Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

• (112) In order to establish an undistorted value of the manufacturing overheads and given the absence of cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission used facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. Therefore, based on the data provided by the applicant in its request, the Commission established the ratio of manufacturing overheads to the total manufacturing and labour costs. This percentage was then applied to the undistorted value of the cost of manufacturing to obtain the undistorted value of manufacturing overheads.

3.1.7.   Calculation of the normal value

• (113) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (114) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the applicant in the review request on the usage of each factor (materials and labour) for the production of the product under review.

• (115) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission added the manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profit as noted in recital 112. Manufacturing overheads were determined based on data provided by the applicant. SG&A and profit were determined based on the financial data of three Brazilian companies (ArcelorMittal Brazil, CSN, and Usiminas) as noted in recital 111. The Commission added the following items to the undistorted costs of manufacturing:

• — Manufacturing overheads, which accounted in total for 10 % of the direct costs of manufacturing starting from the first production process, and 2 %, of the direct costs of manufacturing starting from the second production process;

• — SG&A and other costs, which accounted for 18,5 % of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) of the three Brazilian above-mentioned companies and;

• — Profits, which amounted to 14,7 % of the costs of goods sold as achieved by three Brazilian above-mentioned companies, were applied to the total undistorted costs of manufacturing.

• (116) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. The constructed normal value was either ranging between EUR/tonne 1 200 – 1 400, or between EUR/tonne 1 500 – 1 700, depending on the production process (see recital 102 in this respect) during the review investigation period.

3.1.8.   Export price

• (117) In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers from China, the export price was determined based on 14(6) data ⁶² at CIF level.

3.1.9.   Comparison

• (118) The Commission compared the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price as established above.

• (119) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments based on the information provided by the applicant were made for sea and domestic freight and unloading charges, amounting to EUR/tonne 140,44, on the export price in order to bring it to ex-works price.

3.1.10.   Continuation of dumping

• (120) On this basis, the Commission established that the export price was 29,7 % lower than the normal value for the first production process starting from the raw materials, as explained in recital 102, and 8,83 % for the second production process starting from the semi-finished products.

• (121) However, as the volume of imports in question was very limited, corresponding to less than 0,5 % of total imports into the Union and less than 1 % market share in the Union market, the prices were considered unrepresentative. For this reason, the Commission concluded that these low volumes do not provide a sufficient basis to conclude about the continuation of dumping. Therefore, the Commission investigated the likelihood of recurrence of dumping.

3.1.11.   Likelihood of recurrence of dumping

• (122) For the analysis of the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, the following additional elements were analysed: exports to third countries, the production capacity and spare capacity in China, and the attractiveness of the Union market.

3.1.11.1.   Comparison between export prices to third countries and export prices to the Union

• (123) The Commission analysed the price pattern of Chinese exports to third countries during the RIP. Therefore, it consulted publicly available information such as the Chinese exporting statistics as reported in Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) and extracted the quantities and values of the export of certain cold-rolled flat steel products under the HS codes 7209 15 90, 7209 16 90, 7209 17 90, 7209 18 90, 7209 25 00, 7209 26 00, 7209 27 00, 7209 28 00, 7211 23 00, 7211 29 00, 7225 50 00 and 7226 92 00 for the review investigation period. The export quantities (in tonnes) to all countries (European Union included) amount to 3 253 368 tonnes, of which 31 602 tonnes or about 1 % were exported to the Union.

• (124) The Chinese export statistics provided in GTA reported an average CIF export price from China to other countries amounting to EUR/tonne 629, which was adjusted to an ex-works price (after adjustments for sea and domestic freight, and unloading charges) amounting to EUR/tonne 585. The latter price was even below the export price to the EU in the review investigation period.

• (125) Therefore, it was considered likely that, if the current measures were to be repealed, the Chinese exporting producers would start selling to the Union at levels below the normal value found.

3.1.11.2.   Production capacity and spare capacity in China

• (126) According to the request of the applicant, there are more than 50 exporting producers of the product under review in China. According to Chinese export statistics as reported in GTA, the Chinese exporting producers also exported to the rest of the world.^.

• (127) In the absence of cooperation by the Chinese exporting producers in China, the Commission based its findings with regard to the capacity of the other exporting producers on facts available, and relied on the information contained in the expiry review request as well as other available sources, such as Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 ⁶³, a document of the OECD on the latest developments ⁶⁴ in steelmaking capacities in 2021, published in September 2021 and data of the World Steel Association concerning the year 2021 ⁶⁵.

• (128) First, the information contained in the expiry review request estimated the total Chinese capacity at more than 120 million tonnes, while production and Chinese consumption were both estimated at 100 million tonnes in 2020. On this basis, the spare capacity in China was estimated at 20 million tonnes in 2020, which is indicative for the spare capacity in the review investigation period, and which significantly exceeds the total Union consumption on the free market (about 9,7 million tonnes) in the review investigation period. Second, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 provided that despite ‘the exceptional consumption surge experienced in China’ (see recital 36 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1029), the 2020 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (‘GFSEC’) Ministerial Report, based on data up to 2019, provided that ‘the immediate implication of the demand outlook is that the global capacity-demand gap, an indicator of over-supply risks for the steel market, is going to increase significantly to at least 606 mmt in 2020’. It also noted ‘this reversal in excess capacity can lead to trade disturbances, trigger sharply lower steel prices and hurt the economic sustainability of the steel industry’. Third, this situation was also confirmed in the OECD document, entitled ‘latest development in steelmaking capacities in 2021.’ The document referred not only to ‘a number of new investments related to China’s measures to replace outdated and small steel plants, especially in the eastern and southern coastal areas of China’ but also to the fact that the Chinese government ‘has found instances where some steel mills have expanded their production capacity under the framework of the capacity swap scheme’. Moreover, the OECD document referred to investments of Chinese steel companies in South Asian countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Finally, even if the data of the WorldSteel Association for the year 2021 are for crude steel only, they can be considered indicative for the product concerned as the cold-rolled steel production is basically the second steel production process, after the hot-rolled steel production. In this respect, the 2021 data for the crude steel production showed that China was responsible for 52,9 % of the global world steel production, which is also an indication of the enormous production capacity of the product concerned in the PRC during the year 2021.

• (129) In addition, some main markets such as the USA and India are protected by anti-dumping measures on the product under review, which reduces access of the Chinese exporting producers.

• (130) On this basis, it is likely that Chinese producers will direct their spare capacities to the Union market in large quantities at dumped prices should the measures lapse.

3.1.11.3.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (131) The Union market is among the largest markets of certain cold-rolled flat steel products worldwide.

• (132) The applicant claimed in its request that the Union steel safeguard measures alone, which apply to the product under review, would not be sufficient to protect the Union market against imports in significant quantities at dumped prices. As China did not receive any country-specific quota for the product under review, Chinese exporting producers have access to a large amount of residual quota volumes under which they could direct their exports to the Union market if the anti-dumping measures were to lapse. As a result, if anti-dumping measures were to be repealed, Chinese export volumes are likely to increase significantly within the residual quota and thus flood the Union market before any out-of-quota duty under the safeguard measure would become applicable.

• (133) The importer Duferco S.A. stated ⁶⁶ that the Chinese authorities cancelled the 13 % rebate of value-added tax on steel exports, including on imports of the product under review with a view to curtailing the steel production in China (in order to address its carbon emissions), while ensuring Chinese domestic supply. Duferco S.A. stated that, as a result, prices of Chinese imports are expected to increase, thereby undermining the attractiveness of the Union market. The Commission, however, could not confirm this claim, as the evolution of volumes and prices depends on many other elements as well, like in particular the existing overcapacity and the attractiveness of the Union market in comparison with other third countries.

3.1.11.4.   Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence

• (134) The Union market is very attractive as it is among the largest in the world. Moreover, as laid down in table 7 of recital 202, the weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers on the free market in the Union amounted to EUR/tonne 622 during the review investigation period, which is above the average export price from China adjusted to an ex-works price amounting to EUR/tonne 585 (see recital 124). Thus, it would be likely that, if the current anti-dumping measures expire, Chinese producers would use their spare capacity and, in addition, divert some of their less profitable export sales from third countries to the Union market.

• (135) On the basis of the above considerations, it was concluded that there is a likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures be allowed to lapse.

3.2.   Russia

3.2.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (136) During the review investigation period, imports of the product under review from Russia continued, albeit at significantly lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation (i.e. from 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015). According to Comext (Eurostat) statistics, imports of CRF from Russia accounted for less than 3 000 tonnes in the review investigation period, compared to approximately 700 000 tonnes during the original investigation period. Imports of CRF from Russia accounted for a close to 0 % market share of both the total Union market and the free Union market in the review investigation period, compared to 9,8 % market share during the original investigation period.

• (137) As explained in recital 29, the three Russian exporting producers came forward at initiation and expressed their willingness to cooperate. However, later they informed the Commission that they did not intend to reply to the exporting producers’ questionnaire.

• (138) Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the continuation of dumping as well as to the likelihood of recurrence of dumping were based on facts available.

3.2.2.   Continuation of dumping of imports during the review investigation period

3.2.2.1.   Normal value

• (139) As mentioned in recital 138 above, due to the non-cooperation from exporting producers in Russia, the Commission used facts available to establish the normal value. To this end, the Commission used data provided by the applicant for the review investigation period based on MEPS International ⁶⁷ domestic prices references for Russia – CRF – Volga region. On that basis, the normal value was EUR/tonne 702, 97 during the review investigation period.

3.2.2.2.   Export price

• (140) Due to the non-cooperation from the exporting producers in Russia, the Commission had to use facts available to establish the export price.

• (141) The export price was determined based on CIF Eurostat data. Thus the export price was EUR/tonne of 755,65.

3.2.2.3.   Comparison

• (142) The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the product under review on an ex-works basis. Adjustments were made, based on information provided by the applicant, for sea and domestic freight, and unloading charges, amounting to EUR/tonne 127,84 on the export price in order to bring it to ex-works level. On that basis, the adjusted ex-works export price to the Union was EUR/tonne 627, 81.

3.2.2.4.   Continuation of dumping

• (143) The above comparison showed the export prices to the Union, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value, were 10 % lower than the established normal value.

• (144) However, as the volume of imports in question was very limited, accounting for less than 1 % of total imports into the Union and close to 0 % of the share of the Union market, the Commission also investigated the likelihood of recurrence of dumping.

3.2.3.   Likelihood of recurrence of dumping should measures be repealed

• (145) In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission investigated the likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures expire. In this respect, the following additional elements were analysed: the exports to third countries, the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia as well as the attractiveness of the Union market.

3.2.3.1.   Exports to third countries

(a) Normal value

• (146) The normal value was constructed as explained in Section 3.2.2.1 above.

(b) Export price

• (147) The export price was established on the basis of export prices of the product under review to other third countries. In this respect, due to lack of cooperation from exporting producers, the Commission used the GTA database. The average CIF export price to third countries was EUR/tonne 536 in the review investigation period. The CIF export price to third countries was reduced to ex-works level by deducting the freight and insurance costs and domestic transport cost in Russia, which amounted to EUR/tonne 127,84 as mentioned in recital 141. On that basis, the adjusted ex-works export price to third countries was EUR/tonne 408,72.

(c) Price comparison

• (148) The Commission compared the normal value established in Section 3.2.2.1 and the average export price to third countries on an ex-works basis.

• (149) The above comparison showed that the Russian exports of the product under review to third countries, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value, were 55 % lower than the normal value established.

• (150) In their submission on initiation, the three Russian exporting producers claimed that export prices to third markets are not more representative than export prices to the Union because these exports, mainly to Turkey, are composed of cheaper types of CRF, which would explain their lower prices. They suggested that high Russian export prices reported by Eurostat are representative and must be used in the assessment.

• (151) In this respect, the Commission noted that no evidence was provided to substantiate the allegation of differences in the product types. In fact, the three Russian exporting producers failed to provide a questionnaire reply allowing the Commission to perform its assessment as to the product types exported to the Union. Thus, as explained in recital 138, the Commission based its assessment on facts available. It used the GTA database to establish the Russian export price to third countries as the most appropriate source. In any event, even if the Russian export prices to the Union were used as suggested by the three Russian exporters, the Commission established in Section 3.2.2.4 above that the Russian export prices to the Union sourced from Eurostat, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value, were 10 % lower than the established normal value. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

3.2.3.2.   Production capacity and spare capacity in Russia

• (152) Given the non-cooperation by the Russian exporting producers, the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia were established on the basis of facts available and in particular the information provided by the applicant concerning the review investigation period.

• (153) According to the information provided by the applicant, the total production capacity of the product under review in Russia exceeded 12 000 000 tonnes in the review investigation period. The applicant estimated that the Russian producers have a spare capacity of around 2 million tonnes that cannot be absorbed by the domestic market. In addition, the applicant submitted that the Russian producers have increased the production capacity for cold-rolled steel by approximately 1 150 000 tonnes between 2016 and 2021.

• (154) The Russian exporting producers contested the estimation of the spare capacity in Russia as provided by the applicant. In their submission on initiation, they provided data about total production capacity of the CRF industry in Russia, the overall production volume and the capacity utilisation rate. They claimed that in 2020, the Russian CRF industry had a spare capacity of [1,8 – 2,3] million tonnes which was only [4 – 8] % of the overall Union consumption (32,4 million tonnes). They further stated that taking into account the estimated growth of CRF consumption and production in Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), free capacity of Russian CRFS industry is projected to diminish further.

• (155) In this respect, as explained in recital 32, the Russian exporting producers did not send questionnaire replies and the Commission considered that they provided only fragmented information about production, capacity and production volume without supporting evidence and which the Commission could not verify. Consequently, since the exporting producers did not provide sufficient and reliable information as regards production capacity and production volumes, the Commission used the information available on the file.

• (156) Furthermore, the Russian exporting producers provided the data about production, capacity and capacity utilisation only in a sensitive version without a non-confidential summary. As noted in the Notice of Initiation, if a party providing confidential information fails to show good cause for a confidential treatment request or does not furnish a non-confidential summary of it in the requested format and quality, the Commission may disregard such information unless it can be satisfactorily demonstrated from appropriate sources that the information is correct. Given that the information about production, capacity and capacity utilisation was provided only in sensitive version and thus could not be subject to comments by other interested parties, it could not be satisfactorily demonstrated that the information is correct.

• (157) In any event, the data in question provided by the Russian exporting producers and the one provided by the applicant did not diverge to a large extent. Therefore, the Commission considered that an assessment based on the data provided by the Russian exporting producers would not have led to a different conclusion. As a result, the Commission rejected the claims.

• (158) After disclosure, the Russian government as well as the exporting producers challenged the Commission’s findings that the exporting producers did not cooperate fully with the investigation and that no meaningful open version had been submitted (as explained in recital 156). Thus, the exporting producers claimed that the Commission misused its discretionary powers in this respect.

• (159) First, the Commission observed that the information on capacity per company was only provided by the exporting producers in an indexed form which did not allow the parties to comment on the exact capacity installed (no ranges were provided). Neither production data nor capacity utilisation data was provided in the open version. Consequently, the Commission reiterated its finding that the open version of the information about production, capacity and capacity utilisation could not be scrutinised by the other interested parties. Second, this information was not provided as part of questionnaire replies and could not be cross checked with other parts of the questionnaires and the underlying documents that companies are required to provide as evidence backing the information submitted in the questionnaire reply. Finally, as explained in recital 157 above, the Commission established that even if the data provided were to be taken into account, its findings of spare capacity would not have been altered. Consequently, the Commission rejected these claims.

• (160) The spare capacity of the product under review available in Russia represents approx. 21 % of the total Union consumption on the free market in the review investigation period when it is based on the application and approximately 20 % if the submission of the Russian exporting producers were to be taken into account.

• (161) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Russian exporting producers have significant spare capacities, which they could use to produce CRF to export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse.

3.2.3.3.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (162) The Commission established that the Russian exporting producers exported the product under review to third markets at prices around 14 % lower than the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. Taking into account this price level, exporting to the Union is potentially more attractive for the Russian exporters than exporting to all other countries.

• (163) The Union market is also attractive in view of its geographical proximity and size, with a total consumption of 33 579 173 tonnes, including a consumption on the free market of 9 677 020 tonnes in the review investigation period.

• (164) The volume of exports to third countries was 580 000 tonnes in the review investigation period, which represented 6 % of the free Union market consumption. This represents an additional volume of CRF which could be diverted to the Union market given its attractiveness should the measures expire.

• (165) After disclosure, the exporting producers and the Russian government argued that the Union market was no longer attractive for the exporting producers because of the sanctions, and even in the pre-sanctions period, ‘trade flows, infrastructure and supply chains have already been destroyed’ and it would take years before they were restored.

• (166) While the claim on sanctions is addressed in recitals 167 and 172 below, the Commission observed that no evidence was provided in respect of the claim that it would take years to restore exports to the Union. At the same time, given the significantly lower prices at which the Russian exporting producers continue exporting to the rest of the world, the geographical proximity and size of the Union market as well as the significant volume of exports to third countries that could be diverted to the Union, the Commission reiterated its findings that the Union market is attractive for the Russian exporting producers.

• (167) This conclusion is not called into question by recent events. The Commission noted in this respect that after the initiation of the investigation, due to the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the Union imposed successive packages of sanctions against Russia which also affected steel products and/or the steel companies producing and exporting the product under review after the review investigation period. The latest package of sanctions covering the product under review and/or the exporting producers contains an import ban of CRF. This ban entered into force on 16 March 2022 ⁶⁸. Given that these sanctions are linked to the military aggression and the underlying geopolitical situation, their scope, modulation, and/or duration are unpredictable. Furthermore, anti-dumping measures have a lifetime of five years. Considering the abovementioned uncertainties and the fact that the Council may further amend the precise scope and duration of sanctions at any moment, the Commission found that they cannot have a bearing in its conclusions in this proceeding.

3.2.3.4.   Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping

• (168) The Commission established that Russian exporting producers sell to third countries at prices lower than the normal value.

• (169) As explained in recital 161, the spare capacity in Russia was significant in the review investigation period, representing approx. 21 % of the total Union consumption on the free market in the review investigation period, and increased between 2016 and 2021.

• (170) Finally, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size, geographical proximity and prices points to the likelihood that Russian exports and spare capacity would be (re)directed towards the Union, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

• (171) Following disclosure, the Russian government argued that there is no likelihood of recurrence of dumping since imports have been insignificant and, because of the sanctions, the Russian manufacturers have completely stopped exports to the Union for a long and indefinite period of time.

• (172) Regarding exports to the Union, the Commission recalled that it established a likelihood of recurrence of dumping based on the elements described above which do not include the current level of exports to the Union, which is considered a temporary situation which may change at any time. Regarding the sanctions in place, as explained in recital 167, given that their scope, modulation and/or duration are unpredictable and can be amended at any time, the Commission found that they cannot have a bearing on the conclusions in this proceeding. Therefore, the recent events temporarily affecting imports from Russia into the Union cannot alter the findings made as regards recurrence of dumping in this case and these claims were rejected.

• (173) Consequently, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping, if the measures would not be extended.

4. INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (174) The like product was manufactured by 21 producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

• (175) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 30,5 million tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as information provided by the applicant. As indicated in recital 21, a sample of three Union producers was selected that represented more than 30 % of the total Union production of the like product.

• (176) As the Union industry is mostly vertically integrated and cold-rolled flat steel products are regarded as a primary material for the production of various value added downstream products, the captive and free market consumption were analysed separately.

• (177) The distinction between the captive and free markets is relevant for the injury analysis, because products destined for captive use are not exposed to direct competition from imports, and transfer prices are set within the groups according to various price policies and are therefore not reliable. By contrast, production destined for the free market is in direct competition with imports of the product concerned, and prices are free market prices.

• (178) To provide a picture of the Union industry that is as complete as possible, and similar to what was done in the original investigation, the Commission obtained data for the entire activity of cold-rolled flat steel products and determined whether the production was destined for captive use or for the free market. The Commission found that around 78 % of the total Union producers’ production was destined for captive use.

• (179) The Commission examined certain economic indicators relating to the Union industry on the basis of data for the free market only. These indicators are: sales volume and sales prices on the Union market; market share; export volume and prices and profitability. For other indicators, such as production, capacity, productivity, employment and wages, the figures considered below relate to the whole activity and therefore no separation was warranted.

4.2.   Union consumption

• (180) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of data provided by (a) EUROFER concerning Union industry sales of the like product in the Union, cross-checked with the sampled Union producers; and (b) imports of the product under review from all third countries as reported in Eurostat.

• (181) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Total Union consumption	39 389 717	38 484 642	31 808 880	33 579 173
Index (2018 = 100)	100	98	81	85
Captive market	28 207 944	28 129 434	22 651 025	23 902 153
Index (2018 = 100)	100	100	80	85
Free market	11 181 772	10 355 209	9 157 856	9 677 020
Index (2018 = 100)	100	93	82	87
Source: Data provided by Eurofer and cross-checked with the sampled producers questionnaire replies; Eurostat.	Source: Data provided by Eurofer and cross-checked with the sampled producers questionnaire replies; Eurostat.	Source: Data provided by Eurofer and cross-checked with the sampled producers questionnaire replies; Eurostat.	Source: Data provided by Eurofer and cross-checked with the sampled producers questionnaire replies; Eurostat.	Source: Data provided by Eurofer and cross-checked with the sampled producers questionnaire replies; Eurostat.

• (182) Free market consumption has increased as compared to the 7 122 682 tonnes consumed during the investigation period of the original investigation (1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015). However, during the period considered, the Union captive consumption decreased by around 15 %, while the Union free market consumption decreased by around 13 %. Between the years 2018 to 2019 the consumption on the captive market remained stable while the consumption on the free market decreased by 7 %. The main decrease occurred between the years 2019 and 2020 when both free and captive consumption decreased substantially by 11 % and 20 % respectively. This decrease started in 2019 due to an overall slowdown in Union growth, but was exacerbated due to the overall economic slowdown caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The slowdown in economic growth generally, and in the manufacturing sector specifically, has affected the overall demand for steel. This particularly had an impact on the automotive industry, which constitutes a significant part of the users of CRF. From 2020 to the review investigation period both captive and free consumption increased by 5 % without, however, returning to the levels of 2018.

4.3.   Imports from the countries concerned and the rest of the world

4.3.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned and the rest of the world

• (183) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of a comparison between import volumes and the Union free market consumption, as reported in Table 2 above.

• (184) Imports into the Union from the countries concerned and the rest of the world developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Volume of imports from the countries concerned	14 367	4 286	1 435	9 713
Index (2018 = 100)	100	30	10	68
Market share	0,1  %	0,0  %	0,0  %	0,1  %
Volume of imports from the PRC	2 305	1 275	423	7 065
Index (2018 = 100)	100	55	18	307
Market share PRC	0,0  %	0,0  %	0,0  %	0,1  %
Volume of imports from Russia	12 062	3 011	1 012	2 648
Index (2018 = 100)	100	25	8	22
Market share Russia	0,0  %	0,0  %	0,0  %	0,0  %
Volume of imports from the rest of the world	2 279 706	2 113 190	1 876 491	2 154 420
Index (2018 = 100)	100	93	82	95
Market share rest of the world	20,39  %	20,41  %	20,49  %	22,26  %
Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat	Source: Eurostat

• (185) While imports from the countries concerned accounted for 20 % market share and 1,4 million tonnes in the original investigation period, they have, based on information from Eurostat, virtually disappeared from the Union market. In fact, imports from the countries concerned continued to decrease from 14 367 to 9 713 tonnes over the period considered. Although import volumes from both countries concerned increased again somewhat between 2020 and the review investigation period, in line with increasing consumption volumes in the same period, they still accounted for a market share of only 0,1 % during the review investigation period.

• (186) Total imports of the product under review from third countries other than the countries concerned decreased by 5 % (from 2,28 to 2,15 million tonnes) over the period considered. This follows the same downward trend of the Union free market consumption as mentioned in Table 2, but to a lesser degree. In addition, third countries maintained (and even increased by almost 2 percentage points) their market share in the free market over the period considered, while the Union industry lost almost 2 % market share. However, the supply of CRF on the free market was fragmented, with none of the other third countries holding a market share of more than 4 % in the Union market ⁶⁹.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

• (187) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

• (188) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators based on data contained in the questionnaire response submitted by Eurofer concerning the Union industry’s sales of the like product, crosschecked with the data provided by the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

• (189) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

• (190) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (191) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 4

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Production volume (tonnes)	36 298 267	35 686 689	29 229 520	30 520 404
Index (2018 = 100)	100	98	81	84
Production capacity (tonnes)	45 912 036	45 976 102	48 542 510	44 909 450
Index (2018 = 100)	100	100	106	98
Capacity utilisation (%)	79	78	60	68
Index (2018 = 100)	100	98	76	86
Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers

• (192) Production volumes have decreased significantly since the beginning of the period considered. The decrease follows a largely similar trend and magnitude as that observed for the decrease of the total Union consumption. Production volumes decreased by 16 % over the review investigation period.

• (193) Production capacity also decreased slightly during the period considered, and is at a much lower level than during the original investigation. This is partly because the United Kingdom was still a member of the Union during the original investigation, while their production capacity was no longer taken into account in the current review investigation. In addition, the Union industry has undertaken steps to adapt and rationalize their capacity in line with market consumption. Capacity utilisation rates therefore initially improved as compared to the original investigation. Since the slowdown of Union growth in 2019 and especially the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, however, they again significantly decreased during the period considered, although recovering somewhat in the review investigation period (where the decrease was almost 20 percentage points lower in 2020 as compared with 2018, it was – 11 percentage points in the review investigation period as compared with 2018).

4.4.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

• (194) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Sales volume (tonnes) and market share

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Total Sales volume on the Union market – free and captive	37 095 644	36 367 167	29 930 954	31 415 040
Index (2018 = 100)	100	98	81	85
Captive market sales and use	28 207 944	28 129 434	22 651 025	23 902 153
Index (2018 = 100)	100	100	80	85
Free market sales	8 887 699	8 237 733	7 279 930	7 512 887
Index (2018 = 100)	100	93	82	85
Market share of free market sales	79 %	80 %	79 %	78 %
Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers

• (195) Total sales in the Union followed a downward trend over the period considered, with an overall decrease of 15 %. The same trend is observed with a similar magnitude for the captive and free markets, in line with the decrease in consumption shown in Table 2.

• (196) The market share of the Union industry on the free market remained rather stable throughout the period considered, but went down during the review investigation period by almost 2 %. This coincides with the increase of market share by third countries in the review investigation period, as shown in Table 3.

4.4.2.3.   Growth

• (197) In a context of decreasing consumption, the Union industry not only lost sales volumes in the Union but also lost market share on the free market. Consequently, there was no growth for the Union industry during the period considered.

4.4.2.4.   Employment and productivity

• (198) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Employment and productivity

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Number of employees	9 634	9 137	9 773	9 321
Index (2018 = 100)	100	95	101	97
Productivity (tonnes/employee)	3 768	3 906	2 991	3 274
Index (2018 = 100)	100	104	79	87
Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers	Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers

• (199) The Union industry did not manage to maintain the number of employees engaged in the production of the product under review, which overall decreased between 2018 and the review investigation period by 3 %.

• (200) The productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured as output (tonnes) per employee, followed a downward trend over the period considered (-13 %). The considerable decrease of the productivity is explained by the higher decrease of the production volume, which is also linked to the decrease of sales and demand for Union industry’s products both on the domestic and export markets, compared to the smaller decrease of the number of employees.

4.4.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (201) All dumping margins established during the review investigation period were significantly above the de minimis level. At the same time, the level of imports during the review investigation period was very limited, representing only 0,1 % of Union consumption. The anti-dumping measures imposed following the original investigation had allowed the Union industry to recover from past dumping, as is shown by the data for 2018 and confirmed by statements from the applicant in the review request.

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (202) The weighted average unit sales prices and cost of production of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne)

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the free market	654	613	553	622
Index (2018 = 100)	100	94	85	95
Unit cost of production	592	617	573	643
Index (2018 = 100)	100	104	97	109
Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers

• (203) Throughout the period considered, sales prices on the Union market to unrelated parties (the free market) decreased by 5 %. A detailed analysis shows that from 2018 to 2020, the sales prices decreased by 15 % before increasing again in the review investigation period by 12 %. During the same period the cost of production fluctuated but was almost 10 % higher in the review investigation period than in 2018. Apart from 2018, the average cost of production was higher than the average sales price in all years. Although sales prices increased significantly between 2020 and the review investigation period, the Union industry had not yet been able to increase the sales price to the level sufficient to cover the cost of production.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

• (204) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Average labour costs per employee

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR)	91 664	97 412	93 113	97 981
Index (2018 = 100)	100	106	102	107
Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers

• (205) During the period considered average labour costs fluctuated but showing an overall increase of 7 %. While the number of employees went down, the overall labour costs also went down but to a lesser degree.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

• (206) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Inventories

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Closing stocks (tonnes)	488 722	429 657	284 572	262 487
Index (2018 = 100)	100	88	58	54
Closing stocks as a percentage of production	4	4	3	2
Index (2018 = 100)	100	88	65	55
Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers

• (207) During the period considered, the Union industry’s stock have continuously decreased. Normally any changes in stocks of CRF follow the same trends as those for production, which also decreased during the period considered as shown in Table 4 ⁷⁰. During the period considered, however, certain restructuring activities took place in one of the sampled companies, which involved a partial demerger including the stocks. In addition, one of the sampled companies had issues with several pieces of equipment during a certain time, which necessitated more sales from stock than anticipated. However, as also established in the original investigation, stocks are not considered an important injury indicator for this industry since most types of the like product are produced by the Union industry based on specific orders of the users ⁷¹.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (208) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

	2018	2019	2020	Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)	16,1	-2,8	-14,7	-3,1
Index (2018 = 100)	100	-17	-92	-20
Cash flow (EUR)	1 197 337 649	1 024 735 660	744 992 480	822 335 704
Index (2018 = 100)	100	86	62	69
Investments (EUR)	65 866 851	75 059 376	61 159 498	72 616 722
Index (2018 = 100)	100	114	93	110
Return on investments (%)	5	0	-3	-1
Index (2018 = 100)	100	-8	-69	-12
Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers	Source: Sampled Union producers

• (209) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

• (210) Due to the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, the Union industry had been able to improve its profitability since the original investigation period, and even exceed the target profit set in that investigation ⁷². However, after the peak in 2018, the decrease in Union consumption on the free market coupled with decreasing sales prices in the following years, as shown in Table 7 above, resulted in a unit cost of production that became higher than the average sales price. The reduction in the Union consumption of CRF did not allow the Union industry to set sales prices at a level which would, at least, cover the cost of production.

• (211) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed to a large extent in line with profitability, where it was at its peak in 2018 before declining substantially in 2019 and 2020, while recovering somewhat during the investigation period but still below the levels of 2018 and 2019.

• (212) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. While investments increased overall during the period considered, during 2020 and the review investigation period they remained below the 2019 level. The return on investment developed negatively and followed the same trend as that of the profitability.

4.5.   Conclusion on injury

• (213) All macroeconomic indicators showed a negative trend over the period considered such as production, capacity utilization, sales volume on the Union market (both the captive and the free market), market share, employment and productivity. Similarly, most microeconomic indicators showed a negative trend over the period considered such as sales prices on the Union free market, cost of production, profitability, closing stocks, cash flow and return on investments. Only investments showed a positive trend.

• (214) Even though the Union industry managed to increase prices in the review investigation period, the Union industry still had a negative profit margin of –3,1 % in the review investigation period. The cash flow and return on investments also deteriorated, which makes it more difficult for the Union industry to raise capital and grow.

• (215) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that until 2018 the Union industry had recovered from past material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation caused by dumped imports from China and Russia. However, during the period considered, the injury picture deteriorated and the Union industry was back in an economically fragile and injurious situation during the review investigation period.

• (216) Following disclosure, the Russian government disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion regarding the Union industry’s situation during the review investigation period. According to the Russian government, the situation improved during the review investigation period compared with the previous year, except for the unit cost of production.

• (217) However, while it is correct that some of the injury indicators improved somewhat between 2020 and the review investigation period, as also pointed out in the analysis above (for example in recital 193 or 211), the indicators showed a deterioration during the period considered. The improvement noted in the review investigation period was however not sufficient to lift the Union industry from the economically fragile situation which it faced since 2018. The Commission therefore rejected this claim.

• (218) Due to the negligible levels of imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered, the Commission concluded that imports from China and Russia could not have caused the injury suffered by the Union industry.

• (219) Therefore, the Commission further examined the likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by dumped imports from China and Russia if the measures were repealed.

5. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

• (220) The Commission concluded in recital 215 that the Union industry was in an economically fragile situation during the review investigation period. The Commission also concluded in recital 218 that the injury to the Union industry observed during the review investigation period could not have been caused by dumped imports from China and Russia due to their very limited volume. Therefore the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by the dumped imports from China and Russia if the measures were allowed to lapse.

• (221) In this regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the countries concerned, the relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union and the impact of potential imports and price levels of such imports from these countries on the Union industry’s situation should the measures be allowed to lapse.

5.1.   Spare capacity in China and Russia and the attractiveness of the Union market

• (222) As already described in sections 3.1.11.2 and 3.2.3.2, the exporting producers in China and Russia have significant spare capacities, which together exceed substantially the current production volumes and internal demand in those countries. These spare capacities could be used to produce the product under review for export to the Union if measures were allowed to lapse. The quantities that could be exported by Chinese and Russian exporting producers are significant compared to the size of the Union market. Indeed, the spare capacities represent more than twice the total Union consumption on the free market during the review investigation period.

• (223) As described in sections 3.1.11.1 and 3.2.3.1, the Chinese and Russian exporting producers exported to their main third markets at prices significantly below the normal value as established, which, in addition, were lower than the average (target) sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market during the review investigation period. Therefore, taking into account the price level of exports from China and Russia to other third markets, exporting to the Union is potentially much more attractive for exporters from those countries. Consequently, it can be reasonably expected that, should the measures be repealed, Russian and Chinese exporting producers would again start to export high volumes of the product under review to the Union. This expectation is further reinforced by the availability of substantial spare capacity in China and Russia. As noted in recital 167, although there is currently an Union import ban on certain steel products exported from Russia including CRF ⁷³, it is likely that this will be a temporary measure and there is no way to foresee its duration in relation to the duration of the extension of the current measures. It therefore does not affect the conclusions about the attractiveness of the Union market.

• (224) The three Russian exporting producers claimed that the applicant in its request, overestimated the attractiveness of the Union market with respect to Russia. According to the Russian companies, if they were to increase their exports to third countries, such exports would rather be destined for Russia’s preferential trading partners than for the Union. However, as also pointed out by the applicant, there is no reason why the Russian spare capacity should be used for increasing exports to Russia’s preferential trading partners. Indeed, such exports benefit already currently from a 0 % duty, so they could have already now have exported duty-free. By contrast, exports to the Union are currently subject to duties and a comparison of Russian and Chinese prices to third countries plus the Union anti-dumping duty would not result in undercutting the target price while a removal of the anti-dumping duty would. Hence, it is not convincing to argue that exports to such trading partners would increase as they had not identified any change that could occur between now and the foreseeable future that would increase exports from Russia to such countries. The Commission therefore rejected the Russian exporters’ claim.

• (225) Following disclosure, the three Russian exporting producers and the Russian government claimed that there would be no likelihood of recurrence of injurious dumping from Russia. In the view of those parties, ‘EU law and practice prove that EU sanctions are a long-term policy instrument’, while ‘EU anti-dumping measures do not have a pre-established lifetime’ ⁷⁴. The Russian exporting producers claimed that there is no indication that the sanctions against Russia would be relaxed or lifted. However, even if the sanctions were to be lifted, the EU market is not attractive for Russian exporters ‘due to high risks of introduction of severe trade restrictions’.

• (226) As also set out in recitals 165 and 166, no evidence was provided to show why the Union market would be less attractive to Russian exporters under a scenario without sanctions. In addition, recitals 172, 223 and 248 in this regulation explain why the Commission found that the sanctions cannot have a bearing on the conclusions in this proceeding. Consequently, these claims were rejected.

5.2.   Effect on the Union industry situation

• (227) In order to establish how the imports from China and Russia would affect the Union industry should the measures be terminated, the Commission performed a prospective and comparative price analysis without the existence of anti-dumping measures.

• (228) Due to the lack of cooperation from the exporting producers in the countries concerned in combination with the very low quantities imported in the Union from these countries, no reliable import prices could be established during the review investigation period. It was therefore not possible to perform a meaningful calculation of price undercutting on this basis. Under these circumstances, in order to estimate the likely price at which Chinese and Russian producers would sell when exporting to the Union market, the Commission made a price comparison between the sample Union producers average price (ex-works) to the corresponding weighted average price of the product under review when exported to third countries ⁷⁵ from China and Russia.

• (229) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed a price difference of almost 13 % for Russia. Therefore, the Commission found that Russian prices would undercut Union prices at a similar level in the Union market, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

• (230) The same comparison for China found that export prices from China to third countries were not lower than Union prices. However, further analysis showed that these prices were still below the Union’s target price. Using the same target profit as in the original investigation (9,9 %) ⁷⁶ imports from China at the level of Chinese export prices to third countries were found to be 10 % lower than the Union’s target price. It would thus be likely that imports from China would cause injury if the measures were not maintained.

5.3.   Conclusion

• (231) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China and Russia at injurious prices, which would likely lead to a recurrence of material injury.

6. UNION INTEREST

• (232) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would clearly be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, and users.

6.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (233) The Union industry is located in 14 Member States (Germany, Slovak Republic, Italy, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Hungary and Spain). It employs over 9 000 employees in relation to the product under review.

• (234) Although the anti-dumping measures in force prevented dumped imports from the Russia and China to enter the Union market to a large extent, the Union industry was in an economically fragile situation during the review investigation period, as confirmed by the negative trends of the injury indicators.

• (235) On the basis of the above, the Commission established that there is a strong likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by imports from the countries concerned should the measures expire. The influx of substantial volumes of dumped imports from Russia and China would worsen the already very fragile economic situation of Union industry and threaten its viability.

• (236) The Commission thus concluded that maintaining the anti-dumping measures against Russia and China is in the interest of the Union industry.

6.2.   Interest of users and unrelated importers

• (237) The Commission contacted all known users and unrelated importers. No users or unrelated importers came forward and cooperated in this investigation by submitting a questionnaire reply.

• (238) One unrelated importer, Duferco S.A, and one user, ATS S.A., provided a submission on initiation. According to Duferco S.A, steel prices have significantly increased, creating shortages in the supply chain. The Russian government also pointed to Union users and consumers suffering from a sharp increase of CRF prices. ATS S.A. and the three Russian exporting producers refer to a price hike in the first half of 2021, which they claimed had harmed users and consumers of CRF. In addition, the parties claimed that the existing safeguard measures on imports of steel products constitute a standalone instrument of trade protection which contributes to price growth and a demand-supply imbalance ⁷⁷.

• (239) In this respect, safeguard measures have a different rationale and objective than that of anti-dumping measures. As explained in recital 132 above, the safeguard measures are not sufficient to protect the Union market against imports in significant quantities at dumped prices. In addition, the data supplied by Duferco S.A in support of their statement dates back to April and July 2021, covering trends observed during the review investigation period. As the analysis in section 4.4.2 showed, the Union industry’s capacity utilisation was only at 68 % during the same period, while their sales prices were at a relatively low level. This indicated that there was ample room for increased production at competitive prices.

• (240) No evidence was provided by ATS S.A. or the Russian exporting producers to substantiate the statements made in their submissions. As shown in the analysis in section 4.4.3, the data for the review investigation period, which includes the first half of the year 2021, did not corroborate the statements by ATS S.A. In fact, Union industry prices were not at an abnormally high level. They were below unit cost and even below the export prices of some third countries including China, as well as the Union industry’s target price.

• (241) Since none of the interested parties mentioned in recital 238, nor any other user or unrelated importer provided a questionnaire reply or any other information apart from the above-mentioned submissions, the Commission had insufficient information at its disposal to conclude that the continuation of the measures would be detrimental to the interest of the users or importers.

6.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (242) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of the product under review originating in Russia and China.

7. CLAIMS FOR SUSPENSION/TERMINATION OF MEASURES

• (243) Three Russian exporting producers and one user (ATS S.A.) claimed that the current measures should be suspended. In addition, even before initiation of the expiry review investigation, an unrelated importer located in the United Kingdom (Stemcor London Limited) had also made a similar claim.

• (244) The arguments provided by the different parties referred to the alleged recent high price increase in the Union since the end of 2020, the diminishing imports of CRF from the countries concerned and an alleged imbalance between demand and supply. The evidence and data provided to support these arguments, albeit limited, related almost entirely to a period of time covered by the review investigation period. None of the parties had provided any data related to the period following the review investigation period or future forecast data to support their arguments, except for Union sales prices in the third quarter of 2021 and the mention of a moderate downward trend in at the end of 2021. The three Russian exporting producers claimed that ‘an analytical forecast of future market developments in 2022 -2023 would be uncertain and envisage a large number of alternative, even contradictory scenarios. Even the most complex economic indicators cannot shed light on future developments.’ Thus, at this stage, it is difficult to draw any conclusion on this basis as regards the existence of a temporary change in market conditions.

• (245) The Commission recalled in this respect that Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation provides that, in the Union interest, anti-dumping measures may be suspended where market conditions have temporarily changed to an extent that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of such suspension.

• (246) With respect to the second element, and as set out in the sections on injury, recurrence of injury and Union interest above (recital 174 and further), the Commission noted that the Union industry was still in a fragile situation during the RIP and that, in any event, there was a strong likelihood that material injury originally caused by dumped imports from China and Russia at injurious prices would recur if the measures expire. In addition, the Commission found no compelling reasons of Union interest against maintaining the measures. Therefore, on the basis of the information available in this investigation, the Commission could not conclude at this stage that that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of a suspension, and that it would be in the Union interest to suspend the measures pursuant to Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim. The Commission reserved its right to further examine the need for suspending measures in accordance with Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation in due course.

• (247) In addition, the NLMK Group, the Severstal Group and the MMK Group claimed that because Russian CRF supplies to the Union have been fully halted by sanctions, there was no legal basis to maintain the measures either as an outcome of the ongoing expiry review or during the statutory period of measures application. The exporting producers argued that the fundamental trade flows reorientation brought about by those sanctions was of lasting nature. According to this argument, measures would not serve their purpose of protecting the Union industry and market from unfair trade practices by foreign exporters and, therefore not necessary under Article 11(1) of the basic Regulation.