense of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(479) The Commission further examined whether the price of this raw material was significantly lower as compared to prices in the representative international markets, in accordance with Article 7(2a), second paragraph. For the purpose of this comparison the Commission provisionally used the benchmark price established to calculate the normal value, namely the import price of aluminium ingots into Turkey as indicated in Table 2 at recital (248), as in this case this price was also considered to constitute a price of representative international markets. The Commission compared the benchmark price with the price of the aluminium ingots actually paid by the sampled exporting producers, and established on that basis that the purchase price of this raw material in the PRC by the sampled exporting producers was not significantly below the representative international benchmark price, namely less than [6 %] on average. Evidence on file also showed that domestic prices for aluminium ingots fluctuated above and below international prices.

(480) The Commission thus provisionally concluded that the price of aluminium ingots was not significantly lower as compared to prices in the representative international markets. Therefore, the Commission considered at this stage that the conditions of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation were not met, and as a result, the provisions of Article 7(2) were applicable to set the level of the provisional duty.

(481) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(482) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of aluminium flat-rolled products originating in the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation following the provisional conclusion at recital (480) concerning the possible application of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(483) The Commission compared the underselling margins and the dumping margins (recital (474) above). The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the underselling margins.

(485) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflected the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(486) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(487) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(488) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE’s website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(489) Jiangsu Alcha, Nanshan Group and Xiamen Xiashun commented on the accuracy of calculations. The Union industry did not provide comments on the accuracy of calculations. The Commission considered the comments and corrected clerical calculation errors where appropriate.

(490) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(491) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

— in coils or in coiled strips, in cut-to-length sheets, or in the form of circles; of a thickness of 0,2 mm or more but not more than 6 mm,

— in plates, of a thickness of more than 6 mm,

— in coils or in coiled strips, of a thickness of not less than 0,03 mm but less than 0,2 mm,

currently falling under CN codes ex 7606 11 10 (TARIC codes 7606111025, 7606111086), ex 7606 11 91 (TARIC codes 7606119125, 7606119186), ex 7606 11 93 (TARIC codes 7606119325, 7606119386), ex 7606 11 99 (TARIC codes 7606119925, 7606119986), ex 7606 12 20 (TARIC codes 7606122025, 7606122088), ex 7606 12 92 (TARIC codes 7606129225, 7606129293), ex 7606 12 93 (TARIC code 7606129386), ex 7606 12 99 (TARIC codes 7606129925 and 7606129986), ex 7606 91 00 (TARIC codes 7606910025, 7606910086), ex 7606 92 00 (TARIC codes 7606920025, 7606920092), ex 7607 11 90 (TARIC codes 7607119044, 7607119048, 7607119051, 7607119053, 7607119065, 7607119071, 7607119073, 7607119075, 7607119077, 7607119091, 7607119093) and ex 7607 19 90 (TARIC codes 7607199075, 7607199094) and originating in the People’s Republic of China

Article 2

— Aluminium beverage can body stock, end stock and tab stock.

— Aluminium products, alloyed, of a thickness of not less than 0,2 mm and not more than 6 mm, for use as body panels in the car industry.

— Aluminium products, alloyed, of a thickness of not less than 0,8 mm, for use in the manufacture of aircraft parts.

— Tension levelled aluminium coils

— Hot-rolled coils

— Widths: from 800 mm up to 2 050 mm

— Thicknesses: 0,20 mm up to 1,5 mm

— Tolerance on width: +1,50/-0,00 mm

— Alloys: 5005, 3005, 3105

— Temper: h14, h16, h24, h26

— Max wave height: max. 3 in 1 000 mm

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 1 shall apply for a period of six months.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 9 April 2021.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of aluminium flat-rolled products originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 268, 14.8.2020, p. 5).

(3) Tron document T20.006896.

(4) https://www.european-aluminium.eu/activity-report-2019-2020/market-overview/ consulted on 25 January 2021.

(5) The company considered its transport costs confidential.

(6) See paragraph 105 of the Complaint.

(7) https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2475

(8) Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6).

(9) Tron document t21.000574.

(10) Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of 30 January 2020 on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 29, 31.1.2020, p. 1).

(11) As defined in the Notice amending the Notice of initiation (OJ C 36, 2.2.2021, p. 18).

(12) As defined by the party and referring to the product definition as published in the Notice of initiation referred to in footnote 2 above.

(13) Validation ensures that the developed product fulfils the customer requirements. Validation concerns the automotive HEX itself and the automotive HEX AFRPs. This process can last up to 2 years and includes lab testing, material and process validation.

(14) Case M.9560 – Gränges/Impexmetal Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1) and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (23.9.2020 C(2020) 6652 final), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases1/202050/m9560_488_3.pdf

(15) https://www.world-aluminium.org/media/filer_public/2018/02/19/lca_report_2015_final_26_june_2017.pdf Table 10 p. 34 and https://www.european-aluminium.eu/media/2052/european-aluminium-environmental-profile-report-2018-executive-summary.pdf p. 6 consulted on 18 February 2020.

(16) https://www.ecofinagency.com/finance/2007-34929-morocco-car-manufacturer-nanjing-xiezhong-to-build-at-kenitrahttps://autotechinsight.ihsmarkit.com/news/36512/nanjing-xiezhong-auto-airconditioner-to-set-up-a-new-plant-in-morocco-reporthttps://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/automobile-au-maroc-une-usine-en-vue-pour-le-chinois-xiezhong-specialiste-de-la-clim-a-proximite-du-futur-site-psa.N402812 consulted on 15 February 2020.

(17) Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4).

(18) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2023/2006 of 22 December 2006 on good manufacturing practice for materials and articles intended to come into contact with food (OJ L 384, 29.12.2006, p. 75).

(19) European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste (OJ L 365, 31.12.1994, p. 10).

(20) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1).

(21) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/271 of 16 February 2017 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 925/2009 on imports of certain aluminium foil originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of slightly modified certain aluminium foil (OJ L 40, 17.2.2017, p. 51), as amended by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2213 (OJ L 316, 1.12.2017, p. 17).

(22) Council Regulation (EU) 2019/2220 of 19 December 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 1388/2013 opening and providing for the management of autonomous tariff quotas of the Union for certain agricultural and industrial products (OJ L 333, 27.12.2019, p. 33).

(23) Questionnaire on the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 for the Government of the People’s Republic of China’ and ‘Questionnaire on the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 for the Government of the People’s Republic of China’.

(24) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2 (hereafter ‘Report’).

(25) OECD (2019), ‘Measuring distortions in international markets: the aluminium value chain’, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en (last accessed on 3.9.2020)..

(26) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/915 of 4 June 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 146, 5.6.2019, p. 63).

(27) Report – Chapter 2, p. 6-7.

(28) Report – Chapter 2, p. 10.

(29) Available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4866_0_7.html (last viewed 8 September 2020).

(30) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

(31) Report – Chapter 3, p. 41, 73-74.

(32) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120-121.

(33) Report – Chapter 6. p. 122 -135.

(34) Report – Chapter 7, p. 167-168.

(35) Report – Chapter 8, p. 169-170, 200-201.

(36) Report – Chapter 2, p. 15-16, Report – Chapter 4, p. 50, p. 84, Report – Chapter 5, p. 108-9.

(37) Report – Chapter 3, p. 22-24 and Chapter 5, p. 97-108.

(38) Report – Chapter 5, p. 104-9.

(39) OECD Study, p. 29.

(40) Australian Anti-Dumping Commission, Aluminium Extrusions from China, REP 248, p. 79 (13 July 2015).

(41) Taube, M. (2017). Analysis of Market Distortions in the Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Industry, Think!Desk, 24 April 2017, p. 51.

(42) See for example a report concerning Shandong provincial government’s failure to curb aluminium capacity expansion: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI2OTUyMzA0Nw==&mid=2247494318&idx=1&sn=9690ca50845c19f38eafff659516817a&chksm=eaddaba6ddaa22b071a5e2588aa787ed6f6a1a964ccae55c4d85c6f7ccbfcb5cedd3cdceac9d&scene=0&pass_ticket=JFplYZoDqNTFmOPYUGJbMwF0XlC1N3hAJ3EYPpsKx6rkt4fSeZ4TwIvB5BffX4du#rd (accessed on 7 September 2020).

(43) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 387-388.

(44) See position 35 of the SASAC list: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/index.html

(45) Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-1.

(46) Report – Chapter 2, p. 26

(47) The Report – Chapter 2, p. 31-2.

(48) Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (last viewed 9 September 2020).

(49) Available at www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (last viewed on 10 March 2021).

(50) Financial Times (2020) ‘Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise’, available at: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j

(51) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/915.

(52) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 388.

(53) http://www.chalco.com.cn/chalcoen/rootfiles/2018/04/19/1524095189602052-1524095189604257.pdf (accessed on 8 March 2019).

(54) See the China Non Ferrous Metal Journal, 20 October 2020: https://www.cnmn.com.cn/ShowNews1.aspx?id=423470

(55) http://act.chinatt315.org.cn/hy/tthy/2014/0906/13763.html

(56) The Report – Chapters 14.1 to 14.3.

(57) The Report – Chapter 4, p. 41-42, 83.

(58) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/915.

(59) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1428 of 12 October 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aluminium extrusions originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 336, 13.10.2020, p. 8).

(60) The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf.

(61) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 377.

(62) The Report – Chapter 12, p. 275-282 and Chapter 15, p. 378-382.

(63) The Report – Chapter 12, p. 275 – 282

(64) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 378–382, 390.

(65) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 384–385.

(66) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 382–383.

(67) See http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-06/16/content_5082726.htm (accessed on 20 July 2020)

(68) Ibid, Section 3.

(69) Ibid, Section 4.

(70) See: http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/art/2018/11/6/art_15681_3450015.html (accessed on 20 July 2020), Section 13.

(71) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 386.

(72) See http://miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057569/n3057572/c6566256/content.html (accessed on 20 July 2020).

(73) Ibid, Section I.

(74) Ibid, Section II.

(75) Ibid, Section VII.

(76) See: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-06/16/content_5082726.htm, Section 10.

(77) See: https://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/indu/2019-11-26/doc-iihnzahi3508583.shtml (accessed on 20 July 2020).

(78) See: http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/art/2018/11/6/art_15681_3450015.html, Section 6.

(79) See http://www.chinania.org.cn/html/introduce/xiehuizhangcheng/ (accessed on 21 July 2020).

(80) See: http://www.cnfa.net.cn/about/1546.aspx (accessed on 21 July 2020).

(81) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 377- 387.

(82) The Report – Chapter 15, p. 378 and 389; OECD Study, p. 25-26.

(83) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 390 – 391. Provision of discounted electricity is reported also by other sources. See for example: Economic Information Daily: Worrying over growth downturns, western region releasing preferential policies to support high energy consumption industries http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/2012-07/24/content_389459.htm (accessed on 4 September 2020), reporting on how western Chinese provinces like Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai and Gansu have continued to provide cheap electricity to attract more investments.

(84) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 392 – 393.

(85) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 393 – 394.

(86) The Report – Chapter 15, pp. 395 – 396.

(87) Ibid, p. 16, p. 30. However, the Chinese authorities interfere with respect to other inputs, too. A typical example is coal, where the government retains the power to subdue coal price rises. See: https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/coal-price-unlikely-to-jump-during-heating-season/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e (accessed on 4 September 2020).

(88) Ibid. p. 16-18.

(89) Report – Chapter 6, p. 138-149.

(90) Report – Chapter 9, p. 216.

(91) Report – Chapter 9, p. 213-215.

(92) Report – Chapter 9, p. 209-211.

(93) Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation of certain Aluminium Foil from The People’s Republic of China, published by the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, on 7 August 2017, IX.E. p. 30, available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-17113-1.pdf (last accessed on 11 March 2019).

(94) Report – Chapter 13, p. 332-337.

(95) Report – Chapter 13, p. 336.

(96) Report – Chapter 13, p. 337-341.

(97) Report – Chapter 6, p. 114-117.

(98) Report – Chapter 6, p. 119.

(99) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120.

(100) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(101) See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan, October 2016, WP/16/203

(102) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(103) OECD Study, p. 21.

(104) See Xiamen Xiashun’s website: http://www.xiashun.com/about/awards.htm

(105) See 2012 Fujian Province Notice on developing the recognition of Strategic and Emerging industry backbone enterprises, Sections II and VI: http://www.fjmtxh.com/NewsInfo.aspx?Id=11101

(106) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21 and OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 55.

(107) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

(108) Aluminium, i.e. aluminium, not alloyed, unwrought (HS code 7601 10) and/or aluminium alloys, unwrought (HS code 7601 20) and/or aluminium scrap (HS code 7602 00) can, depending on the product type, represent up to 80 % of the total cost of manufacturing of the product concerned following the data provided in the complaint and by various interested parties. Aluminium scrap is a significant by-product that to a certain extent can be re-used in the production process. Following the complaint, the total quantity of scrap generated during the production can represent up to 50 % of the total production quantity.

(109) In Brazil, recent publicly available financial statements (2019) were only available for one of the two companies having their financial data available. In Turkey, recent publicly available financial statements (2019) were only available for one of the four companies having their financial data available. In Thailand, recent publicly available financial statements (2019) were only available for three of the five companies having their financial data available.

(110) http://www.hindalco.com/investor-cetre/reports-and-presentations

(111) Companies Airoldi, Company A, Jiangsu Alcha Group, Lodec Metal, Nanshan Group and Xiamen Xiashun.

(112) Import tax, tax on industrialized products (‘IPI’), so called ‘PIS-import’ (PIS refers to Social Integration Program) and ‘COFINS-import tax’ (COFINS refers to Contribution for Social Security Financing), additional Freight for the Renovation of the Merchant Marine and the tax on the circulation of goods.

(113) The basic Regulation requires the constructed value to ‘ include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profit s ’.

(114) Circular No 46 of 28 July 2020, of the Brazilian Secretariat of Foreign Trade, http://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/circular-n-46-de-28-de-julho-de-2020-269159613

(115) Section 6.1.6.3 of Circular 46.

(116) April 2019 to March 2020.

(117) Financial statements of Novelis do Brasil and the website of Novelis do Brasil mentions the production of aluminium for the aerospace, automotive and beverage cans sectors, https://pt-br.novelis.com

(118) That is revenues equalling to total of fixed and variable costs.

(119) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1428.

(120) Such data are publicly available in the context of the investigation on aluminium extrusion products, see Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1428.

(121) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33).

(122) The exact percentage of the processing costs is confidential.

(123) IHS Markit, https://ihsmarkit.com/index.html, in the open file.

(124) The labour costs are available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2088

(125) The category ‘basic metals’ includes aluminium under code C24.4.2.

(126) https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/DownloadIstatistikselTablo?p=RQJc6lWaNMpivNV6h1MxkWk9ycHqk1cNqZM2UJkJfMUYAmenKIIz/lKzy74RY7Y2

(127) https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/DownloadFile?p=RitGfpW8hZZnYLLz6NVmT9EdA97OcZ4kN3AGp97wTnz8hDUuqKcBcTsov5HkqdePBK2GLKg1cJVUEzIPmlerlcsrW7chIl366PgstWPx188=

(128) http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/HbGetir.do?id=33646&tb_id=1

(129) https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/investmentguide/pages/cost-of-doing-business.aspx

(130) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1428, recitals (185) and (186).

(131) OJ L 282, 28.10.2010, p. 1, rec. 83 and OJ L 18, 24.1.2017, p. 1, rec. 28.

(132) China – Measures imposing anti-dumping duties on high-performance stainless steel seamless tubes (‘HP-SSST’) from Japan and China – Measures imposing anti-dumping duties on high-performance stainless steel seamless tubes (‘HP-SSST’) from the European Union, WT/DS454/AB/R; WT/DS460/AB/R.

(133) OJ L 282, 28.10.2010, p. 1, rec. 83 and OJ L 18, 24.1.2017, p. 1, rec. 28

(134) China – Measures imposing anti-dumping duties on high-performance stainless steel seamless tubes (‘HP-SSST’) from Japan and China – Measures imposing anti-dumping duties on high-performance stainless steel seamless tubes (‘HP-SSST’) from the European Union, WT/DS454/AB/R; WT/DS460/AB/R.

(135) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/353 of 3 March 2020 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of steel road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 65, 4.3.2020, p. 9).

(136) CN codes 7606 11 10, 7606 11 91, 7606 11 93, 7606 11 99, 7606 12 20, 7606 12 92, 7606 12 93, 7606 12 99, 7606 91 00, 7606 92 00 and 7606 11 90.

(137) As explained in recital (291), the undercutting margins were calculated on a EU-27 basis.

(138) Where the sale from the Chinese producer to the first independent customer on the Union market was through a related sales company based in the Union, the price of the import was established on a CIF basis, by adjusting the sales price to the first independent customer taking into account all costs incurred between the importation and resale, including the SG&A of the related importer and for profits accruing based on the weighted average profit margin during the investigation period reported by the sampled unrelated importers, in line with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation.

(139) The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements.

(140) Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).