Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1426 of 5 August 2022 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards uniform procedures and technical specifications for the type-approval of the automated driving system (ADS) of fully automated vehicles (Text with EEA relevance)

• 3.4.5.5.Accuracy requirement

• 3.4.5.5.1.The requirement for the correlation threshold is defined during the M&S analysis. The validation shall show that the KPIs identified in 3.4.5.3.1. of the present part are met.

• 3.4.5.6.Validation scope (the part of the toolchain to be validated)

• 3.4.5.6.1.A toolchain consists of multiple tools, and each tool will use a number of models. The validation scope includes all tools and the relevant models subject to validation.

• 3.4.5.7.Internal validation results

• 3.4.5.7.1.The documentation shall not only provide evidence of the simulation model validation but shall also be used to obtain sufficient information on the processes and products that provide overall credibility of the toolchain used.

• 3.4.5.7.2.Documentation/results may be carried over from previous credibility assessments.

• 3.4.5.8.Independent validation results

• 3.4.5.8.1.The type-approval authority shall assess the documentation provided by the manufacturer and may carry out physical tests of the complete integrated tool

• 3.4.5.9.Uncertainty characterisation

• 3.4.5.9.1.This section is concerned with characterising the expected variability of the virtual toolchain results. The assessment shall be consist of two phases. In a first phase the information collected in the M&S analysis and description and the data/input pedigree sections are used to characterise the uncertainty in the input data, in the model parameters and in the modelling structure. Then, by propagating all the uncertainties through the virtual toolchain, the uncertainty in the model results is quantified. Depending on the uncertainty in the model results, proper safety margins will need to be introduced by the manufacturer in the use of virtual testing for ADS validation.

• 3.4.5.9.2.Characterisation of the uncertainty in the input data

• The manufacturer shall demonstrate to have appropriately estimated the critical model’s inputs by means of robust techniques such as multiple repetitions for the assessment of the quantity;

• 3.4.5.9.3.Characterisation of the uncertainty in the model parameters (following calibration)

• The manufacturer shall demonstrate that the critical model’s parameters that cannot be estimated identically are characterised by means of a distribution and/or confidence intervals;

• 3.4.5.9.4.Characterisation of the uncertainty in the M&S structure

• The manufacturer shall provide evidence that the modelling assumptions are given a quantitative characterisation of the generated uncertainty (e.g. comparing the output of different modelling approaches whenever possible).

• 3.4.5.9.5.Characterisation of aleatory vs. epistemic uncertainty:

• The manufacturer shall aim to distinguish between the aleatory component of the uncertainty (which can only be estimated but not reduced) and the epistemic uncertainty deriving from the lack of knowledge in the virtualisation of the process (that can instead be reduced).

4. Documentation structure

• 4.1.This section sets out how the above information will be collected and organised in the documentation provided by the manufacturer to the relevant authority.

• 4.2.The manufacturer shall produce a document (a ‘simulation handbook’) structured in line with the present outline to provide evidence for the topics presented.

• 4.3.The documentation shall be delivered together with the corresponding release of the M&S and related produced data.

• 4.4.The manufacturer shall provide clear references that allow the documentation to be traced back to the corresponding M&S/data;

• 4.5.The documentation shall be maintained throughout the whole lifecycle of the M&S utilization. The type-approval authority may audit the manufacturer by assessing their documentation and/or by conducting physical tests.

PART 5

IN-SERVICE REPORTING

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this annex,

• 1.1.‘Occurrence’ refers to safety-related situation involving a vehicle equipped with an automated driving system.

• 1.2.‘Non-critical Occurrence’ means an occurrence involving an operational interruption, defect, fault or other circumstance that has or may have influenced ADS safety and that has not resulted in an accident or serious incident. This category includes for example minor incidents, safety degradation not preventing normal operation, emergency/complex manoeuvres to prevent a collision, and more generally all occurrences relevant to the safety performance of the ADS on-road (like interaction with remote operator, etc.).

• 1.3.‘Critical Occurrence’ means each occurrence in which the ADS is engaged at the time of a collision event and because of which:

• (a) at least one person suffers an injury that requires medical assistance as a result of being in the vehicle or being involved in the event;

• (b) the fully automated vehicle, other vehicles or stationary objects sustain a physical damage that exceeds a certain threshold or any vehicle involved in the event experiences an airbag deployment.

2. Notifications and reporting by the manufacturer

• 2.1.The manufacturer shall notify without delay any safety critical occurrences to the type-approval authorities, market surveillance authorities and the Commission.

• 2.2.The manufacturer shall report within one month any short-term occurrences, as described in Appendix 1, which needs to be remedied by the manufacturer to the type-approval authorities, market surveillance authorities and the Commission.

• 2.3.The manufacturer shall report every year to the type-approval authority that granted the approval on the occurrences listed in Appendix 1. The report shall provide evidence of the ADS performance on safety relevant occurrences in the field. In particular, it shall demonstrate that:

• (a) no inconsistencies are detected compared to the ADS safety performance assessed prior to market introduction;

• (b) the ADS respects the performance requirements set by this Regulation;

• (c) any newly discovered significant ADS safety performance issues have been adequately addressed and how.

• The granting type-approval authority shall share this information with type-approval authorities, market surveillance authorities and the Commission.

• 2.4.Type-approval authorities, market surveillance authorities and the Commission may request the manufacturer supporting data used to elaborate the information provided into the in-service reporting and notifications. These data shall be exchanged by means of an agreed data exchange file. Type-approval authorities, market surveillance authorities, and the Commission shall take all necessary steps to secure such data.

• 2.5.Any pre-processing of data should be notified to the granting type-approval authority in the in-service Data Report.

Appendix 1

List of occurrences for in-service reporting

The occurrences have been subdivided into four categories, based on their relevance to the DDT, to the interaction with fully automated vehicle users, and to ADS technical conditions. For each occurrence, its relevance to the short-term and/or periodic reporting has been flagged in the table below.

Periodic reporting of occurrences is expected to be submitted in the form of aggregated data (per hour of operation or driven km) for ADS-vehicle type and related to ADS operation (i.e. when ADS is activated).

OCCURRENCE	SHORT-TERM REPORTING (1 month	PERIODIC REPORTING (1 year)
1. Occurrences related to the ADS performance of the DDT, such as	1. Occurrences related to the ADS performance of the DDT, such as	1. Occurrences related to the ADS performance of the DDT, such as
1.a.  Safety critical occurrences known to the manufacturer	X	X
1.b.  Occurrences related to ADS operation outside its ODD	X	X
1.c.  Occurrences related to ADS failure to achieve a minimal risk condition when necessary	X	X
1.d.  Communication-related occurrences (where connectivity is relevant to the ADS safety concept)		X
1.e.  Cybersecurity-related occurrences		X
1.f.  Interaction with remote operator (if applicable) related to major ADS or vehicle failures		X
2. Occurrences related to ADS interaction with fully automated vehicle users, such as:	2. Occurrences related to ADS interaction with fully automated vehicle users, such as:	2. Occurrences related to ADS interaction with fully automated vehicle users, such as:
2.a.  User-related occurrences (e.g. user errors, misuse, misuse prevention)		X
3. Occurrences related to ADS technical conditions, including maintenance and repair:	3. Occurrences related to ADS technical conditions, including maintenance and repair:	3. Occurrences related to ADS technical conditions, including maintenance and repair:
3.a.  Occurrences related ADS failure resulting in a request to intervene to the operator or the remote intervention operator		X
3.b.  Maintenance and repair problems		X
3.c.  Occurrences related to unauthorised modifications (i.e. tampering)		X
4. Occurrences related to the identification of new safety-relevant scenarios	X (if modifications made by manufacturer to address a newly identified and significant ADS safety issue involving an unreasonable risk, including description of any previously unanticipated scenarios.)	X

ANNEX IV

EU Type-Approval Certificate (Vehicle System)

Communication concerning granting/extension/refusal/withdrawal (¹⁴) of type-approval of a type of fully automated vehicle with regard to its automated driving system (ADS) in accordance with the requirements laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1426, as last amended by Implementing Regulation (EU) …/…

Number of the EU type-approval certificate:

Reason for extension/refusal/withdrawal (14) :

SECTION I

• 0.1.Make (trade name of manufacturer):

• 0.2.Type:

• 0.2.1.Commercial name(s) (if available):

• 0.3.Means of identification of type, if marked on the vehicle:

• 0.3.1.Location of that marking:

• 0.4.Category of vehicle:

• 0.5.Name and address of manufacturer:

• 0.8.Name(s) and address(es) of assembly plant(s):

• 0.9.Name and address of the manufacturer’s representative (if any):

SECTION II

• 1.Additional information (where applicable): see Addendum.

• 2.Technical service responsible for carrying out the tests:

• 3.Date of test report:

• 4.Number of test report:

• 5.Remarks (if any): see Addendum.

• 6.Place:

• 7.Date:

• 8.Signature:

Addendum

to EU type-approval certificate number

• 1.Description and/or drawing of the ADS including:

• 1.1.ODD, system boundaries and specified maximum speed of the ADS declared by the manufacturer:

• 1.2.Description of the main functions of the ADS

• 1.2.1.Vehicle-internal functions

• 1.2.2.Vehicle-external functions (e.g. backend, off-board infrastructure needed, operational measures needed)

• 1.3.Sensing system (incl. components):

• 1.4.Installation of the ADS sensing system:

• 1.5.Software identification of the ADS:

• 2.Written description and/or drawing of the ADS human supervision

• 2.1.Remote operator and remote intervention on the ADS

• 2.2.Means to activate, deactivate of the ADS

• 2.3.Monitoring in the inside of the vehicle

• 2.4.Any system limitations due to environmental or road conditions

• 3.Written description and/or drawing of the information given to vehicle occupants and other road users

• 3.1.System status:

• 3.2.Request to the on-board operator/remote intervention operator:

• 3.3.Minimal risk manoeuvre:

• 3.4.Emergency manoeuvre:

• 4.ADS data elements

• 4.1.ADS data elements verified after the tests performed in accordance with Annex III Part 3:

• 4.2.Documentation concerning data retrievability, data integrity self-check and protection against manipulation of stored data verified: yes/no

• 5.Cyber security and software updates

• 5.1.Cyber security type-approval number:

• 5.2.Software update type-approval number:

• 6.Assessment on functional and operational safety aspects of the automated driving system

• 6.1.Manufacturers document reference for the assessment (including version number):

• 6.2.Information document

• 7.Technical service responsible for conducting approval tests

• 7.1.Date of the test report issued by that service

• 7.2.(Reference) Number of the report issued by that service

• 8.Annexes

• Addendum 1: Information document for automated driving systems (refer to Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1426.

• Addendum 2: Member States and specific areas where the manufacturer has declared that the ADS had been assessed to comply with local traffic rules. List of documents in the approval file deposited at the administration services having delivered the approval and which can be obtained upon request.

• Addendum 3: ADS Assessment report/test results by the granting type-approval authority.

• Addendum 4: Certificate of Compliance for SMS

ANNEX V

Technical specifications for AVP as referred to in Article 3(2)

PART 1:   DEFINITIONS

1. Definitions

For the purposes of this Annex, the following definitions apply:

• 1.1.‘AVP trip’ means the verification of all safety-related conditions in the AVP feature for AVP activation, the subsequent execution of the DDT and the AVP deactivation.

• 1.2.‘Transition location’ means a designated area located within the ODD, which is appropriate to activate or deactivate the AVP feature.

• 1.3.‘Smallest relevant object’ means the smallest vulnerable road user that the AVP feature is able to detect and react to while carrying out the DDT.

• 1.4.‘Safety distance’ means the distance of an object to which the AVP feature shall react by an appropriate way, whereby the reaction to front, side or rear objects may vary based on their distance.

• 1.5.‘Permanent object’ means an unmoveable object within the ODD.

• 1.6.‘Static object’ means a moveable object within the ODD, which does not move in the relevant period.

• 1.7.‘Dynamic object’ means an object within the ODD which is moving in longitudinal and transverse traffic and which may in particular be a vulnerable road user or another manually driven or fully automated vehicle.

PART 2:   PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

2. General requirements

• 2.1.The AVP feature shall be capable of performing the DDT as specified for and within the limits of its restricted ODD.

• 2.2.The AVP feature shall be designed to avoid any negative effect on safety and traffic flow of the ODD during operation.

• 2.3.The maximum speed of the vehicle with the AVP feature being active shall not be higher than 30 km/h and it shall be specified by the manufacturer based on the ODD particularities (including available speed limits and narrowness of the parking area).

• 2.6.The manufacturer remains the sole responsible for the compliance with the requirements of this Annex irrespective of any third parties involved in the in-use deployment or operation of the AVP feature.

• 2.7.Where the AVP feature relies on the vehicle-external information, availability, compatibility and security of such information shall be ensured during the AVP feature operation.

• 2.8.If the vehicle is equipped with other ADS features, safe interaction between the AVP feature and other ADS features shall be ensured.

• 2.9.In case vehicle occupants are allowed whilst the AVP feature is active, in accordance with the ODD description of the AVP feature, appropriate measures shall be taken against foreseeable misuse by the vehicle occupants.

• 2.10.In case vehicle occupants are not allowed whilst the AVP feature is active, in accordance with the ODD description of the AVP feature, the AVP feature shall be designed to ensure that the AVP feature can only operate when no person or animal is located inside the vehicle.

• 2.11.The steering equipment of the dual mode vehicle equipped with an AVP feature shall comply with UN Regulation No 79 (¹⁵) 04 or later series of amendments.

• The braking system of the dual mode vehicle equipped with an AVP feature shall comply with UN Regulation No 13 (¹⁶), 13 or later series of amendments, or UN Regulation No 13H (¹⁷), 01 or later series of amendments, as applicable.

3. Requirements for AVP feature activation and deactivation

• 3.1.AVP feature activation and deactivation under nominal scenarios shall be possible only in transition locations or parking spaces.

• 3.2.All conditions for AVP feature activation and deactivation shall be verified against the conditions of the defined ODD (including, where relevant, presence or absence of vehicle occupants, parking space or transition location appropriate for entering or exiting the vehicle).

• 3.3.AVP feature deactivation

• 3.3.1.After the AVP feature has successfully completed the AVP trip by either reaching a transition location or a parking space within the ODD, the AVP feature shall automatically bring the vehicle to a halt, keep it stationary and deactivate the AVP feature.

• 3.3.2.The AVP feature shall remain active until the system or user initiated deactivation process has been completed or the vehicle reaches a MRC.

• 3.3.3.If applicable upon AVP feature deactivation, the vehicle controls, indicators, warnings, and tell-tales shall be automatically set to an appropriate state for manual driving and lateral and longitudinal control shall be returned to the driver without any continuous control assistance active.

4. DDT under nominal scenarios

• 4.1.Trajectory planning and velocity

• 4.1.1.Particularities of the ODD (including, where relevant, tight curve radii, ramps, and merging) shall be managed by suitably planning and selecting the trajectory.

• 4.1.2.The AVP feature shall minimise environmental impact by planning an effective and efficient trajectory to reach transition locations.

• 4.1.3.The AVP feature shall always maintain a safe distance to other road users or objects based on the smallest relevant object and adapt its speed in an anticipatory manner. The safety distance, the respective maximum speed in accordance with point 6.1., and the smallest relevant object shall be specified by the manufacturer.

5. DDT under critical scenarios (emergency operation)

• 5.1.By way of derogation from Part 1, points 1.4.1, 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, of Annex III, the AVP feature shall avoid all collisions with road users or obstacles cutting in, crossing or being on the trajectory of the vehicle in the direction of driving.

6. DDT at ODD boundaries

• 6.1.Direct transfer to the MRC shall take place in the case of a recognised misuse and when the vehicle sustains recognised damage.

• 6.2.If the vehicle equipped with an AVP feature only appears to leave the ODD (e.g. due to a temporary inaccuracy in the geographical localisation of the vehicle) and is subsequently being confirmed again to be within the ODD boundaries, this is not considered as giving ground to an MRC and an immediate continuation of the AVP trip is possible.

• 6.3.The vehicle may leave the MRC if it is switched to manual driving mode and driven by a driver.

7. Operating manual

The following aspects shall be addressed and implemented in the operating manual:

• 7.1.All roles necessary for the safe operation of the AVP feature shall be defined, including the designation of the relevant responsible persons and the allocation of organisational and technical tasks.

• 7.2.All role assignments shall be documented within the operating manual.

• 7.3.The operating manual shall include strategies in case of unexpected incidents.

• 7.4.The operating manual shall include considerations regarding the changes to the ODD during AVP feature operation. A process shall be established and included to ensure the assessment of the planned changes.

PART 3:   COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT

8. Tests

• 8.1.General provisions

• 8.1.1.Test cases for the verification of the AVP feature shall include all AVP functions.

• 8.1.2.The scenarios described in point 8.2 of this Annex shall be used. The manufacturer shall select relevant scenarios based on the ODD of the AVP feature.

• 8.1.3.Pass- and fail-criteria to assess AVP feature safety shall be set by the approval authority, based on the requirements set out in Annex II, on the scenarios set out in Part 1 of Annex III, and on this Annex.

• 8.2.Test scenarios to assess the performance of the AVP feature

• This list of scenarios set out in points 8.2.1. to 8.2.7. contains basic test cases that shall be selected based on and adapted to the ODD, and used to test the compliance of the AVP feature of the ADS.

• At the request of the approval authority, additional scenarios that are part of the ODD shall be executed.

• The scenarios listed in points 8.2.1. to 8.2.7. include several consecutive individual test steps. Those individual test steps may be carried out sequentially without the AVP trip being cancelled or a new AVP trip request issued for each of the test steps.

• 8.2.1.AVP hand-over and take-over

• 8.2.1.1.Parking manoeuvre (hand-over and parking)

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature is able to carry out an AVP trip from the transition location to the intended parking space.

• Preconditions: vehicle equipped with AVP feature is parked at the transition location.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: Set up an AVP trip request.

Step 2: Carry-out of the AVP trip.

Step 3: Wait until AVP trip is finished.

• 8.2.1.2.Returning to user (take-over)

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature is able to carry out an AVP trip from the parking space to a transition location.

• Precondition: vehicle equipped with AVP feature standing on a parking space.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: Set up an AVP trip request.

Step 2: Carry-out of the AVP trip.

Step 3: Waiting until AVP trip is finished.

• 8.2.2.System override and deactivation

• 8.2.2.1.Deactivation outside the vehicle

• The test shall demonstrate the possibility of system override or deactivation outside the vehicle equipped with the AVP feature.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: Perform override action.

Step 2: Leave MRC.

• 8.2.2.2.Override or deactivation inside the vehicle

• The test shall demonstrate the possibility of system override or deactivation due to interventions to driving equipment or controls by a person inside the vehicle.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: Intervention shall be done with corresponding drive equipment or controls.

Step 2: The DDT shall be continued according to the declared strategy of the manufacturer.

• 8.2.3.Collision avoidance

• 8.2.3.1.Starting the AVP trip

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature is able to detect and react to objects in the vehicle’s close-proximity so that the vehicle is prevented from starting the AVP trip.

• Precondition: The vehicle is located on a transition location or parking space and AVP feature is activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: The smallest relevant object shall be placed around the vehicle.

Step 2: The smallest relevant object shall be removed.

• 8.2.3.2.Smallest relevant object on the trajectory of the vehicle equipped with AVP feature

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature is able to detect and stop before the smallest relevant object along the driving path and continue in case the intended trajectory is free again.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

• a) Step 1 shall be carried out with the smallest relevant object placed (if applicable):
• (i) centrally on the intended trajectory, in a distance of at least one vehicle length away from the parking space;
• (ii) centrally on the intended trajectory, behind a curve;
• (iii) on the upper part (between 0–1 m after the ramp has reached a constant slope) of a downward ramp;
• (iv) on the flat area behind a downward parking ramp (between 0–1 m after the driving area has become flat);
• (v) in the centre of a parking space;
• (vi) on the lower part (between 0–1 m after the ramp has reached a constant slope) of an upward ramp;
• (vii) on the flat area behind an upwards parking ramp (0–1 m after the driving area has become flat);
• (viii) centrally on the intended trajectory, behind a curve, on a ramp.

• Step 1: The smallest relevant object shall be placed on the intended trajectory of the vehicle in all of the following locations. The approval authority may choose to require tests with additional conditions.

• Step 2: The smallest relevant object shall be removed.

• 8.2.3.3.Static or dynamic objects next to the intended trajectory of the vehicle equipped with an AVP feature

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature is able to detect and proportionately react to an object located beside the driving path and correspondingly adapt the speed of the vehicle.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed both for static and dynamic objects, in the following steps:

• First Step for static object: The static object shall be placed at a distance lower than the permitted safety distance to the side of the driving corridor before the vehicle equipped with AVP feature approaches.

• First Step for dynamic object: The dynamic object shall be moved parallel to the vehicle equipped with AVP feature, at a lateral distance lower than the lateral reaction distance while the vehicle is approaching.

• Second Step for both static and dynamic object: In case the AVP feature has stopped the vehicle for the static and/or dynamic object, the object shall be removed.

• 8.2.3.4.Dynamic objects

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature is able to avoid a collision with obstructed and unobstructed dynamic objects.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed for crossing, moving towards the side or moving opposite to the vehicle, in the following steps:

• First Step for crossing: A dynamic object shall cross the driving path of the vehicle equipped with AVP feature from the outside of the driving path in front of the moving vehicle, resulting in a high risk of collision.

• First Step for moving towards the side: A dynamic object shall move from outside the driving path towards the lateral side of the vehicle equipped with AVP feature, resulting in a high risk of collision.

• First Step for moving opposite: A dynamic object shall move towards the vehicle equipped with AVP feature, against the direction of travel.

• Second Step: The dynamic object shall be removed.

• 8.2.4.Compliance with traffic rules

• 8.2.4.1.Exiting a parking space

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature gives way when driving out from the parking space.

• Precondition: the vehicle equipped with AVP feature is parked on transition location or a parking space, while another vehicle is ready to claim the right of way.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: an AVP trip request shall be sent and AVP feature shall be activated.

Step 2: the other vehicle shall be driven so that it passes the vehicle equipped with AVP feature at the time, when it would start driving out from the parking space.

Step 3: the other vehicle shall be driven past and away from the vehicle equipped with AVP feature.

• 8.2.4.2.Yielding and the right of way

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature stops or yields at junctions, intersections or merging areas, respects the right of way rules and considers other vehicles approaching these areas.

• Precondition: the vehicle is driving with AVP feature activated and approaching a junction, crossing or merging area; another vehicle is ready to claim for the right of way.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: The other vehicle shall reach the junction, crossing or merging area approximately at the same time as the vehicle equipped with AVP feature.

Step 2: The other vehicle shall continue driving through the junction, crossing or merging area.

• 8.2.5.AVP feature activation

• 8.2.5.1.External infrastructure information supply not appropriate for the AVP feature

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature will not be activated in case of inappropriate external infrastructure information supply.

• Precondition: vehicle equipped with AVP feature parked at the transition location which has inappropriate external infrastructure information supply.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following step:

Step 1: an AVP trip request shall be attempted.

• 8.2.6.Perception system

• 8.2.6.1.Sensor occlusion

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature reacts safely to occlusion in the field of view.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: sensor(s) overseeing the part of the vehicle‘s actual driving path shall be covered.

Step 2: Sensor occlusion shall be removed.

• 8.2.6.2.Special objects

• The test shall demonstrate that the limitations of the sensors used for OEDR in the AVP feature are appropriately compensated for to ensure the safe execution of the DDT.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: Objects relevant for testing the limitations of the AVP sensors (e.g. with a highly homogeneous surface, weak contrast to background, reflectivity, etc.) shall be placed randomly in the driving trajectory of the vehicle.

Step 2: In case the vehicle has stopped, the relevant object shall be removed.

• 8.2.7.Failure scenarios

• 8.2.7.1.Critical failure of wireless connection between AVP feature and external infrastructure

• The test shall demonstrate that a failure of the wireless connection is managed safely.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following steps:

Step 1: Wireless signal shall be interrupted.

Step 2: If necessary, wait until the AVP feature interprets the interruption of the radio connection as a permanent loss of the wireless link.

• 8.2.7.2.Failure of a perception sensor

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature detects failures of sensors required for OEDR (sensors in the vehicle and/or in the external infrastructure) and reacts appropriately.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following step:

Step 1: The data connection of a sensor that is relevant for OEDR in the vehicle‘s actual driving trajectory shall be interrupted.

• 8.2.7.3.Failure within the external infrastructure

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature detects errors in the external infrastructure and reacts appropriately.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following step:

Step 1: A critical fault in the external infrastructure shall be artificially induced.

• 8.2.7.4.Failure within the vehicle

• The test shall demonstrate that the AVP feature detects failures within the vehicle and reacts appropriately.

• Precondition: vehicle driving with AVP feature activated.

• The scenario shall be executed in the following step:

Step 1: Artificial manipulation disabling or creating the failure of an AVP feature relevant vehicle system shall be induced.