Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/547 of 5 April 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of superabsorbent polymers originating in the Republic of Korea

(247) The Commission analysed the injury picture of the Union industry as a whole, and not at the level of individual producers. To get a balanced picture the Commission used a representative sample of the Union industry. However, in addition the Commission also analysed if individual facts like investments distorted the injury picture. Such factors were taken out of the injury analysis to the extent that they were not part of the ordinary course of business. Finally, not all companies forming part of a sample must incur the same trend for every indicator.. The claim was therefore rejected.

(248) All main injury indicators showed a negative trend during the period considered. The production volume of the Union industry decreased by around 2% and its sales volume in the Union market decreased by 11%. Considering the stable consumption in the Union market, this translated into a decrease of market share on the Union market from [56%-58%] in 2017 to [49%-51%] in the IP, which corresponds to a drop of 7% during the period considered.

(249) Imports from the Republic of Korea increased by 33% between 2017 and the investigation period and gained considerably in market share, although the Union market consumption remained stable. Imports from the country concerned substantially increased their market share from [12%-14%] to [16%-18%]. In addition, South Korean import prices dropped by 10% throughout the period considered and were consistently below Union industry prices. During the investigation period, the import prices of the cooperating exporting producer undercut Union industry prices by 14.7% on average. Moreover, and regardless of any undercutting, the Commission further noted, on the basis of the trends contained in tables 2, 3, 5 and 7, that the dumped imports supressed the prices of the Union industry. Indeed, the Union industry was unable to raise prices to the same extent as its costs of production.

(250) The average prices of the Union industry dropped by 15% during the period considered and, since 2018, average sales prices in the Union market were set well below the correspondent unitary costs of production. The profitability of the Union industry went from [-2% -7%] in 2017 to [-15% -20%] during the IP. Moreover, Union industry’s closing stocks increased overall by 42% during the period considered and represented 25% of production during the investigation period.

(251) Only the production capacity of the Union industry showed a positive trend during the period considered. As shown in Table 4, production capacity went from [540 000 – 580 000] tonnes in 2017 to [650 000 – 690 000] tonnes in the IP, for an overall increase of 17%. The capacity increase resulted from a major investment made by one Union producer in 2018, given the significantly high capacity utilisation rate of 2017 ([93%-95%]). However, the capacity utilisation went down by 17% during the period considered, passing from [93%-95%]in 2017 to [78%-80%] in the IP.

(252) In summary, although consumption on the Union market remained stable, the Union industry was not able to maintain its market share. Imports from the Republic of Korea were substantial throughout the period considered, at prices which were lower than the Union industry prices. Since 2018, the Union industry was selling at prices which no longer covered its costs and consequently the industry reduced its sales levels and prices.

(253) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(254) Following the final disclosure, LG Chem argued that the conclusion that all injury indicators showed a negative trend during the period considered is partial, since there was a stable production, increased capacity, re-direction of part of sales to export markets, significant investments, employment was affected by modernisation and profitability simply reflects the massive investments made in 2017-2018. Contrary to LG Chem’s allegation, the Commission analysed each of the factors and responded to LG Chem’s arguments. The fact that the Commission did not agree with LG Chem’s arguments did not render the analysis partial. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

(255) Following the 2nd ADD, LG Chem argued that all revised indicators showed improved trends as compared to the indicators initially disclosed. In particular, the sales and employment figures showed a considerably more limited decline throughout the period considered and no longer support the conclusion of injury.

(256) The Commission demonstrated above that for each indicator, disclosed in the 2nd ADD, that the figures support or at least do not contradict the Commission’s initial assessment of the existence of injury. The Commission therefore rejected the claim that these figures do not support the conclusion of injury.

(257) In its comments after final disclosure, the Coalition for an Open and Competitive SAP market (15) (‘Coalition H’) argued that, since the end of the investigation period, the prices for SAP increased. The Coalition H claimed, and provided evidence in support, that currently SAP prices are substantially higher than those registered in the investigation period due to higher transport costs, and that Korean prices have increased above those of the Union producers.

(258) The Commission noted that the Coalition H did not contest the Commission’s analysis on SAP prices during the period considered. These claims refer to a period after the period considered and therefore do not contribute to the analysis of this period. Furthermore, as the Coalition H itself has stated, the price increase following the IP is caused by higher transport prices. These transport prices are linked to the current situation of the Covid19-pandemic. It cannot be confirmed that this is a long-term change in the prices and that thereby a further injury in the future could be excluded. The Commission therefore did not consider that this could alter its findings with respect to the injury found during the investigation period and rejected the claim.

(259) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. Those factors are: imports from third countries, spec-in contracts, the export performance of the Union industry, the COVID-19 pandemic, the price formula in raw material supply contracts, the price formula in SAP supply contracts, costs of capacity increases and cost for R&D.

(260) The volume of imports from the Republic of Korea increased (as shown in Table 2) by 33% from 2017 to the investigation period and, consequently, their market share increased by 33%, i.e. from [12%-14%] to [16%-18%]. This was at the detriment of the Union industry. Indeed, over the same period (as shown in Table 5), the Union industry sales decreased by 11% and its market share in the Union market decreased by 12%. In particular, the market share of the Union industry fell from [56%-58%] in 2017 to [49%-51%] in the IP.

(261) The prices of the dumped imports decreased by 10% over the period considered (as shown in Table 3). In parallel, the Union industry prices in the Union market fell by 15% over the same period. The South Korean imports, ever more present in the Union market throughout the period considered, were made at prices that continuously lower than those of the Union industry.

(262) The pressure exerted by the dumped imports also caused significant price suppression as evidenced by the fact that the Union industry was unable to raise prices at the same rate as costs. Indeed, as shown in Table 7, over the period considered, the costs of production increased by 5% whereas the Union industry’s sales prices decreased by 15%. During the period considered, that inability to increase prices caused the profitability of the Union industry to significantly fall from [-2% - -7%] to [-15% -20%], which is clearly an unsustainable level.

(263) In parallel, imports from the Republic of Korea significantly increased in volume by 33% and their market share increased by 33%, while the market share of the Union industry dropped by 12%. Indeed, despite a stable Union market consumption between 2017 and the IP, South Korean imports continued to gain market share from the Union industry. In the same period, South Korean import prices decreased by 10% (Table 3), while the Union industry prices decreased more, by 15%, contrary to the cost of production, that increased by 5%. Therefore, already by 2018, the Union industry was suffering from material injury caused by the dumped imports.

(264) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the imports from the Republic of Korea caused material injury to the Union industry. Such injury had both volume and price effects.

(265) Following the Final Disclosure LG Chem argued that the allegations of price pressure are not supported by facts, as recent specialized press reports state that at least two Union producers have implemented steep price increases for SAP.

(266) These reports refer to a period after the period considered and therefore did not contribute to the analysis of this period. In addition, such price increases could be connected to multiple short-term factors, including supply shortages caused by the international container shortage, as highlighted by the Coalition H. The Commission therefore did not consider that this could alter its findings with respect to the injury found during the investigation period and rejected this claim.

(267) LG Chem further claimed that most injury indicators started to decline between 2019 and the IP, whereas Korean imports only increased from 2017 to 2019, a period in which the Union industry incurred no injury volume-wise. A depreciation in sales and market shares took place in the IP, when the Union industry decided to increasingly focus on export markets, and when Japanese imports increased.

(268) In this claim LG Chem mixes two claims also made separately. The Commission addresses the claim that the Union industry decided to focus on export markets in section 5.2.4 and the claim that the Japanese import increase in the IP could have contributed to the injury in section 5.2.3LG Chem further claimed that there is no link between the evolution of the market share of Korean exports and the evoluation of the market share of the Union industry, as the Union industry lost most market shares in 2020, the year in which imports from Korea were also losing market share.

(269) This argument is closely linked to LG Chem’s argument that the Japanese imports and not Korean imports were responsible for the loss of market shares in 2020 and was discussed and rejected in recitals (299) to (306).

(270) LG Chem further claimed that the imports from Korea never had any impact on investments, as shown by the continuous developments of new products by Union producers.

(271) While Union producers investments indeed increased from 2017 to 2019, they sharply decreased in the IP, due to the pricing pressure caused by the Korean imports. LG Chem did not include the IP in its analysis of a continuous development of new products. The Commission therefore rejected this claim.

(272) In its comments on initiation LG Chem requested the Commission to analyse whether the decline in sales and market shares of the Union industry was caused by imports from Japan, the worldwide allocation of spec-in contracts as well as capacity increase investments. LG Chem referred to the complaint, where the complainants stated that the Union producers’ sales followed a fluctuating trend similar to that of the consumption until 2019 and that the Union industry’s market share only declined against the Union consumptions trend during the IP. LG Chem argued that the major increase of imports from Japan caused the decline in market share of the Union industry, whereas the minor increase of imports from the Republic of Korea were caused by spec-in contracts.

(273) The Commission analysed if and how far those factors contributed to the injury.

(274) LG Chem argued that an increased demand of spec-in products, which were sourced from Korea has caused the increase in exports from Korea.

(275) Spec-in products are produced and sold in the Union by both Union and South Korean producers. The Commission did not find an increased demand for in-spec products as such. However, it found a shift between suppliers on a global basis, with more orders for spec-in products being awarded to the Korean producer over time.

(276) Furthermore, the Commission analysed the development of the contracted volumes supplied by Union producers over the period considered and found that although there were shifts in volumes among Union suppliers, the overall changes in volume supply over the period considered did not affect the trend of the injury indicators, and more particularly the profitability of the Union industry as a whole, over the period considered.

(277) Therefore, the Commission concluded that this factor did not contribute to the observed injury of the Union industry.

(278) Following the Final disclosure LG Chem argued that since SAP is not a commodity product, negotiations are not based on prices, but on quality. Users require specific SAP grades for specific applications. Contracts are therefore simply concluded with the producers that can best satisfy the customers’ requirements.

(279) The Commission noted that SAP producers are normally able to produce a wide range of grades for specific applications, and that both Union and Korean producers produce such spec-in products. This is also reflected by the fact that many users, especially large users, apply a multi-sourcing strategy. This demonstrates that regularly there is not only one SAP producer with a specific grade that best satisfies the customers requirement, but various. Logically, users, as profit-oriented companies, will in this case balance the characteristic benefits of a certain SAP offered by several suppliers, with the most cost-efficient sourcing. This is different from a situation where users would be restricted from choosing the cheapest supplier due to quality or technical issues. The Commission therefore rejected the argument that negotiations would not be based on prices, but solely on quality.

(280) The Coalition of users argued that the Union industry suffered injury due to the price formula adopted in their supply contracts and thus the imposition of anti-dumping measures would not avoid price declines for the Union producers. They suggested that SAP prices of the Union industry follow an indexation mechanism towards raw material prices and, thus, fluctuate in line with the fluctuation of raw material prices, regardless of the volume of imports from the country concerned.

(281) Furthermore, both the Coalition of users and LG Chem claimed that the price formula mechanism adopted in supply contracts was sufficient for SAP suppliers to achieve sufficient profitability levels, since upward and downward movements in raw material costs were automatically reflected in the final price of SAP products.

(282) Therefore, the alleged profitability losses described in the complaint could not be caused by the decline of sales prices of the Union industry following the price cuts of South Korean imports, but rather by the increase in the costs of production structures of the Union producers.

(283) The Commission analysed the effect of the price formula on the profitability. It is a global standard that SAP sales contracts are concluded for a year or multiple years. In those contracts the price of SAP for a specific month is regularly linked to the price of the main raw materials in the preceding quarter. That delayed influence of the raw material price causes a lower or higher profit margin in the month in question. When the raw material price in the previous quarter was lower than in a current month, it influences the margin negatively. While over time generally positive effects can offset negative effects, the Commission found for the IP an overall negative effect. However, that effect was so small that it could only explain a very minor part of the losses incurred by the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission concluded that this factor could not contribute to the observed injury of the Union industry.

(284) Following the final disclosure, LG Chem argued that there was no price depression or suppression. LG Chem claimed that the price formulas for SAP, which reflect the evolution of raw material prices, rather than the Korean imports, had explanatory force for the downward trend in prices and therefore had a depressive or suppressive effect on domestic prices. The Commission was therefore faced with elements other than imports that may explain the significant depression or suppression of domestic prices. Furthermore, prices of Korean imports and prices of the Union industry followed the same trends.

(285) The Commission has taken into account the fact that price formulas for SAP reflect the price evolution of raw material prices. These formulas ensure that the profits of SAP producers in existing sales contracts made for a certain period, are not affected by increasing raw material prices. If the price formulas were the only explanatory force for the downward trend in prices, it should have resulted in a more stable profit margin for the European producers and only caused a minor price effect, as described in Recital (283), because prices are linked to raw material prices of the previous quarter. However, these price formulas cannot alone be responsible for price trends in re-negotiations or newly negotiated contracts, compared to existing older contracts.

(286) The Commission therefore analysed the pricing variations that occurred over the period considered in addition to the price trends linked to raw material prices. Over the period considered, the Union industry prices decreased more than the raw material prices. It is this additional decrease in sales prices that caused the injury, as this additional decrease was not profit-neutral. The fact that prices of Korean imports and prices of the Union industry followed trends in the same direction, at different rates, does not contradict the fact that on top of the profit-neutral trend caused by the raw material prices, there was an overlaying trend. The Commission therefore rejected the argument that it disregarded a factor with explanatory force for the price depression.

(287) LG Chem further argued that the decline in domestic prices does not result from a decline in the fixed element in the SAP sales contracts, but rather in the variable element reflecting the price changes of the raw materials C3 and NaOH. LG Chem argued that the majority of the price decrease of Union industry prices between 2017 and 2020 was caused by the C3 and NaOH prices, which decreased by 18% in the same period, whereas the fixed price element, according to LG Chem’s calculations, only decreased by 12% in the same period. LG Chem also argued that the profitability of the Union producers on the Union market correlated with the profitability on the Union producers’ export markets, which would be a further indication that external elements affecting the global SAP markets, namely the SAP price formula and cost constraints, were responsible.

(288) As mentioned above, the Commission took into account the fact that changes in raw materials influence the sales price. However, the price formulas connect the sales price exactly for the purpose of maintaining a stable profit level and keeping changes in raw material neutral regarding the profit margin. Therefore, the changes in the fixed amount of the price formula with regard to new contracts or renegotiations are the element that affects the profitability of the Union industry. If only the changes caused by raw material prices would have occurred, then the profitability level over the period considered would have been more stable. This demonstrates that the pricing pressure of the Korean imports on the negotiations of the price element of the contract is the causation for the decline in profitability and not the changing raw material prices. The fact that pricing pressure also occurs in parallel on export markets does not contradict the analysis conducted with respect to the Union market. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

(290) While imports from Japan have first decreased by 28% between 2017 and 2018 and by 25% between 2018 and 2019, they substantially increased by 75% in the IP. The imports from Japan were carried out by one of the sampled Union producers, Nippon Shokubai Europe, which in addition to its own production resells SAP produced by its mother company Nippon Shokubai Japan (‘Nippon Shokubai’). Until 2019, Nippon Shokubai followed a strategy of decreasing Japanese imports in favour of its European production, which is reflected in higher production volume and investments, resulting in a significant European capacity increase in 2018. However, over time, Nippon Shokubai Europe was confronted more and more by customers demanding lower prices due to the pressure of low-priced South Korean imports. Therefore, as of the IP, Nippon Shokubai adapted its strategy.

(291) In order to remain competitive with the South Korean imports and not to lose sales volumes in Europe, Nippon Shokubai Europe increased its resales of SAP produced in Japan.

(292) While prices of Japanese and South Korean imports overall followed a largely similar trend (like those of the Union industry), there is one notable exception: South Korean import prices showed a significant drop in 2019 while Japanese prices still increased and Union industry prices remained nearly stable. This was not sustainable and as a consequence, both the Japanese and Union industry had to follow and drop their prices significantly in the IP.

(293) The development of market shares is also significant. The Republic of Korea increased its market share by 4 percentage points over the entire period considered. By contrast, Japanese imports first decreased significantly in the years 2018 and 2019 and only increased in the IP as a consequence of the pricing pressure from the South Korean imports, which rendered the European production unprofitable. As result, the quantities imported from Japan during the IP were higher than those imported at the beginning of the injury investigation period, and the market share held by Japan increased by 20% over the whole injury period.

(294) There is no evidence on file to suggest that Japanese imports were dumped. As a consequence, regardless of whether or not imports from Japan may have contributed to the injury of other Union producers, the effect of the South Korean exports was substantially higher over the period considered due to the lower price and higher volume increase throughout that period.

(295) In addition, Nippon Shokubai Europe also continued to suffer losses on the sales of its SAP produced in Europe.

(296) Imports from Turkey increased by 25% over the period considered. Their market share increased from [6%-8%] to [7%-9%] in that period. The average price of those imports followed the same trend of those from the Republic of Korea, despite being set at a lower level as of 2018 until the IP. During the investigation period, they undercut South Korean and the Union industry prices by 3% and 14% respectively. Turkish imports should therefore be considered as a contributing factor to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(297) However, as the volume of such imports represented always less than half of those from the Republic of Korea, it is clear that imports from the Republic of Korea were a more important causation factor.

(298) The volume of imports and the market share of the USA both decreased by 24% during the period considered. In parallel, their average price increased by 22%. Thus, American imports could not have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry during this period.

(299) Following the final disclosure, LG Chem requested additional disclosures concerning the methodology used to determine import volumes and values from Korea and Japan. The Commission clarified in the additional disclosure of 8 February 2022 that Eurostat import data based on CN codes has been relied on for imports from third countries. For Japan, Eurostat information for the CN code 3906 90 90 regarding Japan was checked with the confidential information in the case file. As explained in recital 195 of the GDD, the imports from Japan were carried out by one of the sampled Union producers. Due to the fact that the figures stem from one producer, they are confidential. For Korea, the Commission provided adjusted figures as discussed in recitals (159) to (163).

(300) With regard to LG Chem’s comment that the ranges provided for Japanese imports do not allow any proper comparison with either Korean imports or prices of the Union industry, the Commission referred to the fact that the data is confidential and narrower ranges would not ensure the confidentiality of the data.

(301) LG Chem also claimed that injury was mainly caused by Japanese imports. In support of its claim, LG Chem stated that at their peak in 2019, the Korean imports did not prevent the Union industry from increasing the fixed element of their price. The fixed element only declined in 2020, when Korean imports declined but the prices of the Union industry declined more to follow the decline in prices of imports from Japan.

(302) LG Chem’s argument only points to an isolated comparison of the years 2019 and 2020. This, however, disregards the fact that SAP contracts are negotiated regularly for at least a year, but also as multi-year contracts and the price negotiations regularly take place in the year preceding the start of the contract. This means that prices for contracts starting in in 2020 were negotiated in 2019 and multi-year contracts starting in 2019 were already negotiated in 2018.

(303) However, imports from Japan had decreased in 2018 by 28% and in 2019 even by 57% compared to 2017. Also, in 2019 the volume imported from Japan even at the upper end of the range displayed in Table 11 does not even constitute half of the imports from Korea in the same period. From a comparison of the imports from Japan displayed in recital (113) of the complaint for the period from July 2019 to June 2020, [63 000 – 67 000 tons] with the imports for the entire year 2020 displayed in Table 11, [105 000 – 115 000 tons], it is further visible that the increase in Japanese imports mostly took place only as of the second half of 2020.

(304) It is therefore, highly unlikely that the increase in Japanese imports in 2020 had an effect on the price negotiations for the sales in 2020, but rather logical that the additional effect of the 2020 Japanese imports, if any, will only materialize from 2021 onwards. Contrary to that, as LG Chem admits, Korean imports increased substantially in 2018 and with an increase of 38% reached its peak in 2019, the two years in which most price negotiations for 2020 took place. The fact that the Japanese imports only substantially increased in the second half of 2020 shows that these imports are a reaction to the pricing pressure exercised by the Korean importsas highlighted in recital (291) above. The Commission therefore rejected the argument that the increase in imports from Japan taking place in 2020 is causal factor of the price depression in 2020 on the Union market.

(305) LG Chem further argued that the prices of the sampled Union producers followed prices of imports from Japan and not from Korea.

(306) LG Chem did not demonstrate a correlation of the Union producers’ prices with the Japanese import prices. Between 2017 and 2018, Union producer prices and prices of imports from Korea increased by a similar percentage, whereas Japanese import prices only increased marginally. Between 2018 and 2019 prices of imports from Japan clearly increased by 4 percentage points, whereas the Union producers’ prices declined, as did the Korean import prices. Only from 2019 to the IP is there a clear correlation, which indicates that both Union producers and Japanese imports were under the pricing pressure of the record Korean imports in 2019.

(307) LG Chem also argued that NSE did not adapt its strategy as they maintained stable Union sales in the IP, on top of significant imports from Japan. Furthermore, according to LG Chem, suppliers cannot be switched overnight due to a lengthy on-boarding process of users. NSE implemented a long-term predatory strategy to supply the Union market both from Japanese and Union factories, by increasing capacities in the Union and sales to the detriment of other Union producers.

(308) The Commission noted that imports from Japan, including the imports of NSE, have decreased substantially from 2017 to 2019 and only increased in the IP. This demonstrates that a strategy adaptation took place, aiming to replace resales of Japanese imports by local production in the EU. Only in reaction to the competition from low-priced Korean imports, did Japanese imports increase at the end of 2020. Such adaptations can take place more quickly between subsidiaries of a multinational group , with shorter adaptation time required on the user’s side. This also aligns with the fact that imports from Japan decreased while production capacities in the Union were increased. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

(309) LG Chem further claimed that the Commission likely underestimated the market share of Japan by failing to consider other Japanese suppliers, such as Sumitomo Seika.

(310) The Commission has crosschecked the Eurostat data with the available data on file, including the information provided from users. The file did not give any indication that imports by other Japanese suppliers were underestimated. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

(311) Finally, LG Chem claimed that insofar as Turkish imports caused injury to the Union industry, the Commission ought to have ensured that the injurious effects of Turkish imports are separated and not attributed to Korean imports.

(312) The Commission noted in recitals (296) and (297) that the Turkish imports have neither increased substantially over the period considered, nor can they compare in absolute figures to the Korean imports. The Commission therefore rejected that arguments that it has attributed effects of Turkish imports to the Korean imports.

(313) In its comments on initiation LG Chem requested the Commission to analyse if a deliberate focus of the Union industry on exports had contributed to the injury.

(315) The average price of those exports first increased by 23% in 2018. That level then decreased in 2019, remaining 18% higher than the 2017 level, and further in the investigation period to a level that was below the 2017 level (-2%). The average price of those exports was lower than that of the Union industry in the Union market throughout the period considered, and remained stable. Export volumes were consistently below the volume levels that the Union industry achieved in the Union market, even though they increased by 45% overall during the period considered.

(316) The export sales prices developed more closely in line with the raw material price evolution over the period considered, thus not showing the same magnitude of price depression over the period considered, as the sales on the Union market (shown in Table 5). In addition, given that export sales increased, they did not have any additional negative effects on the fixed costs per unit produced. Thus, the Commission concluded that the export performance did not contribute significantly to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(317) Given the spare production capacity of the Union producers as of 2018, there is also no indication that the Union producers had a deliberate strategy to give up market shares in the EU in favour of sales outside the EU. The spare capacity would have allowed the Union producers to increase sales outside the EU without losing market share in the EU.

(318) The Commission therefore rejected the argument that a deliberate focus of the Union industry on exports has contributed to the injury.

(319) Following the final disclosure LG Chem argued that sales on the Union market were not lost for the Union industry, but rather re-directed form the Union market to export markets. In addition LG Chem argued that in a 2007 investigation concerning pentaerythritol, the Commission held that a slight increase in export volumes at sales prices lower than the average sales prices on the Union market had a negative effect on the financial situation of the Union industry.

(320) The Commission observed that the capacity utilisation of the Union industry during the IP was only [78%-80%]. This confirms that the Union industry could have increased the exports sales also without selling less on the Union market. Contrary to the pentaerythritol investigation as described in recital (316), the increased export sales thus did not contribute significantly to the material injury.

(321) The claim was therefore rejected.

(322) LG Chem also argued that the economic downturn of the COVID-19 pandemic should be taken into consideration as a factor that could have potentially caused injury to the Union industry in the period between mid-2019 and 2020. It asked the Commission to investigate to what extent that factor contributed to the injury situation of the Union industry.

(323) SAP is mainly used for basic hygienic needs and was thus not negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. While in the beginning of 2020, fear in the market led to an increased demand for hygienic products and thereby SAP, it equalized over the year. There were also no major production stops caused by the pandemic. No other negative effect of COVID-19 pandemic was observed for the SAP manufacturers. The Commission therefore rejected the argument that the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the injury.

(324) The Coalition of users and LG Chem further argued that the losses in profitability claimed in the complaint by the Union industry could be the result of extraordinary expenses, rather than normal commercial considerations. They suggested that the investments in new capacities by the Union industry – already described in recital (205) – could have played a role in that regard by dragging up the costs of production.

(325) LG Chem added that such extraordinary expenses could also relate to investments in the development of new technologies by the Union industry, which – similarly to investments in production capacity – contributed to the increase of the costs of production.

(326) The Commission noted that it is a part of the normal course of business that SAP manufacturers invest into new production facilities, especially in a situation of close to full capacity utilisation, which was a given in the beginning of the period considered. The capacity increases were also not of an unreasonable dimension, especially taking into account production efficiencies connected to a higher capacity. In addition, the Commission requested the sampled Union producers to exclude any extraordinary effect from impairments or extraordinary write-off from the injury indicators.

(327) The Commission therefore rejected the argument that the cost of capacity increases contributed to the injury.

(328) LG Chem claimed that the Union producers have focused on the developments of new materials, which implied significant R&D costs that also necessarily drove up costs to a material extent.

(329) It is a part of the normal course of business that SAP manufacturers invest into the development of new kinds of SAP. LG Chem also regularly invests in the development of new kinds of SAP and explicitly stressed the importance of such investment in the context of spec-in SAP. The fact that R&D creates costs is therefore a usual part of the business. During the verification of the sampled Union producers no unreasonably high R&D costs were found.

(330) The Commission therefore rejected the argument that R&D costs contributed to the injury of the Union Industry.

(331) Following the Final Disclosure LG Chem argued that with a small number of global buyers, prices are determined at the global level, rather than based on individual trends in the Union market.

(332) First, not all users of SAP operate on a global level as demonstrated by various users, who came forward in the procedure and have their entire production in the Union. LG Chem did not detail or substantiate in its argument to which share of sales in the Union the principle of global price negotiations applies. Second, even in cases where prices are negotiated on a global level, these price negotiations necessarily take into account the price level on the Union market. No global player would pay a higher global price, if a cheaper supply on the Union market would be possible. At the same time, if a supplier within a global contract agrees to supply the Union at dumped and injurious prices, then the global contract is no justification for such dumping. The Commission therefore rejected this claim.

(333) A comparison of the situation of imports with that of the Union industry at the beginning and the end of the period considered clearly shows a substantial increase of imports from the country concerned and the deterioration of the situation of the Union industry. More specifically, the situation deteriorated significantly in 2019 and 2020. South Korean prices decreased importantly in 2019 while the Union industry (and Japan) maintained their price levels. However, this was at the expense of their sales volume as the Republic of Korea considerably expanded its sales. In response, the Union industry followed the price trend set by the Republic of Korea and decreased their sales prices in 2020 but they continued to lose important sales quantities in the market. The dumped imports from the Republic of Korea caused material injury to the Union industry since 2017 because of the massive market penetration achieved at the expense of the Union industry. In terms of prices, the increasing market share of imports continuously undercut those of the Union industry and created substantial price pressure and prevented the market price increases in line with raw material cost increases that were necessary for the Union industry to achieve reasonable profit levels.

(334) Other factors, such as sales volume losses and shifts for spec-in SAP or raw material price fluctuations did not contribute to the observed injury of the Union industry.

(335) Imports from Japan and Turkey in turn had a limited impact on the industry. Imports from Turkey were at similar prices to the South Korean imports but at much lower volumes and thus such imports did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury of the Union industry Similarly, Japanese imports did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury of the Union industry. Such imports decreased during the period considered and only substantially increased in the IP. However, imports from Japan maintained a higher price level than the South Korean imports. The South Korean imports at prices much lower than those of the Union industry are the main reason why the Union industry lost sales and could not raise its prices in line with its cost of production, which led to severe profitability losses.

(336) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the country concerned while other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(337) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. The injury is clear in the evolution of production, capacity utilisation, sales volume in the Union market, market share, employment, average unit sales price in the Union market, cost of production, closing stocks, profitability and return on investments, when seen in light of the evolution of South Korean import volumes and prices (both absolute and in comparison with other market players).

(338) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry and users. As the product is mostly sold directly to the customer, no unrelated importers participated in the procedure.

(339) The imposition of measures will improve market conditions for the Union producers that will be able to improve their competitive position in the market, and recover lost sales volume and market share. As the price pressure from unfair imports would be lifted, the Union industry will be able to increase its sales prices and reach a sustainable profitability.

(340) The absence of measures would have significant negative effects for the Union industry, as imports would continue to increase and lead to further price depression in the Union. This would have a negative impact on the Union industry’s production and sales volume as well as market share. This in turn would negatively affect the Union industry’s financial indicators and in particular, the already loss making situation would be further aggravated with negative consequences for investments and employment in the Union.

(341) Therefore, the imposition of measures would clearly be in the interest of the Union industry.

(342) Several users came forward in the investigation, but only two of them provided a reply to the questionnaire. Both produced predominantly adult healthcare products. The reply of both users was significantly deficient and only one of the companies replied to the Commission’s request to provide additional information within the given deadline and the reply was still deficient. As a result, for one of the users, the Commission was not able to assess the impact of the anti-dumping duties at all. For the second user, despite the incomplete questionnaire response, the Commission was able to estimate the impact of measures. For that company SAP represented [5 - 15%] of its cost of production, but only around one third of this SAP originated from South Korean supplies. The company also demonstrated that for important key markets, multi-year contracts with the public health sector and insurance firms prevent a passing on of additional production costs. The company also provided evidence for various countries reducing costs in the health sector, putting pressure on the company to reduce its sales prices. Despite those challenges and in particular the cost cuttings in the public health sector that impacted users’ sales, the company showed a healthy profit of [10% - 20%]. The Commission therefore concluded that measures of 14.7% on [5% - 15%] of its cost of production could be absorbed or at least passed on to consumers.

(343) Four further users, including Procter & Gamble, FATER and Essity, as well as a Coalition of users, consisting of four users, put forward their arguments during hearings and submissions. All users strongly opposed measures.

(344) Procter & Gamble argued that access to all SAP suppliers, including South Korean suppliers, was vital for maintaining a multiple supply strategy, to ensure supply stability especially for in-spec SAP, which cannot be produced by all SAP producers. The capacity of the Union producers to produce the specific Generation 8 SAP required by Procter & Gamble is not enough to provide the volume required. If Procter & Gamble were to be forced to use other SAP not fulfilling the Generation 8 specifications, it could trigger important costs for adjusting packaging, transport and would have a negative impact on the environment by increasing the amount of waste. In addition a change in SAP will require an adaptation process of at least six months.

(345) FATER brought forward similar arguments regarding supply stability and insufficient production capacity for Generation 8 and 9 SAP, and a required adaptation period of six to nine months. FATER estimated the negative impact of the company in case it was required to use other types of SAP as leading to de-standardisation and triggering additional costs of a seven -digit EUR amount.

(346) A third user brought forward similar arguments regarding supply stability, adaptation costs for change of SAP and environmental impact.

(347) The Coalition of users as well as another user suggested that, in view of the risk that one of the Union producers considering selling its SAP business, the imposition of anti-dumping measures would reinforce a duopoly and jeopardize the competition on the Union market.

(348) The cooperating exporting producer also commented on the risk that the anti-dumping measures could undermine fair competition on the Union market.

(349) Similar claims were advanced by another SAP user, Essity. It claimed that, without the threat of competition, the Union industry would have little incentive to diversify its production and develop new solutions to meet evolving customer needs, hence hampering Essity’s drive to diversification and making it dependent on only a few Union producers.

(350) The Commission considers that the Coalition of users did not provide sufficient evidence in support of its claims on the possibility that the Union market would become a duopoly should the anti-dumping duties be imposed. In particular, the coalition did not consider that the dumped imports and the caused decline of profitability of the Union industry might not increase the risk of a market exit of one Union producer.

(351) Moreover, the information collected during the investigation showed no evidence of any anti-competitive practices carried out by the Union industry. On the contrary, specific evidence that the industry was capable and willing to supply any user of the product concerned was collected.

(352) The Commission concluded that the measures will increase the production costs of the users and are not in the interest of the users. Taking into account that the intended amount of duties will not have a prohibitive effect as SAP only represents [5% - 15%] of the cost of production of adult or baby diapers, the Commission concluded that the interest of the users to have access to all worldwide SAP suppliers without duties does not prevail over the interest of the Union Industry to be protected against dumped imports.

(353) In their comments after the final disclosure, P&G and Fater disagreed with the statement in recital (351) with regards the capability of the Union industry to supply any user of the product concerned. They claimed that the Union Industry is unable to supply the requested amounts of SAP Generation 8 & 9, as it is lacking production capacity for this specific SAP product.

(354) Similar claims were advanced by Coalition H in their submission following disclosure. It also disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion on the capability of the Union industry to supply any user of the product concerned. It argued, and provided evidence, that SAP users systematically experienced supply chain disruptions in the Union market and were not able to secure the quality and quantity of SAP needed for their production. The Coalition concluded that, giving the existing supply chain disruptions, the Union industry would not be able to compensate for the loss of competitive SAP imports from outside the EU.

(355) The evidence brought forward by P&G, Fater and the Coalition H to substantiate a supply shortage mostly concern the period following the IP, but also the second and third quarter of the IP. The evidence provided for In the IP shows that there was a temporary impact of the COVID-lockdown in the period March to June 2020 on one of the European suppliers. However, the data also showed that this was a temporary and exceptional situation, as supplies resumed rapidly after the lockdown. In addition, the data did not show the same difficulties for the entire EU industry. To the contrary, the data seems to indicate that shortage of supply by one Union producer was partly alleviated by increased supply from other Union producers (in combination with imports from outside the EU). The Commission thus concluded that there was insufficient evidence during the IP to conclude that the EU industry would not be able supply users concerned under normal business circumstances.

(356) All the remaining evidence concerned The post IP-period, which was affected by supply disruptions from overseas and the global transport shortage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, thus leading to an increased demand for European SAP. However, these were temporary and not structural phenomena which were expected to disappear as supply chains were adjusting to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, as argued by various users, the adaptation to a new supplier can often not take place immediately and supply contracts are regularly concluded for a period of at least one year. This structure of long-term contracts gives the Union industry some time to adjust, especially taking into account their proven ability to make substantial investments. In addition, the supporting evidence provided by the Coalition H did not point to any major structural issues affecting the European producers ability or willingness to supply under normal market conditions. For example, e-mails relating to Nippon Shokubai only highlighted issues concerning supply from its Japanese plant, not from the European plant. All the evidence submitted with relation to BASF only concerned an unexpected and temporary issue affecting a single SAP grade. Similarly, evidence concerning the other two European producers did not bring to light any structural supply problems.

(357) As for P&G, it did not argue that Union producers cannot produce the Generation 8 & 9 SAP, but only that the production capacities currently adapted and dedicated to this SAP are not sufficient for P&G’s demand. However, the Union industry has demonstrated its willingness to invest during the investigation period, which indicates that existing spare capacity can be adapted or extended if necessary. The Commission therefore rejected the claim that, it did not take into account the evidence provided by P&G, Fater and Coalition H.

(358) P&G and Fater further claimed that the Commission failed to substantiate which “specific evidence” was collected to conclude that the Union industry was capable and willing to supply any user of the product concerned, as stated in recital (351) . Similar claims were advanced by the Coalition H in their submission following disclosure.

(359) The Commission clarifies that the specific evidence collected relate to spare capacities, investments to adapt to needs of new clients and the acceptance of new clients.

(360) Following the final disclosure, LG Chem argued that the supply situation has changed since 2020, including prices and availability of SAP supplies in the Union, supporting the arguments made by P&G and other users. Also, LG Chem argues that SAP price are increasing, as prices for propylene and caustic soda are picking up.The Commission considered the fact that users have provided evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting transport shortages overseas have caused a temporary shortage in SAP supply and led to increasing prices. The Commission however considered that this is only a temporary change (see further recital (355)). Furthermore, the increase of SAP prices due to raw material increases is also not likely to improve the profitability of the Union industry long-term. The Commission therefore considered that the Union interest of imposing measure to counter the injurious dumping that had been established was not affected by the temporary supply shortages.

(361) In its comments after the final disclosure, Coalition H disagreed with the Commission’s methodology. In particular, it commented that the conclusions on Union interest are based on limited and inaccurate information which were described by the Commission as deficient in recital (342).

(362) Coalition H further disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion in recital (352), according to which SAP represents [5% - 15%] of the cost of production of adult or baby diapers. It claimed, and provided evidence, that the cost of SAP accounted for up to [20-30%] of the total cost of production.

(363) It also claimed that the Commission based its conclusion on the data provided by only one user and therefore failed to take into account the evidence provided on the difficulties of passing the additional burden of the duties to its customers. In particular, it was explained that SAP users would typically not be able to pass the price increases on to their own customers for a variety of different reasons, such as long term contracts, fierce competition from non-EU competitors and price sensitivity of customers.

(364) In assessing all documents provided by all interested parties the Commission did not base its assessment on limited and inaccurate information. To the extent that the interested parties cooperated, the Commission verified the provided information. This included the percentage of SAP in the cost of production for baby and adult hygiene products. The Commission therefore rejected these claims of Coalition H.

(365) In its comments after the final disclosure, Kimberly-Clark argued that SAP prices in the Union market are largely driven by the inflation of manufacturing costs, rather than by the imports from Korea. It claimed that SAP prices absorbed the impact of inflation on commodity, distribution, labour and energy costs throughout 2021 and, as a result, SAP prices increased. To conclude, Kimberly-Clark argued that the anti-dumping measures would further exacerbate the trend of increasing prices for both the downstream users and the final customers of products including SAP.

(366) In response, the Commission noted that Kimberly-Clark correctly pointed out that the Union SAP producers were absorbing manufacturing cost increases as they were not able to increase their sales prices accordingly. However, this only demonstrated the price pressure on the market and the fact that the manufacturers were not in a position to pass on increased manufacturing costs to their clients. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

(367) In its comments after final disclosure, Kimberly-Clark also disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion that the duties will not have a prohibitive effect as SAP only represents [5%-15%] of the cost of production of adult or baby diapers, as stated in recital (352).It claimed that this method of calculation did not account for the fact that SAP are not fungible commodity products.

(368) In its assessment the Commission accounted for the fact that SAP is produced with different properties and that users choose a specific kind of SAP that suits their product best. However, the technical differences alone did not justify adding additional PCN categories. The Commission had initially collected more detailed data and came to the conclusion that only a distinction of the use and according to odour-control additives was justified. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

(369) Coalition H further argued that the Commission failed to correctly assess the concerns submitted by several SAP users with regards the imposition of duties, which led to incorrect conclusions on the Union interest. It claimed that the Commission missed the opportunity to provide guidance to the users on how to present their submissions in a more complete and useful manner and did not make a sufficient effort to collaborate with those users so that the information ultimately collected would allow a proper assessment of the Union interest. It further claimed that, among Coalition H members, only three SAP users appear to have received a questionnaire from the Commission and that the Commission only used the information provided in one of two questionnaire responses, while disregarding the arguments put forward in hearings and submissions of at least eight other SAP users.

(370) The Commission sent the notice of initiation with the link to the relevant user questionnaire to all known users and all users that came forward were informed of the procedure. All information provided by users was taken into account in the assessment. The Commission further approached all users that had provided a response to the user’s questionnaire to verify their data. Via deficiency letters, guidance about the necessary data was provided. The Commission therefore rejected the argument that it did not sufficiently take into account or provide assistance to users in this procedure.

(371) Several users indicated that an increase of production cost for health care products will increase the cost of consumers of health care products. In addition a limitation for the access to the Generation 8 and Generation 9 SAP, might lead to less quality products for consumers.

(372) The Commission considered that the additional production costs that can result from the measures will increase the price for health care product consumers. However, the Commission considers that the level of this increase will not be so high that the consumer interest in access to reasonably priced healthcare products prevailed over the interest of the Union Industry to be protected from dumped imports. Further the measures would not have the effect to prevent users from continuing to produce health care products including Generation 8 and Generation 9 SAP.

(373) In its comments following disclosure, Fater claimed that the Commission failed to address its concerns over the possibility that the anti-dumping measures could affect the customers’ capability to access healthcare products at a reasonable price. It reiterated that its production of medical devices relies on the cooperation with Korean exporters and that the measures would entail additional technical work and re-design of its products, which would result in an increased price to the final customers.

(374) The Commission has addressed the potential cost increase for health care product consumers in recital (372) and balanced it against the interest of the Union industry for protection against dumped imports. The Commission therefore rejected Fater’s claim.

(375) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of SAP originating in the Republic of Korea.

(376) Based on the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, definitive measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(377) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(378) The Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry. In this case, the injury would be eliminated if the Union industry was able to cover its costs of production, including those costs resulting from multilateral environmental agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia to the basic Regulation, and was able to obtain a reasonable profit (‘target profit’) by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic regulation.

(379) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, to establish the target profit, the Commission took into account the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country concerned and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6%.

(380) The Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. During the entire period considered the Union industry incurred losses. As this was lower than the minimum 6% required by Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, that profit margin was replaced by 6%.

(381) No claims were made that the Union industry’s level of investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition.

(382) Likewise, no claims were made concerning the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party and that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2), in accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(383) On that basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of the like product for the Union industry by applying the target profit margin of 6% to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation on a type-by-type basis.

(384) The Commission then determined the injury elimination level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled exporting producers in the country concerned on a type-by-type basis, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the free Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from that comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(386) Following the Final Disclosure LG Chem argued that the injury margin determination is affected by the same error as the undercutting calculations, and their considerations made for the undercutting apply mutatis mutandis. Also the injury margin should be adjusted by the impact of the other factors put forward by LG Chem.

(387) The Commission referred to its arguments in recitals (184) to (188) as well as its rebuttal of LG Chem’s arguments on the impact of imports from other countries, the SAP price formula and the investments of the Union industry, set forth in the respective sections of the causation analysis. Those claims were thus rejected also with regard to the injury margin determination.

(388) In their submission following final disclosure, the complainants and Evonik argued that the target profit of 6% did not reflect the profit that would be achieved by the EU producers in the absence of unfair trade practices. In particular, they claimed that the Commission did not take into account the information provided by the Union industry that allowed it to define such profit at a higher level. Therefore, they asked the Commission to increase the profit margin to the average of the target profits that Union sampled producers could reasonably achieve under normal conditions of competition, i.e. [14% - 19%].

(389) Furthermore, the complainants and Evonik disagreed with the Commission’s statement in recital (382) and argued that claims under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation were made in their replies to the Union producers questionnaire and to the macro questionnaire. They requested the Commission to take into account the future costs in the calculation of the target price and provided a weighted average annual cost increase per tonne of SAP produced, stemming from the EU emission allowances. The complainant and Evonik thus requested the Commission to increase the target price of the Union producers by EUR [30 – 45] per tonne of SAP.

(390) The Commission could not confirm the target profit proposed by the complainants and Evonik to be reasonably achieved in comparison with the data available on the file. The Commission took into account profits achieved during the period considered, including adjustments to be made for reaching normal circumstances of competition. The profits thus calculated did not amount to the figures claimed by the Union industry, even at the start of the period considered, when there was less pressure from Korean imports.

(391) The Commission also disagreed with the statements made concerning the future costs of emission allowances. The Commission did indeed take into account the future costs stemming from the EU emissions allowances, according to the verified information provided by the sampled companies. This resulted in an increase of the target price of [16 - 18 ] EUR per tonne of SAP. These claims were therefore rejected.

(392) Definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of superabsorbent polymers originating in the Republic of Korea.

(394) The individual company anti-dumping duty rate specified in this Regulation was established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, it reflected the situation found during this investigation with respect to the single cooperating exporting producer. That duty rate is exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entity. Imports of product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to the individual anti-dumping duty rate.

(395) A company may request the application of its individual anti-dumping duty rate if it changes the name of the entity subject to that duty. The request must be addressed to the Commission. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling it to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(396) Should the exports by any company benefiting from a lower individual duty rate increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. That investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(397) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(398) In their submission following final disclosure, the Union industry argued that there is no production of SAP in Turkey and therefore any volumes of SAP imported from Turkey can only be of another origin. They requested to include a special monitoring clause in the final Regulation to minimise any risks of potential circumvention from Turkey.

(399) The Commission clarifies that special monitoring clauses normally only apply to imports of the country concerned. However, the Commission took note of the parties’ comments and will, as always, be vigilant to act in line with its monitoring practice on measures in force.

(400) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16) when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(401) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion and a simple majority of its component members opposed the draft Commission implementing Regulation. The Commission then resubmitted the draft Commission implementing Regulation to the Appeal Committee in accordance with Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17).

(402) In accordance with Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the appeal committee did not deliver an opinion.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 April 2022.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of superabsorbent polymers originating in the Republic of Korea (OJ C 58, 18.2.2021, p. 73).

(3) For the purposes of this investigation, the Commission granted confidential treatment to the identity of the Coalition members. The Commission received evidence that disclosing their identities would have significant adverse consequences upon the Coalition members due to the threat of commercial retaliations.

(4) To calculate the export price of SAP from the Republic of Korea during the IP, the Complainant relied on the Korean Trade Statistics Service (TRASS). TRASS allowed the identification of SAP exports to the European Union among products declared for exports under commodity code 3906 90 90 based on a specific query.

(5) "Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it."

(6) https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_history.cfm?id=2516&init=2516

(7) Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6)).

(8) For the purposes of this investigation, the Commission granted confidential treatment to the identity of the Company B. The Commission received evidence that disclosing its identity would have significant adverse consequences upon Company B due to the threat of commercial retaliations.

(9) The exact figure is not provided as this is company-specific data.

(10) Recital (352) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336, of 25 September 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain polyvinyl alcohols originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 315, 29.9.2020, p. 1).

(11) CN code 3906 90 90

(12) Judgment of 10 April 2019, Jindal Saw and Jindal Saw Italia v Commission, T-301/16, EU:T:234, para. 184.

(13) Judgement of 2 April 2020, Hansol Paper v Commission, T-383/17, EU:T:2020:139, paras. 196-203.

(14) Judgment of 22 September 2021, PAO Severstal v Commission, T-753/16, EU:T:2021:612, para. 272.

(15) For the purposes of this investigation, the Commission granted confidential treatment to the identity of the Coalition H members. The Commission received evidence that disclosing their identities would have significant adverse consequences upon the Coalition H members due to the threat of commercial retaliation.

(16) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

(17) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).