Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/99 of 11 January 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in Morocco

• (115) The Commission addressed a similar argument in recital 192 below regarding underselling calculations. Indeed, the selection of individual tenders could not substitute the analysis made by the Commission, as this analysis was based on the complete and duly verified actual sales data, i.e. transaction sales listing and price comparison on a per type basis submitted by the sampled Union and exporting producers. This listing provided actual values on the quantity sold and invoiced during the investigation period, which, as explained in recital 136, often ultimately depart from those provided in the terms of a tender. Unlike the latter, the actual sales data takes account of discounts and rebates, deferred or not, which were actually issued and concerned the investigation period. Consequently, tender-base analysis would not reflect accurately the conditions of competition on the ARW market. Furthermore, ACEA did not contest that ARWs produced in Morocco have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses as the ARWs produced by the Union industry. Thus, unlike tender-based analysis, the comparison per product type correctly reflected the competition in prices and volumes between the imports from Morocco and the sales of the Union industry for the purposes of establishing price undercutting and price underselling. As indicated in its comments, ACEA explained that the tender contracts reflect and approximate number of wheels to be supplied, while the exact number is agreed typically within few weeks before the delivery, and that the success of a given car model depends on consumers and thus the volume of production of ARWs. Within each car model, several types of ARWs may be offered and car manufacturers cannot predict the total sales of each type throughout the production life of that car model. Even if the Commission were to consider the price effects at the level of the tenders, it observed that the data received on tenders was incomplete as it originated only from two cooperating users and could not be fully cross-checked with the data provided by the Union industry. In addition, one of the biggest users did not cooperate with the investigation and the partial data received on its behalf from ACEA could not be verified. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (116) After provisional disclosure, ACEA claimed that ARWs of the same specifications are not substitutable as each ARW is built following a car manufacturer order for a specific car model. The design as well as properties and finishing are all defined by the purchaser. Each wheel being unique to the car-manufacturer that ordered it: there is no substitutability between ARWs destined to different car manufacturers.

• (117) The Commission considered that all ARWs, either originating from the Union industry or from Morocco or from other third countries, share the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics within the meaning of the Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. As found during the investigation and clarified by ACEA after final disclosure, all certified producers to certain car manufacturers may compete and supply exactly the same type of wheels to the car manufacturers. For example, a document provided by ACEA indicated that, multiple certified producers located in the Union, Morocco, Türkiye and other third countries competed for the same type of ARW. If needed, various types of wheels can be mounted to a certain car model and not only the ARWs set in the tenders. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (118) After final disclosure, ACEA reiterated its claim that there is no interchangeability between different types of wheels as the subject of investigation is OEM wheels and that OEM by definition refers to a wheel that is produced by a manufacturer for a specific car brand and bears its trademark protected by intellectual property rights. ARWs are an integral part of the general aspect and design of a car and need to be consistent between each and every car of a specific model.

• (119) ACEA also claimed that the Commission did not have evidence that various types of wheels can be mounted to a certain car model and not only the ARWs determined in the tenders. ARWs are an integral part of the general aspect and design of a car and need to be consistent between each and every car of a specific model. Consumers will typically lose their warranty if they replace ARWs with non-OEM parts. ACEA substantiated its claim on warranty based on two documents issued by two car manufacturers.

• (120) The Commission observed that ACEA did not claim or provide additional evidence that all ARWs, either originating from the Union industry or from Morocco or from other third countries, did not share the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics in the meaning of the Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. The Commission also considered that, although there might be some technical limitations not allowing all types of wheels to be mounted to all types of car models, there is a certain degree of interchangeability between ARWs used for different car models. For example, a car manufacturer may decide to revamp a car model by working on the external parts of a car, which may include the ARWs design model. However, most of the technical specifications of the car platform remain identical. Thus, if necessary, a car manufacturer may mount to this car the older ARW design model. ARWs producers are therefore required to keep the older mould years after the end of production in their premises. This was confirmed by those sampled Union producers, which were granted the tender for providing ARWs for a certain car model and subsequently for the redesigned same car model.

• (121) Regarding the claim on warranty, the Commission first observed that one of the warranty disclaimers provided did not contain any requirement on the types of wheels to be used. Second, the evidence provided concerned only the warranty period but not the entire usable life of a car. Third, the fact that there is also an After Market channel of sales of ARWs pointed to the fact that the requirement for using OEM parts for repairs was not constantly applied after the end of the warranty period and was technically and legally allowed. Finally, one of the two documents provided by ACEA concerned the USA market, whereas for the other one it was unclear whether it concerned the Union market. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (122) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that the product type specifications (the so called ‘product control number’ or ‘PCN’) did not capture all characteristics of a specific ARW project and all financial aspects of a particular tender.. As a result, the product control number did not ensure comparability of wheels that are being compared and thus undermined the accuracy of the respective volume and price analysis.

• (123) The Commission considered that the definition of the product control number captured the main characteristics of an ARW: the production process (standard cast wheels without flow-forming or flow formed wheels or forged or two or three part wheels), the diameter and the weight, if with heat treatment or not, the type of finish, if with insert or not and if fitted with tyre or not. None of the cooperating parties commented on the product control number definition during the proceedings. ACEA did not explain which additional characteristic should be includedMoreover, as indicated above in recital 115, the Commission concluded that the tenders did not provide the necessary information for the establishment of the price and volume effects of the dumped imports. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (124) After final disclosure, ACEA argued that there is no support in the non-confidential file or in the disclosure document regarding the significant price undercutting and price suppression found. The Commission observed that recitals 90 and 91 of the provisional Regulation contained the Commission’s analyses and quantification of price undercutting as well as its findings regarding price suppression. Moreover detailed calculation of price undercutting was disclosed to the cooperating exporting producers, who could comment on the accuracy of that calculation. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

• (125) In the absence of other claims concerning undercutting and price effects, recitals 87 to 91 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

• (126) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 92 to 96 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (127) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 97 to 99 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

• (128) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 100 to 102 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.2.3.   Employment and productivity

• (129) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 103 and 104 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.2.4.   Growth

• (130) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 105 to 107 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (131) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 108 to 110 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (132) Regarding recital 113 of the provisional Regulation, ACEA claimed that prices certainly play a role but other considerations are equally important in the selection of an ARW supplier. Moreover, ACEA claimed that there is a fundamental error to allege that the Union producers have to align themselves with prices from Moroccan producers during the tendering process.

• (133) The Commission observed that there is an imbalance in the bargaining power between the car manufacturers and the ARW producers. There is a limited number of car manufacturers, which further diminished in January 2021 with the creation of the Stellantis group. The bargaining power of the car manufacturers is demonstrated by the conditions observed in the tenders, which are in their favour. For example, the car manufacturers do not guarantee the quantities needed to be supplied and thus to be produced by the ARW producers and do not provide the possibility to revise upwards the selling price (save for the aluminium costs which are indexed) during the lifetime of the project. These conditions impact negatively the ARW producers as they are unable to optimise the workload of the production plants and, as a result, to achieve optimal economy of scale to maximise their profitability. The car manufacturers’ favourable position is reinforced by the overcapacity observed in the ARW market as explained in recital 122 due to the establishment of the Moroccan producers.

• (134) Moreover, during the investigation, the Commission received information from the car manufacturers that the price played a key role. User B explained that the main criterion is still the price and that after receipts of the offers, there is a negotiation process, primarily focused on prices, where the producers can improve their offers. EUWA explained that there are commonly price negotiations during the tender process in order to have price adjustments, which can go either way. Similarly, User A explained that other factors such as quality, R & D and supply abilities are very similar among ARW suppliers and therefore the price is the key criterion to determine the choice of the ARW supplier. Furthermore, during a hearing with ACEA, the non-cooperating user confirmed in its presentation that there are several rounds of negotiations with suppliers where their technical capacities, quality rating, logistics, production capability, etc. are verified but, most importantly, producers have to present their most competitive offer in terms of price. In addition, as established in recitals 90 and 91 of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry could not increase its prices despite the increase in its costs in the context of significant price undercutting and price suppression, which showed that the Moroccan exporting producers exercised price pressure on the Union producers during the investigation period. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (135) ACEA claimed that the provisional Regulation incorrectly suggested that contracts are re-negotiated each year and that the Union ARW producers can somehow increase their prices in order to reflect the increase of the prices of the raw materials. ACEA explained that the pricing mechanism under ARW purchase contracts were based on a formula where only the evolution of the costs of the aluminium ingot was a variable element. Thus, the sales invoices did not reflect market conditions but rather contractual terms.

• (136) The Commission confirmed that usually contracts did not provide for any possibility to increase prices over the lifetime of a project to cover costs, save for the cost of aluminium ingots, and improve supplier’s profitability. In recital 113 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission did not argue that the possibility of ARW producers to increase their selling prices within the lifetime of a project exists, but rather explained that the ARW producers were unable to increase their prices when negotiating new tenders during the investigation period. In addition, the Commission collected evidence from the users and Union producers showing that the car manufacturers negotiated various types of discounts and rebates during the lifetime of a project, such as discounts calculated on the yearly overall turn-over, etc. Therefore, it is not accurate to argue that the prices are fixed (with the exception of the aluminium indexation) for the full lifetime of a project. Rather, prices could vary because of the aluminium indexation, but could not be increased further in order to take into account other costs such as labour, energy, raw materials or overheads costs. Furthermore, the actual selling prices may go further down throughout the lifetime of the project due to the various discounts and rebates that were applied. For one user, the amount of rebates or discounts obtained from an ARW producer was found to be significant. Therefore, the prices are not only determined based on the initial contract. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (137) After final disclosure, ACEA reiterated its claim that prices were only determined based on the initial contract as productivity discounts were fixed in the contract and no productivity discounts were granted outside the contractual arrangements. Moreover, ACEA claimed that the Commission did not have positive evidence on the file which demonstrated that prices were not only determined in the initial contract. Finally, ACEA claimed that the evidence collected from the users did not support this conclusion, and that, in particular, the evidence indicated in the recital above was an anecdotal credit note issued by a third country supplier issued for wheels originating in a third country.

• (138) First, the Commission noted that none of the sampled Union producers or the cooperating users submitted comments on the final disclosure, and thus did not put into question the assessment described in recital 136 which was based on the verified evidence collected from them.

• (139) Second, based on ACEA’s comments and documents provided, the Commission noted that ACEA in their comments referred to the confidential version of the mission reports of the cooperating users, member of ACEA, and thus to the evidence collected during the verification visits of these users. This was evident from the various referrals by ACEA in its submissions to the confidential mission reports of the users in question. In particular, the Commission referred to accounting ledgers extracted from User B system where a list of different types of rebates/discounts could be found. During the verification visit, User B explained that price reductions are directly applied on the selling price. Therefore, any other types of rebates/discounts booked in the accounts should be considered as additional rebates/discounts.

• (140) Moreover, the Commission collected evidence from the sampled Union producers showing that the users requested various types of rebates/discounts, such as annual savings, etc. The Commission considered that more detailed information could not be disclosed as the information collected from both the users and the Union industry concerned specific individual transactions which constitute data that is not capable of being summarised within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (141) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that sufficient evidence was provided demonstrating that ARW suppliers are awarded their supply volumes in tenders and that no supply volumes are awarded outside of the tenders. In any case, according to the party, there is no evidence on the record – and no such evidence exists – that following a tender award and in the process of execution of a contract signed as a result of such a tender, volumes assigned to the Union producer would be re-allocated in favour of a Moroccan supplier. ACEA argued that in the course of the on-site verification at one cooperating user was provided evidence showing that the volume of supplies agreed in the contract signed following the conclusion of a tender was generally a good indicator of the actual volume of supplies going forward.

• (142) The Commission considered that ACEA confirmed the findings described in recital 157 that these producers have no guarantee regarding the volume that will be ultimately allocated to them. As indicated by ACEA in its comments and based on User A verification report ‘suppliers quote for a volume: volumes are not secured, but suppliers have an idea of the volumes they are quoting for. If after the end of the project (several years) volumes are substantially lower than expected, suppliers might receive a compensation for the non-amortized equipment’. While the volume quoted was indicated, the typical contract did not mention the exact date of delivery and the planned volume of sales. As stated by ACEA in its comments: ‘the exact number of wheels to be supplied is typically agreed within 4-8 weeks prior to the delivery to the assembly line’. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (143) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that, as acknowledged by EUWA, a more common practice is to award a tender for a particular ARW project to one supplier rather than two or more suppliers. Based on the tenders conducted by three ACEA members in the investigation period (the non-cooperating user and the two cooperating users), the tenders granted simultaneously to two suppliers were limited. Most of the tenders were granted only to one supplier, and thus the supplier will obtain the approximate quantity specified in the tender. When a tender is granted to one supplier, the re-allocation of supplies to any other supplier is not possible.

• (144) The Commission examined the summary spreadsheet provided by ACEA in this respect. First, the listing of tenders provided concerned only tenders concluded during the investigation period, and thus these tenders did not concern actual deliveries during the investigation period as the estimated starting date for the supply under the tenders in question was planned for the time after the investigation period. Second, the Commission observed that most of the tenders listed were reported by the non-cooperating user (around 85 %). Due to the user’s non-cooperation, the Commission was unable to verify the correctness of that listing and whether it included all the tenders and could cover the yearly needs of this car manufacturer. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Commission, nevertheless, analysed the data provided.

• (145) The list of tenders from the non-cooperating user showed that most of these tenders were granted to only one supplier. However, the weighted average volume quoted was rather low, around 50 000 items per tender for the complete lifetime of a project, which explained that only one supplier was awarded the tenders in question. Nevertheless, the Commission observed that one project was allocated to two suppliers ‘due to high volume’ as mentioned during a hearing held with ACEA. Third, the information on tenders provided by the cooperating users concerned three tenders. For User B the data showed that it split a tender for a quantity above 1 million to two suppliers. Moreover, for User A the data provided by ACEA was contradictory. Indeed, on the one hand, it showed that there was one tender which was allocated to one supplier, and, on the other hand, in a separate table regarding offers, the same quantities of that tender were split between two tenders. Consequently, the Commission considered that the information provided by ACEA did not contradict the findings made in recital 157, that the tenders may be allocated to several suppliers based on the quantity quoted which puts into question the actual amount of volumes to be supplied by each supplier throughout the life of the project. In addition, as explained in recital 115 above, ACEA acknowledged the fact that the total volume to be supplied may also depend on the success of the particular car model to be produced.

• (146) The claim was therefore rejected.

• (147) In the absence of other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 111 and 113 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

• (148) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 114 and 115 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

• (149) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 116 and 117 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (150) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 118 to 123 of the provisional Regulation.

4.4.4.   Conclusion on injury

• (151) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

5.1.1.   Quantity and market share of the dumped imports from the country concerned

• (152) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 131 to 136 of the provisional Regulation.

5.1.2.   Prices of the dumped imports from the country concerned and price effects

• (153) ACEA claimed, both after provisional and final disclosure, that imports from Morocco sold in 2020 and during the investigation period were based on tender procedures that took place in 2018-2019. Thus, they could not have had a price impact in 2020 or in the investigation period because they did not result in lost sales in 2020 and in the investigation period but rather before, at the point of the tender procedures.

• (154) The Commission considered that the profit or losses materialized when the production or the sales took place and not at the time of the negotiation of the tenders. As further explained in recital 89, there are possible price and volume changes, during the life of a project, which go beyond the terms of a given tender. Moreover, as explained in recital 113 and recitals 146 to 148 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission considered that the impact of Moroccan producers is not only due to the quantity lost through tenders won by Moroccan exporting producers but also because of the overall price pressure on all tenders where they participated. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (155) ACEA claimed, both after provisional and final disclosure, that the price analysis mentioned in the point 4.4.3.1 of the provisional Regulation should be conducted at the level of tenders, and in this scenario, there was no price difference between Union prices and Moroccan prices as reported in the provisional Regulation.

• (156) ACEA also claimed, both after provisional and final disclosure, that the price competition between suppliers occurred during the tenders. Therefore, price undercutting, price suppression and the underselling margin should be calculated at the level of the tenders and not during the deliveries. Sales and deliveries did not reflect current conditions of competition. Moreover, the volume of deliveries did not depend on suppliers, but rather on the relative success of a specific car model and thus on the level of production.

• (157) The Commission observed that the information provided by the interested parties showed that the prices did not remain unchanged for the entire duration of a certain tender. As explained in recital 79, when negotiating the tenders, ARW producers have to provide a discount scheme over the lifetime of a certain project. On top of this, during the life of a project, car manufacturers may request additional discounts. Moreover, there is no guarantee regarding the volume of sales for the ARW producers. Car manufacturers may select several producers for a certain project, but these producers have no guarantee regarding the volume that will be ultimately allocated to them. For each ARWs manufacturer, the volume of deliveries depended not only on the relative success of a specific car model, but also on the decision of the car manufacturers regarding the allocation of this volume between the selected producers. Consequently, as indicated in recital 115, the selection of data from individual tenders could not substitute the analysis made by the Commission based on the complete data, i.e. transaction sales listing and price comparisons on a per type basis. Such comparison reflects the largest possible amount of data of actual sales transactions that have taken place.

• (158) In view of the above, the Commission considered that, in this case, tenders gave an incomplete picture, while the price effects could be fully grasped only by comparing all imports from the country concerned and all sales of the Union industry on a product type basis, which took place during the investigation period. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

• (159) ACEA and Hands claimed that, even in the absence of imports from Morocco, the Union industry would have been injured, thus demonstrating that imports from Morocco were not a cause of material injury. ACEA reiterated this claim after final disclosure. In particular, Union industry sales in 2020 and in the investigation period would have remained far below the 2019 levels in 2020 (-22 % in 2020 with Morocco and -20 % without Morocco) as well as in the investigation period (-18 % in the investigation period with Morocco and -14 % without Morocco). Injury in the investigation period could not be attributed to imports from Morocco, because in the investigation period as compared to 2020, the Union industry actually increased its sales (by 2 281 thousand items) more than the Moroccan exporting producers (by 1 478 thousand items). Thus, imports from Morocco had no volume impact. Furthermore, imports from Morocco could not have had a price impact in the investigation period since there was no significant price undercutting in tenders concluded during the investigation period, while sales prices of the imports from Morocco observed during the investigation period could not have had any negative impact on the contemporaneous sales of the Union industry.

• (160) ACEA also claimed, both after provisional and final disclosure, that Union industry’s profitability was affected by decreased production and sales resulting from a major decline in the Union car production in 2020 and 2021, which in turn resulted in an increased fixed costs.

• (161) The Commission considered that the Union industry could not pass on these increased fixed costs to the car-makers, because, as set out above, under long-term contracts with the car-makers it was not possible to increase the price due to any increases in the fixed costs, except for the indexation of the cost of aluminium ingots.

• (162) As indicated in the recitals 140 to 142 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission acknowledged that consumption decreased in 2020, which was due mainly to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the imports from Morocco had a clearly negative impact on the Union industry in 2020 and especially during the investigation period when their volumes increased exponentially. Thus, when the conditions started to improve during the investigation period in terms of increase in consumption, the Union industry was forced, due to the dumped imports from Morocco which undercut the Union industry’s prices by 26,9 %, to also keep its prices low, despite the increase in cost of production. Consequently, due to the price suppression the Union industry sold at prices which did not even cover their cost of production let alone a normal profit margin. This conclusion was valid, even assuming that prices were (mainly) fixed in long term contracts, as the negative effects of those lower prices of Moroccan imports materialised when the actual deliveries under the contracts, negotiated at an earlier stage, started in 2020 and the investigation period. Moreover, the participation of the Moroccan producers in tender procedures and their pricing policy, exerted further price pressure on the market which is currently characterized by an excess of supply. Even if the sales quantities of the Union industry increased during the investigation period, it continued to lose market share due to the imports from Morocco and, as a result, its financial situation further deteriorated significantly. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

• (163) Hands claimed that any injury suffered by the Union industry could not be caused by Hands’ exports to the Union from Morocco. According to the company, a majority of the injury indicators (e.g., Union consumption, production quantity, production capacity, capacity utilization, sales quantity, sales price) already started to deteriorate between 2018 and 2019, and could not be attributed to Hands, as the production started in January 2020. Hands argued that the plant was also built to meet growing demand in the Moroccan and non-EU markets, and not only to supply the EU. Moreover, Hands claimed that part of its export to the Union corresponded to a shift of production from South Korea to Morocco.

• (164) Despite the fact that in 2018 and 2019 the Union consumption as well as the Union industry’s sales and production decreased, the Union industry increased its profitability from 7,5 % to 8,2 %. Consequently, no injury was found for those years. Rather injury started to materialise in 2020, at the same time as the imports from Hands, together with other imports from Morocco, started coming into the Union. It had to be noted in this respect, that, in accordance with Article 3 of the basic Regulation, the Commission analysed the effect of all dumped imports from Morocco, and not only those of Hands. In any event, with regard to Hands, its imports undercut the Union industry’s prices and its dumping and injury margins were significant during the investigation period. Consequently, it could not be argued that its imports did not contribute to the injury of the Union industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (165) Hands also claimed that the findings in the provisional Regulation did not support a finding of material injury caused by ARW imports from Morocco. The analysis was built on confusing data and unsubstantiated allegations that have no support in the record of the investigation and in fact in the commercial realities of the ARW market.

• (166) The Commission was unable to identify in this claim what part of its injury analysis was confusing or unsubstantiated or mere allegation. The findings of the Commission were based on positive evidence gathered during the investigation, which was made available to all interested parties in the case file and described in the provisional Regulation. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

5.1.3.   Volume of the dumped imports from the country concerned

• (167) ACEA claimed that there was no significant increase in the volume of Moroccan imports within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation and Moroccan imports occupied a niche that the Union producers voluntarily vacated causing no negative impact on the volumes sold by the Union industry.

• (168) As explained in recital 83 of the provisional Regulation, the imports from Morocco reached 2,5 million items during the investigation period, while they were zero in 2018 and still hardly present in 2019. This resulted in a market share of 3,9 % during the investigation period. Regarding the market share of Moroccan imports, the Commission noted that ACEA contradicted its argument set out in recital 191, that the underselling margins should be calculated at the level of tenders where the competition takes place between the Moroccan producers and the Union producers, demonstrating that there was a direct competition between the Moroccan imports and the Union production. Therefore, the Commission considered that imports were significant, both in absolute terms and relative to the consumption in the Union, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. In light of the price levels established, the volumes had a negative impact on the Union industry’s prices within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim and confirmed its findings summarised in recitals 131 to 136 of the provisional Regulation.

• (169) After final disclosure, ACEA reiterated that the Moroccan imports had no negative volume impact on the Union industry. Moreover, ACEA claimed that the Commission failed to explain how imports of ARWs from Morocco with a 3,9 % market share led to the decrease in the Union production and sales in the period considered by 17 % (production) and by 21 % (sales).

• (170) The Commission noted that ACEA referred to the period considered in its analysis, while as indicated above in recital 162, the decrease of the Union production between 2018 and 2020 was mainly due to the COVID-19 crisis. Moreover, regarding the subsequent period 2020 and the investigation period, when the Union consumption increased by + 8,0 %, the imports from Morocco increased significantly (that is by 244 %) while the Union industry sales increased by only 5,2 %. Furthermore, the increase of the market share of the imports from Morocco between 2020 and the investigation period was around 2,1 percentage points, whereas the Union industry market share decreased by 1,8 percentage points. In addition, when considering all origins of imports other than Morocco, the Commission noted that the increase of import volumes was at around 6,6 % between 2020 and the investigation period. That increase was due to the increase of imports volumes from Türkiye (by 19 %) whereas the imports volumes from all other countries decreased on balance during the same period. However, as described in recitals 171 to 174 below, the Commission established that the imports from Türkiye did not attenuate the causal link found between the imports from Morocco and the materials injury suffered by the Union industry. Consequently, the Commission reiterated its findings in recital 168 above that the volumes of imports from Morocco had a negative impact on the Union industry’s prices within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. The claim was therefore rejected.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

• (171) Hands and ACEA claimed that the impact of third countries’ imports should be properly investigated: other third countries accounted for almost 90 % of the total imports and had a market share of around 25 %. In particular, Türkiye increased its market share in the period considered from 10,3 % to 13,0 %.

• (172) The Commission analysed imports from third countries. Regarding Türkiye, the main importing country, the Commission pointed out that, as indicated in recital 138 of the provisional Regulation, average prices from Türkiye were significantly higher compared with import prices from Morocco (+ 14 %), and even slightly higher compared to the Union industry’s prices (+ 1,0 %). Moreover, the average price of the imports from Türkiye was above the costs of production of the Union industry in 2018, 2019 and 2020. Only in the investigation period it went slightly below by less than 1 %. Moreover in 2020 and in the investigation period, when the profitability of the Union industry went down significantly, prices of Turkish imports were above Union industry’s prices. Therefore, these imports did not attenuate the causal link found between the imports from Morocco and the materials injury suffered by the Union industry. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (173) After final disclosure, regarding imports originating from Türkiye, Hands reiterated its claim that the Commission failed to consider and simply ignored the injurious effects of imports from Türkiye. The Commission allegedly failed to carry out more refined analysis based on the Hands’ own data which shows that its own price offers in tenders were not always the cheapest and was awarded only a small fraction of all tenders. ACEA made a similar claim regarding the same producer.

• (174) The Commission rejected Hands’ claim for several reasons. First, the Commission observed, as explained in recital 90 of the provisional Regulation, that when comparing the actual sales by product type during the investigation period, it established significant undercutting margin of 26,9 %, which included the sales from Hands. Second, as explained in recitals 115 and 192, the Commission rejected ACEA’s claim that the price effects should be analysed at the level of the tenders. Third, Hands did not argue that its price offers in tenders were necessarily more expensive than those of Turkish exporting producers. Rather, its claim concerned ‘other ARW manufacturers’ in general. In addition, even if Hands’ price offers were not necessarily the cheapest, the Commission analysed the price effects on the basis of all imports from Morocco, whereby the share of the other exporting producer, Dika, was significant (representing around [60 % – 70 %] of the market). Finally, as observed in recital 172 above, the import prices from Türkiye were higher than the Union industry’s average price during the investigation period. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

• (175) After final disclosure, ACEA reiterated its claim indicated in recital 159 that the price undercutting from Morocco, based on tenders, was not significant (i.e. 3,7 %), in particular compared to the price undercutting, calculated by ACEA, for Türkiye or for Thailand, which was respectively around 10 % and 1 %.

• (176) First, the Commission assessed the summary spreadsheet submitted by ACEA concerning price offers. This spreadsheet consisted of 15 tenders, originating from three ACEA members (i.e. the non-cooperating user and the two cooperating users). The following information was provided: the user name, the quantity and the item price offered by each suppliers. The Commission noted though that the internal numbering of each tender was not provided, which prevented the Commission from cross-checking the data with the verified information already provided in the course of the investigation by the two cooperating users. Moreover, some price elements were not provided (such as the planned yearly discounts, also called ‘productivity discounts’) and thus it was impossible to assess if all of them had been included in the item price offered. More importantly, most of the price offers concerned the non-cooperating user. As indicated in recital 109, due to the overall lack of cooperation by that user, the limited information it provided could not be considered for the purpose of this investigation. Regarding, the additional information provided by ACEA with respect to User A and User B, it concerned price offers which the Commission could not verify due to its late submission. In particular, the Commission was unable to determine if the dataset provided was exhaustive or not. In any case, the dataset listed 14 Moroccan offers, out of 15 tenders, and 5 for Türkiye and Thailand each. The undercutting calculation made by ACEA was based on the quotation price ²². The Commission observed that ACEA’s own calculations showed that the price offers by the Moroccan producers were lower than the ones of the Union industry. Furthermore, when comparing the volumes reported ²³ in this spreadsheet with the total imports volumes established for Türkiye and Thailand on the basis of the Eurostat data (see table 11 of the provisional Regulation), it appeared that the volume reported in particular for Türkiye was not representative (below 5 %). Thus no meaningful conclusion could be drawn from that information provided by ACEA. Moreover, the Commission already concluded in recital 139 of the provisional Regulation that Thailand and Türkiye did not attenuate the causal link found between the dumped imports from Morocco and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Therefore the claims were rejected.

5.2.2.   The COVID-19 pandemic

• (177) Hands claimed that Union ARW demand decreased in 2020, that is a decrease by 14 million items, representing 20 times the size of imports of ARW from Morocco. The impact of the pandemic was therefore so significant that the Commission should consider that it broke any causal link that may have existed between imports of ARW from Morocco and any injury suffered by the Union industry.

• (178) As indicated in recitals 140 to 142 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission acknowledged the impact of COVID-19 on the Union industry. However, as the investigation period also covered the period of post-COVID recovery, the Commission could establish, as explained in recital 94 above, that when the market rebounded post COVID, the Union industry did not benefit due to the increased imports from the country concerned at dumped prices. Rather the contrary, as the situation of the Union industry further deteriorated in the investigation period. Therefore, the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be considered as the only cause of the injury suffered by the Union industry to the extent that it would have attenuated the causal link between such injury and the dumped imports from the country concerned. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (179) Hands reiterated its request for a satisfactory and detailed explanation is especially needed, given that the Commission explicitly recognised that the COVID-19 pandemic had a negative impact on the Union industry.

• (180) In the absence of a more precise and specific request, the Commission considered that the explanations already contained in this section were sufficient to allow the company to understand the Commission’s reasoning and exercise its rights of defence. It thus rejected the claim.

5.2.3.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (181) In the absence of comments, recitals 143 to 145 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.4.   Effect of multi-year contracts and evolution of the costs of production

• (182) In the absence of comments, recitals 146 to 148 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.5.   Consumption

(183) In the absence of comments, recitals 146 to 148 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed

5.2.6.   Competition in tenders

• (184) ACEA claimed that the Commission should have investigated intra-Union competition. ACEA collected information from its members and found that out of a total of 45 tenders Union producers were successful in 31, suppliers from Morocco and from Thailand in 5 each and suppliers from Türkiye in 4, although in terms of items Türkiye won most of the tenders.

• (185) At the outset, the Commission recalled that ACEA did not dispute the representativeness of the sample of Union producers, established in accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation. Thus, ACEA cannot validly maintain that the Commission was required to investigate whether the alleged impact of the dumped imports on prices did not result from price competition from Union producers not included in the sample ²⁴. Moreover, as indicated in the Table 5 of the provisional Regulation, the Union producers demonstrated their ability to maintain a market share above 70 % but also a profitability of around 8 % in 2018-2019. This was achieved in a very competitive market, based on tenders organised by car manufacturers, in which all Union producers and producers located in other third countries could compete for the same tenders. This meant that the Union producers were competitive under normal and fair market conditions, without the industry as a whole being injured. Furthermore, the Commission noted that the claim made by ACEA was based on 45 tenders from three ACEA members (4 contracts reported by the two cooperating users and 41 from a non-cooperating user). The information was limited only to the tender winner, estimated quantities and the origin of the other non-Union tenderers (Morocco, Thailand or Türkiye). In addition, that information was not backed by any evidence proving its accurateness and reliability. The tender references were not even provided. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (186) ACEA also claimed that, even assuming that it is correct that tender participants must align themselves to the lowest bidder, according to ACEA, there is overwhelming evidence that such alignment is undertaken first and foremost with regard to the cheapest Union producer and secondly by reference to third country imports, with any alignment with the quotations of Moroccan suppliers coming distant third with only 5 cases.

• (187) The Commission noted that the analysis made by ACEA was based on a limited number of tenders (i.e. 15) and the information provided by ACEA consisted of a table listing 15 price offers covering all main sources of the product concerned (Union and all main third countries producers) submitted by three ACEA members. 4 contracts reported by the two cooperating users and 11 from a non-cooperating user. In addition, as for the previous claim, that information was not backed by any evidence proving its accurateness and reliability. The tender references were not even provided. For example, no information was provided regarding whether the price reported included all the ancillary costs and the discounts included in the offers. Furthermore, the underlying tender documents were not provided and, as a result, the Commission was unable to verify the information provided and the claim was therefore rejected. Even if the Commission was to take into account this information, it observed that the total volumes of the quoted offers represented around 5 % of the total Union consumption, and thus was not considered to be representative. In addition, in all but two instances the price offers made by the Moroccan producers were below the ones made by the Union producers. Consequently, the Commission considered that ACEA failed to provide evidence showing that the tender participants had to align themselves with the cheapest Union producers and that the Moroccan suppliers were not pushing prices down.

• (188) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that the Commission itself requested ACEA members to provide such data on tender quotations based on the start of production, which was provided by ACEA accordingly. ACEA also provided additional documents from User B. Finally, ACEA considered this dataset to be representative as it was based on 29 tenders, covered almost 100 % of Moroccan ARW purchases, and was backed by evidence.

• (189) The Commission stressed that the information on tenders was only requested from the two users that fully cooperated with the investigation, provided questionnaire replies and had their data verified. The data subsequently submitted by ACEA regarding the non-cooperating user was considered incomplete, unreliable and not verifiable due to the lack of cooperation by that user. The Commission noted that ACEA based its analysis mainly on the non-cooperating user. Also, while ACEA claimed that its dataset was backed by evidence, the Commission considered that the dataset consisted mainly of summary spreadsheets and that the tender references mentioned by ACEA were in fact the internal numbers of each tender. However, the full documentation regarding the tenders, such as copies of the terms of references, the actual offers received, etc., was not provided. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (190) In the absence of any other comments on causation, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 152 to 154 of the provisional Regulation.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Underselling margin calculations

• (191) ACEA claimed, after provisional and final disclosure, that the Commission should have conducted underselling margin calculations at the level of tenders as in the original investigation against imports of ARW from China ²⁵.

• (192) The Commission examined the argument and found that a similar claim during the expiry review investigation of the above mentioned measures ²⁶ was made and rejected. In recital 115 above, the Commission explained that a selection of data from individual tenders cannot substitute the price and volume analysis made by the Commission based on the complete data, i.e. transaction sales listing and price comparisons on a per type basis. Such comparison reflects the largest possible amount of data of actual sales transactions that have taken place. Moreover, the underselling margin was expressed as a percentage of the export price during the investigation period. The analysis on the basis of the complete data from the sampled exporting producers and the Union producers showed an underselling of 44 % for Hands and of 51,6 % for other Moroccan producers. Therefore, this argument was rejected.

• (193) Hands claimed that the Commission’s adjustments linked to future environmental costs are arbitrary and speculative, and affect price comparability, and introduce a distortion to price comparability between Union and Moroccan sales. Hands made reference to Morocco’s New Development Model, which was launched in April 2021 and includes investment in sustainable green energy in order to be competitive in low-carbon industries, and the country has vowed to source over 50 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030. Therefore, it is clear that the Commission did not take into account future costs which would be incurred by Hands during the application of the measures, including those connected to the de-carbonization efforts in Morocco.

• (194) The Commission stressed that the inclusion of the future environmental costs in the target price for the Union industry was in compliance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. The inclusion of these costs was not based on pure speculation but on positive evidence of actual investments planned. Whether Morocco may have investments in sustainable green energy is immaterial for the application of the relevant provisions of the basic Regulation regarding the establishment of the Union target price in which future environmental costs must be taken into account. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (195) Hands claimed that the Commission did not provide any explanation on its calculation of future costs and thus deprived Hands and other interested parties from their right of defence.

• (196) The Commission provided information regarding the future costs following a request from Dika. The reply was published in the open file which was available to all parties. Therefore, the rights of defence were not breached.

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (197) In the absence of comments, recitals 165 and 166 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.2.   Interest of users

• (198) ACEA reiterated its claim, after provisional and final disclosure, described in recital 170 of the provisional Regulation that the Union ARW industry could not satisfy the demand. Allegedly, for more than 15 years, Union market suffered from under-capacity and shortages due to the insufficient investments made by the Union producers. According to ACEA, the Union ARW producers consistently fail to meet their commitment to increase production capacity and ensure security of supply in the Union. ACEA recalled that in the context of the Commission’s anti-dumping investigation on ARW from China, Union producers allegedly committed to increase their production capacity and the Commission allegedly extended the anti-dumping measure under a condition that capacities will be increased. According to ACEA, between 2006 and the investigation period, the Union capacity increased by 14 % while the consumption increased by 33 % during the same period.

• (199) The Commission noted that this claim was already addressed in recital 171 of the provisional Regulation and no new elements or evidence were brought forward. The Commission observed that, if needed, the Union ARW industry could increase its capacity at relatively short notice, as the relevant investment referred to by the users did not concern the furnaces or the painting booths, but rather casting machines which can be installed easily. Therefore, if the Union ARW producers did not invest in additional production capacity, it was rather due to their difficult economic situation, and the lack of sufficient future contracts from the car manufacturers to justify such investment. Thus, the Union industry did not have sufficient incentive to invest in additional capacity in the absence of foreseeable increase in demand of its production.

• (200) In addition, the Union consumption amounted to 64,31 million items in the investigation period. The total Union industry capacity was 61,29 million items, while the total Union production was 48,75 million items in the investigation period and exports of the Union industry were 2,71 million items, leaving the capacity of 9,83 million items unused. Consequently, the Union industry already had sufficient production capacity to cover almost the total Union demand of ARW. In addition, the Union market could be further supplied by exporting producers in third countries. The total worldwide capacity of ARWs even increased with the arrival of the Moroccan producers. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

• (201) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that the Commission’s allegation that the relevant investments do not concern furnaces or the painting booths, but rather casting machines which can be installed easily, was not backed by evidence. ACEA claimed that the cooperating users demonstrated that the lack of sufficient painting booths is precisely one of the major bottlenecks limiting the Union’s production capacity.

• (202) The Commission observed that the evidence submitted by User A concerned the lack of production capacity from one Union producer for the years 2015-2016, thus before the period considered. Moreover, User A did not provide any document showing production capacity issues during the period considered. Regarding User B, the documents provided were also dated before the period considered (most of them dated in 2016). However, during the verification visit, User B declared that ‘during a normal year like 2018/2019, there was no shortage of aluminium wheels’. ACEA or any other users did not provide any evidence of production shortage due to the lack of sufficient painting booths during the period considered.

• (203) In the course of the investigation, the Commission collected evidence that the Union industry invested in painting booths when the consumption shifted to more diamond cut wheels, which request two turns in painting lines. Regarding investments in painting booths and casting equipment, the Commission collected copies of purchase invoices showing that the Union industry was able to increase its capacity in the past when demand for its products was certain. The Commission considered that more detailed information could not be included in the non-confidential file as the information in question concerned specific individual transactions which constitute data that is not capable of being summarised within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (204) ACEA claimed that at the time when Moroccan suppliers won tenders to supply wheels to the Union, the Union industry had no spare production capacity to offer and thus these imports covered strategic needs for the car manufacturers.

• (205) The Commission noted that ACEA did not provide evidence of this claim, for example of tenders where there was no price offer from the Union producers, in particular for the tenders won by the Moroccan producers. The Commission also noted that no evidence was provided that the Union ARW industry failed to deliver ARW following requests from car manufacturers during the period considered ²⁷. As already mentioned above, the production capacity of the Union industry, together with the one of the exporting producers in third countries is largely sufficient to meet the needs of the car industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (206) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that none of the Union producers decided to invest in additional production capacity, while the car production in the Union increased constantly since 2013.

• (207) The Commission however found that the production capacity of the Union industry increased by around 10,8 million items during that period (51,644 million items ²⁸ in 2013 to 62,475 million items ²⁹ in 2019). Thus the claim was not supported by any evidence and was therefore rejected.

• (208) After final disclosure, ACEA reiterated its claim that the Union industry cannot meet the demand in the Union, even in a disrupted market and a historical drop in demand.

• (209) The Commission observed that the capacity utilisation of the Union industry was at 80 % during the investigation period. Therefore, there was additional spare capacity to meet the demand. Also, there was no requirement that the Union industry was obliged to have the capacity to meet the total demand. Users could also import ARW from any of the producing third countries. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (210) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that it provided evidence demonstrating that the Union industry had no spare production capacity to offer and thus the Moroccan imports covered strategic needs for the car manufacturers. Moreover, ACEA provided evidence concerning the lack of Union industry production in 2016.

• (211) The Commission considered that the claim was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. For example, ACEA did not provide proof of any tender won by Moroccan suppliers where the Union producers did not participate in the bidding process. Regarding the lack of production, ACEA did not submit evidence showing a systemic issue as the evidence provided dated before the period considered. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (212) ACEA claimed that the Commission did not address the fact that the costs of the car manufacturers increased due to the cumulative effects of anti-dumping measures applied on other raw materials, parts and components used for car production.

• (213) The Commission noted that ACEA did not provide any supporting evidence regarding this claim. Even if the costs of their suppliers may have increased and passed on, fully or partially, to the car manufacturers, this appeared not to have led to a negative impact on their economic situation. As pointed out in recital 175 of the provisional Regulation, the car manufacturers published financial results for 2021 which exceeded the usual profits reported during the previous years. Finally, as already set out in recital 169 of the provisional Regulation, the percentage of the cost of ARWs in the production of a car is minor, approximately 0,5 %. Therefore, the impact of the measures on car manufacturers was very limited and the claim was rejected.

• (214) After final disclosure, ACEA disagreed with the Commission’s assessment in the above recital. ACEA submitted that the anti-dumping duties will represent an additional cost of EUR 241-413 million. This is a significant amount for the car manufacturers for an industry that continues to suffer from a low level of car production in the Union while having to absorb additional environmental costs.

• (215) The Commission observed that ACEA did not contest the Commission’s findings that the share of ARWs in the total cost of production of a car is minor, approximately 0,5 % and the relatively low anti-dumping duty would be only a fraction of this 0,5 %. No evidence was submitted demonstrating that the car manufacturers will not be able to absorb such costs. In addition, notwithstanding the correctness of the additional cost estimated by ACEA, the estimation of the additional costs was based on the Union target price and thus relates to the established injury margins. However, the duty was based on the dumping margins which was lower than the injury margins found and, as a result, the effects of the anti-dumping duty would be lower than the amounts estimated by ACEA. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

• (216) ACEA claimed that some of its members estimated that Moroccan suppliers are increasingly committed to monitor the CO2 impact of the supply chains. Therefore, redirecting supply to other third countries would significantly impact the capacity of car manufacturers to meet their CO2 reduction goals.

• (217) The Commission noted that ACEA did not provide any supporting evidence regarding this claim while information obtained during the verification visit of one cooperating user revealed that Moroccan imports face similar issue of their impact on car manufacturers’ CO2 reduction goals due to the distance between the Moroccan plants and the plant of the car manufacturers in the Union. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (218) After final disclosure, ACEA referred to its 10-point plan to help implement the European Green Deal ³⁰ as well as to the fact that User B provided evidence after the verification visit that Moroccan imports are important regarding the CO2 impact due to the geographic proximity of the Moroccan plants and the car manufacturer plants.

• (219) The Commission observed that the 10 point plan did not mention the impact of imports of wheels in general, and of Morocco in particular. Consequently, the plan did not constitute appropriate evidence with regard to the claim described in recital 216 above. In addition, User B indeed reported that it introduced the CO2 emission criterion for selecting suppliers and that the target is to decrease the distance between the plants and the suppliers and thus the carbon print. However, User B also stated that the competitiveness remains a very important factor for the selection of a supplier. In addition, the Commission did not find any evidence that this criterion was actually assessed by User B during the tendering process or that a producer was disregarded due to the CO2 emission criteria. Finally, even if this criterion would play a vital role in the future, the anti-dumping measures do not have as an objective to cease imports from Morocco, but rather to ensure that they enter the Union at fair prices. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (220) ACEA claimed that German Federal Cartel Office initiated in March 2022 an investigation against a Union producer, based on allegations of a conduct restricting competition. However, the Commission noted that no claim of possible effects on the findings of the investigation of such alleged behaviour was made. In any case, that investigation is still on-going and no findings have been reached yet. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (221) After final disclosure, ACEA claimed that the anti-dumping measures should not be applied pending the outcome of the investigation conducted by the German Federal Cartel Office in such exceptional circumstances and in line with the principles of sound administration and good administrative practice as developed in the seamless pipes case ³¹.

• (222) As already explained in recital 220 above, there has been no decision yet taken by the national administration. By contrast, in the seamless pipes case the duties were applied only after a definitive decision sanctioning the anti-competitive practice had been issued and when it had become apparent that that practice concerned the period considered in the investigation and that it covered the product concerned. None of these elements were present in the case at hand. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

7.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (223) On the basis of the above and in the absence of any other comments, the conclusions set out in recital 177 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

• (224) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

• (225) As indicated in recital 63, the dumping margins were slightly revised at the definitive stage.

• (226) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

• (227) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.

• (228) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission ³². The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (229) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

• (230) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.