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Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/112 of 18 January 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2023-01-19
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 4

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (120) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.
  • (121) As mentioned in recital 12, sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (122) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the replies to the anti-dumping questionnaire by the sampled producers as well as macroeconomic data provided by the non-sampled producers and the Union producers’ association, crosschecked with the data in the review request. The data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (123) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.
  • (124) The microeconomic indicators are: average item prices, item cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

5.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

5.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
  • (125) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Production quantity (in 000 items) 59 182 57 097 44 718 48 752
Index (2018 = 100) 100 96 76 82
Production capacity (in 000 items) 62 614 62 475 61 619 61 294
Index (2018 = 100) 100 100 98 98
Capacity utilisation (%) 95 91 73 80
Index (2018 = 100) 100 97 77 84
Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers.
  • (126) Overall, the production quantity of Union industry decreased by 18 % during the period considered. It slightly decreased by 4 % between 2018 and 2019. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the production decreased by 12,3 million items in 2020 and rebounded in the review investigation period by 4 million items.
  • (127) While the production capacity of the Union industry decreased by 2 %, the capacity utilisation followed the same negative trend as production and decreased by 15 % during the period considered.
5.4.2.2.   Sales quantity and market share
  • (128) The Union industry’s sales quantity and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales quantity and market share
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Sales quantity on the Union market (in 000 items) 57 501 55 502 43 110 45 391
Index (2018 = 100) 100 97 75 79
Market share (%) 73,8 75,2 72,4 70,6
Index (2018 = 100) 100 102 98 96
Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and sampled Union producers.
  • (129) The sales quantity of the Union industry on the Union market decreased by 21 % during the period considered. It decreased by 3 % between 2018 and 2019 and then dropped by 12,4 million items in 2020. During the review investigation period, the sales recovered by 2,2 million items.
  • (130) The market share of the Union industry slightly increased between 2018 and 2019, while it declined in 2020 and further in the review investigation period.
5.4.2.3.   Employment and productivity
  • (131) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Number of employees 17 816 17 866 16 963 16 790
Index (2018 = 100) 100 100 95 94
Productivity (item/employee) 3 322 3 196 2 636 2 904
Index (2018 = 100) 100 96 79 87
Source: EUWA and the sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and the sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and the sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and the sampled Union producers. Source: EUWA and the sampled Union producers.
  • (132) While the number of employees decreased by 6 % during the period considered, productivity decreased by 13 %. The decline in productivity was mainly due to the decrease in the production quantity over the period considered and resulted in increased labour costs per item of ARW produced.
5.4.2.4.   Growth
  • (133) As explained in Sections 5.4.2.1 to 5.4.2.3 above, the production quantity and the capacity utilisation of the Union industry decreased by 18 % and 16 %, respectively during the period considered, which resulted in higher fixed costs per item of production and in lower productivity. Total costs of the industry increased by 1,7 EUR/item (+ 3,4 %) over the period considered. However, the average selling price of the Union industry decreased by 3,3 EUR/item (– 6,1 %).
  • (134) Furthermore, the sales quantity on the Union market dropped by 21 % and the market share by 5 %, between 2018 and the review investigation period. Thus, the Union industry experienced a deterioration of its financial performance. As explained in Section 4.4.3.1 below, it faced higher cost of production while being unable to adjust its sales prices accordingly.
  • (135) Therefore, the growth perspectives of the Union industry have been jeopardised.
5.4.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
  • (136) During the review investigation period, the dumping continued and was significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the quantity and prices of imports from the country concerned.
  • (137) In the previous expiry review the Commission concluded that the Union industry no longer suffered material injury and thus it had recovered from the past dumping. In addition, the Commission provisionally found in the on-going investigation regarding imports from Morocco 43 that, during the review investigation period, the Union industry suffered material injury caused by the imports from Morocco to which imports from China did not contribute.
  • (138) Consequently, the Commission confirmed that the Union industry had recovered from the past dumping by imports from China before the dumped imports from Morocco started to enter the Union market in increasing volumes as from 2019.

5.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

5.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices
  • (139) The weighted average sales prices per item of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices in the Union
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Average sales price per item in the Union market (EUR/item) 53,9 52,3 49,3 50,6
Index (2018 = 100) 100 97 92 94
Cost of production per item (EUR/item) 49,9 48,2 49,3 51,6
Index (2018 = 100) 100 97 99 104
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (140) The average Union industry’s sales prices decreased by 6 % during the period considered although the average cost of production increased by 4 % between 2018 and the review investigation period. The Union industry was not able to increase its sales prices to cover the increased cost of production.
5.4.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (141) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR) 35 216 35 700 33 084 35 951
Index (2018 = 100) 100 101 94 102
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (142) The average labour cost per employee of the Union industry slightly increased by 2 % during the period considered with a small increase in 2019 and a decrease by 6 % in 2020, mainly because of production shutdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
5.4.3.3.   Inventories
  • (143) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Closing stocks (in 000 items) 556 439 492 776
Index (2018 = 100) 100 79 88 140
Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%) 0,9 0,8 1,1 1,6
Index (2018 = 100) 100 89 122 177
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (144) Inventories increased by 40 % over the period considered. They decreased by 21 % in 2019, by 12 % in 2020 and rebounded during the review investigation period by + 57 %. The ARW industry in the Union is characterised by multi-years framework contracts between producers and customers that fix the quantities and prices. These framework contracts are implemented through purchasing orders, according to customer’s needs. As a result, the Union industry can plan its production and inventories. Therefore, inventories are not a main indicator for the assessment of the Union industry’s performance.
5.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (145) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) 7,5 8,2 0,4 – 1,6
Index (2018 = 100) 100 109 5 – 21
Cash flow (in 000 EUR) 81 153 82 495 31 805 22 956
Index (2018 = 100) 100 102 39 28
Investments (in 000 EUR) 37 788 30 757 19 848 21 845
Index (2018 = 100) 100 81 53 58
Return on investments 12,0 9,1 0,3 – 0,5
Index (2018 = 100) 100 76 3 – 4
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (146) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.
  • (147) The profitability of the Union industry increased between 2018-2019 from 7,5 % to 8,2 % but then it declined sharply between 2019 and the review investigation period where losses were reported (– 1,6 %). The Union industry was not able to increase sales prices to cover the increased cost of production and therefore became loss making.
  • (148) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed downwards with a significant decrease by 72 % over the period considered. Therefore, the Union industry experienced difficulties to self-finance its activities, which is a further indication of its deteriorated financial situation.
  • (149) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It followed a similar negative trend as profitability and net cash flow. The return on investment decreased significantly between 2018 and the review investigation period and turned negative in the review investigation period. Therefore, the Union industry was not able to generate enough profits in order to cover its investments. Indeed, the Union industry maintained its investments during the period considered, mostly due to the necessity to comply with legal requirements and the needs of the market and it was not able to have a return on these investments. The negative development of the return on investment during the period considered further indicated that the overall financial situation of the Union industry worsened to a significant extent.
  • (150) The sampled Union producers’ ability to raise capital was affected by their deteriorated financial situation. The considerable decrease of the profitability and the net cash flow pointed to serious concerns as regards the liquidity situation of Union industry and its ability to raise capital to finance its operating activity and needed investments.

5.4.4.   Conclusion on injury

  • (151) The evolution of the micro and macro indicators during the period considered showed that the financial situation for the Union industry deteriorated. Overall, the trends of the main economic indicators worsened over the period considered.
  • (152) While the Union industry’s production capacity remained stable, the capacity utilisation decreased by 16 % between 2018 and the review investigation period, which resulted in higher fixed cost per tonne of ARW. Following the same trend, the Union industry’s sales quantity and market share in the period considered declined.
  • (153) The financial situation of the Union industry deteriorated mainly due to the increased cost of production, which could not be covered by a corresponding increase of its sales prices.
  • (154) The average Union industry’s sales prices decreased by 6 % during the period considered although the average cost of production increased by 9 % in the same period. The Union industry suffered losses as from 2020, which further increased in the review investigation period. While net investments decreased by 42 %, the return on investment became negative during the period considered. The trend of the cash flow was also negative, which affected the ability of the Union industry to self-finance its operations. The number of employees decreased during the same period by 6 %; however, the productivity decreased by 13 %, resulting in a higher labour cost per item of ARW.
  • (155) As set out above, economic indicators such as profitability, cash flow and return on investment deteriorated significantly during the period considered. Profitability became negative in 2020 and during the review investigation period. This negatively affected the ability of the Union industry to self-finance operations, to make necessary investments and to raise capital, thus impeding its growth and even threatening its survival. On the other hand, despite the declining trends, the Union industry still managed to maintain large sales volume and considerable market share.
  • (156) The Commission therefore concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.
  • (157) The Commission assessed whether there was a causal link between imports from the PRC and the injury suffered by Union industry.
  • (158) As explained in recital 114, the volumes from the PRC decreased by 29 % during the period considered and reached 3,4 % market share during the review investigation period. The Commission also found in recital 117 that the average price of the imports from China was above the average price charged by the Union industry during the review investigation period. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the injury suffered by the Union industry was not caused by the imports from the PRC during the review investigation period.
  • (159) At the same time, the Commission provisionally established in the separate on-going investigation concerning imports of ARWs from Morocco, that low priced imports from Morocco, which were not only undercutting but also exercising price suppression on the Union industry prices and came in significant quantities, caused the material injury suffered by the Union industry.
  • (160) Therefore, the Commission further examined the likelihood of recurrence of injury if the measures lapse.

6. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

  • (161) The Commission concluded in recital 156 that the Union industry did not suffer material injury from imports originating in the PRC during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the PRC if the measures were allowed to lapse.
  • (162) In order to establish whether there is a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the country concerned, the Commission considered the following elements: (i) production volume and spare capacity in the PRC and attractiveness of the Union market; (ii) likely price levels of imports from the PRC and their impact on the Union industry’s situation, should the measures allowed to lapse; and (iii) the existence of circumvention practices.

6.1.   Production volume and spare capacity in the PRC – attractiveness of the Union market

  • (163) As set out in recital 101, the production capacity in the PRC substantially exceeded the production volumes and demand on the Chinese domestic market. Given in addition the conclusions on the attractiveness of the Union market as described in recitals 104 and 105, such spare capacity will very likely largely be used to increase exports to the Union market, if measures were allowed to lapse.

6.2.   Likely price levels of imports from the PRC and their impact on the Union industry’s situation should the measures lapse

  • (164) In order to assess the impact of future imports on the situation of the Union industry, the Commission considered that price levels of the Chinese exports to other third markets would be a reasonable indicator of future price levels to the Union market.
  • (165) As set out in the recitals 102 to 105, the Commission analysed the price level of Chinese exports to other third markets and found these export prices were significantly lower when compared with the Union industry prices (i.e. 13 %). Therefore, the Union market, in terms of prices, remains very attractive for Chinese producers.
  • (166) Considering the above, and if confronted with an increase of low priced imports from the PRC, the Union producers, in an attempt to keep sales volumes and market shares, would be forced to reduce their prices. This would have an impact on the industry’s overall profitability, which would deteriorate even further in an already loss-making situation (– 1,6 %) during the review investigation period.
  • (167) On the other hand, if the Union industry would keep its current price levels, this would have an almost immediate negative impact on its sales and production volume as well as its market share. Moreover, a decrease in production volume would result in an increase of the item costs of production due to reduced benefits of economy of scale. This would further deteriorate the Union industry’s profitability and result into further losses already in the short term.
  • (168) With a loss of profitability, the Union industry would not be able to carry out necessary investments. Ultimately, this would also lead to loss of employment and risk of closure of production lines.

6.3.   Conclusion

  • (169) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the expiry of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at lower prices than the ones of the Union industry, and therefore further aggravate the already negative situation of the Union industry. It is highly likely that this would lead to a recurrence of material injury and as a consequence, the viability of the Union industry would be at serious risk.

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (170) If ARWs imports originating from Morocco are subject to anti-dumping measures, the only cause for material injury which would remain would be the imports from China. Therefore, should the measures against China be let to expire, the material injury caused by the imports from that country will resume.
  • (171) The effect of anti-dumping measures will be positive for the Union producers, as measures will help the Union industry to adapt its sales prices to cover the increased cost of production. Therefore, measures would help the Union industry return to a sustainable situation, allowing it to make future investments, in particular to comply with environmental and social requirements.
  • (172) In the absence of measures, the Union industry no longer be protected against the likely increase of cheap imports from China, which will cause material injury. As a result, its financial situation, in particular in terms of profitability, return on investments and cash flow, would be expected to worsen further.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers, traders and users

  • (173) The Commission contacted all known unrelated importers, traders and users. None of them replied to the Commission’s questionnaire.
  • (174) The Commission did not receive any comments indicating that the maintenance of the measures would have a significant negative impact on the importers and users, outweighing the positive impact of the measures on the Union industry.

7.3.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (175) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons indicating that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures on imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC.

8. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

  • (176) Based on the conclusions reached by the Commission concerning the continuation of dumping from the PRC, the recurrence of injury caused by dumped imports from the PRC, and the Union interest, the Commission found that the anti-dumping measures on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the PRC should be maintained.
  • (177) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. No comments were received.
  • (178) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council 44 when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.
  • (179) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of aluminium road wheels of the motor vehicles of CN headings 8701 to 8705, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted with tyres, currently falling under CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50 (TARIC codes 8708701015, 8708701050, 8708705015 and 8708705050) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.

The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 22,3 %.

3.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

Where a declaration for release for free circulation is presented in respect of imports of aluminium road wheels of vehicles of CN heading 8716, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted with tyres, and currently falling under CN code ex 8716 90 90, TARIC code 8716909015 or 8716909050 shall be entered in the relevant field of that declaration. Member States shall, on a monthly basis, inform the Commission of the number of items imported under this code, and of their origin.

Article 3

Where a declaration for release for free circulation is presented in respect of the products mentioned under Articles 1 and 2, the number of items of the products imported shall be entered in the relevant field of that declaration.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 January 2023.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 964/2010 of 25 October 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 282, 28.10.2010, p. 1).

3

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/109 of 23 January 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 18, 24.1.2017, p. 1).

4

Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 47, 10.2.2015, p. 4).

5

Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 29, 20.1.2022, p. 34).

6

https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2575

8

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402 of 9 March 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foil originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 83, 10.3.2022, p. 7); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/546 of 29 March 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of aluminium extrusions originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 109, 30.3.2021, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582 of 9 April 2021 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aluminium flat-rolled products originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 124, 12.4.2021, p. 40); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983 of 17 June 2021 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aluminium converter foil originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 216, 18.6.2021, p. 142).

9

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recitals 50-52; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 125-131 and 185-188; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 80-86 and 140-143.

10

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recital 39; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1428 of 12 October 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aluminium extrusions originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 336, 13.10.2020, p. 8), recitals 98-104; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 132-137; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 87-92.

11

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recitals 40-42; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 138-143; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 93-98. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including the producers of aluminium wheels and the suppliers of their inputs.

12

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recitals 43-45; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 144-166; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 99-120.

13

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recital 46; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 167-171; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 121-125.

14

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recital 47; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 172-173; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 126-127.

15

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/402, recital 48; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 174-184; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 128-139.

16

Commission Staff Working document on significant distortions in the economy of the People’s Republic of China, SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20.12.2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf

17

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/915 of 4 June 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 146, 5.6.2019, p. 63), Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/546; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582.

18

OECD Trade Policy Papers, No 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en

19

https://www.citic.com/ar2020/en/manufacturing/auto-components/

20

http://www.znlwheel.com/news/detail.aspx?AID=100000131158951&NodeCode=101030001

21

http://www.zjzzgz.gov.cn/art/2018/11/8/art_1513449_29551627.html

22

http://www.caam.org.cn/chn/42/cate_478/con_5084242.htm

23

CAAM Articles of Association: http://www.caam.org.cn/chn/2/cate_8/con_5223238.html

24

The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), available at https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf (last viewed 6 May 2021).

25

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 147-155; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recitals 102-109.

26

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/582, recitals 156-158; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/983, recital 111.

27

Full text of the plan available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html

28

https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_4ac49eddca6f43d68ed17465109b6001.html

29

http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/art/2021/11/18/art_15681_10296248.html https://h5.drcnet.com.cn/docview.aspx?version=integrated

30

See Report, chapter 6.

31

See 2021 Zhejiang Wanfeng Aowei Auto Wheel Annual Report, p. 192 http://www.wfaw.com.cn/gongsigonggao/download-265.html

32

See Dongfeng Motors 2021 Annual Report, p. 153: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2022/2022-3/2022-03-31/7941734.PDF

33

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

34

If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

35

Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value and, in any event, such import data was negligible.

36

https://www.ibge.gov.br/en/statistics/economic/industry-and-construction/16906-pia-enterprise-pia1.html?=&t=o-que-e

37

http://www.edp.com.br/distribuicao-es/saiba-mais/informativos/tarifas-aplicadas-a-clientes-atendidos-em-alta-e-media-tensao-(grupo-a)

38

https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/Brazil/

39

http://site.sabesp.com.br/site/interna/Default.aspx?secaoId=183

40

Annex D.1 of the Request for review.

41

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/109.

42

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1221 of 14 July 2022 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in Morocco (OJ L 188, 15.7.2022, p. 114).

43

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1221, recital 154.

44

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

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