Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1013 of 27 June 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China and as extended to Vietnam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2022-06-28
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 3

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
2017 2018 2019 RIP
Weighted average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (index 2017 = 100) 100 100 92 93
Weighted average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/’000pcs) 170 – 200 175 – 205 150 – 180 155 – 185
Unit cost of production (index 2017 = 100) 100 103 99 98
Unit cost of production (ranges) 160 – 190 165 – 195 148 – 178 150 – 180
Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies
  • (144) The decrease of the weighted average unit sales prices, by 7 %, was much more pronounced than the slight drop in cost of production.
  • (145) The Union industry’s average sales prices followed the trend of the weighted average Union sales prices of the main exporting countries of RBM to the Union, as reported in table 3. Despite the low capacity utilisation, the average cost of production slightly decreased over the period considered, mainly due to decrease in labour costs following the restructuring efforts by the Union producers.

5.5.5.   Employment and productivity

  • (146) Employment, productivity and average labour costs of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

2017 2018 2019 RIP
Number of employees (index 2017 = 100) 100 88 83 80
Number of employees (FTE ranges) 150 – 200 130 – 180 120 – 170 115 – 165
Labour Productivity (unit/employee – index 2017 = 100) 100 110 111 98
Labour Productivity (unit/employee – ranges) 320 – 370 360 – 410 365 – 415 300 – 350
Average labour costs per employee (index 2017 = 100) 100 102 107 96
Average labour costs per employee (ranges) 18 000 – 22 000 19 000 – 23 000 20 000 – 24 000 17 000 – 21 000
Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies
  • (147) The employment in full time equivalent has decreased over the period considered by 22 %, which is a result of continuing restructuring of the Union industry in order to face the changing market circumstances. At the same time, due to these continuous restructuring efforts, the Union industry’s labour productivity remained stable over the period considered in spite of the pronounced drop of the production as shown in table 4.
  • (148) Average labour costs per employee steadily increased from 2017 to 2019 and then dropped strongly, by 4 % as compared to 2017, in the review investigation period, mainly due to temporary measures in view of the COVID-19 pandemic.

5.5.6.   Inventories

  • (149) Stock levels of the two Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Inventories

2017 2018 2019 RIP
Closing stocks (index 2017 = 100) 100 118 109 112
Closing stocks (ranges) 25 000 – 35 000 30 000 – 40 000 25 000 – 35 000 27 000 – 37 000
Closing stocks as a percentage of production (index 2017 = 100) 100 121 118 144
Closing stocks as a percentage of production (ranges) (%) 40 – 50 50 – 60 48 – 58 60 – 70
Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies
  • (150) The Union industry’s year-end stock levels increased by 12 % in the period considered. However, taking into account the simultaneous decrease in production, stocks were at a relatively high level throughout the period considered, which was considered as normal by the Union producers in order to allow flexibility to react to demand and especially to seasonal fluctuations.

5.5.7.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

  • (151) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2017 2018 2019 RIP
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover indexed) (index 2017 = 100) 100 141 114 72
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover – ranges) 3 – 8 5 -10 4 – 9 2 – 7
Cash flow (index 2017 = 100) 100 63 99 72
Investments (index 2017 = 100) 100 62 45 40
Return on investments (index 2017 = 100) 100 100 87 53
Return on investments (ranges) (%) 8 – 13 8 – 13 7 – 12 5 – 10
Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies
  • (152) The Commission established the profitability of the Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. From 2017 to 2019, the Union industry’s profit fluctuated around the minimum level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition according to Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation (6 %). In the review investigation period it dropped however far below that level. The decrease in profitability is mainly due the decrease in sales price.
  • (153) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The Union industry managed to maintain positive cash flow over the period considered although it decreased in the review investigation period by 28 % as compared to 2017.
  • (154) The investigation showed that the Union industry was not able to maintain its level of investment over the period considered. Investments decreased by 60 % in the review investigation period as compared to 2017. Moreover, the current investments concern maintenance and not machineries to increase production.
  • (155) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The Union industry also managed to maintain positive return on investments over the period considered although it decreased in the review investigation period by 47 % as compared to 2017.
  • (156) The Union producers’ ability to raise capital was not reported as a difficulty during the period considered.

5.5.8.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

  • (157) As explained in recital (101), imports from the PRC in the review investigation period do not provide a sufficient basis for a finding on continuation of dumping. Anti-dumping measures against RBM are in place since 1997 and the Union industry has since then continuously been confronted with related unfair trade practices, resulting in additional investigations and several extensions of the measures (see recitals (1) to (7)). The indicators presented above demonstrate that the continuous dumping, circumvention and absorption practices from the past have weakened the Union industry which therefore remains vulnerable to the injurious effects of any dumped imports on the Union market.

5.5.9.   Export performance of the Union industry

  • (158) The volume of exports of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Export performance of the Union producers

2017 2018 2019 RIP
Export volume ‘000 pcs (index 2017 = 100) 100 117 89 77
Export volume ‘000 pcs (ranges) 6 000 – 10 000 7 000 – 11 000 5 000 – 9 000 4 000 – 8 000
Average price (index 2017 = 100) 100 79 89 85
Average price EUR/’000 pcs (ranges) 200 – 250 150 – 200 180 – 240 170 – 230
Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies Source: Questionnaire replies
  • (159) Export volumes of the Union industry to the unrelated customers decreased by 23 % over the period considered. The Union industry’s exports represented 10 % – 15 % of the total Union industry sales over the period considered.
  • (160) Average unit export price to the unrelated customers decreased twice more than the decrease of the average unit sales price in the Union on the total market over the period considered.

5.5.10.   Conclusion on the situation of the Union industry

  • (161) The volume of imports of RBM originating in PRC remained very low during the period considered.
  • (162) The review showed that the continuation of the measures as from 1997 and the low volume of low-priced dumped imported products from the PRC allowed the Union industry to maintain a positive profitability throughout the period considered. Nevertheless, the profitability achieved was low and well below 6 % in the review investigation period.
  • (163) The injury indicators show that the economic situation of the Union industry is difficult, in a context of worldwide competition and declining consumption. The Union industry has responded to these challenges by restructuring its employment.
  • (164) The indicators examined demonstrate that the anti-dumping measures have achieved their intended result of removing the injury suffered by the Union producers.
  • (165) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

6. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY IF THE MEASURES WERE TO BE REPEALED

  • (166) As the Commission concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury from the dumped imports from the PRC if the measures were allowed to lapse. On the basis of the above-described trends, it appears that the anti-dumping measures have achieved their intended result of removing the injury suffered by the Union producers.
  • (167) In that regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the country concerned, the attractiveness of the Union market, and the likely impact of imports from the country concerned on the situation of the Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse.

6.1.   Spare production/processing capacity

  • (168) As mentioned in recital (113), Chinese exporters have significant spare capacity to increase their exports rapidly. Their spare capacity is estimated around 375 million pieces, which is more than seven times the consumption within the Union.

6.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

  • (169) Chinese exporting producers have engaged in a number of different unfair trade practices to circumvent the measures against imports of Chinese RBM, as explained in recitals (3), (5) and (6) above. Moreover, the investigation showed that prices on the Union market are higher as compared to prices on third country markets, as described in recital (114).
  • (170) All the above points to the fact the Union market is considered an attractive market by the Chinese exporting producers and it is likely that significant quantities currently exported to other countries as well as production from some of the existing spare capacity would be directed to the Union market in the event of the anti-dumping measures being allowed to lapse.

6.3.   Impact of a new influx of dumped imports from the PRC on the situation Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse

  • (171) If measures were allowed to lapse, an increase in imports from the country concerned is expected, due to the existing spare capacities and the attractiveness of the Union market as set out in recitals (168) to (170). These imports are likely to be undercutting the prices of the Union industry or at least put a heavy downward pressure on the non-injurious price level of the Union industry, as set out in recitals (129) to (131).
  • (172) With the likely arrival of large quantities of Chinese imports at dumped prices, the Union industry would be forced to reduce its production or further lower its prices as compared to its costs. The Union industry already finds itself in a fragile situation with modest profitability levels, as explained in recitals (162) and (163). Therefore, it is not in a position to either further lower its prices or to sacrifice sales volumes without putting its viability at risk.

6.4.   Conclusion on likelihood of recurrence of material injury

  • (173) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the expiry of the measures would in all likelihood result in recurrence of material injury to the Union industry. Indeed, in the absence of measures, the likely significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at prices undercutting the Union industry prices, would further aggravate the already fragile economic situation of the Union industry and, consequently, put its viability at risk.

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Introduction

  • (174) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the maintenance of the measures would be against the Union interest as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of the various interests involved, namely those of the Union industry, of importers and users.
  • (175) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.
  • (176) On this basis, the Commission examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and the likelihood of recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures.

7.2.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (177) As concluded in recital (165), the Union industry is not anymore injured but in a fragile state. In such situation, the Union industry cannot cope with a removal of the measures, which is likely to result in a strong increase of dumped imports. A repeal of the measures would therefore put the industry’s viability at stake. The continuation of the measures, therefore, is in the interest of Union industry.

7.3.   Interest of unrelated importers and users

  • (178) All known unrelated importers and users were informed about the initiation of the review. However, the Commission received no cooperation from unrelated importers and users. One unrelated importer came forward and was registered as an interested party, but that party did not make any submissions for the file.
  • (179) Therefore, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a negative impact on the users and/or importers outweighing the positive impact of the measures.

7.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (180) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons showing that it was not in the Union interest to maintain measures on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China.

8. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

  • (181) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation or recurrence of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China should be maintained.
  • (182) To minimize the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.
  • (183) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.
  • (184) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.
  • (185) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in Article 1(3) of this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the PRC and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.
  • (186) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission 57. The request must contain all the relevant information demonstrating that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
  • (187) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. All parties were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. The submissions and comments were duly taken into consideration.
  • (188) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council 58, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.
  • (189) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 delivered a positive opinion,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms, currently falling under CN code ex 8305 10 00 (TARIC codes 8305100019, 8305100029, 8305100039, and 8305100042) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.

For the purpose of this Article, ring binder mechanisms shall consist of two steel sheets or wires with at least four half-rings made of steel wire fixed on them and which are kept together by a steel cover. They can be opened either by pulling the half rings or with a small steel trigger mechanism fixed to the ring binder mechanism.

3.

The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, shall be as follows:

  • (a) for mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305100029 and 8305100042), the amount of duty shall be equal to the difference between the minimum import price of EUR 325 per 1 000 pieces and the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty;
  • (b) for mechanisms other than those with 17 or 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305100019 and 8305100039):
Rate of duty (%) TARIC additional code
People’s Republic of China: People’s Republic of China: People’s Republic of China:
— World Wide Stationery Mfg, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China 51,2 8 934
— all other companies 78,8 8 900
4.

The application of the individual duty rate specified for the company mentioned in paragraph 3 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of ring binder mechanisms sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to ‘all other companies’ shall apply.

5.

The definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to imports originating in in the People’s Republic of China as set out in paragraph 3, is extended to imports of the same certain ring binder mechanisms consigned from Vietnam, whether declared as originating in Vietnam or not (TARIC codes 8305100011, 8305100021, 8305100037 and 8305100040) and to imports of the same certain ring binder mechanisms consigned from Lao People’s Democratic Republic, whether declared as originating in Lao People’s Democratic Republic or not (TARIC codes 8305100013, 8305100023, 8305100038 and 8305100041).

6.

In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 131(2) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 59, the minimum import price set out in paragraph 3 shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable. The duty payable will then be equal to the difference between the reduced minimum import price and the reduced net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before customs clearance.

Article 2

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 June 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Council Regulation (EC) No 119/97 of 20 January 1997 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in Malaysia and the People’s Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed (OJ L 22, 24.1.1997, p. 1).

3

Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/2000 of 29 September 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 119/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 250, 5.10.2000, p. 1).

4

Council Regulation (EC) No 1208/2004 of 28 June 2004 extending the definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Regulation (EC) No 119/97 on imports of certain ring-binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (OJ L 232, 1.7.2004, p. 1).

5

Council Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 of 29 November 2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 359, 4.12.2004, p. 11).

6

Council Regulation (EC) No 33/2006 of 9 January 2006 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 on imports of certain ring-binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (OJ L 7, 12.1.2006, p. 1).

7

Council Regulation (EC) No 818/2008 of 13 August 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 imposing a definitive antidumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the investigation concerning the possible circumvention of anti-dumping measures imposed by that Regulation by imports of certain ring binder mechanisms consigned from Thailand, whether declared as originating in Thailand or not (OJ L 221, 19.8.2008, p. 1).

8

Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) No 157/2010 of 22 February 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (OJ L 49, 26.2.2010, p. 1).

9

Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) 2016/703 of 11 May 2016 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 122, 12.5.2016, p. 1).

10

Notice of impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 331, 7.10.2020, p. 14).

11

Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China and extended to Vietnam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (OJ C 183, 11.5.2021, p. 8).

12

https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2526

13

See Implementing Regulation (EU) No 157/2010.

14

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 36, 17.2.2022, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 of 15 December 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain utility scale steel wind towers originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 450, 16.12.2021, p. 59); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 145) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 of 7 April 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 110, 8.4.2020, p. 3).

15

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 206-208, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 135, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 149-150 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 158-159.

16

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 192, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 58-61, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 115-118 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 122-127.

17

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 193-194, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 62-66, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 119-122 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 128-132: While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1.86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of ring binder mechanisms and the suppliers of their inputs.

18

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 123-129 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 133-138.

19

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 202, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 75, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 130-133 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 139-142.

20

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 76, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143-144.

21

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 76, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 136-145 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 145-154.

22

Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20. 12. 2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf

23

TISCO, ‘Company profile’, http://en.tisco.com.cn/CompanyProfile/20151027095855836705.html (last viewed 2 March 2020)

24

Baowu, ‘Company profile’, http://www.baowugroup.com/en/contents/5273/102759.html (last viewed 6 May 2021)

25

Report – Chapter 14, p. 358: 51 % private and 49 % SOEs in terms of production and 44 % SOEs and 56 % private companies in terms of capacity.

26

Available at:

www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021); https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/higher-expectations-for-large-scale-steel-enterprise/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e (last viewed 6 May 2021), and

www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021).

27

Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021) and http://www.jjckb.cn/2019-04/23/c_137999653.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021).

28

As was the case of the merger between the private company Rizhao and the SOE Shandong Iron and Steel in 2009. See Beijing steel report, p. 58, and the acquired majority stake of China Baowu Steel Group in Magang Steel in June 2019, see https://www.ft.com/content/a7c93fae-85bc-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (last viewed 6 May 2021).

29

TISCO, ‘Company profile’, http://en.tisco.com.cn/CompanyProfile/20151027095855836705.html (last viewed 2 March 2020).

30

Report, Part III, Chapter 14, p. 346 ff.

31

Introduction to The Plan for Adjusting and Upgrading the Steel Industry.

32

Report, Chapter 14, p. 347.

33

The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), available at

https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf (last viewed 2 March 2020).

34

Report – Chapter 14, p. 349.

35

Report – Chapter 14, p. 352.

36

Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment) issued by Order No 9 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 27 March 2011, and amended in accordance with the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) issued by Order No 21 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 16 February 2013.

37

Report – Chapter 14, pp. 375 – 376.

38

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143-144.

39

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

40

If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

41

Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33) as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/749 (OJ L 113, 29.4.2017, p. 11).

42

https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Electricity-and-Natural-Gas-Prices-Period-II:-July-December,-2020-37458

43

Figures provided for the manufacturing overheads were verified on spot and reconciled with the company accounts.

44

Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value and, in any event, such imports were negligible.

45

Available at https://www.macmap.org/en/query/customs-duties (last seen on 10 March 2022).

46

https://archive.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/t/turkey/TUR.pdf page 51 (last seen on 10 March 2022).

47

Available at: https://data.tuik.gov.tr

48

Available at: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Electricity-and-Natural-Gas-Prices-Period-II:-July-December,-2020-37458

49

http://www.transcustoms.cn/index.asp (last seen on 10 March 2022).

50

Countries are listed according to the volumes of imports from the PRC.

51

On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) – China-country in question: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC

52

On the basis of quotation for Tianjin Port – Beijing deliveries as provided by the World Bank https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/c/china/CHN.pdf page 88.

53

In the case of Mexico, CIF values were obtained by using the FOB/CIF value ratio available for the USA.

54

Only ranges are given in order to protect confidentiality of data of the two Union producers.

55

t22.000638.

56

Only ranges are given to protect confidentiality of data of the two Union producers.

57

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

58

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

59

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558).

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