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Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1805 of 12 October 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of wire rod originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2021-10-13
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 2

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (124) Total sales on the free market by the Union industry decreased by almost 1,5 million tonnes over the period considered. While consumption had increased to its highest level in 2018 (+ 3 %), it already showed a downward trend (-2 %) which continued in 2019 and in the review investigation period. Overall sales on the EU free market decreased by 9 %.
  • (125) The market share of free market sales of the Union industry in the free market remained rather stable over the period considered. After the share of free market sales increased in 2017-19 by 1 %, it decreased by 1,3 percentage points in the review investigation period.
4.5.2.3.   Growth
  • (126) In a context of decreasing consumption, the Union industry not only lost sales volumes in the EU but also lost market share on the free market. Consequently, there was no growth for the Union industry during the period considered.
4.5.2.4.   Employment and productivity
  • (127) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity
2017 2018 2019 RIP
Number of employees 10 271 10 530 11 125 10 853
Index (2017 = 100) 100 103 108 106
Productivity (unit/employee) 1 957 1 963 1 793 1 686
Index (2017 = 100) 100 100 92 86
Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers
  • (128) The Union industry managed to maintain and even increase the number of employees engaged in the production of the product under review, which increased between 2017 and the review investigation period by 6 %.
  • (129) The productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured as output (tonnes) per employee, followed a downward trend over the period considered (-14 %) as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic that caused a reduction in the overall production volume of wire rod. The considerable decrease of the productivity is explained by the higher decrease of the production volume, which is also linked with the decrease of sales and demand for Union industry’s products, compared to the increase of the number of employees.
4.5.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
  • (130) The dumping margin established for the country concerned in the original investigation was well above the de minimis level. As explained above, there were no dumped imports from the country concerned during the period considered, therefore the magnitude of dumping margin could not be assessed.
  • (131) In the previous expiry review it was concluded that the Union industry had remained substantially fragile and injured. During the period considered of the current expiry review investigation, the Union industry showed signs of recovery from the effects of past dumping but all the main injury indicators after remaining rather stable in 2017-19 decreased in the review investigation period following a similar trend with the decrease of Union consumption as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, Union industry remains very vulnerable to the injurious effects of any dumped imports in the Union market and should measures be repealed, the impact of the expected dumping on the Union industry would be significant based on the decreasing prices of exports from the PRC to the third countries, as mentioned in recitals (90) and (91).

4.5.3.   Microeconomic indicators 73

4.5.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices
  • (132) Over the period considered, the average unit sales prices to unrelated customers in the Union and the average unit cost of production of the sampled Union producers developed as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices in the Union
2017 2018 2019 RIP
Average unit sales price on the free market (EUR/tonne) 529 604 560 521
Index (2017 = 100) 100 114 106 98
Unit cost of production (EUR/tonne) 523 564 591 575
Index (2017 = 100) 100 108 113 110
Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers
  • (133) Throughout the period considered, sales prices on the Union market to unrelated parties (the free market) decreased by 2 %. A detailed analysis shows that from 2017 to 2018, the sales prices increased by 14 % before decreasing in 2019 by 8 percentage points and decreasing further by 8 percentage points in the review investigation period. The increase of the sales prices followed until 2019 to a certain extent the evolution of the cost of production, which increased by 13 % in 2017-19 remaining though superior to the average sales price. In the review investigation period the cost of production decreased by 3 percentage points. Overall, over the period considered, the average sales price decreased by 2 % while the cost of production increased by 10 %, thus the Union industry was not in a position to increase the sales price in order to cover the increase of the cost of production.
4.5.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (134) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee
2017 2018 2019 RIP
Average labour costs per employee (EUR) 56 548 59 747 58 983 56 665
Index (2017 = 100) 100 106 104 100
Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers
  • (135) The average labour costs per employee first increased from 2017 to 2018 before progressively decreasing in 2019 and the review investigation period. Overall, between 2017 and the review investigation period, the average labour cost per employee remained stable.
4.5.3.3.   Inventories
  • (136) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories
2017 2018 2019 RIP
Closing stocks (tonnes) 363 501 444 814 417 212 420 511
Index (2017 = 100) 100 122 115 116
Closing stocks as a percentage of production 6,8 8,2 8,3 9,5
Index (2017 = 100) 100 122 123 140
Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers
  • (137) The inventories of the Union industry increased between 2017 and the review investigation period, remaining however constantly below 10 % of the yearly production volume the whole period considered. The considerable increase by 40 % of the inventories as a percentage of production observed from 2017 to the review investigation period follows to a certain extent the decrease in the production volume as mentioned in recital (120), with EU producers not being able to dispose of their production given the similar downward trend of the overall Union consumption as mentioned in recital (103).
4.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (138) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments
2017 2018 2019 RIP
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) 1,2 6,5 -5,4 -10,4
Index (2017 = 100) 100 530 - 546 - 952
Cash flow (EUR) 62 999 177 158 497 581 -32 609 909 -73 869 927
Index (2017 = 100) 100 252 - 152 - 217
Investments (EUR) 57 591 654 50 424 514 76 852 470 65 369 090
Index (2017 = 100) 100 88 133 114
Return on investments (%) 1,4 8,1 -5,5 -8,5
Index (2017 = 100) 100 576 - 495 - 705
Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers Source: Sampled Union producers
  • (139) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.
  • (140) Profitability first increased in 2018 as a consequence of increased sales prices to unrelated parties (the free market) at a level exceeding the increase of the cost of production. It decreased in 2019 and further in the review investigation period following a similar trend with the decrease of sales prices as explained in recital (133). The negative profit margin of the Union industry in 2019 and the period considered is due to the fact that the unit cost of production remained superior to the average sales price. As it could be seen in Table 9 above, the gap between the unit cost of production and the average sales price further increased in the review investigation period. Overall, the reduction in the Union consumption of wire rod as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and to some extent due to the competition on the market from imports from other third countries constantly at prices lower than the Union industry prices, did not allow the Union industry to set sales prices at a level which would allow at least to cover the cost of production.
  • (141) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. Net cash flow evolved to a large extent in line with profitability and initially improved in 2018 before declining substantially in 2019 and the review investigation period, when profitability was at the lowest point in the period considered.
  • (142) Investments increased slightly by 14 % over the period considered, which further demonstrates the difficult financial situation of the Union industry.
  • (143) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It developed negatively over the period considered from 1,4 % in 2017 to -8,5 % in the review investigation period. Such development follows the decreasing profitability of the Union industry.

4.6.   Conclusion on injury

  • (144) Most macroeconomic indicators showed a negative trend over the period considered such as production, capacity utilization, sales volume in the EU market, market share and productivity. Only capacity and employment showed a slightly positive trend. Similarly, most microeconomic indicators showed a negative trend over the period considered such as sales prices in the EU free market, cost of production, profitability, closing stocks, cash flow and return on investments. Only investments showed a positive trend, after the sampled producers made investments in order to maintain competitiveness and follow the latest product developments. The same injury indicators also developed negatively when looking at the period 2017-19, that is, before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • (145) Moreover, the competition from third countries’ imports other than the country concerned and the price pressure deteriorated further the profitability situation of the Union industry which had a negative profit margin of –10,4 % in the review investigation period. The cash flow and return on investments also deteriorated, which put the Union industry in a difficulty to rise capital and grow.
  • (146) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.
  • (147) The Commission assessed whether there is a causal link between imports from the country concerned and the injury suffered by Union industry.
  • (148) The volumes of imports from the country concerned remained at a negligible level throughout the period considered.
  • (149) At the same time, low priced imports from third countries other than the country concerned, such as Turkey, Russia and Belarus, put a strong price pressure on the Union industry. As an illustration, the average sales price of Union industry to unrelated customers during the review investigation period was 521 EUR/tonne while the average sales price of products imported from Turkey was 473 EUR/tonne and 434 EUR/tonne for products imported from Russia.
  • (150) Considering the above, the Commission concluded that the material injury suffered by the Union industry could not have been caused by the imports from the PRC due to their very limited volume.
  • (151) Therefore, the Commission further examined the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from the PRC if the measures were repealed.

5. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY ORIGINALLY CAUSED BY DUMPED IMPORTS FROM THE PRC IF THE MEASURES WERE REPEALED

  • (152) The Commission concluded in recital (146) that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded in recital (150), that the injury to the Union industry observed during the review investigation period could not have been caused by dumped imports from the PRC due to their very limited volume. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the PRC if the measures against were allowed to lapse.
  • (153) In this regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the country concerned, the relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union and the impact of potential imports and price levels of such imports from these countries on the Union industry’s situation should the measures be allowed to lapse.

5.1.   Spare capacity in the PRC and the attractiveness of the Union market

  • (154) As already described in recitals (94) and (95), the exporting producers in the PRC have significant spare capacities, which together exceed substantially the current production volumes and internal demand in this country 74 and this spare capacity could be used to produce the product under review for export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse. The quantities that could be exported by Chinese exporting producers are significant compared to the size of the EU market. Indeed, the spare capacities represent around 5 times the total Union consumption in the review investigation period.
  • (155) As described in recital (91) and Table 2, the Chinese exporting producers exported to their main third markets at dumped prices, which are on average from 10 % to 15 % lower as compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. Therefore, taking into account the price level of exports from the PRC to other third markets, exporting to the Union is potentially much more attractive for the Chinese exporters. Consequently, it can be reasonably expected that, should the measures be repealed, Chinese exporting producers would start again to export high volumes of the product under review to the Union. This expectation is further reinforced by the availability of substantial spare capacity in the PRC.

5.2.   Impact of potential imports from the PRC on the Union industry’s situation should the measures lapse

  • (156) As explained in Section 4.3.2, the Commission performed an undercutting analysis without anti-dumping measures to establish how the imports from the PRC would affect Union industry should the measures be terminated.
  • (157) The Commission observed in recital (110) that the undercutting calculation showed a weighted average undercutting margin of 4,5 %.
  • (158) In addition, the Commission performed a simulation in order to better assess the likely impact of imports from the PRC on the financial situation of the Union industry. Two scenarios were modelled, namely a surge of imports from the PRC (i) without affecting the sales prices to the unrelated customers by the Union industry and (ii) a drop of sales prices in the Union due to increased competition. Moreover, for the determination of the hypothetical cost of production the Commission took into account the share of the fixed costs to the total costs of production of the sampled Union producers.
  • (159) In this respect, the Commission assumed that the Union consumption would remain the same as during the review investigation period, that is 18,8 million tonnes and that exporting producers from the PRC would export to the Union quantities corresponding to a market share for the PRC of 5 % as during the initial IP, that is 0,94 million tonnes.
  • (160) The Commission also assumed that 20 % of the total imports from the PRC would affect the Union industry and the remaining 80 % would affect imports from other third countries. The simulation was based on the data submitted by the sampled Union producers and is a very conservative approach taking into consideration that the average sales prices of imports from other third countries are below the average sales price of the Union industry. This means that dumped imports of the product under review from the PRC would most likely first gain market share at the expense of the Union industry, before taking over the market share of the exports from other third countries to the Union. Even under this conservative assumption Union industry would suffer up to 23 % losses as is illustrated below. In any other assumption (e.g. 50 %-50 %) losses would be much higher leading to even further deterioration of the profitability of the Union industry.
  • (161) In the first scenario, that is keeping the same sales prices as during the review investigation period, the profitability of the Union industry would fall by 72 % or by 7,5 percentage points, that is from -10,4 % to -17,9 %.
  • (162) In the second scenario, the effect of a price decrease was found to be potentially highly damaging. In case of a decrease of Union prices to the level of Chinese export prices to third countries (CIF price at EU border calculated at 499 EUR/tonne), the profit would drop from -10,4 % to -23,2 %.
  • (163) In both scenarios, the impact of a surge of Chinese imports at low prices would significantly aggravate the injury already suffered by the Union industry.
  • (164) On this basis, and noting the current fragile situation of the Union industry, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at injurious prices and the already precarious situation of the Union industry would dramatically deteriorate as a result, jeopardising its sheer survival.
  • (165) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that there is likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by imports from the PRC should the measures be repealed.

6. UNION INTEREST

  • (166) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, distributors and users.
  • (167) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their view known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.

6.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (168) Although the anti-dumping measures in force prevented dumped imports from the PRC to enter the Union market to a large extent, the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period and its situation is fragile, as confirmed by the negative trends of the injury indicators.
  • (169) On the basis of the above, the Commission established that there is a strong likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by imports from this country should the measures expire. The influx of substantial volumes of dumped imports from the PRC would cause further injury to the Union industry. This would worsen the already very fragile economic situation of Union industry and threaten its viability.
  • (170) The Commission thus concluded that the maintenance of the anti-dumping measures against the PRC is in the interest of the Union industry.

6.2.   Interest of unrelated importers, traders and users

  • (171) The Commission contacted all known unrelated importers, traders and users. As mentioned in recital (19), the Commission received one questionnaire reply filled in by a user. This user explained that the market needs a certain price stability and thus cannot afford the destabilizing impact of dumped imports.
  • (172) Moreover, in the previous expiry review and in the original investigation, the analysis of the Union interest did not indicate a negative effect of the measures on importers, traders and users either it was concluded that the overall possible impact of the imposition of measures on the activity of the users would be very limited. Firstly, the vast majority of users purchase their wire rod from non-Chinese sources which are abundant. Secondly, the possible impact from the imposition of measures should be seen in the light of the downstream products which enjoy a high added value. On this basis, it is concluded that the maintenance of the measures would not negatively impact the current situation of the users.
  • (173) On this basis, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a significant negative impact on the importers and users, outweighing the positive impact of the measures on the Union industry.

6.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (174) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of the product under review originating in the PRC.

7. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

  • (175) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission concerning the continuation of dumping, the recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from the country concerned, and the Union interest, the Commission found that the anti-dumping measures on imports of wire rod from the PRC should be maintained.
  • (176) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the PRC and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.
  • (177) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it subsequently changes the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission 75. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling it to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it.
  • (178) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures on imports of the product under review from the PRC be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. All comments received have been considered by the Commission.
  • (179) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.
  • (180) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 76, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of bars and rods, hot-rolled, in irregularly wound coils, of iron, non-alloy steel or alloy steel other than of stainless steel originating in the People’s Republic of China, currently falling under CN codes 7213 10 00, 7213 20 00, 7213 91 10, 7213 91 20, 7213 91 41, 7213 91 49, 7213 91 70, 7213 91 90, 7213 99 10, 7213 99 90, 7227 10 00, 7227 20 00, 7227 90 10, 7227 90 50 and 7227 90 95.

2.

The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

Company Anti-dumping duty (%) TARIC additional code
Valin Group 7,9 A930
All other companies 24,0 A999
3.

The application of the individual duty rate specified for the company mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of wire rod sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’ shall apply.

4.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 October 2021.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Council Regulation (EC) No 703/2009 of 27 July 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of wire rod originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of wire rod originating in the Republic of Moldova and Turkey (OJ L 203, 5.8.2009, p. 1).

3

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1846 of 14 October 2015 imposing a definitive antidumping duty on imports of wire rod originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 268, 15.10.2015, p. 9).

4

Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 35, 3.2.2020, p. 3).

5

Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of wire rod originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 342, 14.10.2020, p. 23).

6

Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6).

7

This note was a revised version of the second note of 22 December 2020, as due to an administrative error, the first version had inadvertently not taken the applicant’s comments into account.

8

Commission staff working document on significant distortions in the economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of trade defence investigations of 20.12.2017, SWD (2017) 483 final.

9

https://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/htscty_wta.cfm

10

https://www.dnb.com/

11

https://orbis4.bvdinfo.com/version-201866/orbis/Companies

12

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 145) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 of 7 April 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 110, 8.4.2020, p. 3).

13

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 149 and 150 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 158 and 159.

14

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 115 to 118 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 122 to 127.

15

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 119 to 122 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 128 to 132: While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of wire rod producers and the suppliers of their inputs.

16

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 123 to 129 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 133 to 138.

17

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 130 to 133 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 139 to 142.

18

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134 and 135 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143 and 144.

19

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 136 to 145 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 145 to 154.

20

The request quoted the United States Department of Commerce, China’s status as a non-market economy, A-570-053, 26 October 2017, p. 57.

21

The complaint quoted Financial Times: China’s Communist Party writes itself into company law, 14 August 2017.

22

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17).

23

ThinkDesk Report, ‘Analysis of state-business interaction and subsidization in the hot-rolled flat (HRF) segment of the Chinese steel industry’, 28 February 2016.

24

TISCO, ‘Company profile’, http://en.tisco.com.cn/CompanyProfile/20151027095855836705.html (last viewed 2 March 2020).

25

Baowu, ‘Company profile’, http://www.baowugroup.com/en/contents/5273/102759.html (last viewed 6 May 2021).

26

Report – Chapter 14, p. 358: 51 % private and 49 % SOEs in terms of production and 44 % SOEs and 56 % private companies in terms of capacity.

27

Available at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021); https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/higher-expectations-for-large-scale-steel-enterprise/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e (last viewed 6 May 2021), and www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021).

28

Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021) and http://www.jjckb.cn/2019-04/23/c_137999653.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021).

29

As was the case of the merger between the private company Rizhao and the SOE Shandong Iron and Steel in 2009. See Beijing steel report, p. 58, and the acquired majority stake of China Baowu Steel Group in Magang Steel in June 2019, see https://www.ft.com/content/a7c93fae-85bc-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (last viewed 6 May 2021).

30

See press report by Xinhua Network: ‘Shagang Group: Party building leads to high-quality development and creates a model for party building in non-public enterprises’, 25 December 2020, http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/2020-12/25/c_1126907346.htm (last viewed on 6 May 2021).

31

See the article on the Anshan website: ‘Anshan Iron and Steel builds and strengthens the party building work model’, 13 June 2018: http://www.ansteelgroup.com/ddjs/2020-03-26-02-58-29/3167-2020-04-26-02-24-53 (last viewed on 6 May 2021).

32

See the article published on the Anshan website: ‘Keep employees’ passion for entrepreneurship’, 14 January 2019: http://www.ansteelgroup.com/ddjs/2020-03-26-02-58-29/3166-bczggscydjq (last viewed of 6 May 2021).

33

See Articles of Association of Baoshan, Article 133.4: http://static.sse.com.cn//disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2021-01-08/600019_20210108_8.pdf (last viewed 6 May 2021).

34

See Shougang’s website: https://www.shougang.com.cn/sgweb/html/ddjs/ (last viewed 6 May 2021).

35

Report, Part III, Chapter 14, p. 346 ff.

36

Introduction to The Plan for Adjusting and Upgrading the Steel Industry.

37

Report, Chapter 14, p. 347.

38

The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-20), available at https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf (last viewed 6 May 2021).

39

Report – Chapter 14, p. 349.

40

Report – Chapter 14, p. 352.

41

Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment) issued by Order No 9 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 27 March 2011, and amended in accordance with the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) issued by Order No 21 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 16 February 2013.

42

See the 2018 annual report, page 66: http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN201908201344693765_1.pdf

43

See the 2019 annual report, pages 62 and 67: https://www.shclearing.com/xxpl/cwbg/nb/202006/t20200630_705111.html

44

See the 2019 annual report, page 93: https://www.shclearing.com/xxpl/cwbg/nb/202005/t20200529_691364.html and the 2018 annual report, page 104: http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN201905011325247353_1.pdf

45

See the 2019 annual report, pages 181 and 187: http://static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2020-04-29/1207654234.PDF

46

See the 2019 annual report, pages 121 and 129: https://www.shougang.com.cn/u/cms/www/202004/29163130go9a.pdf

47

See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143-144.

48

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income, last accessed 13 October 2020.

49

See recital (38).

50

https://www.osinergmin.gob.pe/seccion/institucional/regulacion-tarifaria/pliegos-tarifarios/electricidad, last accessed 20 January 2021, https://www.osinergmin.gob.pe/seccion/institucional/regulacion-tarifaria/pliegos-tarifarios/gas-natural, last accessed 20 January 2021.

51

https://www.sunass.gob.pe/prestadores/empresas-prestadoras/estudios-tarifarios/, last accessed 20 January 2021.

52

https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/labour-costs/, last accessed 20 January 2021.

53

See recital (28).

54

Monthly prices falling within these ranges.

55

Monthly prices falling within these ranges.

56

Normally, import data on imports in the representative country from non-WTO members listed in Annex 1 to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33) are also excluded. However, as Peru did not import any of the factors of production from any of the aforementioned countries during the review investigation period, the imports from other third countries were 100 % of total volumes imported to Peru for the factors of production listed in Table 1.

57

https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/, last accessed 20 January 2021.

58

https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/320807/IF-161-2018-MTPE-2-14.1.pdf at p. 2, and also https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264305823-en.pdf?expires=1611133368&id=id&accname=oid031827&checksum=AD488AE7705661410076E3EC1D21F9F5 at p. 88, last accessed 20 January 2021.

59

https://www.osinergmin.gob.pe/seccion/institucional/regulacion-tarifaria/pliegos-tarifarios/gas-natural, last accessed 20 January 2021.

60

https://www.osinergmin.gob.pe/seccion/institucional/regulacion-tarifaria/pliegos-tarifarios/electricidad, last accessed 20 January 2021.

61

https://www.sunass.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/emapisco_fina_261218.pdf, last accessed 20 January 2021.

62

https://investors.acerosarequipa.com/storage/memorias/July2020/sk9JvC6DOo51hCmXhDQ2.pdf, last accessed 20 January 2021.

63

This data is presented in ranges in order to protect the confidentiality of business sensitive information under Article 19 of the basic Regulation.

64

https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3972213/Search-results/FOCUS-Chinas-steel-exports-expected-to-rise-in-2021.html, last accessed 1 February 2021.

65

https://www.kallanish.com/en/steel-news/market-reports/article-details/chinese-wire-rod-exports-diverge-from-domestic-market-0121/, last accessed 1 February 2021.

66

https://www.mysteel.net/. Other sources mentioned by the applicant, such as CRU and Worldsteel, show similar figures.

67

Measures were put in place against wire rod from the PRC by, for example, Australia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and the United States.

68

The production volume is based on EU-27 data as the United Kingdom ceased to be part of the European Union on 1 January 2021.

69

The consumption is based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

70

The import volume is based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

71

See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/566 of 9 April 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings originating in the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council and terminating the investigation concerning the imports of the same product originating in the Republic of Turkey (OJ L 99, 10.4.2019, p. 9), recital 128.

72

The macroeconomic indicators are based on EU-27 data, excluding data related to the United Kingdom.

73

Microeconomic indicators are based on EU-28 data, including the United Kingdom. Considering that the sales into the United Kingdom constituted only 1,5 % of the sampled Union producers, the conclusions on material injury would not have been altered.

74

The spare capacity in the PRC exceeds more than 5 times the total Union consumption in the free market during the review investigation period.

75

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

76

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

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