Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of silicon consigned from the Republic of Korea and from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or Taiwan or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and the Council

• (170) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost had been established, the Commission added the manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profit as noted above. Manufacturing overheads were determined based on data provided by the applicant. SG&A and profit were determined based on the financial statements of PMB Silicon Bhd for the year 2020 as reported in the company’s audited accounts ⁵³.

• (171) The Commission used the following percentages to calculate the normal value from the undistorted cost of manufacturing:

• — Addition of manufacturing overheads, which accounted in total for 7,6 % of the direct cost of manufacturing,

• — Addition of SG&A and other costs, which accounted for 17,7 % of the total cost of manufacturing,

• — Removal of by-product income, which accounted for 6,97 % of the cost of production, and

• — Addition of profit, which amounted to 5,05 % of the cost of manufacturing.

• (172) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (173) After disclosure, EUSMET commented on the method used to deal with by-product income, which was based on a percentage of the cost of production rather than a percentage of the cost of manufacturing.

• (174) The method used in this case is appropriate, given that no Chinese producer cooperated, and therefore the calculation of normal value was based on the format of the consumption data received from the sampled Union producers where by-product income was expressed as a percentage of cost of their production.

• (175) The simulations in the submission of EUSMET take the indexed normal value from 122,87 to 119,92, a reduction of just under 3 percentage points. The Commission does not consider that this small difference requires any change to the consumption data received from the Union industry, where by-product income is expressed as a percentage of cost of production.

• (176) In any event, the purpose of the normal value calculation in an expiry review is to determine whether there is a continuation of dumping, and regardless of the methods proposed by EUSMET to deal with by-product income, the finding of continuation of dumping would not change.

• (177) However, on considering EUSMET claims regarding the dumping calculations, the Commission noted that there was an error in the calculation (the by-product income had not been deducted from the cost of production) and therefore the normal value had been overstated. This was corrected and re-disclosed to interested parties. No comments were received.

• (178) EUSMET also requested a further detailed disclosure to them of the calculation of the normal value and in particular the data regarding the quantity of the factors of production used to calculate the normal value.

• (179) The Commission placed information regarding the benchmarks and the factors of production on the open file on 17 June 2022 ⁵⁴, attached to the Note Verbale sent to the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union.

• (180) The Commission has not disclosed to any interested party the quantities of each factor of production used by the sampled Union producers to make 1 tonne of silicon because this information is business confidential.

• (181) The method used to calculate the normal value has been clearly explained to all interested parties in the disclosure document, reproduced as recitals 168 to 172 above.

3.3.   Export price

• (182) In the absence of cooperation by producers from China, the export price was determined based on CIF Eurostat data corrected to ex-works level by removing 5 % as an estimate of the (sea) freight and insurance cost and domestic transport cost, based on data from previous cases.

3.4.   Comparison

• (183) The Commission compared the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

• (184) The Commission made no adjustments to the normal value or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, as both were already at an ex-works level.

3.5.   Dumping margin

• (185) Based on the data available the Commission calculated a dumping margin of 26,9 %.

• (186) The Commission therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF DUMPING

• (187) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following additional elements were analysed:

• (1) production capacity and spare capacity in China; and

• (2) the attractiveness of the Union market.

4.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in China

• (188) The request for review estimated that production capacity in China is between 6 and 8 million tonnes per year, stating also that general agreement exists that production capacity in China is higher than total world consumption. The applicant estimated the Chinese capacity utilisation to be between 20 % and 40 % in 2020. The request also pointed out that in 2014, production capacity in China was between 3 and 5 million tonnes per year, suggesting that in recent years capacity in China has significantly increased.

• (189) Even if a conservative approach was to be taken, with production capacity at 6 million tonnes and utilisation at 40 %, the PRC would have spare capacity of around 3,6 million tonnes. This is around seven times the entire Union consumption.

• (190) In the previous expiry review investigation, the Commission also found significant spare capacity in China and concluded that this spare capacity could indeed be used to supply the Union market if measures lapsed ⁵⁵. No evidence has been received to call that conclusion into question.

• (191) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET disputed the amount of spare production capacity in China as set out in the request for review. EUSMET again requested that the applicants disclose the AlloyConsult report referred to in the request for review. The Commission notes that this report is copyrighted, and the open version of the request for review is a sufficient summary of the report’s findings.

• (192) EUSMET instead referred to a report from CRU dated April 2021 that suggests that nameplate capacity in China is 5 million tonnes per year, and ‘operative capacity’ is 4 million tonnes per year.

• (193) EUSMET also disputed the capacity utilisation of 20 % to 40 %, which is based on the estimated capacity of 6 million tonnes and production of 2 million tonnes set out in the request for review.

• (194) EUSMET did not provide any estimates on the production of silicon in China for 2020. Using the estimate of 2 million tonnes of production in the request for review, and the estimate of 4 million tonnes capacity from CRU, this data would show capacity utilisation at 50 %, with an estimated 2 million tonnes of capacity that could be brought into use for export to the Union market.

• (195) The Commission’s findings on the existence of significant spare capacity in China that could indeed be used to supply the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse remains therefore unchanged.

• (196) EUSMET also noted that in their submission of 10 August 2021 they had provided evidence that Chinese silicon demand is rising, and that in the future therefore this demand would be supplied from the spare capacity in China, reducing the amount of silicon that could supply the Union market.

• (197) The EUSMET submission of 10 August 2021 states that ‘According to the CRU, Chinese silicon metal demand is set to rise at the highest pace in the coming years’. This is referenced to the ‘CRU Silicon Metal Market Outlook, April 2021’.

• (198) EUSMET provided no summary of the CRU Outlook for April 2021 in their submission, as the report was protected by copyright.

• (199) At present all the evidence provided to the Commission points to the current significant spare capacity in China, which is not covered by existing Chinese demand. If the predictions in the CRU report that ‘Chinese silicon metal demand is set to rise’ come to pass, then there is no evidence that this increase would cover all of the spare operative capacity in China, let alone the nameplate capacity.

• (200) The CRU report predictions therefore do not change our conclusions that spare capacity remains in China that could supply the European Union should measures be allowed to lapse.

4.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (201) Continued imports into the Union, despite the measures in force, would suggest that the Union market continues to be attractive, and that if measures were to be allowed to lapse, imports at dumped prices would continue.

• (202) The Commission also notes that measures against circumvention remain in force on imports consigned from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan ⁵⁶. Such efforts deployed to circumvent the measures in place point to the continued attractiveness of the Union market for Chinese exporting producers.

• (203) The UK was the second biggest consumer of silicon in the Union. Although the Union market has been affected by the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the Union remains an attractive market for Chinese exporters. This is because of the continued imports of silicon from China into the remaining Union market as referenced above.

• (204) The Commission further examined whether the Union market was attractive in terms of price levels.

• (205) First, as set out below under injury and undercutting, the investigation found that Chinese import prices including the anti-dumping duties still undercut those of the Union producers by 9,2 % during the RIP. Without the duties, undercutting would amount to 14,6 %.

• (206) Second, the Commission analysed the export prices from China to other countries extracted from GTA for 2020. The request for review identified the three main open markets for Chinese silicon: Japan, the Republic of Korea and India. Exports to these three countries in 2020 made up 46 % of all Chinese exports of silicon. According to GTA, the average export price to these countries at FOB level for 2020 was 1 800 USD per tonne.

• (207) Using the same data extraction from GTA for the same period showed that the average export price to the Union at FOB level was 1 915 USD per tonne. This suggests that the Union market remains attractive in terms of price for Chinese exporters, despite the measures in force.

• (208) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET noted that the FOB price of 1 915 USD per tonne for Chinese exports to European Union countries was higher (when adjusted to EUR) than the CIF price of 1 523 EUR per tonne for Chinese imports into the European Union quoted in Table 4 below.

• (209) The Commission notes that the GTA extraction is based on data obtained from the Chinese customs authority and has been used simply as a baseline to compare export prices to various destinations. It should not be used, and was not extracted for, comparison with data from Eurostat as to the exact value in EUR per tonne of imports into the Union.

• (210) Finally, the fact that the US has high anti-dumping duties on imports of silicon from the PRC in place even further increases the attractiveness of the Union market. Australia, and Canada also have anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures against imports of silicon from China.

4.3.   Conclusion

• (211) Based on the significant spare capacity in China and the attractiveness of the Union market for the Chinese exporting producers the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would result in an increase of dumped exports.

• (212) In view of its findings on the continuation of dumping during the RIP and on the likely development of Chinese exports should the measures lapse, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures on imports from China would result in the continuation of dumping in significant quantities.

5. INJURY

5.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (213) The like product was manufactured by three producers, of which two belonging to the same group, in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. For confidentiality reasons, figures related to the Union industry are therefore indexed and/or given in a range.

• (214) The total Union production during the review investigation period was [120 000 to 160 000 tonnes] ⁵⁷. The figure was computed on the basis of the questionnaire reply from three Union producers, constituting the Union industry. As indicated in recital 8 the three Union producers represent 100 % of the total Union production of the like product.

5.2.   Union consumption

• (215) The Commission established the Union consumption by adding the Union industry’s sales on the Union market to the imports from China and other third countries, based on data from Eurostat and questionnaire replies.

• (216) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (in tonnes)

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Total Union consumption ranges)	[500 000 – 550 000 ]	[460 000 -510 000 ]	[430 000 – 480 000 ]	[450 000 – 500 000 ]
Index	100	88	81	84
Source: Questionnaire replies and Eurostat	Source: Questionnaire replies and Eurostat	Source: Questionnaire replies and Eurostat	Source: Questionnaire replies and Eurostat	Source: Questionnaire replies and Eurostat

• (217) Union consumption decreased steadily until 2020 and slightly rebounded by 3 percentage points between 2020 and the RIP. Overall, the Union consumption fell by 16 % over the period considered.

• (218) The decrease in demand is partly driven by the lower demand for silicon used for aluminium production, caused by the decreased vehicle production in the EU, largely employing aluminium materials, which are produced using silicon. The decline in the vehicle sector was due to a market saturation which affected most industrialised countries in 2018 besides a fall in 2020 and the RIP, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. During the period considered, also the demand of silicon in the chemical sector decreased, partially influenced by the general disruption of trade flows, during 2020 and the RIP, due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

5.3.   Imports from the country concerned

• (219) The Commission established the volume of imports from China on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the Union consumption as set out in recitals 215 and 216.

• (220) Imports into the Union from China developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (in tonnes) and market share

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Volume of imports	76 401	48 379	36 310	29 788
Index	100	63	48	39
Volume of duty- paid imports	33 416	10 714	10 637	12 017
Index	100	32	32	36
Volume of imports under IPP	42 985	37 665	25 673	17 771
Index	100	88	60	41
Market share (range)	[12 -18  %]	[8 -13  %]	[5 -10  %]	[4 -9  %]
Index	100	72	59	46
Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat

• (221) Import volumes from the country concerned decreased steadily over the period considered (an overall decrease of 61 %), resulting in halving of their market share during the period considered.

• (222) The majority of silicon (60 % of the total in the RIP) from China are imported under IPP and used as a raw material mainly in the chemical industry. For those imports no duties (conventional or anti-dumping) are paid, provided the downstream products are exported.

• (223) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET submitted that there was no competition between imports and Union production as between 56 % and 80 % of the silicon imports from China were made under IPP and that they were related to a special silicon grade, which is not produced in the Union.

• (224) As concluded in recital 65, silicon is considered a homogenous product. As noted in recitals 48, no exporting producers in the PRC cooperated with the investigation and therefore the Commission had to use import statistics. All grades of the product under review are reported under the same CN code and there is no import data available that would allow a differentiation by end-use or product grades, regardless of the import regime. As mentioned in recital 66, due to non-cooperation of the exporting producers in the present investigation, for majority of imports, the Commission is unable determine which product-types (or grades of silicon) are being imported. This claim was therefore rejected.

5.3.1.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

• (225) The Commission established the prices of imports from China on the basis of Eurostat data. The average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
China	1 786	1 693	1 523	1 532
Index	100	95	85	86
Duty-paid imports	1 538	1 337	1 311	1 496
Index	100	87	85	97
IPP imports	1 980	1 795	1 611	1 556
Index	100	91	81	79
Figures are CIF Union border, Source: Eurostat	Figures are CIF Union border, Source: Eurostat	Figures are CIF Union border, Source: Eurostat	Figures are CIF Union border, Source: Eurostat	Figures are CIF Union border, Source: Eurostat

• (226) The average unit price decreased by 15 % between 2018 and 2020 and slightly rose by1 % in the RIP. Overall, the price decreased by 14 % over the period concerned.

• (227) The import prices of silicon imports under IPP fell steadily during the period considered, whilst the duty-paid imports fell between 2018 and 2020 by 15 % and increased by 12 % in the RIP. Throughout the period considered, the prices of silicon imported under IPP were higher than the imports subject to duties.

5.3.2.   Price undercutting

• (228) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing:

• — the weighted average sales price of the Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and

• — the corresponding weighted average prices of the imports from the country concerned to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis as explained in recital 182, with appropriate adjustments for conventional customs duties and anti-dumping duties (if applicable) and post-importation costs of 1 %.

• (229) The undercutting (expressed as a percentage of the Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period) applying the conventional and anti-dumping duty for imports, where applicable, was 9,2 %.

• (230) In their comments of the disclosure, EUSMET claimed that the Commission should have revised the undercutting margin calculation by taking into account post-importation costs, on the one hand, and by adjusting the Union sales prices, on the other hand. EUSMET based this on the assumption that 40 % of the imports from China were mainly made by traders/importers, whereas the EU producers sell their products to the end users in the aluminium sector. Additionally, EUSMET identified that some Union producers had intercompany sales, therefore there is a difference in the level of trade.

• (231) First, it should be recalled that, as noted in recital 48, no exporting producers in the PRC cooperated with the investigation. The undercutting margin was therefore established on facts available. Second, in their comments on the disclosure EUSMET does not explain how the type of the purchaser can be established based on the TARIC level data. Third, contrary to EUSMET’s claim, the evidence on file indicates that the cooperating users made a significant number of purchases directly from China (without traders and/or distributors). Fourth, the Commission did not take into account intercompany sales, thus, there is no difference in the level of trade. Therefore, the Commission’s findings during the investigation do not support EUSMET’s submission.

• (232) Furthermore, the undercutting established in recital 229 was established based on all imports from China. For the avoidance of doubt the Commission found undercutting of 9,2 % when the totality of imports were taken into consideration and of 0,4 % when only duty-paid imports were considered.

• (233) The Commission also calculated the undercutting in absence of anti-dumping duties. While taking the comments after disclosure into account, the Commission noted that in the disclosed version, the total undercutting in absence of anti-dumping duties had a clerical mistake (i.e. the duties were actually not fully removed). After correcting the clerical mistake, the Commission found undercutting of 14,6 % when the totality of imports were taken into consideration and of 13,9 % when only duty-paid imports were considered.

• (234) Therefore, based on the evidence on file and the price analysis conducted by the Commission, EUSMET’s claim of margin inflation was rejected.

5.4.   Imports from third countries other than China

• (235) The imports of silicon from third countries other than China (duty-paid and inward processing) originated mainly from Norway, Brazil and Malaysia.

• (236) The volume of imports into the Union as well as the market shares and price trends for imports of silicon from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 5

Imports from third countries

Country		2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Norway	Volume (tonnes)	136 812	168 827	174 008	185 342
	Index	100	123	127	135
	Market share (range)	[21 -26  %]	[35 -40  %]	[38 -43  %]	[39 -44  %]
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	1 960	1 860	1 809	1 787
	Index	100	95	92	91
Brazil	Volume (tonnes)	64 467	31 721	41 663	43 467
	Index	100	49	65	67
	Market share (range)	[10 -15  %]	[5 -10  %]	[9 -14  %]	[9 -14  %]
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	1 973	1 857	1 567	1 537
	Index	100	94	79	78
Malaysia	Volume (tonnes)	0	748	17 713	25 747
	Index	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Market share (range)	0 %	[0 -5  %]	[2 -6  %]	[5 -10  %]
	Average price (EUR/tonne)		1 594	1 519	1 569
	Index		100	95	98
Other third countries	Volume (tonnes)	86 527	85 740	53 865	44 843
	Index	100	99	62	52
	Market share (range)	[15 -20  %]	[16 -21  %]	[10 -15  %]	[6 -11  %]
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	1 974	1 662	1 648	1 764
	Index	100	84	83	89
Total of all third countries except the country concerned	Volume (tonnes)	287 805	287 036	287 248	299 399
	Index	100	100	100	104
	Market share (range)	[50 -55  %]	[60 -65  %]	[65 -70  %]	[65 -70  %]
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	1 967	1 800	1 726	1 729
	Index	100	92	88	88
Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat

• (237) The import volumes from third countries rose by 4 % over the period considered. Given the 16 % decrease of the Union consumption during the same period, the market share of the imports from third countries increased by 24 % between 2018 and the RIP. Most of these imports originated in Norway, Brazil, and Malaysia. However, whilst the imports from Norway grew by 35 %, the imports from Brazil decreased by 33 % and the imports from Malaysia, absent in 2018, reached 5-10 % market share in the RIP.

• (238) The import price in EUR per tonne from the third countries steadily fell over the period concerned (an overall decrease of 12 %). In the RIP, import prices from Norway, Brazil, Malaysia and all other third countries, were on average all higher than the import prices from China.

5.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

5.5.1.   General remarks

• (239) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

5.5.1.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (240) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Production volume (in tonnes) (range)	[200 000 – 240 000 ]	[150 000 – 190 000 ]	[110 000 - 150 000 ]	[120 000 -160 000 ]
Index	100	78	66	71
Production capacity (in tonnes) (range)	[200 000 – 240 000 ]	[170 000 – 210 000 ]	[170 000 – 210 000 ]	[170 000 – 210 000 ]
Index	100	84	84	83
Capacity utilisation – Index	100	93	78	86
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (241) The production volume decreased by 34 % between 2018 and 2020 and increased by 5 % in the RIP. Overall, during the period concerned, the production volume fell by 29 %, to adjust to a lower demand. The evolution of the production volume also reflects a supply excess at the beginning of the period considered, also apparent in the volume of closing stocks in 2018 (see recital 256), which was gradually reduced.

• (242) The production capacity also fell but mostly between 2018 and 2019 (16 %) and remained fairly stable until the RIP, when it fell by an additional 1 %. Since the production volumes fell faster than the production capacity, the capacity utilisation fell by 17 % in the period considered.

5.5.1.2.   Sales volume and market share

• (243) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales volume and market share (in tonnes)

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Sales volume on the Union market (range)	[150 000 – 190 000 ]	[120 000 – 160 000 ]	[100 000 – 140 000 ]	[110 000 – 150 000 ]
Index	100	80	64	71
Market share (range)	[30 -35  %]	[25 -30  %]	[26 -31  %]	[27 -32  %]
Index	100	90	80	85
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (244) The sales volume on the Union market followed a similar pattern as the production, decreasing steadily by 36 % between 2018 and 2020 and rising in the RIP, by 10 %. Overall, sales in the Union fell by 29 % in the period considered. During the same period, the market share of the Union industry decreased by 15 %.

5.5.1.3.   Growth

• (245) While the consumption fell by 16 %, both Union industry’s production volumes and sales fell by 29 %, resulting in a market share decreased by 15 %. The Union industry’s losses in terms of production volume and sales exceeded the contraction of the market.

5.5.1.4.   Employment and productivity

• (246) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Number of employees – Index	100	88	87	88
Productivity (tonne/employee) – Index	100	88	75	81
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (247) In line with the capacity trend, the employment fell by 12 % between 2018 and 2019, and remained fairly stable until the RIP. Since the production fell even faster (29 %), the productivity decreased by 19 %, between 2018 and the RIP.

5.5.1.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (248) Despite the decreasing levels of the import quantities from China, the imports dumped at 39,4 % had a negative impact on the Union industry’s performance, making it also difficult for the Union industry to recover from past dumping practices.

5.5.1.6.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (249) The average unit sales prices of the Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne)

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market – Ranges	[2 000 – 2 200 ]	[1 700 – 1 900 ]	[1 700 – 1 900 ]	[1 700 – 1 900 ]
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market – Index	100	88	85	87
Unit cost of production – Ranges	[1 800 – 2 000 ]	[1 700 – 1 900 ]	[1 700 – 1 900 ]	[1 700 – 1 900 ]
Unit cost of production – Index	100	99	92	95
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (250) The unit sales price of the Union industry to unrelated costumers in the Union decreased by 12 % in 2019 compared to 2018 and then further decreased by 1 percentage point between 2019 and the RIP.

• (251) Unlike the unit sales price, the unit cost of production of the Union industry remained stable in 2019 and fell by 5 % between 2019 and the RIP. This partly reflected the decision of some producers to shut down certain furnaces, in view of the oversupply that originated from the lower demand.

• (252) As a result, the sales price fell twice as much (13 %) than the cost of production (5 %) during the period considered.

5.5.1.7.   Labour costs

• (253) The average labour costs of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR) – Index	100	92	86	88
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (254) The average labour cost per employee decreased by 12 % during the period considered. The employees’ bonuses paid out in 2018 and social security programme in the periods of lower output explain the average cost trend.

5.5.1.8.   Inventories

• (255) Stock levels of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Closing stocks (in tonnes) – Index	100	79	65	9
Closing stocks as a percentage of production – Index	100	101	98	13
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (256) The closing stocks fell by 91 % during the period considered. This reduction was mostly because the stocks in 2018 were high in volumes, given the lower demand for silicon at the beginning of the period considered had created an oversupply in the Union.

• (257) Similarly, the ratio between the closing stocks and the production volumes fell by 87 % between 2018 and the RIP.

5.5.1.9.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (258) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) (range)	[5  % – 10  %]	[-6  % – -1  %]	[0  % – 5  %]	[0  % – 5  %]
Index	100	- 107	38	12
Cash flow (EUR) – Index	100	-11	104	38
Investments (EUR) – Index	100	88	8	41
Return on investments (range)	[70  % – 75  %]	[-70  % – -75  %]	[0  % – 5  %]	[-15  % – 20  %]
Index	100	- 105	6	-29
Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies	Source: Questionnaire replies

• (259) The Commission established the profitability of the Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. From a situation of positive profitability in 2018 the Union industry became loss making in 2019. The average profitability slowly improved in 2019 and 2020, but overall, the Union industry experienced an 88 % reduction in their profitability over the period considered.

• (260) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow decreased by 111 % in 2019 to grow again by 124 % in 2020 and decreased again by 66 % in the RIP. Despite the increase, the cash flow during the RIP was still 62 % lower than in 2018 and was mostly the consequence of the significant sales decrease of one Union producer during the period considered.

• (261) The level of investments decreased to a very low level in 2020 to slightly rebound in the RIP. Overall, the investments has more than halved during the period considered. Around 70-80 % of the investments relate to replacement of certain equipment by one of the producers. More in general, as a reaction to the falling demand, the companies were reducing their assets used for production during the period considered until the RIP, where some investments were made upon the signs of demand recovery.

• (262) The return on investments needed to produce silicon on the total silicon sales was following the decreasing profits.

5.6.   Conclusion on injury

• (263) All injury indicators, apart from the stock levels, showed a negative pattern during the period considered. In a context of demand decrease (16 %), both sales and production fell in a higher magnitude (29 %). This led to a similar decrease in capacity (17 %) and employment (12 %). Since the decrease in production was faster (29 %) than the decrease of capacity and employment, the capacity utilisation and the productivity also fell during the period considered.

• (264) During the same period, the average unit prices also decreased (13 %). As a consequence, despite a decrease of the cost of production (5 %), the profitability fell by 88 %. Along with the profitability, also the investment, cash flow and return on investment fell significantly over the period considered.

• (265) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

6. CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE INJURY AND THE DUMPED IMPORTS FROM CHINA

• (266) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from China concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry, in particular imports from third countries.

• (267) Over the period considered, the import volumes from China decreased from 14 % in 2018 to 7 % in the RIP. These imports entered at price levels which undercut, during the RIP, the Union sales prices by 9,2 %, when considering the anti-dumping duties or 14,6 % when not considering the duties. Against the backdrop of a market which was shrinking during the period considered, the import from the country concerned therefore kept exerting pressure on the Union industry whose profitability remained very low throughout the period considered and even reached negative levels at times.

• (268) At the same time, imports from other countries, such as Norway and Malaysia, kept increasing and their market share went up from 53 % to 66 % between 2018 and the RIP. Imports from these countries were sold at prices lower or close than those of Chinese imports with duties included, thereby also contributing to the injurious situation of the Union industry. Therefore, the effect of third country imports on the Union industry’s negative developments, in particular in terms of profitability, attenuating to some extent the causal link between the injury and the dumped imports from China.

• (269) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from China contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry, with third country imports attenuating to an extent the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

• (270) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET argued that the Commission followed a ‘check list’ approach in its injury assessment and it failed to consider conflicting evidence, such as the evidence suggesting that the Chinese imports did not constitute the explanatory force of the injury to the Union industry. In particular EUSMET claimed that the Commission did not take into account evidence relating to the fact that (i) the volume of Chinese imports declined over the period considered, (ii) there was no correlation between the Chinese silicon import volumes and prices on the Union industry’s situation, (iii) the decline in the Union industry’s production, sales volumes, sales prices and other financial indicators corresponded to the period of declining demand and prices in the Union and globally and (iv) the majority of the silicon imports from China in the RIP were under the IPP and basically pertained to the special grade silicon metal imports made by one EUSMET member, (v) the Commission also did not consider the significant imports of silicon metal from South Africa into the Union in the RIP and (vi) the Commission does not explain how the significantly higher volume of Norwegian imports at prices that undercut the EU producers’ prices did not affect the economic situation of the Union industry.

• (271) It is clear from recital 269 that the Commission has not attributed to Chinese imports the role of explanatory force behind the injury suffered by Union producers. Nor the Commission concluded that the dumped Chinse import were the main and sole cause for the decrease on Union prices. And finally, the Commission has not neglected the decrease of the demand in the Union and globally, as explained in recital 218 and clearly reported in Table 2. Nevertheless, the Commission has factually noted that these Chinese imports, despite decreasing during the period considered, were still at dumped prices in the RIP and were still undercutting Union prices, thus certainly contributing to the injurious situation of the Union industry.

• (272) Whilst the Commission agrees that the majority of import from China were under IPP it contests that these pertained to a certain grade of silicon used by one EUSMET member. Indeed, even assuming that the totality of imports from EUSMET members during the RIP were entirely of the special grade silicon, these would only be equal to less than a half all the imports from China under IPP, or less than one third of the overall imports from China, during the RIP.

• (273) The Commission considered but did singled out the impact of imports from South Africa, because these are in lower volumes than imports from other countries such as Norway, Brazil and Malaysia, for which detailed data were provided. Impact of imports from South Africa, as well as from other minor exporting countries are still captured in the aggregated figure of ‘other imports’ in Table 5.

• (274) Finally, the Commission concurs with EUSMET that Norway, along with other countries including China, have contributed to the injurious situation if the Union industry over the period considered. Import volumes and prices of Norwegian imports are clearly reported in Table 5.

• (275) In conclusion, as explained in recital 269, the Commission attributed the injury to both imports of silicon from China and other third countries. Contrary to the EUSMET’s claims, the Commission focused on an analysis of recurrence of injury, as described in recitals 276 to 294, identifying the likely situation whereby the Union industry would be injured, should the measures lapse and the imports from China surge at the current undercutting prices.

7. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

• (276) The Commission concluded in recital 265 that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. Nevertheless, given the trend of decreasing volumes and market share of Chinese imports over the period considered, the Commission also examined, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by the dumped imports from China if the measures against were allowed to lapse.

• (277) In this regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in China, attractiveness of the Union market, the likely price levels of imports from China in the absence of anti-dumping measures, and their impact on the Union industry.

• (278) The capacity and spare capacity in China is discussed in recital 188. Due to the non-cooperation of the Chinese producers, the findings of the investigation were based on the information provided in the expiry review request. The review request estimated the Chinese silicon production capacity between 6 and 8 million tonnes per year and stated that Chinese silicon production capacity is far higher than the total world consumption. This confirms the conclusions of the last expiry review that China has significant spare capacity that could be used to supply the Union market if the measures are allowed to lapse.

• (279) The attractiveness of the Union market is discussed in recitals 201 to 204. In the review investigation period, the Union industry average selling price was well above the average import price of Chinese silicon. In addition, other markets remained closed due to trade defence measures ⁵⁸, indicating that it is likely that Chinese exports in large quantities putting the spare capacity into use would be directed towards the Union, should the measures lapse.

• (280) The price levels of the Chinese exports to the Union without anti-dumping duties would be a reasonable indicator of future price levels to the Union market. Using the data from the RIP, applying only conventional duties, the undercutting would reach 14,6 % when all imports are considered and 13,9 % when only duty paid imports are taken into account.

• (281) The price pressure would not allow the Union industry to maintain a profitable pattern. Instead, the Union industry would further deteriorate should the measures be allowed to lapse. Indeed, in the absence of measures, Chinese dumped imports at injurious prices would likely exert further downward pressure on the sales prices in the Union market. The Union industry would very likely be obliged to decrease its sales prices which would lead to further loss of profitability and, in all likelihood, important losses in the short term.

• (282) Alternatively, should the Union industry attempt to increase its sales prices to profitable levels, considering the large overcapacity in China, the dumped imports would likely gain significant market share in the Union to the detriment of the Union industry.

• (283) While the volume of imports from China was gradually decreasing over the period considered, the interest of Chinese exporting producers in the Union market is shown by the continued imports during the period considered, despite the measures in force, at prices which undercut the Union industry prices. Moreover, as seen in recital 206 the export prices from China to other countries (i.e. 1 800 USD per tonne) were lower than the average prices of exports to the Union, during the same year (i.e. 1 915 USD per tonne).

• (284) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET reiterated its comment that the Commission has overestimated the capacity and spare capacity in China.

• (285) The Commission noted that EUSMET provided no new evidence in this regards and simply reiterated its previous claims. As clarified in recitals 191 to 195, the Commission’s findings, that there is significant spare capacity in China, that could be used to supply the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse remain unchanged.

• (286) EUSMET noted that the analysis on the attractiveness of the Union market was based on export prices of Chinese silicon towards the EU vis-a-vis to other markets. EUSMET requested the disclosure of these data.

• (287) As specified in recital 209 the Commission based its analyses on GTA extraction, which is readily available. GTA data are based on data obtained from Chinese customs’ authorities, and has been used simply as a baseline to compare export prices to various destinations.

• (288) EUSMET claimed that the Commission failed to demonstrate that, by allowing measure to lapse, Chinese imports would flood the Union market. This was based on the fact that during the silicon shortage between 2021 and 2022 Chinese imports into the Union did not increase.

• (289) The Commission considered that the situation after the RIP and in particular the steep increase of demand and the consequent shortage of supply was of a temporary nature. Indeed, these shocks in demand and supply have been linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the increase of electricity prices (part of which occurred even before the Russian aggression against Ukraine). Nevertheless, there are no elements supporting the arguments that these are not temporary, nor did EUSMET demonstrate this in its submissions. Furthermore, the Commission noted that a situation where demand temporarily increases is different from a situation where duties are permanently removed. The exporter’s reaction to former cannot be considered as a blueprint for their reaction to the latter. Moreover, based on the considerations on Chinese spare capacity and attractiveness of the Union market the Commission still considers that the Chinese silicon imports would enter the Union market in significant quantities at dumped prices, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

• (290) EUSMET further claimed that the Commission’s assumption that the Chinese imports would increase should measures be repealed was wrong since: (i) the undercutting margin was inflated: (ii) difference between various grades of the product concerned not being reflected in the analysis, (iii) the Union was not the major Chinese market for exports, (iv) the Chinese silicon metal was not the explanatory force behind the Union industry injury.

• (291) No new evidence to support these claims was provided in the comments on the disclosure. In the light of the above four elements addressed in the previous recitals on undercutting margin (see recital 234), product differentiation (see recital 65), the Union not being the major export market for the PRC (see recitals 206 to 210) and the causation (see recital 275), the Commission’s analyses on the potential volumes and prices effects of the Chinese imports on the Union market, should measures be repealed, remained unchanged.

• (292) EUSMET claimed that the Commission failed to consider the market development post-RIP and in particular the sharp increase of the Union prices of silicon, the global supply shortage, including at Union industry level, that would lead the Union producer making significant profits.

• (293) The Commission considered that both the price development as well as the global shortage of silicon after the RIP were temporary trends, mostly linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical events in 2021 and 2022. The evidence provided by EUSMET, including the forecast on the increase of silicon demand and prices, do not indicate that the global supply shortage or that the sharp price increase will be of a permanent nature.

• (294) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China at injurious prices and material injury would be likely to recur.

8. UNION INTEREST

• (295) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

8.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (296) Three Union producers accounting for 100 % of Union production cooperated in this investigation. As stated in recital 265, the Union industry suffers material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation despite the measures in force.

• (297) The measures in force have largely contained the imports volumes from China, which still occurred at injurious prices that undercut the Union prices and that therefore further contributed to the precarious condition of the Union industry.

• (298) Indeed, if measures were repealed, the import volumes from China would likely surge and, given the spare capacity in China as well as the attractiveness of the Union market, the economic situation of the Union industry would be even further compromised, leading to further reduction of production, sales and employment in the Union.

• (299) Any further deterioration of the Union industry’s economic situation would entail the risk of a scaling-down of production or even definitive closure of production sites in the Union. Therefore, it can be concluded that the continuation of the measures against China would be in the interest of the Union industry.

• (300) Interest of unrelated importers

• (301) No importer came forward following the publication of the notice of initiation and during the investigation.

• (302) Therefore, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a negative impact on the importers outweighing the positive impact of the measures.

8.2.   Interest of users

• (303) The Commission received replies from three users, two from the chemical sectors (Wacker and Evonik, forming the consortium EUSMET) and one from the aluminium sector (Raffmetal). Moreover, the Commission received comments from the European Aluminium Association, representing the whole value chain of the aluminium industry in Europe.

• (304) The European Aluminium Association along with Raffmetal support the continuation of the existing measures. These users emphasised that silicon is an essential material in the aluminium production. If on the one hand the anti-dumping measures have an adverse impact on the users’ cost of production, on the other hand the measures preserve the production of silicon in the Union. As a consequence, the users benefit from a reliable and geographically close supply of silicon.

• (305) EUSMET claimed that the anti-dumping measures should not be maintained. For these users, silicon is of significant importance and it accounts for a large share of their raw materials cost. These users are importing from China and the anti-dumping duties increase their cost of production for silicon-based products. Moreover, they claimed that the effect of the measures on the chemical users would be potentially more significant than in the aluminium industries.

• (306) However, the information supplied by the two cooperating users producing chemical products shows that they import significant amounts under IPP, thereby being to certain extent exempted from the anti-dumping duty. The effect of the measures on part of the imports from these users was therefore considered to be limited.

• (307) EUSMET further pointed to the good financial situation of the Union producers, especially after the RIP.

• (308) The Commission notes that the apparent improvement of the financial situation of the Union producers coincides with the recent global growth of the silicon demand. Such short-term market development, occurring in any event after the RIP, cannot be considered indicative of the Union industry’s financial situation, given in particular the conclusions in recitals 211, 212 and 294. Therefore, since the Union industry is not in a stable economic situation and since it would be subject to future negative impact of dumped imports from China should the measures be allowed to lapse, the argument was rejected.

• (309) EUSMET claimed that the demand for silicon has increased while the supply has declined, in the EU, in the last years. EUSMET expressed concern about the security of supply and in particular the inability of the Union industry to fully supply the Union demand. This would lead to a situation of unavailability of the like product to satisfy the demand, which is growing fast, especially after the RIP. EUSMET also pointed out to the fierce competition in their downstream products markets, where the higher silicon costs put EUSMET at a competitive disadvantage compared to other world producers.

• (310) The investigation, however, showed that a variety of sources of silicon exists. First, the Union industry has spare capacity that can be reactivated to meet a growing future demand. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, even if the Union industry reduced their production and production capacity to some degree in reaction to the declining silicon consumption, a significant free capacity (i.e. around 26 % in the RIP) is still available in the Union should the demand surge again. The investigation showed that the furnaces that have been shut down could be reactivated in as short as two weeks to two months, depending of the inactivity time.

• (311) Moreover, silicon can be sourced from other countries, such as Norway, Malaysia, Brazil, Bosnia and Herzegovina. As set out in recital 236 two thirds of the silicon purchased in the Union is imported from Norway, Brazil, Malaysia, and a number of other countries. The Commission noted further that the measures in force did not stop Chinese imports of silicon from entering the Union market.

• (312) In conclusion, the combination between other sources of supplies and the spare capacity in the Union represent a diversified variety of options for the Union users of silicon. The argument therefore could not be accepted.

• (313) EUSMET claimed that the measures should be terminated also in view of the fact that silicon has been classified as a critical raw material (‘CRM’) by the Commission ⁵⁹ based on its economic importance and supply risk. EUSMET claimed that maintaining the measures would limit the amount of silicon and the variety of sources available on the market.

• (314) The Commission concurs on the critical nature of silicon in the industrial ecosystem in the Union. Nevertheless, the presence of imports at dumped price in the market would significantly endanger the Union industry and jeopardise the reliability of supply of silicon in the Union in the long period. For this reason, the claim was rejected.

• (315) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET disagreed with the Commission’s conclusions that the special grade silicon, needed by some users to produce products whose demand will increase in the future, is available in sufficient quantities in other markets than the PRC. Moreover, EUSMET claimed that the majority of IPP imports relate to this special grade silicon imported by one of its members.

• (316) The Commission noted that the duties on imports from the PRC are not prohibitive and if the users need a special grade of silicon, this remains available for importation under fair competition conditions.

• (317) Moreover, as already clarified in recital 272, based on Eurostat volumes, the majority of IPP imports relate to other imports than those from the EUSMET member who imports the special grade silicon, even assuming that this member only purchases the special grade silicon under IPP.

• (318) EUSMET submitted that the IPP is only relevant to the extent that goods are exported and cannot be used under several of the EU FTA’s, including the EU-Japan FTA. Thus, the access to IPP does not reduce the competitive disadvantage suffered by EUSMET members.

• (319) The Commission mentioned in recital 306 that certain volumes imported by EUSMET members are under IPP only to underline that part of their imports were not subject to the duties and that the latter had therefore a limited impact during the RIP. The Commission is aware that EUSMET members cannot only import via IPP and that the residual imports under regular regime made by EUSMET members are subject to the duties and have an impact on the importers. However, it is a fact that if a company is in position to import silicon under IPP, this limits the impact of the duties for the users concerned, even if it does not limit that impact for the entire volume so imported.

• (320) EUSMET noted that the spare capacity of the EU industry is insufficient to supply the growing silicon demand in the Union. Moreover, EUSMET highlighted that due to the development of electricity prices in the Union, Union producers will not be in position to increase their capacity utilisation.

• (321) The spare capacity in the Union was considered to be significant (26 % on average, representing about 10 % of the current Union consumption). In addition, the imports of silicon from other sources, including China, are available. EUSMET also did not demonstrate that the potential electricity prices increase would not be accompanied by the silicon sales price, which would enable to increase the Union producer’s capacity utilisation. As the electricity is a major cost component in the production, there is likely to be a corelation between those two, therefore this claim is rejected.

• (322) EUSMET claimed that first, the Commission did not consider the increase in demand for the period after the RIP. In particular, the Commission did not consider that the demand of the special silicon grade not produced in the Union and mostly originating from the PRC will increase. Second, the Commission allegedly did not consider the silicon shortage right after the RIP. Third, the Commission did not consider the increased competition faced by users in the Union from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (‘the UK’) and the PRC. Fourth, the Commission did not consider the effects of sanctions on Russian exports.

• (323) The Commission did considered the situation after the RIP and, as concluded in recital 293, found it to be of a temporary nature.

• (324) Furthermore, the commission agrees with EUSMET that Union users need diversity and security of supply to ensure continued production. However, such diversity and security will not be possible if the Union producers would be driven out of business due to the injurious imports of silicon from China at dumped prices.

• (325) Concerning the increased competition from the UK, the Commission notes that EUSMET did not provide sufficient information necessary to measure the impact of the increased competition from the UK so this claim is dismissed.

• (326) Concerning the effects of the sanctions on Russia, the Commission noted that this would further reduce the potential sources of silicon on the Union market. Nevertheless, based on the RIP data, Russia only represented 2 % of the total imports of silicon in the Union. Given the magnitude of Russian imports and the availability of other sources at global level, the Commission considered that the impact on the users of silicon not will not be substantial in the long period.

• (327) EUSMET finally underlined that silicon metal producers in different countries of the world do not want to increase sales to EUSMET members because of the fear of AD measures.

• (328) This claim was not supported by any factual evidence or fact that the suppliers outside the Union will refuse to supply. Indeed, the Commission noted a continuation of imports from third countries and in some cases even an increase of these, during the period considered.

• (329) On balance, the positive effect of the measures on the Union industry and users in the aluminium industry therefore outweighs the limited negative impact of the measures in force on the other users.

8.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (330) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of silicon originating in China.

9. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

• (331) Based on the conclusions on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on silicon from China should be maintained.

• (332) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

• (333) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be considered by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (334) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

• (335) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

• (336) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission ⁶⁰. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (337) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measure s be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. Only one interested party – EUSMET provided comments.

• (338) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET requested that, should measures be confirmed, the measures be limited to a period of two years, given the changed market circumstances concerning both demand and supply and Union’s high import dependence on specific silicon grades.

• (339) However, the Commission noted that there is nothing in the RIP data that would support such conclusion. Moreover, as discussed in recitals 289 and 293, the post-RIP developments appear to be of a temporary nature. In any event, if there are special circumstances warranting that the situation is reassessed in the future, an interim reviews can be requested in accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation.

• (340) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁶¹, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (341) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion on the measures provided for in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Company	Anti-dumping duty	TARIC additional code
Datong Jinneng Industrial Silicon Co., Pingwang Industry Garden, Datong, Shanxi	16,3  %	A971
All other companies	16,8  %	A999

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 August 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN