Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/433 of 15 March 2022 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2012 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia

(938) Jindal Indonesia however purchased upstream products, namely hot rolled coils, from a related company in India, which may have benefited from the GOI provision of chromium ore for less than adequate remuneration (see Section 3.3.2). In this regard, the Commission could not make any findings since there was insufficient information on file on this matter. Therefore, the claim of the complainant was rejected.

(939) The complainant further argued that the massive exports from Indonesia are not an incidental consequence of its policy in the stainless steel industry, but rather its very purpose. This would make many schemes de facto contingent on exports, in particular the provision of nickel ore for LTAR and the financial support granted in the context of the bilateral cooperation between the GOID and the GOC. The complainant urged the Commission to assess the de facto contingency on exports of these schemes and to countervail them based on the turnover of exports rather than the total turnover of the exporting producer.

(940) As highlighted in recital (929) above, the Commission agreed with this claim for the scheme relating to the imports of raw materials in the bonded zone. However, the Commission disagreed with the claim for the other schemes. Provision of nickel ore for LTAR is a production subsidy, and there is no link with export sales of the finished product.

(941) Concerning financial support, the situation is different from the Tyres case cited by the complainant. In that case, a subsidy was awarded by the Chinese government to a company located in China with the specific commitment to increase its export sales from China to the EU, via the acquisition of the global assets (most importantly its technical know-how and distribution channels in the EU) of a foreign-owned company under the umbrella of the BRI. Translating this into the current context would correspond to a subsidy provided by the GOC to Tsingshan Group’s parent company in China with the commitment to increase its exports from China to Indonesia. Clearly, this was not the case here. On the other hand, in a context similar to the one at hand, as was the case in the GFF anti-subsidy investigation, financing support awarded under the bilateral cooperation between China and Egypt was not considered to be export contingent. This claim was thus rejected.

(942) Since the subsidy amount for Jindal Indonesia is below the de minimis threshold, no duties will be imposed on this company.

(943) A subsidy amount also had to be established for the sole cooperating non-sampled exporting producer in Indonesia. In view of the specific circumstances of the case, this could not be done according to the usual methodology, based on the weighted average amount of countervailing subsidies established for the cooperating exporting producers in the sample. Indeed, as mentioned above, the final subsidy amount for Jindal Indonesia was below the de minimis amount. Since there was only one remaining exporting producer, the Commission decided to apply the duty rate of this exporting producer to the sole cooperating non-sampled exporting producer, with the exclusion of the scheme related to preferential financing, for which there was no evidence on file that the company in question could have benefited from. Indeed, the company in question has no links with China, and could thus not have benefited from the preferential financing as provided to the IRNC Group.

(945) The like product was manufactured by 13 known producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constituted the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation.

(946) Following final disclosure the consortium of importers and distributors and one unrelated importer requested the disclosure of the identity of the 13 Union producers that made up the Union industry during the IP. Aside from the three sampled producers and the companies supporting the complaint (i.e. Acerinox, Outokumpu Nirosta GmbH, Outokumpu Stainless AB), these are Marcegaglia, Acroni, Arinox, Otelinox, and three re-rollers based in Germany (i.e. SAP Precision Metal, BWS, and Waelzholz).

(947) The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 3,1 million tonnes. The Commission established this figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, namely the verified questionnaire reply received from Eurofer and remotely cross-checked questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

(948) As indicated in recital (25), three Union producers were selected in the sample, representing over 60 % of total Union production of the like product. They are all vertically integrated producers.

(949) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of: (a) the verified Eurofer data concerning Union industry’s sales of the like product to unrelated customers, whether direct or indirect sales, partially cross-checked with the sampled Union producers, as further set out in recital (976) below; and (b) imports of the product under investigation from all third countries as reported by Eurostat.

(951) During the period considered, the Union consumption decreased by 17 %.

(952) The Commission examined whether imports of SSCR originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 8(3) of the basic Regulation.

(954) The amount of countervailable subsidies established in relation to the imports from each of the two countries concerned are summarised under recitals (302) and (933). They are all, but for Jindal Indonesia, above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation.

(955) The volume of imports from each of the two countries concerned was not negligible. Imports market shares in the investigation period were 3,4 % for India and 2,8 % for Indonesia.

(956) The conditions of competition between the subsidised imports from each of the two countries concerned and between them and the Union like product were similar. Indeed, SSCR originating in India and Indonesia competed with each other when imported for sale on the Union market, and with the like product produced by the Union industry, as all of them are sold to similar categories of customers.

(957) The consortium of importers and distributors and one unrelated importer contested the cumulative assessment of the effects of the Indian and Indonesian imports on the Union industry’s situation. The interested parties argued that the import volumes from both countries are low compared to the market share of the Union industry, the imports from India remained stable and were limited by the safeguard measures, and no proper analysis of the conditions of competition between imported products and between the imported products and the like Union products was conducted as requested by Article 8(3) of the basic Regulation.

(958) The consortium and one unrelated importer requested the disclosure of the theoretical models used to assess the conditions of competition in the Union market of the product under investigation and the countries concerned, and the confirmation that the competition and economic analysis services of the Commission have been consulted on these conditions of competition.

(959) The Commission did perform an analysis in which it compared the product types sold on the Union market by the exporting producers and the product sold by the Union producers, on the basis of the product control numbers (PCNs) given by the sampled companies. This analysis showed a high level of matching. The level of matching between each of the exporting producers and the sales by the Union industry is provided to the sampled exporting producers in their specific disclosure. Furthermore, the Commission also found a significant level of similarity in the product types sold by the exporting producers from Indonesia compared to the product types sold by the exporting producers from India. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the imported products from the countries concerned and the Union products were in clear competition with each other and a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports to be appropriate. The consortium and unrelated importer did not provide any substantiated evidence why the analysis done by the Commission would be incorrect or insufficient. The fact that India has a country-specific quota within the safeguard measures does not affect this analysis in light of the conditions listed in Article 8(3). The claim was therefore rejected.

(960) Therefore, all criteria set out in Article 8(3) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from the countries concerned were examined cumulatively for the purposes of injury determination.

(961) The Commission established the volume of subsidised imports on the basis of Eurostat data and the data of the exporting producers. Since the Commission found the exports of Jindal Indonesia to be subsidised below the de minimis level, they were taken out of the import figures. The market share of imports was thus established by comparing the volume of subsidised imports with the Union consumption.

(962) Given the limited number of parties that submitted some data, some of the figures presented below are in the form of ranges for reasons of confidentiality (220).

(964) Imports from the countries concerned increased by around 55 % over the period considered, which allowed them to increase their joint market share from [3,0-3,1] % in 2017 to [5,5 - 5,8] % in the IP. This increase, both in volume of imports and in market share, can be attributed to the imports coming from Indonesia, which increased its import volumes almost 6 times in the period considered and its market share increased from practically zero to [2,1 - 2,4] %. The imports from India increased from 2017 to 2018, but showed a drop afterwards. This resulted in an overall drop in absolute terms during the period considered. On 1 February 2019, the Commission published a Regulation imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (221). India received a country-specific tariff quota for the product under investigation, limiting imports subject to the in-quota duty during the IP to a lower level than the 2018 level. As Indonesia was not subject to a country-specific tariff quota, but to the quota for all other countries, its imports were not as restricted as the Indian ones. However, the drop in Indian imports was less severe as the overall drop in Union consumption and thus India’s market share still increased slightly from 3 % in 2017 to 3,4 % in the IP.

(966) In case of India, the average import prices went up from 2017 to 2018 by 4 %, but remained stable in the overall period considered, while for Indonesia they increased by 28 % (imports in 2017 were negligible). Nevertheless, throughout the whole period considered, the average import prices from both countries concerned were consistently lower than Union producers’ prices (see Table 10).

(968) The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the investigation period. It showed undercutting margins of 5,8 % and 13,4 % for the Indian exporting producers and 12,4 % for the Indonesian exporting producer.

(969) Following final disclosure, the consortium of importers and distributors and one unrelated requested the Commission to disclose the data and criteria used to determine both the import prices of the product concerned and to calculate the undercutting margin.

(970) The prices of the imports from the countries concerned, as given in Table 6 above, are based on Eurostat. This information is publicly available. As explained in recitals (966) and (967) above, the undercutting margin was based on a comparison between the sales prices of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market and the corresponding prices of the sampled exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, differentiated per product type and adjusted to be at equal sales terms. As the detailed sales prices per company is by definition business confidential, it was only provided to the companies concerned in their respective specific disclosures.

(971) In accordance with Article 8(4) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the subsidised imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(972) As mentioned in recital (25), sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry.

(973) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data from the verified questionnaire reply of Eurofer relating to all Union producers, cross-checked where necessary with the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the cross-checked questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(974) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, the magnitude of subsidy and recovery of past unfair trade practices.

(975) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, stocks, profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments.

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(977) Following final disclosure, the consortium of distributors and importers and one unrelated importer requested on the basis of which data the Commission came to the figures in Table 7 and claimed that the decrease in capacity utilisation is not linked to the imports from India and Indonesia, since the decrease was larger than the increase in imports from the countries concerned.

(978) The data in Table 7 above is based on the cross-checked questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers and, with regard to the other Union producers, on the basis of the verified macro-economic questionnaire of Eurofer. Eurofer provided data that it collected from its members and reasonable estimates for the remaining producers.

(979) Indeed the decrease in production was larger than the increase in imports from the countries concerned. This is caused by a decrease in consumption, reflected in Table 4. As set out in section 6.2.3, the Commission concluded that this decrease in consumption did not break the causal link between the subsidised imports from India and Indonesia and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(980) The consortium of distributors and importers and one unrelated importer requested to disclose the quantity imported by the Union producers from the countries concerned. The data available to the Commission showed that the sampled Union producers did not resell or further process any imports from the countries concerned.

(981) The Union industry’s production volume decreased sharply by 16 % in the period considered. The reported capacity figures refer to actual capacity, which implies that adjustments considered as standard by the industry – for set-up time, maintenance, bottle necks and other normal stoppages – have been taken into account. After the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of SSCR from the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) and Taiwan in 2015 (222), some Union producers initiated the modernisation of their production capacity. This modernisation has led to a slight production capacity increase of 4 % over the period considered.

(982) As a result of decreased production and slightly increased capacity, capacity utilisation decreased by 19 % over the period considered and dropped below 70 % in the IP.

Sales volume and market share

(984) The Union industry’s sales volume decreased by 15 % over the period concerned.

(985) The Union industry managed however to maintain and even slightly increase its market share by 2,1 percentage points over the period considered as the decline in consumption was even larger than the decline in the Union industry’s sales volume, as Union sales partially replaced imports from other countries than the countries concerned.

(986) Following final disclosure, the consortium of importers and distributors and one unrelated importer argued that the increase in market share of the Union industry indicated an absence of injury and that the increase of market share of the countries concerned did not negatively affect the market share of the Union industry. They claimed that the Commission was required to provide other positive evidence showing injury with regard to the other injury indicators.

(987) As explained in recital (963), the slight increase in the market share of the Union industry during the period considered did not alter the fact that subsidised imports from the countries concerned did show an increase of around 55 % and were causing material injury to the Union industry. As set out in recitals (1006) and (1007), also the other injury indicators showed positive evidence that the Union industry suffered material injury in the investigation period. Therefore, the claim had to be rejected.

Growth

(988) The above figures in respect of production and sales volume showed a clear decreasing trend over the period considered and demonstrated that the Union industry was not able to grow in absolute terms. A slight growth in relation to consumption was only possible because the Union industry chose to respond to the price pressure of the subsidised imports by lowering its sales prices.

Employment and productivity

(990) The level of Union industry employment related to the production of SSCR increased by 4 % between 2017 and 2019 and showed a decrease of 2 percentage points between 2019 and the IP, resulting in an increase of 2 % over the period considered. In view of the sharp decrease in production, the productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured as tonnes per employee (in full time equivalent) produced per year, decreased significantly by 18 % over the period considered.

Magnitude of the subsidy margin and recovery from past unfair trade practices

(991) All subsidy margins, excluding Jindal (Indonesia) as indicated above, were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of these subsidy margins on the Union industry was not negligible, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned.

(992) Aside from the separate anti-dumping investigation into SSCR from the countries concerned (223), imports of SSCR have already been subject to an earlier anti-dumping investigation. The Commission found that the situation of the Union industry during 2013 was significantly affected by dumped imports from the PRC and Taiwan, resulting in the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports from these countries in October 2015 (224). These anti-dumping measures were extended in September 2021 (225). The Union industry’s situation was therefore unlikely to be more than marginally affected by the unfair trade practices throughout the period considered.

Prices and factors affecting prices

(994) After showing a slight increase of 3 % from 2017 to 2018, average unit sales prices decreased by 6 % from 2018 to the IP, resulting in a decrease of 3 % over the period considered. Over the same period, the costs of production showed a simultaneous increase of 5 %, after which they stabilised at a cost level which was 3 % higher than at the start of the period considered. To a large extent the cost evolution was driven by important raw material price increases, such as nickel and ferrochromium. Due to the price suppression from the subsidised imports, the Union industry was not able to pass on this cost increase to its sales prices and was even forced to lower its sales prices.

Labour costs

(996) The average labour costs per employee of the sampled Union producers fell by 3 % in the period considered. This shows that Union producers were able to lower labour costs as a reaction to the deteriorating market circumstances in an attempt to limit its injury.

Inventories

(998) During the period considered the level of closing stocks decreased by 21 %. This trend followed the decrease in production volume. Most types of the like product are produced by the Union industry based on specific orders of the users. Therefore, stocks are not considered to be an important injury indicator for this industry. This is also confirmed by analysing the evolution of the closing stocks as a percentage of production. As can be seen above, this indicator fluctuated between 5 and 7 % of the production volume of the sampled Union producers over the period considered.

(999) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(1000) Overall profitability fell from 7,6 % in 2017 to 0,4 % in the IP. As set out in section 5.3.3, this drop coincided with the increase of import volumes from the countries concerned and their market share at undercutting prices.

(1001) All other financial indicators, i.e. cash flow, investments, and return on assets, clearly followed the same downward trend.

(1002) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The cash flow showed a continuous decrease over the period considered, resulting in the IP at a level 52 % lower than the start of the investigation period.

(1003) Investments are the net book value of assets. After staying stable from 2017 to 2018, a sharp drop of 13 percentage points can be seen from 2018 to 2019. The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments which reflects the level of depreciation of assets. It decreased continuously and significantly by 80 % over the period considered.

(1004) The poor financial performance of the Union industry between 2017 and the investigation period limited its ability to raise capital. The Union industry is capital intensive and is characterised by substantial investments. The return on investment during the period considered is not sufficient to cover for such substantial investments.

(1005) The investigation indicated that the Union industry could only respond to the price pressure of the subsidised imports from India and Indonesia by lowering its sales prices to maintain (and even slightly increase) its market share in the period considered. The effect of the subsidised imports caused price suppression, within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the basic Regulation, on the Union market during the investigation period. Prices of the Union industry decreased by 3 % during the period considered, while, under conditions of fair competition, they would have been expected to increase at a ratio comparable to rise of the cost of production, which increased by 3 %.

(1006) The Union consumption decreased significantly during the period considered and both sales volumes and production volumes on the Union industry followed this trend. Production capacity increased marginally, caused by a positive outlook for the Union industry following the imposition of anti-dumping measures against imports of the product under investigation originating in the PRC and Taiwan in 2015.

(1007) However, Union producers experienced a sharp decrease in productivity and capacity utilisation in the period considered. These deteriorating figures can only be explained to a small degree by the small increase in employment and capacity and were mainly caused by the decrease in Union consumption and the simultaneous increase in imports from the countries concerned.

(1008) However, it is the financial indicators of the Union producers which fully showed the injury suffered. The Union industry experienced an increase in its costs of production in the period considered which, accompanied by a decrease in sales prices, resulted in a profitability drop from 7,6 % in 2017 to 0,4 % in the IP. A similar negative development can be seen in relation to the other financial indicators: investments (-13 %), return on investments (-80 %) and cash flow (-52 %).

(1009) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 8(5) of the basic Regulation.

(1010) The post-IP information available to the Commission further confirmed the same conclusion. Based on the analysis of data spontaneously submitted by the Union industry and covering the last two quarters of 2020, the Commission noted the following trends: increases in production, capacity, capacity utilisation and sales were marginal; prices continued to decrease significantly without any corresponding drop in the cost of production; the profitability of the sampled Union producers went further down and became negative, and also the cash flow, net investments, and return on investment showed a further negative trend compared to the period considered, as did employment; the market share of the Union industry slightly increased, but so did the market shares of the imports from the countries concerned.

(1011) After final disclosure, the consortium of importers and distributors and one unrelated importer argued that the complaining companies had an increase in profits after the investigation period. While post-IP developments are not directly relevant, as shown in Annex 1 to this Regulation, the sampled Union producers became loss-making in the second half of 2020, contrary to the claim of the consortium and the unrelated importer. Therefore, the Commission had to reject this claim.

(1012) In accordance with Article 8(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the subsidised imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 8(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could, at the same time, have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the subsidised imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the subsidised imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, a decrease in consumption, the export performance of the Union industry, an increase in the cost of raw materials, and the competitive price behaviour of the Union industry.

(1013) Imports from the countries concerned increased by more than 50 % in the period considered and their market share almost doubled. This increase in market share was at the detriment of imports from third countries. However, the low priced subsidised imports from the countries concerned created a price pressure on the Union industry. Prices of imports from India and Indonesia have been, during the period considered, between 5 and 19 % below prices of the Union industry. Due to these imports prices, the Union producers were not only unable to reflect raw material cost increases in their prices, they were even forced to decrease their sales prices in order to maintain their market share.

(1014) As a result, the profitability of the Union producers, at a relatively high level in 2017, dropped down to almost zero in the IP, which had a further adverse effect on all the financial indicators of the companies in question.

(1015) There is thus a strong causal link between the subsidised imports from India and Indonesia and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(1016) Following final disclosure, the consortium of importers and distributors and one unrelated importer claimed that the financial indicators of the Union industry were not worsening due to dumped imports but due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

(1017) The Commission found that the prices of imports from the countries concerned greatly influenced the prices of the Union industry and its financial indicators. As established in recital (965), the average import prices from both countries concerned were consistently lower than Union producers’ prices throughout the whole period considered, before the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic could potentially have affected the consumption on the Union market but such an impact could have only materialised in the last quarter of the IP (April-June 2020), while a substantial decline in consumption was already noted in 2019.

(1018) Moreover, the Commission analysed the decrease in consumption (whether partially related to COVID-19 or not) as a potential other factor that could have caused injury in recitals (1028) to (1029) below and concluded that it did not attenuate the causal link between the subsidised imports from the countries concerned and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(1019) As set out in recital (933) above, subsidisation for one of the sampled Indonesian exporting producers, Jindal Indonesia, was found to be de minimis.

(1021) In the period considered, non-subsidised imports from Indonesia showed an increase in 2018 and 2019, but were in the IP at a slightly lower level than in 2017. The market share of these imports was very limited throughout the period considered at not more than 0,65 %. The sales price of these imports was at a higher level than the subsidised imports from Indonesia.

(1022) Even though the imports from Jindal Indonesia were undercutting the prices of the Union industry, the company’s sales to the Union were slightly decreasing over the period considered and remained low. Therefore, the injury caused by these imports did not attenuate the causal link between the subsidised imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(1024) In the period considered, imports from third countries decreased significantly in terms of absolute volumes (by 33 %) and market share (from 26 % in 2017 to 21 % in the IP).

(1025) As far as individual countries are concerned, only imports from Korea increased in the period considered, resulting in a slight increase in its market share (from 3,8 % to 5,1 %). Although prices of Korean imports are below those of the countries concerned, they are likely to be affected by the existence of transfer prices, as a result of the relationship between the Korean stainless steel manufacturer Samsung STS and the EU cold roller Otelinox in Romania. No conclusion can be drawn as to whether these imports also undercut the Union industry prices, also in view of the unknown product mix of these imports.

(1026) As set out in recital (991) above, the imports from Taiwan are currently subject to an anti-dumping duty of 6,8 % (226) and imports from the PRC to a duty of 24,4 to 25,3 %.

(1027) Imports from the PRC were very low throughout the period considered. Imports from Taiwan showed an increase of 12 % from 2017 to 2018, but decreased from 2018 to the IP with 26 %, keeping a market share of around 5 % during the period considered. The average price of imports from Taiwan were below the average prices of imports from the countries concerned. As the Commission did not receive any cooperation from the producers in Taiwan in the expiry review that was concluded in September 2021, it did not have any further details on Taiwanese import prices. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that these imports caused additional injury to the Union industry. However, even if imports from Taiwan contributed to injury caused to the Union industry, the imports from Taiwan decreased by 17 % over the period considered and could therefore not have been the cause of the increasing negative trends found in the injury analysis.

(1028) The Commission therefore concluded that imports from other countries do not attenuate the causal link between subsidised Indian and Indonesian imports and material injury suffered by Union producers.

(1029) A significant decrease in consumption during the period considered has had an adverse effect on some of the injury indicators, especially on sales and production volumes. However, as explained in recital (1004), the Union industry was suffering price injury rather than volume injury. Despite a shrinking market, the Union producers managed to slightly increase their market share through severe price competition with unfairly priced subsidised imports which resulted in the deterioration of the profitability and other financial indicators of the Union industry such as cash flow, investments, and return on investments.

(1030) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the decrease in consumption did not attenuate the causal link between the subsidised imports from countries concerned and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(1032) Export sales of the Union producers decreased by 17 % in the period considered, mainly caused by measures imposed by the United States on the product under investigation and increased competition on third markets with Chinese sales and sales from the countries concerned. However, the volumes exported were limited as compared to the total Union sales volumes, representing around 13 % of its total sales volume, and average price of export sales was in the period considered constantly higher than prices on the Union market.

(1033) On that basis, the Commission concluded that the impact of the export performance of the Union industry on the injury suffered was, if any, marginal.

(1034) One unrelated importer pointed at the issue of increasing costs of raw materials (nickel, ferrochrome) as a reason of the injurious situation of the Union industry.

(1035) An increase in raw material prices is not per se a source of injury because it is generally accompanied by a subsequent price increase in selling prices. However, the decrease in the Union producers’ profitability and all their financial indicators is more than just a reflection of the increasing costs of production. Low-priced imports suppressed prices in the Union market and not only did not allow Union producers to increase prices to cover the increase in costs, but forced them to even lower their prices, to avoid an imminent loss of market share. This resulted in a steep decrease in their profitability figures, declining to break even during the investigation period.

(1036) On that basis, it is concluded that the increase in prices of certain raw materials as such did not cause injury to the Union industry.

(1037) The unrelated importer claimed that internal competition and price behaviour of the Union producers caused their deteriorating financial situation.

(1038) However, the investigation did not confirm this claim. The imports from the countries concerned were consistently sold at prices undercutting the Union industry and thus the main reason why the Union producers are not able to raise their prices and cover their increasing costs is the price pressure from subsidised imports. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(1039) A causal link was established between the subsidised imports from India and Indonesia on the one hand and the injury suffered by the Union industry on the other hand. There was a coincidence in time between the increase in the volume of the subsidised imports from the countries concerned and the worsening of the Union's performance during the period considered. The Union industry had no other choice but to follow the price level set by the subsidised imports in order to avoid losing market share. This resulted in a situation where the Union industry made an unsustainable level of profit.

(1040) The Commission has found that other factors that may have had an impact on the situation of the Union industry were: non-subsidised imports from Indonesia, imports from third countries, the decrease in consumption, and the export performance of the Union industry.

(1041) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the subsidised imports. The effect of non-subsidised imports from Indonesia and from third countries, the decrease in consumption, and the export performance of the Union industry, on the Union industry's negative developments in terms of especially profitability and financial indicators was only limited.

(1042) In light of the above considerations, the Commission established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the subsidised imports from the countries concerned. The subsidised imports from the countries concerned have had a major determining impact on the material injury suffered by the Union industry. Other factors, individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link.

(1043) As depicted in the Annex 1, trends in the second half of 2020 confirmed this analysis. Imports from the countries concerned continued to gain market shares, helped by prices which further dropped significantly, continuously undercutting the Union industry and suppressing the prices on the Union market. On the other hand, no other factors attenuate the causal link. While consumption continued to drop, price injury persisted. Imports from other third countries continued to drop, further losing market shares, and there were no indications that the situation of imports from Jindal (Indonesia) has changed. Exports by the Union industry increased only marginally. In sum, other factors, individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link in the second half of 2020.

(1044) In accordance with Article 31 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious subsidisation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(1045) The Union industry consists of 13 producers located in several Member States and it employs directly 13 660 employees in relation to the product under investigation. None of the Union producers opposed the initiation of the investigation. As shown in section 5 above when analysing the injury indicators, the whole Union industry experienced a deterioration of its situation and was negatively affected by the subsidised imports.

(1046) It is expected that the imposition of anti-subsidy duties will restore fair trading conditions on the Union market, end the price suppression and enable the Union industry to cover their increasing costs of production and improve their financial situation despite lost sales due to a shrinking market. This would result in an improvement of the Union industry's profitability towards levels considered necessary for this capital intensive industry. The Union industry has suffered material injury caused by subsidised imports from the countries concerned. It is recalled that a number of key injury indicators showed a negative trend during the period considered. In particular, indicators pertaining to the financial performance of Union producers were seriously affected. It is therefore important to restore prices to a non-subsidised level in order to allow all producers to operate on the Union market under fair trading conditions.

(1047) It is therefore concluded that the imposition of anti-subsidy duties would be in the interest of the Union industry as it would allow it to recover from the effects of the injurious subsidisation found.

(1048) One unrelated importer came forward. Furthermore, one Union producer that acted also as unrelated importer and end user submitted a questionnaire reply.

(1049) The unrelated importer pointed out potential negative impacts of the anti-subsidy measures on competition on the Union market which in turn would result in lack of supply, worse service, increasing prices and a worse quality of material.

(1050) Notwithstanding potential anti-subsidy measures, the Commission concluded that there will remain a healthy level of competition in the Union given that there are 13 Union producers of the product under investigation, some of them not taking part in the complaint. Furthermore, imports from third countries still account for more than 20 % of the market. Therefore, the potential negative impacts indicated by the importer are not likely to occur.

(1051) Measures would also allow importers to pass-on prices to their customers and therefore the profitability of importers is not expected to be adversely affected. The product range and service quality is not expected to be reduced – to the contrary, protection against subsidised imports allows the Union industry to have new investments and improve its quality.

(1052) Following final disclosure, the consortium of distributors and importers and one unrelated importer argued that the Commission did not take into account the situation of the steel market after the investigation period and claimed that the pandemic-related measures have resulted in a slowdown in scrap extraction, refining and collection activities, an increase in the prices of raw materials, and a shortage of raw materials. This has resulted in Europe being the highest priced market in the world for stainless steel products.

(1053) They further stated that the imports from third countries are necessary for the Union market as the Union producers cannot meet actual demand on the Union market, causing significant problems in the steel supply.

(1054) The increase in the prices of raw materials has affected production worldwide, and did affect both the Union industry and the imports. Furthermore, there are sources of supply of SSCR from other third countries, the biggest of them being Taiwan and Korea. Imports from Taiwan have still been entering the Union, having relatively low anti-dumping duties. Korea managed in the period considered to increase its export to the Union both in absolute and relative terms. South Africa also remains present on the Union market despite the alleged control of the European companies over its SSCR production. Moreover, the countervailing duties imposed on the countries concerned are not aimed at closing the Union market for the countries concerned, but are aimed at raising prices to a fair level. Therefore, the claims had to be rejected.

(1055) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons to conclude that the countervailing duties were of such magnitude as to lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of the product under investigation originating in the countries concerned.

(1056) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to subsidisation, injury, causation, and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 15 of the basic Regulation, a definitive countervailing duty should be imposed.

(1057) Article 15(1), third subparagraph of the basic Regulation provides that the amount of the definitive countervailing duty shall not exceed the amount of countervailable subsidies established.

(1058) Article 15(1), fourth subparagraph states that ‘where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of measures in accordance with the third subparagraph, the amount of the countervailing duty shall be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry’.

(1059) No such information has been submitted to the Commission, and therefore the level of the countervailing measures will be set with reference to Article 15(1), third subparagraph.

(1061) The anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with a separate anti-dumping investigation concerning the same product concerned originating from India and Indonesia, in which the Commission imposed anti-dumping measures at the level of the dumping margin for the exporting producers in Indonesia and for one of the exporting producers in India. Only for Chromeni, was the dumping duty based on the lower injury margin. The Commission made sure that the imposition of a cumulated duty reflecting the level of subsidisation and the full level of dumping would not result in offsetting the effects of subsidisation twice (‘double-counting’) in accordance with Article 24(1) of the basic Regulation.

(1062) In the case of both countries, the Commission considered whether some of the subsidy schemes are export contingent subsidies, which have the effect of reducing export prices and thus increase accordingly the dumping margins, in order to decide whether it needs to reduce the dumping margin by the subsidy amounts found in relation to export contingent subsidies in accordance with Article 24(1) of the basic Regulation.

(1063) Since the Commission did countervail some export contingent subsidy schemes, in accordance with Article 24(1) of the basic Regulation and in order to avoid double counting, the Commission first imposed the definitive countervailing duty at the level of the established definitive amount of subsidisation. Then the Commission imposed the remaining definitive anti-dumping duty, which corresponds to the relevant dumping margin reduced by the amount of the export contingent subsidies and up to the relevant injury elimination level established in the separate anti-dumping investigation. Since the Commission reduced the dumping margin found with the entire amount of subsidisation related to export subsidies, there was no double counting issue within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the basic Regulation.

(1064) Where the amount resulting from deducting the amount of export subsidisation from the dumping margin is higher than the injury margin, the Commission capped the anti-dumping duty at the injury margin. Where the amount resulting from deducting the amount of export subsidisation from the dumping margin is lower that the injury margin, the Commission set the level of the anti-dumping duty on the basis of the lower amount.

(1065) A subsidy amount also had to be established for the sole cooperating non-sampled exporting producer in Indonesia. In view of the specific circumstances of the case, this could not be done according to the usual methodology, based on the weighted average amount of countervailing subsidies established for the cooperating exporting producers in the sample. Indeed, as mentioned in recitals (941) et seq. above, the final subsidy amount for Jindal Indonesia was below the de minimis amount. Since there was only one remaining exporting producer, the Commission decided to apply the duty rate of this exporting producer to the sole cooperating non-sampled exporting producer, with the exclusion of the scheme related to preferential financing, for which there was no evidence on file that the company in question could have benefited from it. Indeed, the company in question has no links with China, and could thus not have benefited from the preferential financing as provided to the IRNC Group.

(1066) For India, given the high rate of cooperation of exporting producers in the countries concerned, the Commission found that the level of the highest duty imposed on the sampled companies would be representative as the ‘all other companies’ rate. The ‘all other companies’ duty will be applied to those companies, which did not cooperate in this investigation. For Indonesia, given the fact that the Commission only calculated a duty rate for one exporting producer, and in view of the fact that cooperating non-sampled exporting producers benefit from a lower rate, as explained in recital (1064) above, the Commission exceptionally decided to set the level of the duty for ‘all other companies’ at the level of the IRNC Group.

(1068) The individual company countervailing duty rate specified in this Regulation was established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, it reflects the situation found during the investigation with respect to the company concerned. This duty rate (as opposed to the countrywide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) is thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the country concerned and produced by the company mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(1069) A company may request the application of these individual duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate, which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate, which applies to it, a regulation informing about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(1070) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual countervailing duties. The companies with individual countervailing duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the countervailing duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(1071) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of countervailing duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and should, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(1072) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a countrywide duty.

(1073) In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the countervailing duty, the duty level for all other companies should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers, but also to those producers, which did not have any exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(1074) The complainant, in its comments to the final disclosure, claimed that there is a risk of circumvention arising from the fact that the exporting producers are large corporate groups which rely on intra-group transactions and with presence in several third countries. Therefore, the complainant encouraged the Commission to be vigilant of the increase in exports of upstream materials and to be ready to initiate ex officio an anti-circumvention investigation. The intent to do so, according to the complainant, should be mentioned in this regulation.

(1075) Jindal Group and Jindal Indonesia responded that there is no risk of circumvention because it will involve customs fraud, which is a crime. In addition, they clarified that the only processing of SSCR done outside of India and Indonesia occurs in Spain (at Iberjindal S.L.) and that, in any event, the product under investigation is subject to safeguard measures that apply to all imports.

(1076) The Commission takes note of the parties’ comments and will, as always, be vigilant to act in line with its monitoring practice on measures in force.

(1077) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (227), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(1078) As explained in recitals (1060) and (1066), the Commission deducted from the dumping margin part of the subsidy amount in order to avoid double counting. Thus, should any modification or removal of the definitive countervailing duties occur, the level of anti-dumping duties should be automatically increased by the same proportion in order to reflect the actual extent of double counting as a result of this modification or removal. This change of the anti-dumping duties should take place as from the entry into force of this regulation.

(1079) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 (228), the Commission imposed a safeguard measure with respect to certain steel products for a period of three years. By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 (229), the safeguard measure was prolonged until 30 June 2024. The product concerned is one of the product categories covered by the safeguard measure. Consequently, once the tariff quotas established under the safeguard measure are exceeded, the above-quota tariff duty, the anti-dumping duty and the countervailing duty would become payable on the same imports. As such cumulation of anti-dumping and countervailing measures with safeguard measures may lead to an effect on trade greater than desirable, the Commission decided to prevent the concurrent application of the anti-dumping and countervailing duty with the above-quota tariff duty for the product concerned for the duration of the imposition of the safeguard duty.

(1080) This means that where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and exceeds the level of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties pursuant to this Regulation, only the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected. During the period of concurrent application of the safeguard and anti-dumping and countervailing duties, the collection of the duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation shall be suspended. Where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and is set at a level lower than the level of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties in this Regulation, the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected in addition to the difference between that duty and the higher of the level of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation. The part of the amount of anti-dumping and countervailing duties not collected shall be suspended.

(1081) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (230),

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2012 is amended as follows:

‘6.   Should the definitive countervailing duties imposed by Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/433 be modified or removed, the duties specified in paragraph 2 shall be increased by the same proportion limited to the actual dumping margin found or the injury margin found as appropriate per company and from the entry into force of this Regulation.’

‘7.   In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period.’

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 March 2022.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 55.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia (OJ C 57, 17.2.2021, p. 16).

(3) The term ‘GOI’ is used in this Regulation in a broad sense, including all Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Administrations at central, regional or local level.

(4) The term ‘GOID’ is used in this Regulation in a broad sense, including all Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Administrations at central, regional or local level.

(5) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2012 of 17 November 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia (OJ L 410, 18.11.2021, p. 153).

(6) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia (OJ C 322, 30.9.2020, p. 17).

(7) Notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt (OJ C 167, 16.5.2019, p. 11).

(8) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt (OJ L 189, 15.6.2020, p. 1).

(9) Sherlock document no t21.001429 of 17 February 2021.

(10) https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2513

(11) A list of the financial institutions providing loans or export credits to the sampled companies was attached to the questionnaire.

(12) Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (2020/C 86/06) (OJ C 86 of 16.3.2020 p. 6).

(13) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1382 of 2 September 2019 amending certain Regulations imposing anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures on certain steel products subject to safeguard measures (OJ L 227, 3.9.2019, p. 1).

(14) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27).

(15) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1754 of 4 October 2021 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1382 amending certain Regulations imposing anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures on certain steel products subject to a safeguard measure (OJ L 352, 5.10.2021, p. 1, recital (6)).

(16) POLICY FOR PROVIDING PREFERENCE TO DOMESTICALLY MANUFACTURED IRON & STEEL PRODUCTS IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT- REVISED, 2019, art 2.11 and Annex B (Gazette of India No 324 of 29 May 2019).

(17) http://www.cbic.gov.in/htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/formatted-htmls/cs-rulee

(18) Notification No. 88/ 2017-CUSTOMS (N.T.) New Delhi, the 21st September, 2017.

http://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/notifications/notfns-2017/cs-nt2017/csnt88-2017.pdf

(19) Cus. 20th April, 2001F.NO.605/47/2001-DBK, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Declaration under Rule 12(1)(a)(ii) of Drawback Rule for availing AIR of Drawback. See in particular Sections 2 and 3 of the Declaration under Rule 12(1)(a)(ii) of Drawback Rule for availing AIR of Drawback; available at: http://www.cbic.gov.in/htdocs-cbec/customs/cs- circulars/cs-circulars-2001/24-2001-cus

(20) The level of DDS rate changed as of 28 January 2020.

(21) The Government of India’s Public Notice No 32/2015-2020 of 22 September 2016, available at https://content.dgft.gov.in/Website/PN3216_0.pdf

(22) Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25127/, last accessed 27 January 2022.

(23) Notification no 246 of 17 April 2015.

(24) Notification no 322 of 20 May 2015.

(25) Notification no 516 of 29 June 2015.

(26) Notification no 632 of 14 August 2015.

(27) Notification no 749 of 3 December 2015.

(28) Notification no 645 of 20 October 2015.

(29) Notification no 471 of 11 July 2016.

(30) Notification no (number not provided) of 4 March 2016.

(31) Notification no 137 of 27 February 2017.

(32) Available at https://mines.gov.in/writereaddata/Content/NMP12032019.pdf, last accessed 27 January 2022.

(33) WT/DS379/AB/R (US – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China), Appellate Body Report of 11 March 2011, DS 379, paragraph 318. See also WT/DS436/AB/R (US — Carbon Steel (India)), Appellate Body Report of 8 December 2014, paragraphs 4.9 - 4.10, 4.17 - 4.20 and WT/DS437/AB/R (US – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China) Appellate Body Report of 18 December 2014, paragraph 4.92.

(34) WT/DS379/AB/R (US – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China), Appellate Body Report of 11 March 2011, DS 379, paragraph 349.

(35) Available at https://steel.gov.in/sites/default/files/GRANT%20OF%20MINING%20LEASES_0.pdf, and last accessed on 27 January 2022.

(36) Page 4 of the Dang Report.

(37) Pages 119-120 of the Dang Report.

(38) Pages 121-122 of the Dang Report.

(39) Page 157 of the Dang Report.

(40) Page 121 of the Dang Report.

(41) Page 144 of the Dang Report.

(42) Available at http://mme.iitm.ac.in/shukla/wg_steel2212%281%29.pdf, and last accessed on 27 January 2022.

(43) Page 77 of the Working Group Report.

(44) Page 79 of the Working Group Report.

(45) Page 81-82 of the Working Group Report.

(46) https://steel.gov.in/policies/exportimport-policy-iron-ore (second table refers to chromium ore).

(47) https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials last accessed on 27 January 2022.

(48) The rate increased to 3 000 INR/tonne in 2009.

(49) Recent legal basis – Notification no 35/2016-Customes dated 26.5.2016.

(50) ‘FYx/x+1’ covers period from 1 April of the year x to 31 March of the year x+1.

(51) Heinz H. Pariser analysis - Sherlock document no t21.007982 of 25 November 2021.

(52) Idem.

(53) DDC Mining Export Limited, Izmir, Turkey, http://www.ddcmining.com/chrome-ore.html

(54) Jindal, Comments on Eurofer benchmark submission, 29 July 2021, para 13, page 5.

(55) Jindal, Comments on Eurofer benchmark submission, 29 July 2021, para 8, page 4.

(56) Idem.

(57) https://archive.org/details/gov.in.is.10818.1984/page/n7/mode/2up page 4.

(58) Source: 2020 CRU International Ltd. ©.

(59) Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted on 19 December 2014, para. 4.317.

(60) On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) Turkey-China. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC adjusted to IP on the basis of BDI Baltic Exchange Dry Index https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltic_Dry_Index

(61) On the basis of quotation for Istanbul – Derince port deliveries as provided by World Bank https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/t/turkey/TUR.pdf, p. 51.

(62) IHS Mark it.

(63) Sherlock document no t21.007982 of 25 November 2021.

(64) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2014, para 4.398.

(65) https://www.statista.com/statistics/273634/nickel-reserves-worldwide-by-country/

(66) See, for example, the GOID’s efforts to attract Japan: https://kemenperin.go.id/artikel/3594/Let-Japan-Process-Nickel-in-Indonesia:-Industri-minister

(67) https://koran.tempo.co/read/ekonomi-dan-bisnis/44119/cina-minta-indonesia-jamin-investor

(68) http://en.people.cn/200506/28/eng20050628_192888.html

(69) https://koran.tempo.co/read/ekonomi-dan-bisnis/44119/cina-minta-indonesia-jamin-investor

(70) https://koran.tempo.co/read/ekonomi-dan-bisnis/44119/cina-minta-indonesia-jamin-investor

(71) Article 1 of Law No 11 of 1967 on Mining already granted a predominant role to the GOID and powers to regulate this sector, stating that ‘[a]ll minerals found within the Indonesian mining jurisdiction in the form of natural resources as blessing of God Almighty are national wealth of the Indonesian people and shall, therefore, be controlled and utilized by the State for maximum welfare of the people’.

(72) https://perpustakaan.bappenas.go.id/e-library/file_upload/koleksi/migrasi-data-publikasi/file/RP_RKP/RPJPN%202005-2025-english.pdf

(73) http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/main/legal_updates/government_changes_divestment_requirements_for_mining_companies_in_indonesia.php

(74) https://jdih.esdm.go.id/peraturan/Permen%20ESDM%20Nomor%2048%20Tahun%202017.pdf

(75) Antam’s 2020 Annual Report, p. 296, available at: https://www.antam.com/en/reports/annual-reports.

(76) http://www.vale.com/indonesia/EN/investors/information-market-id/annual-reports/doc/2020-Annual-Report-PT-Vale-Indonesia-Tbk.pdf

(77) A 100 % Indonesian State-owned company.

(78) http://www.vale.com/indonesia/EN/investors/information-market-id/shareholder-profile/Pages/default.aspx

(79) http://www.vale.com/indonesia/en/business/mining/nickel/nickel-indonesia/pages/default.aspx

(80) The GOID is the controlling shareholder in Antam via Inalum who has 65 % stake in Antam.

(81) Antam owns 10 % stake in PT Weda Bay Nickel. Antam has the option to increase its shares in PT WBN to 25 %. The remaining 90 % is owned by Strand Minerals Pte. Ltd who is currently 57 % owned by the Tsingshan group and 43 % owned by Eramet S.A (see Annual report of Antam of 2020, page 421).

(82) https://timah.com/userfiles/post/2103166050097BA4F96.pdf (Annual report 2020 of PT Timah).

(83) PT Vale was included based on publicly available information (PT Vale annual report).

(84) http://www.vale.com/indonesia/EN/aboutvale/local-leadership/boc/Pages/default.aspx

(85) https://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/assets/eumpublications/newsflash/2014/eumnewsflash-50.pdf

(86) http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins137694.pdf

(87) https://jdih.kemenkeu.go.id/fulltext/2017/13~PMK.010~2017Per.pdf

(88) http://www.apbi-icma.org/uploads/files/old/2018/02/Peraturan-Menteri-ESDM-No.11-Tahun-2018-English-Version-.pdf

(89) http://www.apbi-icma.org/uploads/files/regulation/PERMEN%20ESDM%20NO.%207%20THN%202020%20(ENG-VERSION).pdf

(90) http://www.apbi-icma.org/uploads/files/old/2017/02/PP-No.1-2017-ENGLISH-Version.pdf

(91) http://www.apbi-icma.org/uploads/files/old/2017/02/Permen-ESDM-No.9-2017-English-Version.pdf

(92) https://jdih.esdm.go.id/peraturan/25_Permen%20ESDM%20No.%2043%20Tahun%202018%20tentang%20Perubahan%20atas%20Permen%20ESDM%20Nomor%209%20Tahun%202017.pdf

(93) https://www.esdm.go.id/en/media-center/news-archives/-new-regulation-on-mineral-ore-benchmark-price-issued

(94) https://cerindocorp.com/News/61835aaa4161220b3a25ea7d

(95) https://cerindocorp.com/News/61835aaa4161220b3a25ea7d

(96) https://industriallindah.com/tag/obyek-vital-nasional/

(97) The GOID stated that this amended version of Article 85 in GR 1/2017 was meant to apply the HPM in mineral and coal sale for the purpose of State revenue calculation. However, there does not seem to be any reference to the fact that the HPM should be used only for the purpose of State revenue calculations in this regulation.

(98) https://www.esdm.go.id/en/media-center/news-archives/-new-regulation-on-mineral-ore-benchmark-price-issued

(99) https://www.esdm.go.id/en/media-center/news-archives/-new-regulation-on-mineral-ore-benchmark-price-issued

(100) http://www.ima-api.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IMA-Daily-Update-Tuesday-July-21-2020-dikonversi.pdf

(101) http://www.ima-api.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IMA-Daily-Update-Tuesday-July-21-2020-dikonversi.pdf

(102) Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3 501, paras. 7.378 and 7.380.

(103) Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, cit., para. 7.382.

(104) Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, cit., para. 7.381.

(105) Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, cit., para. 8.8.

(106) Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3295, para. 362(b).

(107) Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 8.29.

(108) Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS533/R, circulated to WTO Members 24 August 2020, paras. 7.600 and 7.606.

(109) Panel Report, US – Exports Restraints, cit., para. 8.34.

(110) https://www.tambang.co.id/harga-patokan-mineral-akan-diterapkan-di-bulan-oktober-15712/

(111) https://www.ap3i.or.id/News/News-Update/Oktober-ESDM-Terapkan-Harga-Patokan-Mineral.html

(112) https://www.esdm.go.id/en/media-center/news-archives/-new-regulation-on-mineral-ore-benchmark-price-issued

(113) Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted on 19 December 2014. para. 4.158.

(114) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1408 of 6 October 2020, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 325, 7.10.2020, p. 26).

(115) Appellate Body Report DS 436, para. 4.398.

(116) https://kemenperin.go.id/artikel/3594/Let-Japan-Process-Nickel-in-Indonesia:-Industri-minister

(117) IMIP Annual report 2017;

https://www.business.hsbc.com.cn/en-gb/belt-and-road/story-5;

www.etsingshan.com/Art/Art_38/Art_38_69.aspx;

https://www.dsppatech.com/dsppa-pa-system-applied-in-indonesia-morowali-industrial-park.html

(118) https://koran.tempo.co/read/ekonomi-dan-bisnis/44119/cina-minta-indonesia-jamin-investor

(119) https://treaty.kemlu.go.id/apisearch/pdf?filename=CHN-2010-0093.pdf

(120) https://tingroom.com/print_173679.html

(121) Master Plan Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025. pg 65-68.

(122) Master Plan Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025.

(123) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China, (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17), recitals 49 et seq.

(124) Ibidem, recital 55.

(125) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/688 of 2 May 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain organic coated steel products originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 116, 3.5.2019, recitals 37 and 70.

(126) Commission Staff Working Document on significant distortions in the economy of the People's Republic of China for the purposes of trade defence investigations, SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20.12.2017, p. 360. More generally on the steel sector in the PRC, see Chapter 14 – Steel sector, pp. 346-376 of the same document.

(127) ‘The Indonesia-China Five-Year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation’, (Chapter I and Chapter III).

(128) ‘The Indonesia-China Five-Year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation’, (Chapter I., 1.2.3).

(129) ‘The Indonesia-China Five-Year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation’, (Chapter II).

(130) ‘The Indonesia-China Five-Year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation’, (Chapter II, 2.7.8).

(131) https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cebe//eng/mhs/t1249201.htm

(132) Bisnis, ‘China-based lenders back investment in Indonesia’, 26 April 2011, https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/331438/cina-diminta-investasi-pengolahan-hasil-tambang

(133) ‘The Indonesia-China Five-Year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation’, (Chapter I. 1.2.3).

(134) http://www.china-asean-fund.com/sub-fund-3-detail.php?id=1

(135) www.beritasatu.com/whisnu-bagus-prasetyo/ekonomi/142063/sby-presiden-tiongkok-hadiri-penandatanganan-bisnis-lebih-rp-36-t

(136) https://www.business.hsbc.com.cn/en-gb/belt-and-road/story-5

(137) Jindal Stainless Indonesia did not benefit from any preferential financing scheme, as it was not part of the bilateral cooperation between the GOC and the GOID, and did not receive any loans at preferential terms.

(138) http://www.cccme.org.cn/cp/cooperation/zones.aspx

(139) https://enterpriseasia.org/apea/indonesia/awards/id-2015/halim-mina/

(140) https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/11/15/morowali-investors-jittery-over-policy-uncertainties.html

(141) http://www.decent-china.com/index.php/index/about/index?cid=15

(142) https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/331438/cina-diminta-investasi-pengolahan-hasil-tambang

(143) Agreement between the Governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the Indonesia-China Integrated Industrial Parks, 5.1.

(144) Agreement between the Governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the Indonesia-China Integrated Industrial Parks, 5.2.

(145) Master Plan Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025. pg 120-140.

(146) Committee for Acceleration of Priority Infrastructure Delivery (KPPIP) and Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2016 on Acceleration of the Implementation of National Strategic Projects.

(147) As stipulated by Presidential Regulation No. 3 of 2016 on Acceleration of the Implementation of National Strategic Projects.

(148) http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31200/Document/1493265/1493265.htm

(149) https://mscconference.com/wp-content/uploads/MSC18-presentations/Evolving-Seascape-3-Xue-BRI.pdf and http://www.acfic.org.cn/zzjg_327/nsjg/llb/llbgzhdzt/2019zhinan/2019zhinan_1/201910/t20191029_144336.html. See also https://www.etsingshan.com/Art/Art_19/Art_19_103.aspx and https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11442-018-1526-5.pdf

(150) http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jwjmhzq/article02.shtml

(151) Annual Report on Development in Africa, No.19 (2016-2017, Yellow Books of Africa, p. 13.

(152) ‘Regulation Industrial estates 142/2015 vs 24/2009’ and subsequent ‘Regulation Industrial estates 142/2015’.

(153) https://enterpriseasia.org/apea/indonesia/awards/id-2015/halim-mina/

(154) http://www.china-asean-fund.com/sub-fund-3-detail.php?id=1

(155) Tenggara strategic Briefing paper: Belt and Road Initiative: What’s in it for Indonesia?, https://tenggara.id/assets/source/Insights/BRI-Briefing-Paper-English.pdf

(156) http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/report/2016-11/29/content_731597.htm

(157) https://www.tssgroup.com.cn/en/tsingshan-became-a-newcomer-of-the-fortune-500/

(158) https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/2021/01/17/indonesia-morowali-industrial-park-how-industrial-policy-reshapes-chinese-investment-and-corporate-alliances/

(159) https://kemenperin.go.id/artikel/17208/Kunjungan-Chairman-Tsingshan-Holding-Group-Tiongkokhttps://kemenperin.go.id/artikel/17208/Kunjungan-Chairman-Tsingshan-Holding-Group-Tiongkok

(160) https://www.etsingshan.com/Art/Art_14/Art_14_196.aspx

(161) Joint Statement on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia, available at

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceindo/eng/zgyyn/zywx/t1249223.htm

(162) Commission Implementing regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt (OJ L 189, 15.6.2020, p. 1).

(163) Commission Implementing regulation (EU) 2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt (OJ L 189, 15.6.2020, p. 1).

(164) Section IV – 8 of the 13th Five Year Plan on Steel adjustment and upgrade.

(165) D. Brautigam & Xiaoyang Tang; Going Global in Groups: Structural transformation and China’s Special Economic Zones overseas, World Development Vol. 63, 2014, pp. 78–91.

(166) GFF anti-subsidy investigation and Tyres case (sections 4.3.3 and 3.7).

(167) Commission Implementing Regulation 2018/1690 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain tyres from China (OJ L 283, 12.11.2018, p. 1), Recitals 409-412.

(168) Such as Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/96 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17).

(169) Commission Implementing Regulation 2018/1690 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain tyres from China (OJ L 283, 12.11.2018, p. 1), Recital 377.

(170) See Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation and Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.

(171) Appellate Body Report, US – DRAMs, (WT/DS296/AB/R), para. 112.

(172) Incidentally, the facts at issue may also be considered from the angle of Article 16 of the ILC Articles. The close cooperation between the GOID and the GOC not only resulted in acknowledgment and adoption of Chinese acts by the GOID, but also served to potentially circumvent actual and potential duties imposed by the EU on Chinese exports of the product concerned made in Indonesia.

(173) Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/R, adopted 23 March 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R, DSR 2012:II, p. 649, para. 7.955.

(174) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, DSR 2012:I, p. 7, para. 614.

(175) Panel Report, US – Exports Restraints, cit., paras. 8.65 and 8.73.

(176) Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, DSR 2009:III, p. 1291, para. 268 and Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 9, para. 45.

(177) WT/DS2/AB/R – US – Reformulated Gasoline, Appellate Body Report adopted on 20 May 1996, p. 17.

(178) See in detail J. Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO – How far can we go?, American Journal of International Law (2001), pp. 535 and following; Graham Cook, Digest of WTO Jurisprudence on Public International Law Concepts and Principles (CUP 2015).

(179) WT/DS379 – United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report adopted on 11 March 2011, §§308; M.E. Villiger, "Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), p. 433.

(180) WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 304 – 322.

(181) Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001) (“ILC Commentaries”), Article 11, para. (8).

(182) See judgments of 22 May 2014, Guangdong Kito Ceramics and Others v Council, T-633/11, EU:T:2014:271, para. 38; of 11 July 2017, Viraj Profiles v Council, T-67/14, EU:T:2017:481, para. 88; and of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw, T-300/16, ECLI:EU:T:2019:235, para. 101.

(183) See, in particular, judgments of 7 June 2007, Řízení Letového Provozu, C-335/05, EU:C:2007:321, para. 16, and of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, C-240/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:125, paras. 45 and 51, which concerns interpretation of the basic Regulation in conformity with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(184) WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (WT/DS379/AB/R), adopted 25 March 2011, para. 308 (‘ In order to be relevant, such rules must concern the same subject matter as the treaty terms being interpreted ’).

(185) WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (WT/DS379/AB/R), adopted 25 March 2011, para. 312.

(186) See in particular judgments of 6 May 2010, C-63/09, Axel Walz, ECLI:EU:C:2010:251, paras. 27 – 29; and of 6 October 2020, C-66/18, European Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792, para. 90. See also AG Kokott’s Opinion of 15 April 2010, C-334/08, European Commission v. Italian Republic, ECLI:EU:C:2010:187, paras. 29 and 30.

(187) http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jwjmhzq/ and http://www.cocz.org/index.aspx

(188) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17) (‘HRF case’), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1690 of 9 November 2018 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries and with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1579 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People's Republic of China and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 (OJ L 283, 12.11.2018, p. 1) (‘Tyres case’) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 of 17 January 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of electric bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 16, 18.1.2019, p. 5) (‘E-bikes case’), the GFF anti-subsidy investigation.

(189) OJ L 201, 25.6.2020, p. 10.

(190) https://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/perbankan/data-dan-statistik/statistik-perbankan-indonesia/Default.aspx

(191) Presidential Decree No. 39 of 1991 concerning Coordination of Management of Offshore Commercial Loans, dated September 4 1991.

(192) https://www.djppr.kemenkeu.go.id/page/load/3265 and https://www.djppr.kemenkeu.go.id/page/load/2631, last accessed on 19 January 2022.

(193) See https://www.barclays.co.uk/current-accounts/bank-account/overdrafts/overdraft-charges/, last accessed on 18 August 2021, fees for executive overdrafts – ‘ overdrafts over £15 000 have a set-up fee of 1,5 % of the arranged overdraft limit, and a renewal fee of 1,5 % ’.

(194) See GFF case, recitals 354 and 355.

(195) See section 4.3.3 of the GFF Investigation.

(196) IMIP annual report 2017, p. 84.

(197) https://web.archive.org/web/20131029223637/http:/www.chinaeconomicreview.com/node/43071

(198) http://www.china-asean-fund.com/about-caf.php?slider1=1

(199) https://business.sohu.com/20100524/n272300363.shtml

(200) http://www.china-asean-fund.com/about-caf.php?slider1=1

(201) http://www.china-asean-fund.com/about-caf.php?slider1=1

(202) https://business.sohu.com/20100524/n272300363.shtml

(203) http://eg.china-embassy.org/eng/rdwt/201309/201309/t20130915_7245108.htm

(204) GFF case, recital 775; Tyres case, recital 357.

(205) http://www.china-asean-fund.com/sub-fund-3-detail.php?id=1

(206) The Chinese parent companies are part of Tsingshan Group.

(207) https://www.etsingshan.com/Art/Art_38/Art_38_69.aspx

(208) http://www.minmetals.com/english/News/201706/t20170626_226241.html

(209) Tyres case, recitals 405 and 416.

(210) Due to the full non-cooperation of the GOC, the Commission was unable to ask potential relevant information about prices of similar equipment in China to establish benchmarks on the basis of official statistics in China. Since the Commission could not find any information about prices in China and no information was provided about the origin of the equipment, the Commission decided to use a combination of prices for similar equipment from several countries as a proxy.

(211) Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571, para. 90.

(212) Indonesian Ministry of Industry, Industry Facts and Figures, 2017, pp. 34-35, https://kemenperin.go.id/majalah/11/facts-and-figures-industri-indonesia

(213) Art. 38.4, 39.1(d) of regulation 142 of 2015 on industrial estate.

(214) https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/media/6702/regulation-of-minister-of-finance-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-number-89-pmk010-2015.pdf

(215) Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025 (‘MP3EI’), page 15.

(216) Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025 (‘MP3EI’), page 19.

(217) Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025 (‘MP3EI’), page 20.

(218) Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025 (‘MP3EI’), page 22. Nickel is also included in this list.

(219) Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development 2011-2025 (‘MP3EI’), page 67.

(220) The data on Indonesian import in this regulation is presented in ranges because of the risk that any sampled company reverse-engineers its competitors’ data, especially given the limited number of exporting producers in this country.

(221) OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27.