Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(230) Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular the normal value was constructed using the information provided by PAO Severstal that were cross checked and found correctly reported.

(231) As mentioned in recital (230) above, the non-cooperation from exporting producers in Russia forced the Commission to use facts available in establishing the normal value. To this end, the information submitted by the partially cooperating Russian producer was used.

(233) In the absence of any other reliable and verified profit the Commission used the profit declared by the company even if it was found to be incorrectly allocated, as explained above in recital (226). The profit margin used corresponds to the total profit of the company (for all products) as reported in the audited accounts, and it was therefore considered the most reliable benchmark. Moreover, the correct profit would necessarily have been higher than the one declared by the company. In the case at hand, given that the dumping margin, as explained in recital (238) below, was already as high as to confirm the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, an increase of the dumping margin as a result of this adjustment is therefore not relevant to the outcome of this review.

(234) The cost of production was adjusted, wherever found necessary.

(235) Due to the non-cooperation from the exporting producers in Russia, the Commission had to use facts available in establishing the export price. Information from the sole partially cooperating Russian producer could not be used as this producer did not export the product under review to the EU during the review investigation period.

(236) Therefore, the export price was determined based on CIF Eurostat data corrected to ex-works level. Thus, the CIF export price was reduced by the freight and insurance costs (91) and domestic transport cost in Russia (92).

(237) The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the product under review on an ex-works basis.

(238) The above comparison showed a countrywide dumping margin for the Russian exports to the EU, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value of 12,4 %. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

(239) The Commission therefore concluded that dumping from Russia continued during the review investigation period. However, as the volume of imports in question was very limited, accounting for 0,7 % of total EU imports and 0,4 % of the share of the Union market, the Commission also investigated the likelihood of recurrence of dumping.

(240) After disclosure it was argued by the authorities of the Russian Federation that the likelihood of continuation of dumping as regards Russian exporters, cannot be positively established since the determination of dumping made in the previous expiry review and in the original investigation were both inconsistent with WTO rules.

(241) In their comments the Russian authorities claimed that the adjustment of the cost of natural gas, applied by the Commission in the previous expiry review and in the original investigation is incompatible with Articles 2.2.1.1, 2.2.1 and 2.2 ADA and with the findings made in the following WTO cases: EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate and EU – Cost Adjustment Methodologies. The Russian authorities specifically refer to findings in the latter report issued on 24 July 2020 (93) (‘DS494 Report’), namely that the alleged Russian government intervention/market distortion did not constitute an adequate basis to conclude that the records of the exporting producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product concerned.

(242) This comment had to be rejected for the following reasons. First, the findings of the DS494 Report are subject to appellate proceedings and therefore the panel’s findings are yet not final. Second, as set out in recital (232), in the current investigation the Commission established the normal value using the cost of production of the like product as reported by the partially cooperating Russian exporting producer during the review investigation period, without applying any cost adjustment.

(243) The Commission investigated in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following additional elements were analysed: the existence of dumped export to third countries, the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia and the attractiveness of the Union market.

(244) Normal value was constructed as explained above in recital (232).

(245) The export price was established on the basis of sales prices of the partially cooperating Russian producer to other third countries.

(246) The Commission compared the constructed normal value and the average export prices to third countries on an ex-works basis. The comparison was done per product type and a weighted average dumping amount was established.

(247) The above comparison showed a countrywide dumping margin for the Russian exports to third countries, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value, of 4,3 %.

(248) Given the limited cooperation by the Russian exporting producers, the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia were established on the basis of facts available and in particular the information provided by the applicant and by the sole partially cooperating Russian producer.

(249) According to the information published in Metal Expert provided by the applicant, the total production capacity of the product under review in Russia exceeds 8 million tonnes. The applicant estimated that the Russian producers have a spare capacity of around 1 million tonnes that cannot be absorbed by the domestic market. Moreover, there are at least 11 producers of the product under review in Russia and the sole cooperating one has, alone, a nominal production capacity that exceeds the total Union consumption.

(250) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Russian exporting producers have significant spare capacities, which they could use to produce WPT to export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse.

(251) The investigation revealed that the Russian exporting producer exported to its main third markets at prices around 29 % lower as compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. Taking into account this price level, exporting to the Union is potentially much more attractive for the Russian exporters than exporting to all other countries.

(252) The Union market is also attractive in view of its geographical proximity and size, with a total consumption of 541 000 tonnes.

(253) After disclosure the Russian authorities contested the Commission’s view as regards the attractiveness of the Union market for the Russian exporters. In their view Russian producers focus more on the growing internal market and on their main export markets, the CIS countries (94), which are attractive due to the absence of import duties.

(254) The Commission disagreed with this view. First, as explained in recitals (238) and (251), sales prices on the Union market are far more attractive for the Russian producers than the domestic and export prices to other third countries. Second, as agreed by the Russian authorities themselves, the absence of duties increases the attractiveness of an export market, therefore the Russian producers will have a strong incentive to redirect their export to the Union market in case the measure were repealed.

(255) The investigation showed that Russian imports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period.

(256) Furthermore, the investigation proved that dumping practices existed also with regard to the Russian exports to their main third country markets.

(257) Moreover, the Commission found other evidence that dumping will likely recur should the measures lapse.

(258) The spare capacity in Russia is very significant and exceeds the total Union consumption during the review investigation period. In addition, according to the information provided by the applicant, the Russian capacity of WPT production increased by almost 1 million tonnes between 2018 and 2019.

(259) The Russian authorities contested the estimation of the spare capacity in Russia as provided by the applicant as, in their opinion it did not take into account the facts that some plants are capable, and used, to produce products other than the product concerned, reducing significantly the spare capacity.

(260) In this regard the Commission took into account the other products that can be produced on the same production line. However, it is confirmed that the total nominal capacity of the product concerned, in Russia, is at the levels as estimated above in recital (258). Therefore, the Commission concluded that, given the attractiveness of the Union market, it is likely that the Russian producers will change the product mix, increasing their production capacity of the product under review, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(261) Finally, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and prices as demonstrated above, points to the likelihood that Russian exports and spare capacity would be (re)directed towards the Union, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(262) Consequently, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping, if measures would not be extended.

(263) The like product was manufactured by 12 producers in the Union during the period considered and 11 producers in the Union during the review investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(264) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 291 704 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as data provided by the applicant (95). As indicated in recital (15), three Union producers were selected in the sample representing around 40 % of the total Union production of the like product.

(265) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the sales volumes of the Union industry’s own production destined for the Union market and the import volumes data on the Union market obtained from Eurostat statistics.

(267) Throughout the period considered, the Union consumption increased. It increased with 15 percentage points in 2018 before decreasing with 7 percentage points in the review investigation period compared to 2018. Overall, the Union consumption increased by 8 % between 2016 and the review investigation period.

(268) The Commission established the volume of imports from the countries concerned on the basis of Eurostat statistics. The market share of the imports was established based on of the Union consumption as set out in recital (266).

(270) Imports of the product under review from the countries concerned remained low during the period considered and the review investigation period. Although imports from Russia and the PRC increased between 2016 and the review investigation period, the market share of these two countries remained very low (below 1 %), while the market share of imports from Belarus was below 0,0033 % during the period considered.

(271) The Commission established the average prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat statistics.

(273) Regarding imports from Russia, an increase of the average unit price was observed between 2016 and the review investigation period. This price evolution is consistent with the overall price evolution of the product under review (see also Tables 5 and 9 below).

(274) In view of the very low import volumes from the PRC and Belarus, prices of these imports could not be analysed meaningfully.

(278) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin for the countries concerned of between 6,2 % and 23,5 %.

(279) The imports of the product under review from third countries other than Russia, Belarus and the PRC were mainly from Turkey, India and the Republic of North Macedonia.

(281) Imports of the product under review from Turkey increased substantially during the period considered. The market share of these imports increased with 13 percentage points or around 100 % between 2016 and the review investigation period. Imports from India decreased during the period considered; however, their market share remained important, i.e. 9 %, during the review investigation period. Imports from the Republic of North Macedonia remained constant and represented 4 % market share. The total imports from third countries except the countries concerned increased by 30 % between 2016 and the review investigation period to reach 50 % market share in the review investigation period compared to 42 % in 2016.

(282) The average sales prices of imports from third countries other than the countries concerned increased during the period considered. This trend is consistent with the trend observed for imports from the countries concerned in Table 4 above and the price trend observed for sales of Union industry on the Union market in Table 9 below.

(283) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(284) As mentioned in recital (15), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(285) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data related to all Union producers provided by the applicant. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data related to the sampled Union producers contained in the questionnaire replies. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(286) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(287) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(289) Although the Union consumption increased by 8 percentage points during the period considered as mentioned in recital (267), the production volume of the like product decreased during the same period from 319 525 tonnes in 2016 to 291 704 tonnes in the review investigation period, which represents a decrease by 9 percentage points. Therefore, the increase of the Union consumption has not benefitted to the Union industry.

(290) The decrease of the production volume is mainly due to the increasing competition that the Union industry faces from imports of the product under review originating in third countries other than the countries concerned. As explained in recitals (281) and (282), import volumes from third countries, in particular from Turkey, have significantly increased during the period considered. The market share of imports from third countries other than the countries concerned has increased by 8 percentage points between 2016 and the review investigation period. The total import volume from these countries in the review investigation period was 273 088 tonnes representing a market share of 50 %, while the total imports volume from the countries concerned in the same period was only 2 475 tonnes representing a market share of below 0,5 %.

(291) Although the production capacity remained stable during the period considered, the capacity utilisation decreased from 40 % to 37 % following the same trend as the production volume.

(293) Sales volumes of the Union industry of its own production to unrelated customers in the Union followed the same trend as the production volume and decreased in a similar way by 8 percentage points between 2016 and the review investigation period. The market share of the Union industry also decreased from 58 % in 2016 to 49 % in the review investigation period, which corresponds to the increase of market share of imports from third countries other than the countries concerned, which was by 8 percentage points.

(294) Therefore, the decrease in the sales volume of the Union industry and its market share was caused by the increase of imports from third countries other than the countries concerned.

(295) Although between 2016 and the review investigation period the Union consumption increased by 8 %, the volume of sales to unrelated customers in the Union decreased also by 8 %, which resulted in 9 percentage points market share loss for the Union industry over the period considered. Consequently, there was no growth for the Union industry during the period considered.

(297) The number of employees of the Union industry engaged in the production of the product under review decreased between 2016 and the review investigation period by 3 %. The productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured as output (tonnes) per employee, followed the same trend with a decrease of 6 % over the period considered.

(298) The decrease of the number of employees is due to the decrease of production volume, which is also linked with the decrease of sales and demand for Union industry’s products. The decrease of the productivity is explained by the higher decrease of the production volume compared to the decrease of the number of employees.

(299) The Commission concluded in recital (239) that dumping from Russia continued during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded that there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping from Belarus and the PRC, if measures would not be extended.

(300) At the same time, the level of imports from the countries concerned during the review investigation period was very limited, representing only 0,45 % of the Union consumption. Therefore, the impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was rather limited.

(301) The macroeconomic indicators examined above show that, notwithstanding the anti-dumping measures in force since 2008, the economic situation of the Union industry has remained substantially fragile and injurious. Thus, no recovery from the past dumping could be established and the Union industry remains highly vulnerable to the injurious effects of any dumped imports in the Union market.

(303) The average unit sales prices of the Union industry increased during the period considered. Between 2016 and the review investigation period the prices increased by 18 %. The product under review is a commodity and the sales price is influenced by the price of the main raw material – hot rolled coils – which represents more than 50 % of the cost of production. The increase of the sales prices followed to a certain extent the evolution of the cost of production, which increased by 25 % between 2016 and the review investigation period. However, the average sales price did not increase at the same rate as the unit cost of production, which in addition consistently remained above the average sales price during the period considered. This trend is due to the increase of the price of raw materials and the increased competition from imports which put pressure on the Union industry’s sales prices.

(305) The average labour costs per employee first declined from 2016 to 2017 before progressively increasing in 2018 and the review investigation period. Between 2016 and the review investigation period the average labour cost per employee increased by 8 %.

(307) The inventories of the Union industry decreased between 2016 and the review investigation period. Initially they decreased by 40 % from 2016 to 2017 before progressively increasing in 2018 and the review investigation period but remaining at level lower than 2016. Overall, inventories decreased by 15 % between 2016 and the review investigation period.

(309) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(310) In 2016, the Union industry had a negative profit margin of –6 %, which further decreased to –11 % during the review investigation period. The negative profit margin of the Union industry throughout the period considered is due to the fact that the unit cost of production was always higher than the average sales price of the product under review. As can be seen in Table 9 above, the gap between the unit cost of production and the average sales price further increased in the review investigation period. This situation is explained by the fact that since the product under review is a commodity, the sales price is dependent on the price of the main raw material (hot rolled coils) and the competition on the market. It is observed that due to increased competition from imports from third countries in terms of volumes and low prices, the Union industry could not set sales prices at a level which would allow it to at least cover the cost of production.

(311) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow initially improved in 2017 before declining again in 2018 and the review investigation period when it reached -8 million EUR. This decrease is mainly explained by the decrease in profitability, as described in recital (310).

(312) Investments decreased by 15 % between 2016 and the review investigation period, which further demonstrates the difficult financial situation of the Union industry. The return on investments, which is expressed as the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments dropped from -18 % to -41 % during the period considered and therefore followed the same trend as the profitability.

(313) The evolution of the micro and macro indicators during the period considered showed that the financial situation for the Union industry deteriorated. Overall, the trends of all economic indicators worsened over the period considered.

(314) Production and sales volumes decreased, which had a negative effect on employment and productivity as well as on profitability. The increased competition and price pressure from third country imports caused the profitability situation of the Union industry to further deteriorate. This led to a negative profit margin of –11 % for the Union industry during the review investigation period. The cash flow, investments and return on investments also deteriorated, which made it difficult for the Union industry to raise capital and invest.

(315) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

(316) The Commission assessed whether there is a causal link between imports from the countries concerned and the injury suffered by Union industry.

(317) The volume of imports from the countries concerned was very low during the period considered, and the combined market share of imports from these countries was only 0,43 % during the review investigation period.

(318) At the same time, a surge of low priced imports from third countries other than the countries concerned, such as Turkey, India and the Republic of North Macedonia, put strong price and volume pressure on the Union industry sales. As an illustration, the average sales price of the Union industry to unrelated customers during the review investigation period was 778 EUR/tonne while the average sales price of products imported from Turkey was 626 EUR/tonne and 574 EUR/tonne for products imported from the Republic of North Macedonia. In addition, the market share of imports from countries other than the countries concerned increased from 42 % to 50 % between 2016 and 2019.

(319) Considering the above, the Commission concluded that the material injury suffered by the Union industry could not have been caused by the imports from the countries concerned due to their very limited volume.

(320) Therefore, the Commission further examined the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from the countries concerned if the measures were repealed.

(321) The Commission concluded in recital (315) that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. In recital (319), the Commission also determined that the material injury suffered by the Union industry could not have been caused by imports from the countries concerned. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned if the measures were allowed to lapse.

(322) In order to establish whether there is likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned, the Commission considered the following elements: (1) spare capacity in the countries concerned and the attractiveness of the Union market; and (2) the impact of potential imports and price levels of such imports from these countries on the Union industry’s situation should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(323) As already described in recitals (78), (210) and (250), the exporting producers in Belarus, the PRC and Russia have significant spare capacities, which together exceed substantially the current production volumes and internal demand in these countries (103) and this spare capacity could be used to produce the product under review for export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse.

(324) As described in recitals (205) and (213), the Chinese exporting producers exported to their main third markets at dumped prices, which are on average from 8 % to 21 % lower as compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. As concluded in recital (251), the Russian export prices to third countries were found to be around 29 % lower than the Union producers’ prices on the Union market. Finally, it was established in recital (82) that the Belarusian exporting producers exported to their main third market, Russia, at prices around 5 % lower as compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. Therefore, taking into account the price level of exports from Belarus, the PRC and Russia to other third markets, exporting to the Union is potentially much more attractive for the Belarusian, Chinese and Russian exporters. Consequently, it can be reasonably expected that, should the measures be repealed, Belarusian, Chinese and Russian exporting producers would start again to export high volumes of the product under review to the Union. This expectation is further reinforced by the availability of substantial spare capacity in these countries.

(325) As explained in Section 4.3.2.2, the Commission performed an undercutting analysis without anti-dumping measures to establish how the imports from the countries concerned would affect Union industry should the measures be terminated.

(326) The Commission observed in recital (278) that the undercutting calculation showed a weighted average undercutting margin for the countries concerned of between 6,2 % and 23,5 %.

(327) In addition, the Commission performed a simulation in order to better assess the likely impact of imports from the countries concerned on the financial situation of the Union industry. In this respect, the Commission assumed that exporting producers from the countries concerned would export to the Union the same quantities as before the imposition of the measures (i.e. a combined 250 559 tonnes), and that the Union consumption would remain the same as during the review investigation period (i.e. 541 409 tonnes). The Commission also assumed that 50 % of the total imports from these countries would affect the Union industry and the remaining 50 % would affect imports from other third countries since market shares are at the similar level of magnitude. Finally, the Commission assumed that the Union industry would keep the same sales prices as during the review investigation period since it is already loss making.

(328) The result of this simulation shows that the Union industry is likely to lose sales volume and market share on the Union market. This would have an impact on the industry’s overall profitability, which would decrease from -11 % to -25 %.

(329) This is a conservative analysis taking into consideration that the average sales prices of imports from other third countries are below the average sales price of the Union industry. This means that dumped imports of the product under review from the countries concerned would most likely first gain market share at the expense of the Union industry, before taking over the market share of the exports from other third countries to the Union. This would lead to even further deterioration of the profitability of the Union industry.

(330) Following disclosure, the Belarusian Government argued that considering that according to Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, ‘where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, the effects of such imports shall be cumulatively assessed only if it is determined that (…) the volume of imports from each country is not negligibl e’ and that the imports from Belarus, the PRC and Russia were negligible in 2019, the simulation exercise conclusions should be removed from this Regulation.

(331) The Commission noted that Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation relates to the assessment of the effects of actual imports on the Union industry to determine injury in the framework of an anti-dumping investigation, while the simulation carried out by the Commission in recitals (327) to (329) relates to the determination of the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by imports from the countries concerned in case the measures are allowed to lapse. In order to estimate the potential effects of such imports on the Union industry, the simulation consists of a hypothetical where it is assumed that the countries concerned would export the same quantities as before the imposition of the measures. These quantities were not negligible (104). Therefore, considering that Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation does not apply to the simulation carried out as well as that the potential import volumes from each country considered in the simulation are not negligible, the claim was rejected.

(332) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned at prices undercutting the Union industry prices, and therefore further aggravate the injury suffered by the Union industry. As a consequence, the viability of the Union industry would be at serious risk.

(333) Following disclosure, the Government of Russia claimed that there is a lack of a causal link between imports from Russia and the situation of the Union industry. In this respect, the Commission pointed out that Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation does not require the Commission to perform a causality analysis between imports from the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry in expiry reviews. The findings that the expiry of the measures would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of injury are sufficient to justify the continuation of the measures. The Commission concluded in recital (332) that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned at prices undercutting the Union industry prices, and therefore further aggravate the injury suffered by the Union industry and thus demonstrated the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from the countries concerned, including Russia, if the measures were repealed. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

(334) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, distributors and users.

(335) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their view known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.

(336) Although the anti-dumping measures in force prevented dumped imports from the countries concerned to enter the Union market to a large extent, the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period and its situation is fragile, as confirmed by the negative trends of the injury indicators.

(337) Despite the very low volume of imports of the product under review from the countries concerned, the Commission established that there is a strong likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by imports from these countries should the measures expire. The influx of substantial volumes of dumped imports from the countries concerned would cause further injury to the Union industry. This would worsen the already very fragile economic situation of Union industry and threaten its viability.

(338) The Commission thus concluded that the maintenance of the anti-dumping measures against the countries concerned is in the interest of the Union industry.

(339) The Commission contacted all known unrelated importers, traders and users. Only one distributor provided only filled-in tables without a reply to the narrative part of the questionnaire.

(340) In the previous expiry review and in the original investigation, the analysis of the Union interest did not indicate a negative effect of the measures on unrelated importers, traders and users either.

(341) On this basis, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a significant negative impact on the unrelated importers, traders and users, outweighing the positive impact of the measures on the Union industry.

(342) Following disclosure, the Government of Russia argued that the continuation of the measures would have a negative impact of the EU downstream industries. In this respect, the Commission pointed out that the EU downstream industries had the opportunity to participate in the investigation and to comment on the disclosure. The Commission received no comments from unrelated importers, traders and users. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(343) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of the product under review originating in the countries concerned.

(344) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission concerning the continuation of dumping from Russia, the recurrence of dumping from Belarus and the PRC, the recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from the countries concerned, and the Union interest, the Commission finds that the anti-dumping measures on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel from Belarus, the PRC and Russia should be maintained.

(345) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in Russia and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(346) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it subsequently changes the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (105). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling it to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a notice announcing the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(347) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures on imports of the product under review from Belarus, the PRC and Russia be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. All comments received have been considered by the Commission.

(348) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (106), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(349) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 16 April 2021.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1256/2008 of 16 December 2008 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following a proceeding pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 384/96, originating in Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the same Regulation, originating in Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) and an interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the same Regulation, and terminating the proceedings in respect of imports of the same product originating in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey (OJ L 343, 19.12.2008, p. 1).

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/110 of 26 January 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia and terminating the proceeding for imports of certain welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 20, 27.1.2015, p. 6).

(4) OJ C 166, 15.5.2019, p. 7.

(5) OJ C 24, 24.1.2020, p. 17.

(6) OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6.

(7) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33).

(8) Galvanized pipes/tubes are black pipes/tubes that have subsequently undergone a galvanizing process, in which the pipe/tube is coated with a layer of zinc.

(9) http://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm

(10) https://www.doingbusiness.org/

(11) https://stats.oecd.org/

(12) On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC), Belarus – Russia. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC

(13) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2.

(14) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-12/01/content_5243734.htm

http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c3377945/content.html

http://www.gov.cn:8080/gongbao/content/2019/content_5416183.htm

(15) https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cn/Documents/tax/deloitte-cn-tax-changes-to-vat-regulations-zh-171205.pdf

(16) http://www.transcustoms.cn/index.asp

(17) https://www.globaltradealert.org/

(18) https://m.huaon.com/detail/407989.html

https://m.huaon.com/detail/617918.html

(19) As established in recitals (144) to (152).

(20) Referred to in recital (82) above.

(21) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969.

(22) Report – Chapter 2, p. 6-7.

(23) Report – Chapter 2, p. 10.

(24) Available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4866_0_7.html (last viewed 15 July 2019).

(25) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

(26) Report – Chapter 3, p. 41, 73-74.

(27) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120-121.

(28) Report – Chapter 6. p. 122-135.

(29) Report – Chapter 7, p. 167-168.

(30) Report – Chapter 8, p. 169-170, 200-201.

(31) Report – Chapter 2, p. 15-16, Report – Chapter 4, p. 50, p. 84, Report – Chapter 5, p. 108-9.

(32) Report – Chapter 3, p. 22-24 and Chapter 5, p. 97-108.

(33) Report – Chapter 5, p. 104-9.

(34) Report – Chapter 14, p. 358: 51 % private and 49 % SOEs in terms of production and 44 % SOEs and 56 % private companies in terms of capacity.

(35) Available at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm (last viewed 2 March 2020); https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/higher-expectations-for-large-scale-steel enterprise/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e (last viewed 2 March 2020), and www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(36) Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 2 March 2020) and http://www.jjckb.cn/2019-04/23/c_137999653.htm (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(37) As was the case of the merger between the private company Rizhao and the SOE Shandong Iron and Steel in 2009. See Beijing steel report, p. 58, and the acquired majority stake of China Baowu Steel Group in Magang Steel in June 2019, see https://www.ft.com/content/a7c93fae-85bc-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(38) Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-1.

(39) Report – Chapter 2, p. 26.

(40) Report – Chapter 2, p. 31-2.

(41) Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (last viewed 15 July 2019).

(42) The full text of the plan is available on the MIIT website:

http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c5353943/content.html (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(43) TISCO, ‘Company profile’, http://en.tisco.com.cn/CompanyProfile/20151027095855836705.html (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(44) Baowu, ‘Company profile’, http://www.baowugroup.com/en/contents/5273/102759.html (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(45) Report – Chapters 14.1 to 14.3.

(46) Report – Chapter 4, p. 41-42, 83.

(47) Analysis of the 2018 steel welded pipes industry in China, Huajing Information Network, published on 5.3.2019 https://m.huaon.com/detail/407989.html

(48) Report, Part III, Chapter 14, p. 346 ff.

(49) Introduction to The Plan for Adjusting and Upgrading the Steel Industry.

(50) Report, Chapter 14, p. 347.

(51) The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), available at

https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf (last viewed 2 March 2020).

(52) Report – Chapter 14, p. 349.

(53) Report – Chapter 14, p. 352.

(54) Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment) issued by Order No 9 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 27 March 2011, and amended in accordance with the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) issued by Order No 21 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 16 February 2013.

(55) Report – Chapter 14, pp. 375 – 376.

(56) Report – Chapter 6, p. 138-149.

(57) Report – Chapter 9, p. 216.

(58) Report – Chapter 9, p. 213-215.

(59) Report – Chapter 9, p. 209-211.

(60) Report – Chapter 13, p. 332-337.

(61) Report – Chapter 13, p. 336.

(62) Report – Chapter 13, p. 337-341.

(63) Report – Chapter 6, p. 114-117.

(64) Report – Chapter 6, p. 119.

(65) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120.

(66) See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan, October 2016, WP/16/203.

(67) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(68) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

(69) If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

(70) In Turkey, during the RIP, there were no import data for an important factor of production – the main by-product (non-alloy steel scrap). Furthermore, there were export restrictions with regard to sulphuric acid. In Thailand, import data were available for all the raw materials and by-products, and no export/import restrictions were identified concerning any of the factors of production.

(71) Figures provided for the manufacturing overheads were remotely crosschecked and reconciled with the company accounts.

(72) https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/t/thailand/THA.pdf p. 48.

(73) https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2011/12/thailand-other-taxes-levies.html

(74) https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer17/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=HOW_TEMP_SEX_ECO_NB_A

(75) http://www.nso.go.th/sites/2014en/Pages/Statistical%20Themes/Population-Society/Labour/Labour-Force.aspx (Quarter 1 to 4, Excel file – Folder 1-19 Wk, Table 15).

(76) http://www.mea.or.th/en/profile/109/114 – industrial TOU tariff was used.

(77) http://www.eppo.go.th/index.php/en/en-energystatistics/energy-economy-static Table 7.2.4.

(78) https://www.dede.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=42079

(79) https://www.pacificpipe.co.th/EN/investor.html#financial_information

(80) https://asiametal.co.th/Investor/index.php?page=fin_data&lang=0

(81) On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) – China-the Netherlands. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC

(82) On the basis of quotation for Tianjin port – Beijing deliveries as provided by World Bank https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/c/china/CHN.pdf p. 88.

(83) http://www.transcustoms.cn/index.asp

(84) Countries are listed according to the volumes of imports from the PRC.

(85) On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) – China-country in question. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC

(86) On the basis of quotation for Tianjin port – Beijing deliveries as provided by World Bank https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/c/china/CHN.pdf p. 88.

(87) In case of Peru, the country custom codes do not allow to distinguish between the black and galvanized products. Therefore, all the pipes/tubes under review were treated as one product type in the calculation.

(88) https://m.huaon.com/detail/407989.html; https://m.huaon.com/detail/617918.html

(89) Analysis of the 2018 steel welded pipes industry in China, Huajing Information Network, published on 5.3.2019 https://m.huaon.com/detail/407989.html

(90) https://www.globaltradealert.org/

https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction

https://www.globaltradealert.org/latest/state-acts

(91) On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) – Russia-Latvia: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC#.

(92) On the basis of quotation for Moscow – St Petersburg deliveries as provided by World Bank: https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/r/russia/RUS.pdf p. 85.

(93) European Union —Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia, Panel Report of 24 July 2020, WT/DS494/R.

(94) Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

(95) The production volume is based on EU-27 data as the United Kingdom ceased to be part of the European Union as from 1 February 2020 and the transition period for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal ended on 31 December 2020.

(96) The consumption is based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

(97) The import volume is based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

(98) The import prices are based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

(99) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/566 of 9 April 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings originating in the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kora and Malaysia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council and terminating the investigation concerning the imports of the same product originating in the Republic of Turkey (OJ L 99, 10.4.2019, p. 9), recital 128.

(100) Imports from third countries are based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom as a Member State but including data related to the United Kingdom as a third country.

(101) The macroeconomic indicators are based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

(102) Microeconomic indicators are based on EU-28 data, including the United Kingdom. Based on the low volume of sales of the sampled Union producers in the United Kingdom (approx. 3 % of the average EU sales of those producers in the RIP), the impact of transactions concerning the United Kingdom would appear to be minimal on the injury findings, and the conclusions on material injury would therefore not have been altered when using EU-27 data.

(103) The spare capacity in the PRC exceeds more than ten times the total Union consumption during the review investigation period, while the sole cooperating Russian exporting producer has a nominal production capacity that exceeds the total Union consumption. The spare capacity in Belarus represents 9 % of the Union consumption.

(104) 184 887 tons from the PRC, 36 057 tons from Russia and 29 615 tons from Belarus.

(105) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(106) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).