Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1395 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in Russia and Turkey

• (273) Imports from the countries concerned increased by more than five-fold during the period considered, increasing from 196 643 tonnes in 2017 to over 1 million tonnes in the investigation period. Their market share grew from 2,2 % in 2017 to 13,1 % in the investigation period. These increasing imports were made at prices lower than those of the Union industry throughout the period considered, with the gap increasing over time. In particular, in 2019 and the investigation period, the years with the highest increases in the imports from the countries concerned, the Union industry’s prices were depressed by the dumped imports. The price pressure exerted by imports from the countries concerned entailed that, in order to keep the loss in sales volumes limited, the Union industry had to decrease its sales prices more than to account for the drop in cost of production. As a result, profitability shrank from 6,2 % to 0,4 % and the financial indicators deteriorated.

• (274) The Turkish association CIB contested any negative impact of imports from the countries concerned on the grounds that such imports did not set prices on the Union market and followed global market trends driven by fluctuating hot-rolled coils prices. The Commission rejected the claim. With an exponential increase in volumes, by roughly 1 million tons in such short period and accounting for a market share of 12,9 % in the investigation period, the very low prices of imports from the countries concerned did negatively affect prices that the Union industry could obtain on the free market.

• (275) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers reiterated this comment, pointing at market intelligence it had provided to the Commission, which would show that the price trends over the period considered were the same on the main global markets and for the Union industry in the Union.

• (276) The Commission rejected this claim. First, Union sales prices of the Union industry decreased by 12 % over the period considered, whereas prices from the countries concerned decreased by 14 %. With prices of imports already well below Union industry prices in 2017, in as mentioned recital (274), the high volume of imports at very low prices from the countries concerned negatively affected the prices that the Union industry could obtain on the free market. Second, the Commission noted that some of the price trends in the provided data might be partly comparable, but that the eventual price level was not and that prices on each of these main markets are thus established on the basis of the specific dynamics and circumstances applicable to that market. The fact that the Commission had established that the product concerned is a commodity, as the parties concerned mentioned, does not undermine such conclusion.

• (277) Several parties claimed that there was no correlation between imports from Russia and Turkey and the injury suffered by the Union industry. The Commission rejected the claim. The Commission acknowledged that in the first part of the period considered the Union industry was able to take advantage of relatively good market circumstances and the anti-dumping measures in place against Chinese imports. However between 2018 and 2019, when the year-on-year increase of imports from Russia and Turkey was the highest, the Union industry became lossmaking. The poor financial situation continued in the investigation period, after a further increase of imports from the countries concerned in absolute and relative terms. There was thus a clear correlation between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

• (278) After final disclosure CIB and several exporting producers submitted that between 2018 and 2019, when the year-on-year increase of imports from Russia and Turkey was the highest, the Union industry managed to increase its Union sales volumes by a bit over 200 000 tonnes.

• (279) The Commission observed, however, that this increase was in absolute terms less than half of the increase of imports from the countries concerned and, in view of the prices prevailing in a market flooded by dumped imports, the financial situation of the Union industry deteriorated strongly as from 2018 and it became lossmaking in 2019.

• (280) Several parties stated that Turkish and Russian imports never reached volumes that could be injurious since, inter alia, they were below the level of the residual quota of the steel safeguard quotas in the Union. The Commission rejected the claim. Anti-dumping measures address a different situation than safeguard measures. The steel safeguard measures do not prevent the imposition of anti-dumping measures within the free-of-safeguard duty quotas, which indeed, as mentioned in recital (214), are large enough to allow significant volumes of imports before the safeguard duty applies. In addition, the volume of imports from each of the countries concerned was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation, as noted in recitals (213) to (214) above. Therefore, dumped imports from the countries concerned were significant enough to materially cause injury to the Union producers.

• (281) Some parties called for the Commission to analyse data for 2021 and stated that the strong recovery of Union producers in that year evidenced that imports from the countries concerned were not the source of any material injury suffered by the Union industry. The Commission dismissed the claim in accordance with Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation, which establishes that information relating to periods subsequent to the investigation period should normally not be taken into account.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

• (282) The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Imports from third countries

Country		2017	2018	2019	IP
South Korea	Volume (tonnes)	143 873	180 993	209 248	248 890
South Korea	Index (2017 = 100)	100	126	145	173
South Korea	Market share (%)	1,6	2,2	2,3	2,9
South Korea	Index (2017 = 100)	100	135	146	182
South Korea	Average price (EUR/tonne)	703	729	685	626
South Korea	Index (2017 = 100)	100	104	97	89
Taiwan	Volume (tonnes)	69 919	87 803	140 334	184 158
Taiwan	Index (2017 = 100)	100	126	201	263
Taiwan	Market share (%)	0,8	1,0	1,6	2,2
Taiwan	Index (2017 = 100)	100	134	202	278
Taiwan	Average price (EUR/tonne)	624	675	656	624
Taiwan	Index (2017 = 100)	100	108	105	100
India	Volume (tonnes)	232 677	126 651	194 355	169 040
India	Index (2017 = 100)	100	54	84	73
India	Market share (%)	2,6	1,5	2,2	2,0
India	Index (2017 = 100)	100	58	84	77
India	Average price (EUR/tonne)	683	689	639	573
India	Index (2017 = 100)	100	101	94	84
Tunisia	Volume (tonnes)	0	29 901	82 426	85 436
Tunisia	Index (2017 = 100)		100	276	2 286
Tunisia	Market share (%)	0	0,4	0,9	1,0
Tunisia	Index (2017 = 100)		100	225	250
Tunisia	Average price (EUR/tonne)		648	600	570
Tunisia	Index (2017 = 100)		100	93	88
Ukraine	Volume (tonnes)	19 501	30 165	25 434	19 140
Ukraine	Index (2017 = 100)	100	155	130	98
Ukraine	Market share (%)	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,2
Ukraine	Index (2017 = 100)	100	166	131	104
Ukraine	Average price (EUR/tonne)	635	645	593	538
Ukraine	Index (2017 = 100)	100	102	93	85
China	Volume (tonnes)45	1 557 192	903 775	668 707	245
China	Index (2017 = 100)	100	58	43	0
China	Market share (%)	17,3	10,8	7,5	0,0
China	Index (2017 = 100)	100	62	43	0
China	Average price (EUR/tonne)	597	478	860	896
China	Index (2017 = 100)	100	80	144	150
Other third countries	Volume (tonnes)	113 906	120 947	77 991	132 678
Other third countries	Index (2017 = 100)	100	106	68	116
Other third countries	Market share (%)	1,3	1,4	0,9	1,6
Other third countries	Index (2017 = 100)	100	114	69	123
Other third countries	Average price (EUR/tonne)	658	691	687	599
Other third countries	Index (2017 = 100)	100	105	99	87
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Volume (tonnes)	2 137 068	1 480 235	1 398 494	839 588
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Index (2017 = 100)	100	69	65	39
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Market share (%)	23,8	17,6	15,6	9,9
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Index (2017 = 100)	100	74	66	41
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Average price (EUR/tonne)	636	695	655	603
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Index (2017 = 100)	100	109	103	95
Source: Surveillance 2 (adjusted)	Source: Surveillance 2 (adjusted)	Source: Surveillance 2 (adjusted)	Source: Surveillance 2 (adjusted)	Source: Surveillance 2 (adjusted)	Source: Surveillance 2 (adjusted)

• (283) During the period considered, the market share of imports from all other countries fluctuated. Overall, there was a decrease from 23,8 % in 2017 to 9,9 % in the investigation period, a trend which was partly influenced by the imposition of trade defence measures against Chinese CRS.

• (284) In the investigation period, imports from other third countries amounted to 839 588 tonnes (72 % of which from South Korea, Taiwan and India). The bulk of these imports arrived in the Union at prices higher than import prices from the countries concerned.

• (285) As noted in recitals (247) and (248) above, the Union industry was still affected by Chinese dumped imports during a share of the period considered. Some parties stated that there was no evidence that circumventing Chinese imports did not continue to enter the Union market in 2020, for which they requested the disclosure of TARIC data ⁴⁶. Given the timing of the anti-circumvention proceeding against China and the registration that applied as from the initiation of that investigation, the Commission considered that Chinese imports did not cause the material injury suffered by the Union industry during the investigation period of the present proceeding. Most importantly, imports of CRS from the PRC were virtually inexistent during the investigation period, when the Commission found the Union industry continued to be materially injured.

• (286) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the Union industry’s decrease in profitability in 2018 and 2019 was because the profitability that was achieved in 2017 was mainly due to the imposition of anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports of CRS and that the drop in profitability from that 2017 level in 2018 and 2019 was caused by the imports of circumvented Chinese CRS, a claim which was also made by GOT.

• (287) First, with regard to the Union industry’s profitability in 2017, the Commission noted that in 2017 the profitability was above the minimum target profit of 6 % which suggested that (i) after a period of unfair competition from China resulting in material injury to the Union industry, the Union industry’s profitability was not, in that year, materially affected by the Chinese dumping in the Union market, most likely as a consequence of the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation against Chinese CRS in December 2016; and (ii) the volume of imports from the countries concerned was not yet as such that it materially affected the profitability level of the Union industry. The absence of unfair trade distortions does however in no way mean that the profitability was inflated, as the parties concerned seemed to suggest, even more as the level was at a modest 6,2 %. With regard to the impact of the circumvented imports from China in 2018 and 2019, the Commission did not ‘simply disregard’ it, as CIB and several exporting producers claimed, but it had acknowledged that the Union industry was still affected by it. However, contrary to the trend of imports from the countries concerned, due to the anti-circumvention investigation, those imports decreased strongly in volume in 2018 and 2019, when they were already at a level below that of imports from the countries concerned. There were virtually no more imports of CRS from China in the investigation period.

• (288) The Commission therefore concluded that the impact of imports from other third countries did not attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Russia and Turkey and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (289) The volume and prices of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Export performance of the sampled Union producers

	2017	2018	2019	IP
Export volume (tonnes)	708 037	657 417	812 594	748 774
Index (2017 = 100)	100	93	115	106
Average price (EUR/tonne)	608	672	600	589
Index (2017 = 100)	100	110	99	97
Source: Eurofer (volumes), Sampled Union producers (unit price)	Source: Eurofer (volumes), Sampled Union producers (unit price)	Source: Eurofer (volumes), Sampled Union producers (unit price)	Source: Eurofer (volumes), Sampled Union producers (unit price)	Source: Eurofer (volumes), Sampled Union producers (unit price)

• (290) The Union industry increased its export volume by 6 % over the period considered. The additional export sales (of around 40 000 tonnes in the investigation period as compared to the beginning of the period considered) are limited compared to the loss of over 93 000 tonnes of sales in the Union market during the same period. Except for the higher prices in 2018, Union producers enjoyed rather stable export prices over the same period. The products which are exported by the Union industry are generally cheaper CRS and they therefore have significantly lower average prices than the products sold in the Union. The export sales of the Union industry could for a very small part compensate the negative developments both in terms of volumes and prices on the Union market by diluting fixed costs and other costs.

• (291) Some exporting producers attributed any loss of market share of Union producers in the CRS Union market to the increased focus of the Union industry on export markets, which, for some parties, were non-profitable. The Commission dismissed the claim. The volumes exported by Union producers were limited as compared to total Union sales volumes, representing around 12 % of their total sales volume. As noted in recital (290), in absolute terms the additional export sales were limited, while prices were rather stable and in line with the product mix.

• (292) The Commission concluded that the impact of the export performance of the Union industry on the injury suffered by Union producers was, if any, marginal.

5.2.3.   Evolution of demand in general

• (293) As shown in Section 4.3, free market consumption decreased during the period considered. On that basis, the Commission concluded that the evolution of free market consumption could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

• (294) After final disclosure, GOR claimed that the decrease of consumption was the main reason for the decrease in the Union industry’s production. However, the Commission reiterated that decrease of consumption was not found to attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Russia and Turkey and the injurious situation of the Union industry in the investigation period, in view of the increase in volumes and market shares of imports from the countries concerned and their effect on the Union industry’s prices. Moreover, whereas consumption decreased by 467 000 tonnes over the period considered, imports from the countries concerned increased by almost the double.

5.2.4.   Evolution of demand in the automotive sector

• (295) Some parties claimed that the Union industry was performing badly due to problems and lower demand in the automotive sector. The claim was not confirmed by the current investigation. To the contrary, the investigation showed that Union producers were supplying CRS to various industry sectors that are not in the automotive sector. Given that hot dipped galvanised products typically used in the automotive sector fall outside the scope of the investigation if a part of the Union industry was negatively affected by a downturn in the automotive industry, this derived from products that are not a like product and hence not accounted for in the current analysis. The claim was rejected.

• (296) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the lower demand in that sector, which is produced on the same production lines, would have increased the fixed cost and thus have negatively affected the profitability of the Union industry.

• (297) The Commission acknowledged that certain Union producers manufacture, on the CRS product lines, also products used in the automotive sector. However, it clarified that the analysis in the current investigation, including the cost analysis, is made only on the product group covered by it. The micro-indicators have been collected at the level of the sampled producers only. The verified production costs of these parties, and in particular their fixed costs, have not been subject to such reallocation. Indeed, this reallocation of production capacity only applied to a small number of non-sampled producers. Therefore, none of the micro-indicators and as mentioned in the disclosure document and also in this regulation, only 2 macro-indicators, namely production capacity (Table 4) and employment (Table 6), were affected by the development in product groups other than CRS.

• (298) The claim was therefore rejected.

5.2.5.   Captive use

• (299) Union producers use the product under investigation for the production of organic coated steel.

• (300) As shown in Table 1 above, captive consumption fell by 13 % over the period considered. The drop took place mainly in the second part of the period considered as a consequence of the negative growth in some steel-using sectors. Nevertheless, captive use remained rather stable in relative terms, i.e., as a percentage of Union production.

• (301) The Commission concluded that the evolution of captive consumption on the injury suffered by the Union industry, if any, was marginal.

5.2.6.   Self-inflicted injury

• (302) Some parties pointed at ill-timed investments for the production of hot dipped galvanised products for the automotive sector as a source of the injury suffered by Union producers. As discussed in recital (295), the claim concerns investments on a product that is not covered by this investigation. The Commission thus dismissed the claim.

• (303) Some parties pointed at ill-timed investments leading to a production capacity much higher than consumption in the Union as a source of the injury suffered by Union producers. The Commission dismissed the claim. As noted in recital (263), Union producers did not invest in order to increase CRS production capacities as such. Also, recital (235) notes that the production capacity increases for CRS were theoretical and therefore were not considered an indication of material injury in this particular case. This claim was reiterated after final disclosure, however without any new evidence or reasoning and therefore was rejected.

• (304) Some parties pointed at self-inflicted injury within the Union industry because SSCs related to Union producers import of the product under investigation. The claim was unsubstantiated and, thus, rejected. It is noted that many Union producers do not have related steel service centres with importing functions. The bulk of Union producers in the sample do not have related steel service centres of the kind. Imports by steel service centres related to Union producers, if any, were not found to attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Russia and Turkey and the injurious situation of the Union industry in the investigation period, in view of the increase in volumes of imports from the countries concerned, their effect on the Union Industry’s prices and the impact of other factors analysed in this section.

5.2.7.   COVID-19 pandemic

• (305) Some parties attributed injury to COVID-mandated shutdowns in the Union which would have increased fixed costs of the Union steelmakers in view of lower production volumes. The claim, which was reiterated after final disclosure, was dismissed. COVID-mandated shutdowns in the 14 Member States where Union producers are located varied in terms of periods and scope. Indeed, there were Union steel producers barely affected by shutdowns, which served essential businesses during the pandemic and which overall output in 2020 did not vary significantly as compared to 2019 ⁴⁷.

• (306) Those parties considered that the reason why the Union industry lost market shares was the lower volumes available for sale as a result of lower capacity utilisation rates and reduced production due to COVID-19 pandemic plant shutdowns or idled capacities. The Commission disagreed. In a context of falling consumption (see Table 1), dumped imports gained more market shares than the Union industry, which, overall, was in a position to serve the market further.

• (307) Several parties stated that Turkish and Russian imports filled in a gap in the Union market resulting from COVID-19 mandated production shutdowns in the Union, causing shortages. The Commission rejected the claim. The Commission noted that most of the increase of imports from the countries concerned, in terms of volumes as well as market shares, took place in 2018 and 2019, i.e. before the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the impact of COVID-19 mandated production shutdowns was overall limited as explained in recital (305) and varied amongst Union producers. In any case, COVID-19 related shutdowns could never justify dumping practices by the countries concerned. These comments were reiterated after final disclosure, however without any new evidence or reasoning and therefore were rejected.

• (308) CIB and several exporting producers also submitted that the quarterly analysis it had made of prices and costs in the complaint (see recital (260)) would demonstrate that, in particular in the first quarter of 2020, the Union industry was severely lossmaking. This would corroborate the claim that mandatory plant shutdowns in the Union were the cause of the poor profitability in the investigation period (rather than the dumped imports).

• (309) The Commission noted that the findings of these parties’ own analysis of these specific complaint data already showed a dramatic deterioration of profit between the third and fourth quarter of 2019 (from 1,22 % to -1,96 %), i.e. before the COVID-19 pandemic, and also a very pronounced improvement of the Union industry’s profitability in the second quarter of 2020 to a level (-0,45 %) comparable to that supposedly achieved in the third quarter of 2020 – whereas the parties highlighted that the shutdowns started from March 2020 ⁴⁸. It considered that both the strong decrease of profitability in the last quarter of 2019, i.e. prior to any mandatory plant shutdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the strong profitability improvement in the second quarter of 2020 are at odds with the claim that this analysis would corroborate the claim on the impact of the mandatory shutdowns. The claim was therefore not found to be convincingly substantiated.

• (310) GOR stated that certain COVID-related findings summarised in a study were the cause of the deterioration of the Union industry in the investigation period ⁴⁹. Those findings relate to the slow recovery of the euro area as compared to China, the impact of short-term supply shortages on manufacturing industries and the differences amongst sector as regards rebounding after COVID-19. The claim is dismissed on the grounds explained in recital (306) and the nature of the study, which focuses on sectors unrelated to CRS.

5.2.8.   Hot-rolled coils prices

• (311) Some parties stated that Union producers suffered from a ‘cost-price squeeze’ due to the price fluctuations of hot-rolled coils, which became more expensive in the second part of 2020 according to market intelligence. Most Union producers are vertically integrated and the price of hot-rolled coils in the free market had no impact on their cost of production of CRS. The Commission dismissed the claim.

5.2.9.   Competitive state of the Union industry

• (312) After final disclosure, GOR claimed that the increase in market shares achieved by the Republic of Korea and Taiwan showed that the Union industry was not sufficiently competitive.

• (313) The Commission noted that an increased presence of imports is not indicative of the competitive state of a domestic industry. It also noted that the absolute volume of imports from these two countries and, even more so, their increase over the period considered was limited in comparison with that of the countries concerned. The claim was therefore rejected.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (314) In light of the above considerations, the Commission established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from Russia and Turkey. The increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned coincided with a deterioration of the Union industry’s situation. Low priced imports from Turkey and Russia increased exponentially and prevented the Union industry from increasing sales prices and volumes following the anti-circumvention investigation concerning Chinese imports. In terms of prices, the dumped imports from the countries concerned continuously undercut those of the Union industry sales prices in the Union market, and in any event created substantial price pressure preventing the Union industry from setting prices at sustainable levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins.

• (315) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. It found that factors such as the development of captive use and certain investments did not contribute to the injury suffered. The effect of factors such as imports from other third countries, exports by Union producers, the evolution of demand, COVID-19 pandemic and hot-rolled coils prices was limited overall.

• (316) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

• (317) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

6.1.   Injury margin

• (318) The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic regulation.

• (319) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

• (320) The complainant stated that the target profit should be at least the same as in the previous (China) CRS case (7,4 %). A Union producer proposed 15 %. Some parties claimed that the level of profit put forth by the complainant was too high.

• (321) The Commission found that in 2017 the Union industry was able to achieve a 6,2 % profit on average. Although anti-dumping measures had not been imposed on imports of CRS from the PRC yet, the volume of Chinese dumped imports had already decreased in 2017 as a result of the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation in December 2016. In addition, in that year the level of imports from Russia and Turkey was still relatively low (see Table 2).

• (322) The Commission also assessed the years prior to the period considered but those were not found appropriate because of the influx of dumped imports from China affecting the Union industry. The Commission took note of the target profit used in the previous (China) CRS case, which however dates from 2008.

• (323) Therefore, the Commission decided to use the average weighted profit of 6,2 % achieved in 2017 was the most appropriate basis for the target profit calculation in the present case.

• (324) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, two Union producers provided evidence that their level of investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. Based on the companies’ documentary evidence, which could be reconciled with the companies’ reporting tools and accounting systems, the Commission accepted the claims. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R & D and innovation (‘IRI’) expenses under normal conditions of competition as provided by the Union Industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such differences, expressed as a percentage of turnover, were 0,02 % and 0,35 %. Such percentages were added to the basic profit of 6,2 %, leading to a final target profit ranging between 6,20 % and 6,55 %.

• (325) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available (based on the companies’ accounting systems, their reporting tools and forecasts), the Commission established an additional cost in a range between 3,05 and 38,78 euros per tonne.

• (326) These costs comprised the additional future costs to ensure compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional costs were calculated on the basis of the estimated EU Allowances (EUAs) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures (2022 to 2026). The additional costs also took account of indirect CO2 costs stemming from an increase in electricity prices over the period 2022 to 2026 linked to the EU ETS and the forecasted prices of EUAs.

• (327) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the target profit margin (see recital (324)) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

• (328) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers claimed that the production costs used as a basis to calculate a non-injurious price would be inflated due to reallocation of production lines for certain producers as referred to in recital (235). This claim was unsubstantiated. In any event, as mentioned in recital (295), the cost data used in this investigation, including for calculating a non-injurious Union industry price, only concern the costs associated with the production of the like product and the micro-indicators have been collected and used at the level of the sampled producers only. The Commission confirmed that the reallocation referred to in recitals (235) and (244) concerns a small number of non-sampled producers and it therefore only affects the macro-indicators in question as duly explained. The claim is therefore rejected.

• (329) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the Russian exporting producers and the sampled cooperating exporting producers in Turkey, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

• (330) After final disclosure, Severstal contested the adjustments for SG&A and profit made to the sales prices of its related traders in the Union by analogy to Article 2(9), for the same reasons as mentioned in recital (220).

• (331) As noted in recital (221), the Court of Justice has confirmed the legality of using Article 2(9) by analogy to establish the export price for the purpose of calculating undercutting and underselling ⁵⁰. Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

• (332) The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other companies’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see recitals (138) and (182)).

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (333) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation:

Country	Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)	Definitive anti-dumping duty
Russia	PJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works	36,6  %	37,4  %	36,6  %
Russia	Novolipetsk Steel	12,7  %	10,3  %	10,3  %
Russia	PAO Severstal	39,8  %	31,3  %	31,3  %
Russia	All other companies	39,8  %	37,4  %	37,4  %
Turkey	MMK Turkey	10,5  %	13,8  %	10,5  %
Turkey	Tatmetal	2,4  %	10,1  %	2,4  %
Turkey	Tezcan	11,0  %	13,7  %	11,0  %
Turkey	Other cooperating companies	8,0  %	12,5  %	8,0  %
Turkey	All other companies	11,0  %	13,8  %	11,0  %

7. UNION INTEREST

• (334) The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (335) The Union industry is composed of 20 producers in 14 Member States and employs 9 237 people. The majority of Union producers supported the complaint. No producer opposed the initiation of the investigation.

• (336) As concluded in Sections 4.5.4 and 5.3, the situation of the whole Union industry deteriorated as a result of dumped imports from Russia and Turkey.

• (337) Anti-dumping measures against imports from Russia and Turkey are expected to restore fair trade conditions on the Union market and enable the Union industry to reach sustainable profit levels for such a capital-intensive industry. As a result, Union producers are expected to recover from the injurious situation, further invest and fulfil their commitments, including social and environmental ones.

• (338) The non-imposition of measures would entail heavy losses within the Union industry, endanger its viability and possibly trigger the closure of production facilities and dismissals. The absence of measures might lead to dependency on supplies from third countries.

• (339) The exporting producer Tezcan stated that steel imports are already controlled via steel safeguard measures and will also be controlled by the CBAM ⁵¹ monitoring starting in 2023. Other parties, including GOT, echoed the protective measures Union producers benefit from already. All these claims are dismissed: the current anti-dumping investigation addresses a distinct issue not yet covered by any existing measure.

• (340) The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of measures was in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

• (341) No importers cooperated with the investigation.

• (342) The Turkish association CIB pointed at shortages of supply that could negatively affect importers in the Union. The Commission found the claim unjustified because, apart from the abundant Union production, importers and supply chains can avail themselves from imports from numerous countries. In addition, the imposition of anti-dumping measures does not mean that imports from the countries concerned are banned. The level of the measures should not prevent Turkish and Russian steelmakers from selling their CRS in the Union and to the Union importers at fair prices. The claim was dismissed.

• (343) CIB also submitted that measures would negatively affect importers in the Union because importers were still struggling to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. It did not present any evidence to support the claim and therefore it was dismissed. The lack of cooperation of importers did not allow the Commission to analyse whether importers were performing badly or unable to pass on price increases, if any.

7.3.   Interest of users

• (344) No users cooperated with the investigation.

• (345) The European Association of Automobile Manufacturers made a submission requesting car manufacturers in the Union to be exempted from any measures that would negatively affect their competitiveness. The Commission found that the product covered by this investigation is virtually not used by the car industry and therefore any impact that measures would have in that sector could only be immaterial.

• (346) Parties representing the interests of exporting producers pointed at shortages of supply that could negatively affect users in the Union. The parties alleged that Union producers were struggling with the restart of their operations and unable to supply a growing demand from customers, particularly as regards thin materials, narrow materials, galvalume materials and coils lighter than 10 tonnes, which Union producers would traditionally be unwilling to supply. The claim was unsubstantiated and dismissed on the grounds explained in recital (342) above.

• (347) The Turkish association CIB called for no measures on the grounds that in the 2007 investigation on synthetic staple fibres of polyesters ⁵² the Commission found measures not to be in the Union interest, inter alia, because of the low profits of users and their difficulties to pass on price increases and supply problems. The claim was dismissed. The part of the claim relating to supply problems is dismissed on the grounds explained in recital (342) above.

• (348) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that using alternative sources of supply, which as mentioned in that recital are widely available, would entail increased CRS purchase prices for users. The Commission recalled that the objective of anti-dumping measures is to eliminate unfairly priced imports from the Union market in order to re-establish a level playing field for all market participants. The same parties also questioned the availability of the alternative sources mentioned in recital (342) on the account of US importers being the highest bidders at a global level. The Commission noted that in the investigation period imports from countries other than the countries concerned had a market share of 9,9 %, in spite of the unfair competition in the Union market from the countries concerned which had a market share of 12,9 %. On that basis, the claim was rejected.

• (349) As mentioned, users did not reply to the users’ questionnaire and therefore, no information regarding profitability of users could be collected from them. In Annex U-1 to the complaint, the complainants provided a calculation demonstrating that, for a construction application, CRS represented a negligible part of the cost of the final product. According to Eurofer, the same would be true for other downstream segments ⁵³.

• (350) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that this information was inadequate but they failed to provide a meaningful alternative cost impact assessment for users. It also submitted, as did GOR, that after the investigation period prices of CRS would have surged and that these most recent increase in prices would ‘necessarily’ heavily impact users.

• (351) The Commission recalled that in the Union interest analysis, the relevant impact assessment for the users should be the assessment of the impact, if any, of the anti-dumping duty on them – not the impact of price hikes, if any, for other reasons. Users did not cooperate with the investigation and therefore the Commission was not in a position to analyse the impact of developments after the investigation period on the situation of users. On that basis, the claim was rejected.

7.4.   Other factors

• (352) Some parties stated that Union steelmakers were consistently trying to keep their oligopoly in the Union market and remove international competition. They noted that Union producers served already a significant share of the free market, while such a percentage did not include captive volumes, and feared a monopoly.

• (353) The Commission found the oligopoly claim unjustified, since, as stated in recital (335), there are 20 known producers belonging to more than 10 different groups and significant imports from third countries. In the absence of evidence of uncompetitive practices, the market share the Union industry currently holds is irrelevant to support these claims of oligopoly, let alone a monopoly. The Commission refers to its recent Staff Working Document ⁵⁴, where it noted that ‘[i]n the recent consolidation wave, merger control enforcement contributed to keeping vibrant competition in the European steel markets to the benefit of the many downstream industries that use steel, rely on affordable materials to compete globally and employ millions of Europeans. By prohibiting anti-competitive mergers (e.g. Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp) or approving mergers subject to conditions, such as structural divestitures (e.g. ArcelorMittal/Ilva), merger enforcement ensured that European steel customers are not left with less choice, higher prices, or less innovation.’. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (354) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of CRS originating in Russia and Turkey.

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

• (355) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. Anti-dumping duties should be set in accordance with the lesser duty rule.

• (356) The Commission noted that after the initiation of the investigation, due to the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the EU imposed successive packages of sanctions against Russia which also affected steel products and/or the steel companies producing and exporting the product under investigation after the investigation period. The latest package of sanctions covering the product under investigation and/or the exporting producers contains an import ban of CRS. This ban entered into force on 16 March 2022 ⁵⁵. Given that these sanctions are linked to the military aggression and the underlying geopolitical situation, their scope, modulation, and/or duration are unpredictable. Furthermore, anti-dumping measures have a lifetime of five years. Considering the abovementioned uncertainties and the fact that the Council may further amend the precise scope and duration of sanctions at any moment, the Commission found that they cannot have a bearing in its conclusions in this proceeding.

• (357) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty
Russia	PJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works	36,6  %
Russia	Novolipetsk Steel	10,3  %
Russia	PAO Severstal	31,3  %
Russia	All other companies	37,4  %
Turkey	MMK Metalurji Sanayi Ticaret ve Liman İşletmeciliği A.Ş.	10,5  %
Turkey	TatMetal Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş	2,4  %
Turkey	Tezcan Galvanizli Yapi Elemanlari Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	11,0  %
Turkey	Other cooperating companies	8,0  %
Turkey	All other companies	11,0  %

• (358) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

• (359) A company, among these specifically mentioned in this Regulation, may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission ⁵⁶. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (360) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

• (361) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

• (362) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (363) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

9. FINAL PROVISIONS

• (364) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁵⁷, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (365) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 ⁵⁸, the Commission imposed a safeguard measure with respect to certain steel products for a period of three years. By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 ⁵⁹, the safeguard measure was prolonged until 30 June 2024. The product concerned is one of the product categories covered by the safeguard measure. Consequently, once the tariff quotas established under the safeguard measure are exceeded, both the above-quota tariff duty and the anti-dumping duty would become payable on the same imports. As such cumulation of anti-dumping measures with safeguard measures may lead to an effect on trade greater than desirable, the Commission decided to prevent the concurrent application of the anti-dumping duty with the above-quota tariff duty for the product concerned for the duration of the imposition of the safeguard duty.

• (366) This means that where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and exceeds the level of the anti-dumping duties pursuant to this Regulation, only the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected. During the period of concurrent application of the safeguard and anti-dumping duties, the collection of the duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation shall be suspended. Where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and is set at a level lower than the level of the anti-dumping duties in this Regulation, the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected in addition to the difference between that duty and the higher anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation. The part of the amount of anti-dumping duties not collected shall be suspended.

• (367) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The following products are excluded:

• (i) of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel;

• (ii) not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).

Country	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty	TARIC additional code
Russia	PJSC Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works	36,6  %	C217
Russia	Novolipetsk Steel	10,3  %	C216
Russia	PAO Severstal	31,3  %	C218
Russia	All other companies	37,4  %	C999
Turkey	MMK Metalurji Sanayi Ticaret ve Liman İşletmeciliği A.Ş.	10,5  %	C865
Turkey	TatMetal Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş	2,4  %	C866
Turkey	Tezcan Galvanizli Yapi Elemanlari Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.	11,0  %	C867
Turkey	Other cooperating companies listed in Annex	8,0  %
Turkey	All other companies	11,0  %	C999

Article 2

Article 3

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from Turkey and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

• (a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in Turkey during the period of investigation (1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020);

• (b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and

• (c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 August 2022.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN