Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(213) All macroeconomic indicators showed a negative trend over the period considered such as production, capacity utilization, sales volume on the Union market (both the captive and the free market), market share, employment and productivity. Similarly, most microeconomic indicators showed a negative trend over the period considered such as sales prices on the Union free market, cost of production, profitability, closing stocks, cash flow and return on investments. Only investments showed a positive trend.

(214) Even though the Union industry managed to increase prices in the review investigation period, the Union industry still had a negative profit margin of –3,1 % in the review investigation period. The cash flow and return on investments also deteriorated, which makes it more difficult for the Union industry to raise capital and grow.

(215) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that until 2018 the Union industry had recovered from past material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation caused by dumped imports from China and Russia. However, during the period considered, the injury picture deteriorated and the Union industry was back in an economically fragile and injurious situation during the review investigation period.

(216) Following disclosure, the Russian government disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion regarding the Union industry’s situation during the review investigation period. According to the Russian government, the situation improved during the review investigation period compared with the previous year, except for the unit cost of production.

(217) However, while it is correct that some of the injury indicators improved somewhat between 2020 and the review investigation period, as also pointed out in the analysis above (for example in recital 193 or 211), the indicators showed a deterioration during the period considered. The improvement noted in the review investigation period was however not sufficient to lift the Union industry from the economically fragile situation which it faced since 2018. The Commission therefore rejected this claim.

(218) Due to the negligible levels of imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered, the Commission concluded that imports from China and Russia could not have caused the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(219) Therefore, the Commission further examined the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from China and Russia if the measures were repealed.

(220) The Commission concluded in recital 215 that the Union industry was in an economically fragile situation during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded in recital 218 that the injury to the Union industry observed during the review investigation period could not have been caused by dumped imports from China and Russia due to their very limited volume. Therefore the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by the dumped imports from China and Russia if the measures were allowed to lapse.

(221) In this regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the countries concerned, the relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union and the impact of potential imports and price levels of such imports from these countries on the Union industry’s situation should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(222) As already described in sections 3.1.11.2 and 3.2.3.2, the exporting producers in China and Russia have significant spare capacities, which together exceed substantially the current production volumes and internal demand in those countries. These spare capacities could be used to produce the product under review for export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse. The quantities that could be exported by Chinese and Russian exporting producers are significant compared to the size of the Union market. Indeed, the spare capacities represent more than twice the total Union consumption on the free market during the review investigation period.

(223) As described in sections 3.1.11.1 and 3.2.3.1, the Chinese and Russian exporting producers exported to their main third markets at prices significantly below the normal value as established, which, in addition, were lower than the average (target) sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market during the review investigation period. Therefore, taking into account the price level of exports from China and Russia to other third markets, exporting to the Union is potentially much more attractive for exporters from those countries. Consequently, it can be reasonably expected that, should the measures be repealed, Russian and Chinese exporting producers would again start to export high volumes of the product under review to the Union. This expectation is further reinforced by the availability of substantial spare capacity in China and Russia. As noted in recital 167, although there is currently an Union import ban on certain steel products exported from Russia including CRF (73), it is likely that this will be a temporary measure and there is no way to foresee its duration in relation to the duration of the extension of the current measures. It therefore does not affect the conclusions about the attractiveness of the Union market.

(224) The three Russian exporting producers claimed that the applicant in its request, overestimated the attractiveness of the Union market with respect to Russia. According to the Russian companies, if they were to increase their exports to third countries, such exports would rather be destined for Russia’s preferential trading partners than for the Union. However, as also pointed out by the applicant, there is no reason why the Russian spare capacity should be used for increasing exports to Russia’s preferential trading partners. Indeed, such exports benefit already currently from a 0 % duty, so they could have already now have exported duty-free. By contrast, exports to the Union are currently subject to duties and a comparison of Russian and Chinese prices to third countries plus the Union anti-dumping duty would not result in undercutting the target price while a removal of the anti-dumping duty would. Hence, it is not convincing to argue that exports to such trading partners would increase as they had not identified any change that could occur between now and the foreseeable future that would increase exports from Russia to such countries. The Commission therefore rejected the Russian exporters’ claim.

(225) Following disclosure, the three Russian exporting producers and the Russian government claimed that there would be no likelihood of recurrence of injurious dumping from Russia. In the view of those parties, ‘EU law and practice prove that EU sanctions are a long-term policy instrument’, while ‘EU anti-dumping measures do not have a pre-established lifetime’ (74). The Russian exporting producers claimed that there is no indication that the sanctions against Russia would be relaxed or lifted. However, even if the sanctions were to be lifted, the EU market is not attractive for Russian exporters ‘due to high risks of introduction of severe trade restrictions’.

(226) As also set out in recitals 165 and 166, no evidence was provided to show why the Union market would be less attractive to Russian exporters under a scenario without sanctions. In addition, recitals 172, 223 and 248 in this regulation explain why the Commission found that the sanctions cannot have a bearing on the conclusions in this proceeding. Consequently, these claims were rejected.

(227) In order to establish how the imports from China and Russia would affect the Union industry should the measures be terminated, the Commission performed a prospective and comparative price analysis without the existence of anti-dumping measures.

(228) Due to the lack of cooperation from the exporting producers in the countries concerned in combination with the very low quantities imported in the Union from these countries, no reliable import prices could be established during the review investigation period. It was therefore not possible to perform a meaningful calculation of price undercutting on this basis. Under these circumstances, in order to estimate the likely price at which Chinese and Russian producers would sell when exporting to the Union market, the Commission made a price comparison between the sample Union producers average price (ex-works) to the corresponding weighted average price of the product under review when exported to third countries (75) from China and Russia.

(229) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed a price difference of almost 13 % for Russia. Therefore, the Commission found that Russian prices would undercut Union prices at a similar level in the Union market, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(230) The same comparison for China found that export prices from China to third countries were not lower than Union prices. However, further analysis showed that these prices were still below the Union’s target price. Using the same target profit as in the original investigation (9,9 %) (76) imports from China at the level of Chinese export prices to third countries were found to be 10 % lower than the Union’s target price. It would thus be likely that imports from China would cause injury if the measures were not maintained.

(231) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China and Russia at injurious prices, which would likely lead to a recurrence of material injury.

(232) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would clearly be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, and users.

(233) The Union industry is located in 14 Member States (Germany, Slovak Republic, Italy, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Hungary and Spain). It employs over 9 000 employees in relation to the product under review.

(234) Although the anti-dumping measures in force prevented dumped imports from the Russia and China to enter the Union market to a large extent, the Union industry was in an economically fragile situation during the review investigation period, as confirmed by the negative trends of the injury indicators.

(235) On the basis of the above, the Commission established that there is a strong likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by imports from the countries concerned should the measures expire. The influx of substantial volumes of dumped imports from Russia and China would worsen the already very fragile economic situation of Union industry and threaten its viability.

(236) The Commission thus concluded that maintaining the anti-dumping measures against Russia and China is in the interest of the Union industry.

(237) The Commission contacted all known users and unrelated importers. No users or unrelated importers came forward and cooperated in this investigation by submitting a questionnaire reply.

(238) One unrelated importer, Duferco S.A, and one user, ATS S.A., provided a submission on initiation. According to Duferco S.A, steel prices have significantly increased, creating shortages in the supply chain. The Russian government also pointed to Union users and consumers suffering from a sharp increase of CRF prices. ATS S.A. and the three Russian exporting producers refer to a price hike in the first half of 2021, which they claimed had harmed users and consumers of CRF. In addition, the parties claimed that the existing safeguard measures on imports of steel products constitute a standalone instrument of trade protection which contributes to price growth and a demand-supply imbalance (77).

(239) In this respect, safeguard measures have a different rationale and objective than that of anti-dumping measures. As explained in recital 132 above, the safeguard measures are not sufficient to protect the Union market against imports in significant quantities at dumped prices. In addition, the data supplied by Duferco S.A in support of their statement dates back to April and July 2021, covering trends observed during the review investigation period. As the analysis in section 4.4.2 showed, the Union industry’s capacity utilisation was only at 68 % during the same period, while their sales prices were at a relatively low level. This indicated that there was ample room for increased production at competitive prices.

(240) No evidence was provided by ATS S.A. or the Russian exporting producers to substantiate the statements made in their submissions. As shown in the analysis in section 4.4.3, the data for the review investigation period, which includes the first half of the year 2021, did not corroborate the statements by ATS S.A. In fact, Union industry prices were not at an abnormally high level. They were below unit cost and even below the export prices of some third countries including China, as well as the Union industry’s target price.

(241) Since none of the interested parties mentioned in recital 238, nor any other user or unrelated importer provided a questionnaire reply or any other information apart from the above-mentioned submissions, the Commission had insufficient information at its disposal to conclude that the continuation of the measures would be detrimental to the interest of the users or importers.

(242) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of the product under review originating in Russia and China.

(243) Three Russian exporting producers and one user (ATS S.A.) claimed that the current measures should be suspended. In addition, even before initiation of the expiry review investigation, an unrelated importer located in the United Kingdom (Stemcor London Limited) had also made a similar claim.

(244) The arguments provided by the different parties referred to the alleged recent high price increase in the Union since the end of 2020, the diminishing imports of CRF from the countries concerned and an alleged imbalance between demand and supply. The evidence and data provided to support these arguments, albeit limited, related almost entirely to a period of time covered by the review investigation period. None of the parties had provided any data related to the period following the review investigation period or future forecast data to support their arguments, except for Union sales prices in the third quarter of 2021 and the mention of a moderate downward trend in at the end of 2021. The three Russian exporting producers claimed that ‘an analytical forecast of future market developments in 2022 -2023 would be uncertain and envisage a large number of alternative, even contradictory scenarios. Even the most complex economic indicators cannot shed light on future developments.’ Thus, at this stage, it is difficult to draw any conclusion on this basis as regards the existence of a temporary change in market conditions.

(245) The Commission recalled in this respect that Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation provides that, in the Union interest, anti-dumping measures may be suspended where market conditions have temporarily changed to an extent that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of such suspension.

(246) With respect to the second element, and as set out in the sections on injury, recurrence of injury and Union interest above (recital 174 and further), the Commission noted that the Union industry was still in a fragile situation during the RIP and that, in any event, there was a strong likelihood that material injury originally caused by dumped imports from China and Russia at injurious prices would recur if the measures expire. In addition, the Commission found no compelling reasons of Union interest against maintaining the measures. Therefore, on the basis of the information available in this investigation, the Commission could not conclude at this stage that that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of a suspension, and that it would be in the Union interest to suspend the measures pursuant to Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim. The Commission reserved its right to further examine the need for suspending measures in accordance with Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation in due course.

(247) In addition, the NLMK Group, the Severstal Group and the MMK Group claimed that because Russian CRF supplies to the Union have been fully halted by sanctions, there was no legal basis to maintain the measures either as an outcome of the ongoing expiry review or during the statutory period of measures application. The exporting producers argued that the fundamental trade flows reorientation brought about by those sanctions was of lasting nature. According to this argument, measures would not serve their purpose of protecting the Union industry and market from unfair trade practices by foreign exporters and, therefore not necessary under Article 11(1) of the basic Regulation.

(248) The Commission noted that after the initiation of the investigation, due to the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the Union imposed successive packages of sanctions against Russia which also affected steel products and/or the steel companies producing and exporting the product under review after the review investigation period. However, contrary to the exporting producers’ assertion, the current situation cannot be considered of a lasting nature. Indeed, as set out in recitals 167 and 172 the Commission found that those sanctions cannot have a bearing in its conclusions in this investigation. In particular, the Commission found that despite of the current sanctions, measures were still necessary within the meaning of Article 11(1) and (2) of the basic Regulation.

(249) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on recurrence of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on CRF from Russia and China should be maintained.

(250) Special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(251) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(252) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(253) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(254) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (78). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(255) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (79) when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(256) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 (80), the Commission imposed a safeguard measure with respect to certain steel products for a period of three years. By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029, the safeguard measure was prolonged until 30 June 2024. The product under review is one of the product categories covered by the safeguard measure. Consequently, once the tariff quotas established under the safeguard measure are exceeded, both the above-quota tariff duty and the anti-dumping duty would become payable on the same imports. As such cumulation of anti-dumping measures with safeguard measures may lead to an effect on trade greater than desirable, the Commission decided to prevent the concurrent application of the anti-dumping duty with the above-quota tariff duty for the product under review for the duration of the imposition of the safeguard duty.

(257) This means that where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product under review and exceeds the level of the anti-dumping duties pursuant to this Regulation, only the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected. During the period of concurrent application of the safeguard and anti-dumping duties, the collection of the duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation shall be suspended. Where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product under review and is set at a level lower than the level of the anti-dumping duties in this Regulation, the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected in addition to the difference between that duty and the higher anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation. The part of the amount of anti-dumping duties not collected shall be suspended.

(258) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The following product types are excluded from the definition of the product concerned:

— flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of all widths, cold-rolled (cold-reduced), not clad, plated or coated, not further worked than cold-rolled, whether or not in coils, of all thickness, electrical,

— flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of all widths, cold-rolled (cold-reduced), not clad, plated or coated, in coils, of a thickness of less than 0,35 mm, annealed (known as ‘black plates’),

— flat-rolled products of other alloy steel, of all widths, of silicon-electrical steel, and

— flat-rolled products of alloy steel, not further worked than cold-rolled (cold-reduced), of high-speed steel.

(a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in the People’s Republic of China during the period between 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015 (original investigation period);

(b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and

(c) it has either actually exported the product under review or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the original investigation period.

Article 2

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 26 October 2022.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 11.

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328 of 29 July 2016 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cold rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation (OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 1).

(4) OJ C 389, 16.11.2020, p. 4.

(5) Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation (OJ C 311, 3.8.2021, p. 6).

(6) OJ C 311, 3.8.2021, p. 8, par. 4.2.

(7) https://www.gtis.com/gta/

(8) https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials

(9) https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2538

(10) Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (2020/C 86/06) (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6).

(11) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181 of 10 February 2016 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation (OJ L 37, 12.2.2016, p. 17), recital 113.

(12) See previous footnote.

(13) https://www.gtis.com/gta/

(14) https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials

(15) https://ec.altares.eu/

(16) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 36, 17.2.2022, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 of 15 December 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain utility scale steel wind towers originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 450, 16.12.2021, p. 59); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 145) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 of 7 April 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 110, 8.4.2020, p. 3).

(17) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 149-150 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 158-159.

(18) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 115-118 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 122-127.

(19) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 119-122 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 128-132: While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1.86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of SSCR producers and the suppliers of their inputs.

(20) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 123-129 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 133-138.

(21) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 130-133 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 139-142.

(22) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143-144.

(23) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 136-145 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 145-154.

(24) Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20. 12. 2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf

(25) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 of 5 April 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 92, 6.4.2017, p. 68); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/688 of 2 May 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain organic coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 116, 3.5.2019, p. 39).

(26) Global Forum on steel excess capacity, Ministerial Report, 20 September 2018.

(27) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/688, recital 86.

(28) See at: https://worldsteel.org/steel-topics/statistics/top-producers/ (accessed on 4 August 2022)

(29) See for example at: www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/china-baowu-steel-group-corporation-limited-05-03-2021 (accessed on 4 August 2022).

(30) Report – Chapter 14, p. 358: 51 % private and 49 % SOEs in terms of production and 44 % SOEs and 56 % private companies in terms of capacity.

(31) Available at:www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm); https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/higher-expectations-for-large-scale-steel-enterprise/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e, and www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (accessed on 4 August 2022).

(32) Available at http://www.jjckb.cn/2019-04/23/c_137999653.htm (accessed on 4 August 2022).

(33) As was the case of the merger between the private company Rizhao and the SOE Shandong Iron and Steel in 2009. See Beijing steel report, p. 58, and the acquired majority stake of China Baowu Steel Group in Magang Steel in June 2019, see https://www.ft.com/content/a7c93fae-85bc-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (accessed on 4 August 2022).

(34) See: https://www.miit.gov.cn/gzcy/yjzj/art/2020/art_af1bef04b9624997956b2bff6cdb7383.html (accessed on 13 January 2022).

(35) See Section IV, Subsection 3 of the Plan, available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (accessed on 13 January 2022).

(36) See the 14th Five-Years Plan on the Steel Industry development, Foreword.

(37) See the group’s website, available at: http://www.baowugroup.com/about/board_of_directors (accessed on 28 March 2022)

(38) See the company’s website, available at: https://www.baosteel.com/about/manager (accessed on 28 March 2022)

(39) See the group’s website, available at: http://www.baowugroup.com/party_building/overview (accessed on 28 March 2022)

(40) Ibidem.

(41) Report, Part III, Chapter 14, p. 346 ff.

(42) Introduction to the Plan for Adjusting and Upgrading the Steel Industry.

(43) Report, Chapter 14, p. 347.

(44) The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), available at: https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202105/P020210527785800103339.pdf(accessed on 4 August 2022).

(45) Report – Chapter 14, p. 349.

(46) Report – Chapter 14, p. 352.

(47) See People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035, Part III, Article VIII, available at:

https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan/ (accessed on 4 August 2022).

(48) Guiding Catalogue for Industry Restructuring (2019 Version), approved by Decree of the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China No 29 of 27 August 2019; available at:

http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-11/06/5449193/files/26c9d25f713f4ed5b8dc51ae40ef37af.pdf (accessed on 27 June 2022).

(49) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635, recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508, recitals 143-144.

(50) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(51) If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

(52) https://www.edp.com.br/distribuicao-es/saiba-mais/informativos/tarifas-aplicadas-a-clientes-atendidos-em-alta-e-media-tensao-(grupo-a), and https://www.edp.com.br/distribuicao-es/saiba-mais/informativos/bandeira-tarifaria

(53) https://ilostat.ilo.org/

(54) https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/ https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer36/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EAR_4MTH_SEX_ECO_CUR_NB_A.

(55) https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer38/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=HOW_TEMP_SEX_ECO_NB_A

(56) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value and, in any event, such import data was negligible.

(57) https://ilostat.ilo.org/

(58) https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/ https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer36/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EAR_4MTH_SEX_ECO_CUR_NB_A

(59) https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer38/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=HOW_TEMP_SEX_ECO_NB_A

(60) https://www.edp.com.br/distribuicao-es/saiba-mais/informativos/tarifas-aplicadas-a-clientes-atendidos-em-alta-e-media-tensao-(grupo-a), and https://www.edp.com.br/distribuicao-es/saiba-mais/informativos/bandeira-tarifaria

(61) www.macmap.org

(62) The 14(6) database provides data on imports of products that are already subject to registration or anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures, from the countries concerned by the proceeding and from other third countries, at the level of 10-digit TARIC codes.

(63) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products (OJ L 225 I, 25.6.2021, p. 1).

(64) https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/latest-developments-in-steelmaking-capacity-2021.pdf

(65) https://worldsteel.org/steel-topics/statistics/world-steel-in-figures-2022/

(66) Initiation of expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, submission on behalf of Duferco S.A., 27.8.2021, section 4.1. China, pages 6-7.

(67) Global Steel Prices, Indexes & Forecasts | MEPS International

(68) Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1) as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428 (OJ L 87 I, 15.3.2022, p. 13). Please refer to https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20220413 for the consolidated version of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, containing all amendments relating to the package of sanctions.

(69) India, Turkey, Ukraine and the Republic of Korea were the only countries with a market share above 3 % during the review investigation period, while only Taiwan and the United Kingdom had over 2 % market share.

(70) This was also confirmed in the original investigation, see recital 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181.

(71) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/181, recital 136.

(72) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328.

(73) See Regulation (EU) 2022/428 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

(74) According to the Russian exporting producers, any anti-dumping measure ‘shall be terminated as the conditions underlying its impositions ceased to exist’ while the Commission uses anti-dumping measures ‘as a long-term trade protection tool’.

(75) This price was established on a CIF basis, as reported in GTA (https://www.gtis.com/gta/), with appropriate adjustments for post-importation costs.

(76) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328, recital 156.

(77) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/978 of 23 June 2022 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products (OJ L 167, 24.6.2022, p. 58).

(78) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(79) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

(80) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27).