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Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/116 of 27 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of acesulfame potassium originating in the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation

Publication 2022-01-28

State In force

Text As published

Department European Commission, TRADE

Source EUR-Lex

articles 2

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API


	2017	2018	2019	Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/ tonne)	[9 840 – 11 911 ]	[9 833 – 11 903 ]	[10 941 – 13 245 ]	[13 279 – 16 075 ]
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/tonne) (Index)	100	100	111	135
Unit cost of production (EUR/ tonne) (Index)	100	97	101	101
Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.

(265) The Union industry’s average unit sales price to unrelated customers increased by 35 % over the period considered following the imposition of anti-dumping measures.

(266) The cost of production remained stable during the period considered.

5.5.1.6. Labour costs

(267) The average labour costs of the Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee


	2017	2018	2019	Review Investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR)	[88 709 – 107 384 ]	[91 459 – 110 714 ]	[96 239 – 116 500 ]	[98 783 – 119 579 ]
Index	100	103	108	111
Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.

(268) The Union industry average labour costs per employee increased by 11 % over the period considered.

5.5.1.7. Inventories

(269) Stock levels of the sole Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Inventories


	2017	2018	2019	Review Investigation period
Closing stocks (tonnes)	[696 – 842 ]	[979 – 1 186 ]	[1 150 – 1 392 ]	[1 226 – 1 484 ]
Index	100	103	108	111
Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.

(270) Inventories increased by 11 % during the period considered.

5.5.1.8. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(271) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union producer developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments


	2017	2018	2019	Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (Index)	100	116	137	193
Cash flow (EUR)	[12 183 444 – 14 748 380 ]	[10 422 105 – 12 616 232 ]	[15 616 733 – 18 904 467 ]	[21 987 559 – 26 616 519 ]
Index	100	86	128	180
Investments (EUR)	[1 360 987 – 1 647 510 ]	[1 187 387 – 1 437 363 ]	[1 236 940 – 1 497 348 ]	[1 182 289 – 1 431 192 ]
Index	100	87	91	87
Return on investments	[92 – 111 ]	[92 – 111 ]	[131 – 159 ]	[206 – 250 ]
Index	100	100	142	224
Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.	Source: Data provided by the Union industry.

(272) The Commission established the profitability of the Union producer by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The profitability showed a strong increase by 93 % during the period considered. The anti-dumping duties allowed the Union producer to return to a high level of profitability.

(273) The investigation showed that the RIP was characterised by exceptional circumstances, which were linked to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, large food and pharma grade customers bought higher volumes of Ace-K from the Union industry during the first half of 2020 in order to secure supplies of this ingredient. Also, the yearly maintenance of the Union industry which entails a period where production is stopped, was postponed in 2020 as compared to its usual timing in the year, which has led to increased production in the RIP. These exceptional market developments generated an increase in the Union industry’s sales prices as compared to 2019 and an increase in the Union industry’s profit in the RIP. The investigation found that by eliminating such one-off impacts, the profit of the Union industry would be in the same order of magnitude as the profitability achieved before the exceptional circumstances took place, i.e. in 2019.

(274) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow increased similar to the profitability by 80 %, reflecting again the positive effect of the anti-dumping duties and exceptional circumstances in the RIP described in recital (273).

(275) The level of investment decreased by 13 % over the period considered. As described in recital (272), the anti-dumping duties allowed to return to healthy business activities but did not justify the need for investments in additional production capacities.

(276) The return on investment increased considerably by 124 % during the period considered.

5.5.1.9. Conclusion on injury

(277) Most injury indicators, such as production, employment, capacity utilisation, productivity, profitability and cash flow developed positively. While the trend of the financial indicators such as the level of investment and the return on investment is negative, their absolute levels are satisfactory and do not indicate a sign of material injury.

(278) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the Union industry has recovered from previous injury and did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

6. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

(279) The Commission concluded in recital (278) that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the PRC if the measures against Chinese imports were allowed to lapse.

(280) The Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, the likely price levels of imports from the PRC in the absence of anti-dumping measures and their impact on the Union industry, including the level of undercutting in the absence of anti-dumping measures.

(281) As set out in recitals (210) - (223) above, there is substantial production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC to increase exports to the EU market rapidly in the event that the anti-dumping measures were allowed to expire.

(282) This significant overcapacity and the attractiveness of the Union market described in recitals (225) to (229) would be likely to generate massive additional exports to the Union at dumped prices, which could easily cover the full Union consumption.

(283) In the world market outside the Union, where no trade defence measures are in place, Chinese producers have a dominant market share (on average more than 70 %).

(284) In the absence of measures, it is likely that the market share of Chinese producers would reach at least their worldwide market share.

(285) In its comments on final disclosure, Anhui Jinhe argued that there was no dominant position of China on third markets as the alleged 70 % market share of Chinese producers on third markets corresponded to their share in total production capacity in the world, and this market share therefore reflected a well-balanced repartition of the world market between competing producers.

(286) In its comments on Anhui Jinhe’s submission, the applicant claimed that Anhui Jinhe’s argument was based on a comparison of total Chinese production capacity with the total production capacity of the applicant and that this argument was invalid because there was significant excess capacity in China.

(287) Anhui Jinhe’s argument reflects China’s step-by-step approach to industrial policy: massive overcapacity is built, based on State-led distortions; a large part of that overcapacity is exported globally; decimating competitors in the EU (and elsewhere), not on the basis of genuine competitiveness, but on the basis of unfair trade; Chinese companies attain massive, even dominant positions worldwide. This is then argued to be ‘normal repartition’. Yet markets should not be driven by the size of competitors, but rather by their ability to compete on a fair basis on a level playing field. This argumentation provides a Chinese narrative as to the reasons behind China’s massive global presence. But the fact remains that such massive presence has a material impact on competition, and leads to the Commission’s findings that in the absence of anti-dumping measures, the market share of Chinese producers on the Union market would very likely increase significantly and that this would entail an important loss of market share for the Union producer. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(288) Without the anti-dumping duties, customs cleared prices of Chinese Ace-K would range from about 6,2 to 6,75 EUR/kg. When comparing these prices to the Union industry’s unit cost of production, net of freight and warehousing during the RIP and its average ex-works sales price in the Union for food grade Ace-K in the RIP to users and to traders, the analysis showed that prices of imports from China would undercut the Union industry’s sales prices by more than 45 %.

(289) In the absence of measures, in a scenario where Chinese exporting producers would have in the EU the same penetration as in other world markets (around 70 % on average) ⁸⁰, the loss in sales and resulting increase in the costs of the Union industry would entail significant financial losses considering the likely price levels, with profitability becoming negative. Injury would thus become material within a short period and jeopardise the survival of the Union industry.

(290) This likely scenario is supported by the evidence provided by the applicant of a significant loss of sales and market share in the UK following Brexit and the resulting removal of anti-dumping measures on Ace-K. Indeed, a similar situation is likely to develop in the Union market in the absence of measures.

(291) In its comments on final disclosure, Anhui Jinhe argued that that the applicant did not suffer a significant loss of sales and market share in the UK following the removal of anti-dumping duties due to Brexit. In addition, Anhui Jinhe claimed that there was no evidence on the open file regarding the UK sales of the applicant and an increase of Chinese exports to the UK.

(292) In its comments on Anhui Jinhe’s submission, the applicant claimed the Anhui Jinhe had access to Chinese export statistics and that the applicant had also provided such export data in the course of the investigation. Moreover, the applicant pointed out that its loss off business took place already in anticipation of the lifting of anti-dumping duties in the UK.

(293) In this respect, the Commission recalls that the applicant submitted its questionnaire reply first with data including the UK in the EU sales and then a new version with data excluding the UK. The non-confidential versions of the two questionnaire replies are on the open file. The Commission also analysed import statistics of the product under review from China to the UK. In reply to Anhui Jinhe’s submission, a note was added to the non-confidential file of the investigation in this regard. Both the questionnaire replies and the statistics confirmed the findings on the loss of market share of the applicant already in anticipation of the removal of anti-dumping duties due to Brexit. Therefore, the above claim of Anhui Jinhe is unfounded.

(294) The above analysis has shown that the Union industry benefited from the imposition of duties and has recovered from its injurious situation after measures were imposed. However, in the absence of measures, the expected massive increase in imports from China at injurious prices would quickly lead to the deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry resulting in material injury.

(295) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the country concerned at injurious prices and material injury would be likely to recur.

7. UNION INTEREST

(296) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, and users.

(297) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.

(298) On this basis the Commission examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures.

7.1. Interest of the Union industry

(299) As stated in recital (278), Union industry has recovered from the injury caused by past dumping and its operations are viable when not subject to unfair competition by dumped imports.

(300) Should the measures be allowed to lapse, the situation of the Union industry is likely to deteriorate quickly as explained in recitals (279) to (294).

(301) It was therefore concluded that extending the measures in force against the PRC would be in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2. Interest of unrelated importers

(302) As stated in recital (29), no unrelated importer cooperated during the investigation.

(303) The current investigation did not reveal any significant adverse impact of the measures in force on importers.

(304) The previous investigation concluded that importers could be negatively affected by the measures but to a very limited extent. Ace-K is only a small part of the business for importers, which have a wider product portfolio.

(305) Therefore, from the information available, it is clear that the imposition of measures on importers would have a very limited impact, if at all, and such impact would be clearly outweighed by the benefits that the measures could bring to the Union industry.

7.3. Interest of users

(306) Ace-K is mainly used as a sugar substitute in the food and beverage sector, for example in soft drinks or dairy products. To a smaller extent, Ace-K is used in the pharma sector.

(307) No users cooperated in the investigation.

(308) The current investigation did not reveal any significant adverse impact of the measures in force. The previous investigation against the PRC revealed that in terms of costs, the impact of Ace-K in finished products is minimal. However, it revealed also that the use of Ace-K is essential for products that are already in the market. New products might be developed with alternative sweeteners but to change the formulation of established products would be risky and costly. Hence, the access of users to alternative sources of Ace-K was considered important.

(309) On these grounds, the Commission concluded that should the measures be extended, the impact on the economic situation of users was likely not to be significant.

7.4. Other factors

7.4.1. Security of supply

(310) The Union producer claimed that security of supply of Ace-K is crucial to producers of food and beverages and it was not in the Union interest to become dependent on product supplies of only one country. The producer further considered that once a producer of a beverage or food product has chosen to use Ace-K as its low calorie sweetener, it cannot switch to another sweetener without materially changing the taste and affecting consumers’ perception of the product.

7.5. Conclusion on Union interest

(311) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of Ace-K originating in the PRC.

(312) In its comments on final disclosure, Anhui Jinhe argued that the continuation of the measures was not in the Union’s interest. In this respect, Anhui Jinhe claimed that the applicant had a limited production capacity and a high capacity utilisation rate and was therefore incapable of supplying the whole market without disengaging from export markets. Moreover, Anhui Jinhe held that users of Ace-K were reliant on alternative sources of supply and therefore had no choice but pay the anti-dumping duties and pass them on to consumers, which inflated food prices. Finally, Anhui Jinhe maintained that the multiple sourcing strategy of users would in any case be a sufficient protection for the applicant, as it would prevent Chinese imports from grabbing substantial market shares from the Union producer.

(313) In its comments on Anhui Jinhe’s submission, the applicant claimed that it had enough production capacity to supply the whole of the Union market as well as its current exports to third countries. The applicant also argued that due to the very small dosage levels of Ace-K used in beverages and food, the effect of anti-dumping duties on the cost of the finished products was negligible. In addition, the applicant claimed that contrary to Anhui Jinhe’s claim, the dual sourcing strategy of Ace-K users did not prevent Chinese imports from grabbing substantial market shares to the detriment of the Union producer in the period prior to the original investigation.

(314) With regard to these arguments, the Commission recalls that no importers, users or consumer organisations cooperated in the present expiry review. In fact, the investigation found that there was sufficient production capacity of Ace-K in the EU to cover consumption as seen in recitals (239) and (252) in addition to the spare capacity in China as described in recital (210) to (223) and therefore there was no risk of insufficient supply of the product under review. Also, the Commission found that in terms of costs, the impact of Ace-K in finished products was minimal as described in recital (308). Therefore, the Commission dismissed the above arguments.

8. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

(315) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on Ace-K from the PRC should be maintained.

(316) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁸¹, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(317) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of acesulfame potassium (potassium salt of 6-methyl-1,2,3- oxathiazin-4(3H)-one 2,2-dioxide; CAS RN 55589-62-3) originating in the People’s Republic of China currently falling under CN code ex 2934 99 90 (TARIC code 2934999021).

The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

Company	Anti-dumping duty - euro per kg net	TARIC additional code
Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd	4,58	C046
Suzhou Hope Technology Co., Ltd	4,47	C047
Anhui Vitasweet Food Ingredient Co., Ltd	2,64	C048
All other companies	4,58	C999

The application of the individual anti-dumping duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice on which it must appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of acesulfame potassium sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to ‘All other companies’ shall apply.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 January 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1963 of 30 October 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of acesulfame potassium originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 287, 31.10.2015, p. 1).

Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 46, 11.2.2020, p. 8).

Due to the fact that there is only one producer of Ace-K in the Union, some of the data in this Regulation are presented in ranges or in index form to preserve the confidentiality of the data of the Union producer.

Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of acesulfame potassium (Ace-K) originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ C 366, 30.10.2020, p. 13).

On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom withdrew from the Union. The Union and the United Kingdom jointly agreed on a transition period during which the United Kingdom remained subject to Union law, which ended on 31 December 2020. The United Kingdom is no longer a Member State of the Union and therefore the figures, findings and conclusions in this Regulation treat the United Kingdom as a third country.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/787 of 19 May 2015 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of acesulfame potassium originating in the People's Republic of China as well as acesulfame potassium originating in the People's Republic of China contained in certain preparations and/or mixtures (OJ L 125, 21.5.2015, p. 15).

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/765 of 14 May 2019 repealing the anti-dumping duty on imports of bioethanol originating in the United States of America and terminating the proceedings in respect of such imports, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 126, 15.5.2019, p. 4), recital (89).

Council Regulation (EC) No 240/2008 of 17 March 2008 repealing the anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Belarus, Croatia, Libya and Ukraine, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (OJ L 75, 18.3.2008, p. 33), recital (76).

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 135/2014 of 11 February 2014 repealing the anti-dumping duty on imports of dicyandiamide originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 43, 13.2.2014, p. 1), recital (70).

Commission Decision of 21 February 2001 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, the People's Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela, OJ L 84/36, 23 March 2001.

https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2491

Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6).

Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2 (hereafter ‘Report’).

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/546 of 29 March 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of aluminium extrusions originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 109, 30.3.2021, p. 1).

Report – Chapter 2, p. 6-7.

Report – Chapter 2, p. 10.

Available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4866_0_7.html (last viewed 15 July 2019).

Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

Report – Chapter 3, p. 41, 73-74.

Report – Chapter 6, p. 120-121.

Report – Chapter 6. p. 122 -135.

Report – Chapter 7, p. 167-168.

Report – Chapter 8, p. 169-170, 200-201.

Report – Chapter 2, p. 15-16, Report – Chapter 4, p. 50, p. 84, Report – Chapter 5, p. 108-9.

Report – Chapter 3, p. 22-24 and Chapter 5, p. 97-108.

Report – Chapter 5, p. 104-9.

Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-1.

Report – Chapter 2, p. 26.

Report – Chapter 2, p. 31-2.

Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (last viewed on 15 July 2019).

Available at www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (last viewed on 10 March 2021).

Financial Times (2020) ‘Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise’, available at: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j

Anhui Jinhe Industrial’s website (jinheshiye.com).

Report – Chapters 14.1 to 14.3.

Report – Chapter 4, p. 41-42, 83.

Zhongtai securities’ analysis of Anhui Jinhe Industrial, February 2020 (dfcfw.com).

13th Five Year Plan on the development of the petrochemical and chemical industry 2016-2020, displayed on the NDRC website.

Announcement of Anhui Jinhe Industrial signing a framework agreement with the Dingyuan County on a circular economy industry park project - 24 NOV 2017 as released on the financial information website cninfo.com.cn

Anhui Jinhe Industrial’s 2020 annual report (dfcfw.com).

Report – Chapter 6, p. 138-149.

Report – Chapter 9, p. 216.

Report – Chapter 9, p. 213-215.

Report – Chapter 9, p. 209-211.

Report – Chapter 13, p. 332-337.

Report – Chapter 13, p. 336.

Report – Chapter 13, p. 337-341.

Report – Chapter 6, p. 114-117.

Report – Chapter 6, p. 119.

Report – Chapter 6, p. 120.

Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022). http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (last viewed on 3 April 2021). The Plan instructs to ‘

further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector ’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management. ’

See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020. http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (last viewed on 12 April 2021).

See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China's Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan, October 2016, WP/16/203.

Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

See OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29.

https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en

See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2020-04/20/c_1125877816.htm (last viewed on 12 April 2021).

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

https://globalfinancials.com/index-admin.html

https://www.ajinomoto.com.my/investors/annual-reports

http://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials

https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction

Given that in expiry reviews anti-dumping duties are not revised, the use of these two raw materials to construct the normal value in principle would not affect the overall findings of this review. In fact, in this particular case, any impact would be to the advantage of the exporting producers since the constructed normal value, and the resulting dumping margin, would be potentially higher in the absence of such licencing requirements.

Ajinomoto (Malaysia) Berhad Financial Statements for the year ended 31 March 2020, p. 84.

Ajinomoto (Malaysia) Berhad Financial Statements for the year ended 31 March 2020, p. 45.

https://www.ilmia.gov.my/index.php/my/labour-cost

https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1

https://www.tnb.com.my/assets/files/Tariff_Rate_Final_01.Jan.2014.pdf

Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33).

https://www.ilmia.gov.my/index.php/my/labour-cost

https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1

https://www.tnb.com.my/assets/files/Tariff_Rate_Final_01.Jan.2014.pdf

Open version of Request, p. 41.

Certificate issued by the China Food Additives and Ingredients Association on 2 March 2021, provided by Anhui Jinhe in Slide 16 of their Open Submission dated 4 March 2021 and Announcement of the Peoples Court confirming bankruptcy of Hope, provided by Anhui Jinhe in Slide 17 of their Open Submission dated 4 March 2021.

http://www.hzsanhe.com/default2.asp

http://www.cninfo.com.cn/new/disclosure/detail?plate=sse&orgId=9900023704&stockCode=603968&announcementId=1209844300&announcementTime=2021-04-27%2018:00, p. 30.

Applicant’s open submission dated 8 June 2021 Annex I.

This includes best estimates of potential spare capacity for two companies based on information in a submission received and/or a sampling form received from a Chinese exporting producer.

Request non-confidential version, page 41.

See recital (255).

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

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