Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1305 of 25 July 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of molybdenum wire originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2022-07-26
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 6

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (129) The Union industry’s average unit sales price to unrelated customers in the Union remained stable over the period considered, with the exception of 2019 when the average price went up by 8 percentage points in comparison with 2017.
  • (130) The average cost of production of the Union industry remained relatively stable over the period considered, although intermittently, in 2018, the unit cost increased by 7 percentage points and in 2019 by another 11 percentage points in comparison with 2017.
5.5.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (131) The average labour costs of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee

2017 2018 2019 Review investigation period
Average labour costs per employee – index (EUR) 100 142 114 115
Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply.
  • (132) The average labour costs per employee increased by 15 % over the period considered, however with a sharp intermittent increase of 42 % in 2018.
5.5.3.3.   Inventories
  • (133) Stock levels of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories

2017 2018 2019 Review investigation period
Closing stocks – index (kg) 100 72 142 115
Closing stocks as a percentage of production –index 100 57 171 144
Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply.
  • (134) Inventories represented only a very small percentage of total production during the period considered. This factor was therefore not considered meaningful for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.
5.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (135) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2017 2018 2019 Review investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers – index (% of sales turnover) 100 56 45 83
Cash flow index (EUR) 100 87 61 112
Investments index (EUR) 100 728 2 772 4 901
Return on investments – index 100 30 38 60
Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply. Source: Verified questionnaire reply.
  • (136) The Commission established the profitability of the Union industry by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.
  • (137) The profitability of the Union industry dropped from 2017 to 2018 by 44 percentage points, then in 2019 deceased a further 9 percentage points and finally increased during the review investigation period 38 percentage points. All in all, profitability decreased by 17 % during the period considered.
  • (138) Although the profitability dropped during the period considered, it remained at high levels.
  • (139) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed positively during the period considered, however in comparison with 2017, in 2018 it was 13 % lower, in 2019 39 % lower and in the review investigation period it ended up 12 % higher.
  • (140) The investments increased substantially in comparison with 2017 and especially during 2019 and the review investigation period, mainly because of the upgrade of a production line of Plansee SE.
  • (141) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The return on investment from the production and sale of the like product decreased over the period considered. However, there was a more pronounced decrease through the years 2018 and 2019 and the indicator recovered considerably ending up 40 % lower than in 2017.

5.6.   Conclusion on injury

  • (142) During the period considered, the Union consumption decreased by 29 % and, although the market share of the Union industry was close to 100 %, this decline in demand had a negative impact on a number of injury indicators.
  • (143) Although profitability remained at healthy levels in the review investigation period, it fell by 17 % during the period considered and some of the other injury indicators like production, production capacity, capacity utilization and sales volume experienced a negative development during the period considered. Specifically, the production volume dropped by 30 %, the production capacity by 20 %, the capacity utilisation by 13 % and the sales volume by 29 %, all of which due to the contracting market demand in the Union. Other indicators, such as number of employees (by 25 %) and cash flow (by 12 %), improved over the period considered.
  • (144) The volume of imports from the PRC or from other countries into the Union were very low. In the previous expiry review the market share of the imports from China increased mainly due to circumvention practices that had stopped in the meantime following the imposition of anti-circumvention measures in 2013 and 2015.
  • (145) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.
  • (146) Therefore, the Commission further examined the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from the PRC if the measures were repealed.

6. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

  • (147) The Commission concluded in recitals (145) that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury if the measures were allowed to lapse.
  • (148) In this regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, the attractiveness of the Union market as well as the likely price levels of imports from the PRC in the absence of anti-dumping measures and their possible impact on the Union industry.

6.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC

  • (149) Based on the request, the PRC producers have a production capacity of approximately 3 500 tonnes per year, over 19 times higher than the Union consumption.

6.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market and pricing behaviour in third countries

  • (150) The Union market is attractive in terms of its size and prices as well as due to the importance of the EU automotive industry. In the past Chinese producers repeatedly showed their interest in the Union market by attempting to circumvent the anti-dumping measures. Also, average import prices from the PRC to the Union were lower than the export prices from the PRC to other countries during the review investigation period.
  • (151) In the absence of significant quantities sold by Chinese exporting producers to the Union, the Commission also analysed their pricing behaviour when exporting to third countries. The PRC producers sell on average at prices which are [28-37] % lower than the average price charged by the Union industry. Consequently, exporting producers have strong incentive to redirect their sales to the Union market should the measures be allowed to lapse.
  • (152) The Union market is hence considered very attractive for Chinese producers, and it can be concluded that available spare capacities in China would, at least partially, be used to significantly increase exports to the Union market at dumped prices should the measures expire.

6.3.   Possible scenarios in the case of lapsing of measures

  • (153) The attractiveness of the Union market, as described in recitals (93) and (150), would probably lead to a significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC. As molybdenum wire is a rather homogenous product in terms of quality, the price level is the most important factor when deciding on whether to buy from the Union producers or from the Chinese exporting producers. Furthermore, and as analysed in the previous expiry review, the sudden decrease in Chinese imports in response to the anti-dumping and anti-circumvention measures indicates that customers can easily switch to the supplier with the most competitive price (i.e. from the Chinese exporting producers to the Union producers or vice-versa in case the measure lapse).
  • (154) For these reasons, the Union industry will then be likely forced to either reduce its sales prices at the expense of their profitability or to keep the sales prices level and most likely lose sales volume and market share to the Chinese exporters. A combination of these scenarios seems even more realistic. Ultimately, this would lead to downward price pressure, losses and the imports from the PRC likely regaining their pre-measures market share.
  • (155) To assess quantitatively the likely impact of imports from the PRC on the financial situation of the Union industry, the Commission performed a simulation. Two scenarios were modelled, namely a surge of imports from the PRC (i) at the level of the PRC import volumes during the investigation period of the original case in 2009 (i.e. from 1 April 2008 to 31 March 2009), but at the same price level as charged to unrelated customers by the Union industry and (ii) at the level of the PRC exporting producers’ market share during the investigation period of the original case back in 2009, while undercutting the Union industry’s prices by 15 %. Given that the exporting producers’ prices to third countries were on average [28-37] % lower than the prices charged by the Union industry during the review investigation period, the figure chosen for undercutting (15 %) is very conservative since the actual undercutting found was [52-67] % during the review investigation period. Moreover, for the determination of the hypothetical cost of production, the Commission took into account the share of the fixed costs to the total costs of production of the sampled Union producers.
  • (156) In the first scenario, the profitability of the Union industry would fall to – [15 – 24] %.

In the second scenario, the profitability of the Union Industry would even fall to –[25 – 33] %.

  • (157) In both conservative scenarios, the impact of Chinese imports would render the Union industry highly unprofitable.
  • (158) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at injurious prices, which will lead to recurrence of material injury.

7. UNION INTEREST

  • (159) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.
  • (160) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.
  • (161) On this basis, the Commission examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (162) The anti-dumping measures in force had a positive effect on the Union industry and allowed it to recover from the past dumping during the review investigation period.
  • (163) However, should the measures be allowed to lapse, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood of recurrence of injury given the attractiveness of the Union market, the spare capacities available in the PRC, the pricing behaviour of the exporting producers in the PRC and the history of circumvention.
  • (164) The Commission thus concluded that maintaining the anti-dumping measures on imports of the product under review originating in the PRC is in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers, traders and users

  • (165) The Commission invited unrelated importers, traders and users to come forward but did not receive any questionnaire reply.
  • (166) The Commission did not receive any comments indicating that maintaining the measures would have a significant negative impact on the importers and users, outweighing the positive impact of the measures on the Union industry.
  • (167) Therefore, the Commission concluded that maintaining the measures would not have any important impact on importers, traders and users of the Union.

7.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (168) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union interest against maintaining the existing measures on imports of the product under review originating in the PRC. Maintaining measures would be in the interest of the Union industry and would not harm the situation of users and importers in the Union.

8. FINAL PROVISIONS

  • (169) It follows from the above considerations that, under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain molybdenum wires originating in the PRC, imposed by Regulation (EU) 2016/1046 should be maintained. As a consequence, the extension of the measures following anti-circumvention investigations mentioned in recital (2) should also be maintained.
  • (170) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council 54, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.
  • (171) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross- sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China, not consigned from Malaysia, currently falling under CN code ex 8102 96 00 (TARIC code 8102960019).

2.

The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 64,3 %.

Article 2

The duty set out in Article 1(2) is hereby extended to imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, currently falling under CN code ex 8102 96 00 (TARIC code 8102960011), consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not.

Article 3

The duty set out in Article 1(2) is hereby extended to imports into the Union of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 97 % but less than 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China, currently falling within CN code ex 8102 96 00 (TARIC code 8102960030).

Article 4

The duty set out in Article 1(2) is hereby extended to imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 97 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 4,0 mm but does not exceed 11,0 mm originating in the People’s Republic of China, currently falling under CN code ex 8102 96 00 (TARIC codes 8102960020 and 8102960040).

Article 5

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 6

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 25 July 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 of 14 June 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain molybdenum wires originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 150, 16.6.2010, p. 17).

3

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 14/2012 of 9 January 2012 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 on imports of certain molybdenum wires originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of certain molybdenum wires consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not and terminating the investigation in respect of imports consigned from Switzerland (OJ L 8, 12.1.2012, p. 22).

4

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 871/2013 of 2 September 2013 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 on imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 97 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 243, 12.9.2013, p. 2).

5

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1952 of 29 October 2015 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 on imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 97 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 4,0 mm but does not exceed 11,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 100).

9

Dun & Bradstreet (D&B): https://sso.dnb.com/

10

https://www.gtis.com/gta/

11

Austria, China, Germany, India, Thailand and USA.

12

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267 of 26 July 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten electrodes originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (OJ L 200, 29.7.2019, p. 4).

13

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 95-96.

14

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 56-60.

15

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 61-64.: While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of [the product under review] and the suppliers of their inputs.

16

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 65-73.

17

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 74-77.

18

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 78-80.

19

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1267, recitals 81-91.

20

Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20.12.2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf

21

See company website for details: http://www.jdcmmc.com/INFO-Single/010102.shtml

22

https://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/view/vCI_CorpManagerInfo.php?stockid=600549 &Pcode = 30011851&Name=%BB%C6 %B3 %A4 %B8 %FD

23

http://www.jdcmmc.com/INFO/10282.shtml

24

Xiamen Tungsten articles of association: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2021/2021-5/2021-05-29/7288169.PDF

25

See China Report, chapters on 13th FYP for mineral resources and 13th FYP for the nonferrous metals industry, pages 267-282.

26

http://kj.quanzhou.gov.cn/wsbs/xgxz/201703/t20170322_431820.htm

27

https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202009/t20200925_1239582.html

28

https://www.hlj.gov.cn/n200/2017/0525/c75-10829703.html

29

https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/dffzgh/201606/P020191104643472060002.pdf

30

http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5598119.htm

31

See page 238 of the 2020 annual report of the holding company Xiamen Tungsten http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2021/2021-3/2021-03-31/7001827.PDF(accessed 16 May 2022).

32

See page 139 of the 2020 annual report.

33

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

34

If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

35

https://www.merc.gov.in/

36

http://www.labourbureaunew.gov.in/showdetail

37

https://labour.gov.in/annual-reports http://labourbureau.gov.in/Report_PBLS_2017.pdf

38

https://www.ciicovid19update.in/uploads/1/3/1/3/131362769/mahrashtra.pdf

39

http://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm

40

Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33).

41

https://labour.gov.in/annual-reports

42

https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Annual_Report_PLFS_2018_19_HL.pdf

43

http://datatopics.worldbank.org/jobs/country/india

44

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

45

https://www.india.gov.in/india-glance/profile

46

https://www.merc.gov.in/

47

https://www.ciicovid19update.in/uploads/1/3/1/3/131362769/mahrashtra.pdf

48

WebFill Limited Annual Report 2021 (WebFillindia.com)

49

Commission Regulation (EU) No 1247/2009 of 17 December 2009 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain molybdenum wires originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 336, 18.12.2009, p. 16).

50

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 14/2012 of 9 January 2012 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 on imports of certain molybdenum wires originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of certain molybdenum wires consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not and terminating the investigation in respect of imports consigned from Switzerland (OJ L 8, 12.1.2012, p. 22).

51

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 871/2013 of 2 September 2013 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 on imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 97 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 243, 12.9.2013, p. 2).

52

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1952 of 29 October 2015 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 511/2010 on imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 99,95 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 1,35 mm but does not exceed 4,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of molybdenum wire, containing by weight at least 97 % of molybdenum, of which the maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeds 4,0 mm but does not exceed 11,0 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 100).

53

As shown in Annex 25 of the request of the expiry review and in the following source: https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/molybden

54

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

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