Legalize
Legalize / European Union / Implementing Regulation

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752 of 12 April 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2023-04-13
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 2

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (130) The Union industry provided information showing that the transport cost from China to the Union has significantly increased in the review investigation period, reaching EUR 210 to EUR 250 per tonne. This temporary cost increase would be, by far, the main factor explaining the relatively high export price of Chinese sodium gluconate during the review investigation period. Taking into account the above average transport cost, the ex-works price of Chinese sodium gluconate exported to the Union would be at around EUR 600 per tonne, namely between 20 to 30 % lower than the ex-work price of the Union industry.
  • (131) The Commission also collected publicly available information 53 suggesting that the output of the main Chinese producers decreased by 5,4 %. In parallel, the price of corn starch, the main raw material used to produce sodium gluconate, was increasing in 2021. According to the same public source, the ex-work price of Chinese sodium gluconate increased in 2021 was, on average, at EUR 560/tonne. This price is between 25 to 35 % below the ex-works price of the Union Industry and confirms that the Chinese price level observed during the review investigation period is mainly due to the temporary increase in transport costs.
  • (132) Based on another public source 54, it was estimated that the average transport cost from China to the EU in 2021 was around EUR 130 – 170/tonne, namely 3 times the cost of 2020. Adding the average transport costs to the average ex-works price for all Chinese sodium gluconate would lead to a constructed average export price at around EUR 700/tonne. This price concerns all types of sodium gluconate produced in China.
  • (133) A price comparison on that basis would lead to an average price undercutting of 9 % of Union industry turnover, when anti-dumping duties are not taken into account.

5.5.   Imports from third countries other than China

  • (134) As mentioned in recital (31) sodium gluconate is produced in China, in the United States and in the Union. The imports of sodium gluconate from third countries other than China were negligible (well below 1 % of Union consumption) during the review investigation period. It is therefore considered that these imports did not have any material impact on the Union market during the period considered. For this reason, the Commission did not consider these imports further in its injury analysis.

Table 5

Imports from third countries
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Rest of the world Volume (tonnes) [3 -4 ] [1 -2 ] [6 -7 ] [5 -6 ]
Index 100 54 186 146
Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat.

5.6.   Economic situation of the Union industry

5.6.1.   General remarks

  • (135) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.
  • (136) The Union industry is composed of two producers. The bigger producer (the applicant) fully cooperated by filling in the Union producer questionnaire and providing all data necessary for the injury analysis. Both producers provided the information, which allowed establishing the macroeconomic injury indicators. The smaller producer did not provide a response to the Union producer questionnaire.
  • (137) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The macroeconomic indicators were established on the basis of data contained in the request for review, the verified questionnaire reply of the cooperating Union producer, and data provided by the smaller Union producer. This covered the macroeconomic data relating to the two Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the verified questionnaire reply of the cooperating Union producer. The sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (138) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.
  • (139) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

5.6.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

5.6.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
  • (140) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6 A

Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Production volume (tonnes) [47 169 -57 099 ] [46 207 -55 935 ] [47 376 -57 350 ] [50 049 -60 586 ]
Index 100 98 100 106
Production capacity (tonnes) [55 765 -67 505 ] [55 765 -67 505 ] [55 765 -67 505 ] [55 765 -67 505 ]
Index 100 100 100 100
Capacity utilisation (%) [80 -97 ] [79 -95 ] [81 -98 ] [85 -100 ]
Index 100 98 100 106
Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry.
  • (141) Production of sodium gluconate increased by 6 % during the period considered, in particular during the review investigation period. The investigation showed that the main reasons for this increase were the increase in export sales (+ 18 %) and a higher captive use (+ 14 %) for downstream products in that period.
  • (142) This positive trend in production allowed the Union industry to make economies of scale with a higher utilisation of production capacity and to decrease certain costs, in particular during the review investigation period.
  • (143) As already stated above, the table below shows that the share of production intended for captive use is important and represents around 35 to 45 % of total production. That share increased by 14 % and remained important for the Union Industry during the period considered. Both producers composing the Union industry use sodium gluconate for downstream products. This means that the production of sodium gluconate is very important for the whole activity and the survival of the Union industry in the medium and long term.
  • (144) The production capacity of the Union industry remained unchanged during the entire period considered. The table below shows that the increase in capacity utilisation was mainly due to an increased demand in the export markets and by downstream activities. Sales in the Union market remained by and large stable during the period considered.

Table 6B

Union production intended for captive use
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Production volume (tonnes) [18 294 -22 145 ] [17 792 -21 538 ] [20 758 -25 128 ] [20 822 -25 206 ]
Index 100 97 113 114
Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry.
  • (145) The production intended for captive use represents a large share of the Union industry production and activity. The internal demand for sodium gluconate increased in particular in 2020 and in the review investigation period. As mentioned in recital (141), it allowed the Union industry to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs.
5.6.2.2.   Sales volume and market share
  • (146) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Union sales volume and market share
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Sales volume on the Union market (tonnes) [17 896 -21 664 ] [17 114 -20 717 ] [15 908 -19 256 ] [18 128 -21 944 ]
Index 100 96 89 101
Market share (%) [93 -97 ] [91 -95 ] [88 -93 ] [90 -94 ]
Index 100 97 96 97
Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry.
  • (147) The sales of sodium gluconate on the free market slightly increased by 1 % over the period considered. Sales volume decreased by 11 % up to 2020, then recovered during the review investigation period.
  • (148) Although the Union market was growing, the Union industry lost 3 percentage points of market share to Chinese imports in the review investigation period. The loss of market share was particularly pronounced between 2018 and 2020 (4 percentage points) and could not be recovered in the upturn of the free market during the review investigation period. Nevertheless, the market share of the Union industry stayed well below the level at the beginning of the period considered.
5.6.2.3.   Growth
  • (149) The investigation showed that, on the one hand certain volume indicators such as production (+ 6 %) and in parallel, employment (+ 4 %) developed positively, in particular during the review investigation period. On the other hand, even if sales in the free market increased marginally and production capacity remained stable, the Union industry lost 3 percentage points of market share to imports from China and its investments had to be reduced by more than 50 % over the period considered.
  • (150) It is recalled that production developed positively because of a higher demand in the export markets and in the downstream products of the Union industry. Despite the measures in force and an increase in the free market consumption by 4 %, the Union industry could only increase its sales on the Union market by 1 % during the period considered.
5.6.2.4.   Employment and productivity
  • (151) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity in the Union
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Number of employees [48 -59 ] [49 -60 ] [50 -61 ] [50 -61 ]
Index 100 102 104 104
Productivity (tonne/FTE) [926 -1 121 ] [892 -1 079 ] [898 -1 087 ] [948 -1 148 ]
Index 100 96 97 102
Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry. Source: Data provided by the Union industry.
  • (152) The number of employees in the Union industry increased by 4 % up to 2020 and then stabilized in the review investigation period. As a result of the decrease in production and increased employment in 2019, productivity temporarily decreased in that year. It improved in 2020 and especially in the review investigation period, in line with an increasing production.
5.6.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
  • (153) The original dumping margins ranged from 5,6 % to 79,2 %. The investigation showed that Chinese prices were very low from 2018 to 2020. They were on average 15 to 25 % lower than prices charged by the Union industry to its Union customers in the same period. This situation did not allow the Union industry to recover from past dumping. Profitability was negative or close to break-even and investments were significantly reduced. The analysis of the injury indicators shows that the Union industry was still impacted by past injurious dumping up to 2020. The measures in place only had a positive impact as from the review investigation period.
  • (154) The dumping margin established during the review investigation period was significant.

5.6.3.   Microeconomic indicators

5.6.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices
  • (155) The weighted average unit sales prices of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union developed as follows over the period considered:

Table 9

Sales prices in the Union and unit cost of production
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Average unit sales price in the Union (EUR/tonne) [685 -829 ] [722 -875 ] [712 -862 ] [719 -870 ]
Index 100 105 104 105
Unit cost of production (EUR/tonne) [695 -841 ] [735 -890 ] [702 -850 ] [668 -809 ]
Index 100 106 101 96
Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer.
  • (156) The Union industry concludes yearly, in some cases two years, contracts with its customers. The investigation showed that the average sales price established on an ex-works basis increased by 5 % during the period considered. The main price increase took place in 2019 to respond to a similar increase in costs. After that, prices remained by and large stable up to the end of the review investigation period.
  • (157) The unit cost of production increased by 6 % in 2019, coinciding with a decrease in production (– 2 %) and sales volume in the free market (– 4 %). Subsequently, the unit cost of production decreased by 9 % between 2019 and the review investigation period. Overall, the unit cost of production decreased by 4 % during the period considered. The decrease was due to a reduction of certain direct costs and selling, general and administrative expenses.
5.6.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (158) The average labour costs of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Average labour costs per employee (EUR/FTE) [82 630 -100 026 ] [71 828 -86 950 ] [71 910 -87 049 ] [80 332 -97 244 ]
Index 100 87 87 97
Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer.
  • (159) Average labour costs decreased by 3 % during the period considered. In any event, as labour represents only a minor portion of the production cost, this should not be considered a meaningful indicator in the analysis of the economic situation of the Union industry.
5.6.3.3.   Inventories
  • (160) Stock levels of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Closing stocks (tonne) [1 784 -2 160 ] [2 148 -2 601 ] [1 959 -2 371 ] [1 596 -1 932 ]
Index 100 120 110 89
Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%) 4 5 4 3
Index 100 123 109 84
Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer.
  • (161) The level of inventories increased between 2018 and 2019 (+ 20 %) and then showed a decrease (– 26 %) between 2019 and the review investigation period. Overall, the level of inventories decreased by 11 % over the period considered. The investigation has shown that production of sodium gluconate is destined to both captive use by the Union industry and sales in the free market. The Union industry has shown that it could be flexible to meet its customers and internal needs and that it is mainly producing on orders for the free market. The level of stocks could thus be kept at a minimum level (3–5 % of production).
5.6.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (162) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union Industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments
2018 2019 2020 Review investigation period (2021)
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) [–10 -– 1 ] [–11 -– 1 ] [0 -+10 ] [5 -+20 ]
Index – 100 – 104 34 293
Cash flow (EUR) [–1 001 175 –185 632 ] [– 591 908 -– 111 256 ] [571 495 - 691 810 ] [1 064 837 - 1 289 013 ]
Index – 100 –23 142 265
Investments (EUR) [282 981 - 342 556 ] [140 951 - 170 624 ] [158 832 - 192 271 ] [116 361 - 140 858 ]
Index 100 50 56 41
Return on investments (%) [–30 -– 37 ] [–21 -– 25 ] [–11 -– 14 ] [12 -16 ]
Index – 100 –68 –39 42
Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer. Source: Verified data provided by the cooperating Union producer.
  • (163) The Commission established the profitability of the Union industry by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.
  • (164) The Union industry was loss-making during the first two years of the period considered and became slightly profitable in 2020. Profitability improved further in the review investigation period but remained still below the target profit used in the original investigation. The improvement of the profitability in 2020 and the review investigation period was mainly due to lower direct costs, the recovery in production volume and lower selling, general and administrative costs. The Union industry was able to achieve economies of scale by increasing its production and reducing costs, in particular in the review investigation period. It shows that the Union industry, which is still in a vulnerable position, is able to recover further in a market governed by effective competition conditions.
  • (165) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. It was established on the basis of the entire sodium gluconate sales activity of the Union industry during the period considered. It was negative in 2018 and 2019 and turned positive in 2020 and further improved during the review investigation period, in line with the recovery in profitability. Such development should be sustained in the medium term to produce lasting positive effects on the Union industry.
  • (166) The return on investments is established on the basis of the profit of all sales of the product under review in percentage of the net book value of investments. As explained in recital (155), sales prices were relatively stable and in recital (163), costs could be decreased between 2020 and the review investigation period. This led to the recovery of profitability for sales made to unrelated customers in the Union market and allowed this indicator to develop positively during the period considered.
  • (167) During the period considered, the Union industry’s investments in its sodium gluconate activity decreased substantially by 50 to 60 %. The Union industry kept the injection of fresh capital to a minimum by lowering its level of investment to almost negligible amounts. Therefore, the ability to raise capital could not be analysed and no conclusion could be drawn. Nevertheless, it is clear that such a low level of investment could not ensure production continuity in the medium term.

5.7.   Conclusion on injury

  • (168) The investigation showed that the Chinese exporting producers managed to increase their import volume and market share, which significantly grew by 45 % in 2019 and a further 30 % in 2020. In that period, it was found that the Chinese average import price was between 15 to 25 % below the Union industry price. The Chinese exporting producers managed to keep this market share despite a higher average import price in the review investigation period. Given the absence of cooperation from Chinese exporters and the unavailability of relevant price data, such as the product mix to perform a meaningful price comparison, no reliable conclusion could be drawn on price undercutting.
  • (169) The Union industry sales volume and market share developed negatively during the first three years of the period considered. The decline in sales volume (– 4 %) was more pronounced than the decline in consumption (– 2 %) in 2019 and sales further decreased by 7 % in 2020. Between 2018 and 2019, production remained by and large stable but inventories significantly increased (up to 20 %) due to reduced sales. Profitability was negative but eventually became slightly profitable in 2020. Between 2020 and the RIP, the Union industry managed to increase its sales volumes (+ 12 %) and market share (+ 1 %). It also managed to decrease its cost of production to further improve profitability during the RIP.
  • (170) At the same time, the investigation showed that the Union industry did not fully benefit from the market growth during the period considered. Whilst consumption in the free market increased by 4 %, sales of the Union industry slightly increased by 1 % and thus lost 3 percentage points of market share.
  • (171) To summarize, the investigation showed that injury indicators such as production, capacity utilisation and employment, together with financial indicators such as profitability, cash flow and return on investments, developed positively, in particular in the review investigation period. Profitability and cash flow became positive as from 2020, and the return on investments become positive in the review investigation period.
  • (172) On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission concluded that the Union industry has started to recover from previous injurious dumping and did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period. It is nevertheless considered that even if the recent developments in the economic situation of the Union industry showed signs of recovery, the industry is still in a vulnerable situation.

6. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

  • (173) The investigation showed that the Chinese imports entered the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period and that there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should measures be allowed to lapse.
  • (174) The Commission concluded in recital (172) that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by dumped imports from China if the measures were allowed to lapse.
  • (175) The Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in China, the likely price levels of imports from China in the absence of anti-dumping measures and their impact on the Union industry, and the attractiveness of the Union market.
  • (176) As set out in recitals (95) to (98) above, there is substantial production capacity and spare capacity in China to increase exports to the Union market rapidly in the event that the anti-dumping measures were allowed to expire. As established in recital (96), in the review investigation period, Chinese exporting producers had a capacity of around 1 300 000 tonnes, which equals more than 50 times the Union consumption on the free market. Based on data provided by the Union industry, this capacity will be increased substantially in the next years. No other party questioned this data nor provided any other elements in this respect.
  • (177) Publicly available 55 data confirms that the output of sodium gluconate in China increased compared to previous years of the period considered and was at 701 400 tonnes in the review investigation period. This means that the utilisation of capacity was around 54 % and the excess in capacity around 600 000 tonnes in that period. This is more than 25 times the Union consumption in the free market.
  • (178) Although it is expected that consumption of sodium gluconate will increase in the next years, the low utilisation of capacity supports the Union industry’s claim that Chinese capacity is far exceeding the internal needs. The spare capacity in China cannot be absorbed by the Chinese market, considering any reasonable expectation of its growth. Therefore, there are strong incentives for Chinses producers to export, in particular to the Union market, even more so if the measures are allowed to lapse.
  • (179) According to the Union industry, excess in production capacities is an incentive to continue exporting at dumped prices. It is clear that Chinese exporters must exploit all existing possibilities to increase production to fully benefit from the significant investments they made in installed capacities. The most obvious way is to penetrate any open market worldwide and very likely at dumped prices as it is still the case in the current investigation. Considering the decrease in transport cost in 2022 56 and the expected price level in the Union, imports of Chinese sodium gluconate would very likely increase to large quantities at dumped prices in the Union market if the measures are allowed to lapse.
  • (180) The investigation showed that the average price of Chinese sodium gluconate to the EU during the review investigation period, was higher than the average export price charged by Chinese exporters to other destinations, see recital (101). Exporting sodium gluconate to the EU if the trade defence measures are allowed to lapsed, would thus make economic sense, especially given that Chinese exporting producers have large production capacity available and could easily increase their production even without diverting (less economically attractive) sales volume to the EU.
  • (181) Finally, the Union industry recalled that the United States, the only country with sodium gluconate production other than China and the EU, also established that Chinese exporting producers of sodium gluconate were selling at dumped prices in their market. In parallel, these producers were also found to benefit from public subsidies encouraging exports. As explained in recital (105), the trade defence measures in place in the United States effectively limit the entry of Chinese sodium gluconate in that market.
  • (182) In the rest of the world, Chinese exporting producers dominate the supply of sodium gluconate. According to data provided by the Union industry, Chinese manufacturers have a dominant market share in Africa (above 90 % in 2021), in the Middle East above (99 %) and in countries of Europe not members of the EU (almost 80 %) 57.
  • (183) The applicant maintained that there was a temporary distortion in the Chinese prices in 2021 and early 2022 as the exceptionally high freight rates for container shipments from China to overseas destinations resulted in increased prices of Chinese products. This rendered the offers of the Union industry more competitive 58. Therefore, the Union industry could slightly increase its sales volume and implement a higher price level. However, the applicant also claimed that the trend of increasing freight costs had recently changed and that Chinese exporting producers were selling again at lower prices which do not allow the Union industry to compete on fair terms. The decreasing freight cost in 2022 is also confirmed by the publicly available data mentioned in recital (178) above.
  • (184) This claim was also supported by very low quotations offered by certain Chinese exporters to Union customers in 2022 59. As explained in recitals (96) to (98) above, the large spare production capacities in China could easily be used and a high volume of Chinese dumped imports would very likely re-enter the Union market in significant quantities. These high volumes of low-priced sodium gluconate would exert a significant price pressure on the Union industry and would most likely result in decreasing sales volume and prices. Hence, the economic situation of the Union industry is likely to deteriorate quickly jeopardizing its recent recovery and its survival in the short to medium term.
  • (185) Taking into account the significant increase of the price of raw materials which has already taken place in 2022 and which is foreseen to continue in 2023 60, profitability of the Union industry is likely to be negatively affected. Even more so, if the measures were allowed to lapse which would in addition very likely lead to a surge of increased quantities of dumped imports from China, thus transforming the Union industry in a loss making industry. This situation would lead to the disappearance of the sodium gluconate production in the Union and of the downstream activities of the Union industry within a relatively short period of time. In this case, the worldwide production of sodium gluconate would be reduced to China and the United States which could impact the security of supply in the Union.
  • (186) In view of the above facts and considerations, namely the large spare capacities in China, the need for Chinese exporters to increase production and find new markets, the attractiveness of the Union market and the limited access of Chinese exporters to the United States’ market, the recent decrease in transport costs and the low level of prices currently offered to customers in the EU by Chinese exporters, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China at injurious prices and material injury would be likely to recur.

7. UNION INTEREST

  • (187) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.
  • (188) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.
  • (189) On this basis the Commission examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed, which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (190) As stated in recital (171), the Union industry showed that it was able to recover from injurious dumping in a market governed by effective trade conditions. The share it holds on the US market further confirms that its operations are viable when not subject to unfair competition by dumped imports. Nevertheless, as explained in recital (171) above, the industry is still in a vulnerable state.
  • (191) The trade defence measures currently in force in the EU and the United States aim at establishing an effective and competitive environment for all producers of sodium gluconate but also for all other operators. Data provided by the applicant show that whilst Chinese producers have less than 5 % market share in the United States’ market, EU producers have around 20 % market share. This demonstrates that the Union industry is competitive and is not ready to abandon this sales segment, which is unique in the Union.
  • (192) Based on the above, it was concluded that extending the measures in force against the PRC would be in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

  • (193) As stated in recital (18), no unrelated importer cooperated during the investigation.
  • (194) The current investigation did not reveal any significant adverse impact of the measures in force on importers.
  • (195) The previous expiry review investigation concluded that importers could be negatively affected by the measures but to a very limited extent. It was found that the share of sodium gluconate represented less than 5 % of the turnover of the importers which cooperated in the previous expiry review.
  • (196) Based on information available, the Commission considers that the maintenance of measures would have a very limited impact, if at all, on importers and such impact would be clearly outweighed by the benefits that the measures could bring to the Union industry.

7.3.   Interest of users

  • (197) None of the users of sodium gluconate cooperated in the investigation.
  • (198) It was found in the previous expiry review investigation, that for the cooperating user, sodium gluconate represented less than 5 % of the cost of manufacturing of the finished products incorporating sodium gluconate. Any increase in the price of sodium gluconate should thus have a limited impact on the users’ activities.
  • (199) The investigation also showed that the Union industry behaved in a reasonable way in terms of price setting. In 2019, when prices of the Union industry increased on average by 5 %, it was to respond to a 6 % costs increase in that year. During the review investigation period, when Chinese prices for certain types of sodium gluconate were higher than the Union Industry, the Union industry price remained stable.
  • (200) In the absence of cooperation, and as was the case in the previous investigation, the current investigation did not reveal any significant adverse impact of the measures on users.
  • (201) Therefore, from the information available, the Commission concluded that the impact, if any, on users of the continuation of measures would be limited.

7.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (202) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the PRC.

8. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

  • (203) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on sodium gluconate from the PRC should be maintained.
  • (204) To minimize the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.
  • (205) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.
  • (206) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.
  • (207) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the PRC and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.
  • (208) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission 61. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
  • (209) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. No comments were received.
  • (210) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council 62 when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.
  • (211) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of dry sodium gluconate, with a Customs Union and Statistics (CUS) number 0023277-9 and a Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number 527-07-1, currently falling under CN code ex 2918 16 00 (TARIC code 2918160010) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.

The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

Company Definitive anti-dumping duty (%) TARIC additional code
Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co., Ltd 5,6 A972
Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd 27,1 A973
All other companies 53,2 A999
3.

The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product under review) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 April 2023.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 965/2010 of 25 October 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 282, 28.10.2010, p. 24).

3

Commission implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2229 of 9 December 2016 terminating the partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China, limited to one Chinese exporting producer, Shandong Kaison (OJ L 336, 10.12.2016, p. 40).

4

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/94 of 19 January 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 16, 20.1.2017, p. 3).

6

Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of Sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 25, 18.1.2022, p. 8).

7

https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2570

8

https://www.gtis.com/gta/

9

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/116 of 27 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of acesulfame potassium originating in the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 19, 28.1.2022, p. 22).

10

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1924 of 10 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium cyclamate originating in the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 264, 11.10.2022, p. 12).

11

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2001 of 21 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame originating in the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 274, 24.10.2022, p. 24).

12

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 82-88 and 121-122, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recitals 71-77 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recitals 105-108.

13

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 91-92, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recitals 55-56 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recital 94.

14

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 93-94, 96, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recital 57-61 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recitals 95-96: While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of acesulfame potassium and the suppliers of their inputs.

15

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 97-100, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recitals 62-67 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recitals 97-101.

16

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 101-104, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recital 68 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recital 102.

17

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 105-106, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recital 69 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recital 103.

18

Regulation (EU) 2022/116, recitals 107-117, Regulation (EU) 2022/1924, recital 70 and Regulation (EU) 2022/2001, recital 104.

19

Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20. 12. 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2017)483&lang=en

20

See the request, pages 19-20.

21

See the request, page 20.

22

See the request, page 20.

23

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/633 of 14 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of monosodium glutamate originating in the People’s Republic of China and in Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 63); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/607 of 14 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of citric acid originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of citric acid consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council l (OJ L 129, 15.4.2021, p. 73); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/441 of 11 March 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sulphanilic acid originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 85, 12.3.2021, p. 154); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336 of 25 September 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain polyvinyl alcohols originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 315, 29.9.2020, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/39 of 16 January 2020 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of peroxosulphates (persulphates) originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 13, 17.1.2020, p. 18).

24

See US DOC, ITA, Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation of Sodium Gluconate, gluconic acid and derivative products (GNA) from the People’s Republic of China, 2 May 2018; Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Determination in Countervailing Duty Investigation of Sodium Gluconate, gluconic acid and derivative products from the People’s Republic of China, 17 September 2018.

25

CSIA Articles of Association available at: http://www.siacn.org/

26

See the article on CSIA’s website: https://www.siacn.org.cn/ds/2209ce7a3f.html

27

China Industrial Economic Information Network, ‘Private Entrepreneur Speech | Zhang Dada, Chairman of Shandong Fuyang Biotechnology Co., Ltd.: Promote the construction of high-tech projects and build the world’s top biological product manufacturing base’ published on 16 August 2021 (original text in Chinese), available at: http://www.cinic.org.cn/xy/dezhou/cjgc/1139848.html

28

Full text of the 14th Five Year Plan (‘FYP’) on Economic and Social Development available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202103/t20210323_1270124.html?code=&state=123

29

Full text of the 14th FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html

30

Full text of the Guiding Opinions to Promote the High-Quality Development of the Petrochemical and Chemical Industries during 14FYP available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm#msdynttrid=WRmyf07ph0z74SHmXoOLKjRWl09BdZ4lGdYp9fiI9xU

31

Full text of the ‘MOA + 15 administrations’ Notice of Several Policy Measures to Support the High Quality Development of Agricultural Products’ Deep Processing available at: http://www.xccys.moa.gov.cn/gzdt/201901/t20190102_6314547.htm

32

Article 1 of Shandong province’s Notice of a Plan fostering the building of a strong agricultural province (2021—2025). Full text of the document available at: http://www.shandong.gov.cn/art/2021/10/28/art_107851_114919.html

33

Heilongjiang province’s 14FYP on Developing Corn Processing Industry, box 3.3. Full text available at: https://zwgk.hlj.gov.cn/zwgk/publicInfo/detail?id=450171

34

See Ministry of Agriculture website: http://www.moa.gov.cn/xw/qg/202012/t20201207_6357665.htm

35

See Ministry of Agriculture website: http://www.moa.gov.cn/xw/qg/202206/t20220614_6402372.htm

36

http://www.moa.gov.cn/xw/qg/202206/t20220614_6402372.htm

37

Article 3.4. Full text of the document published on Jilin government’s website: http://xxgk.jl.gov.cn/szf/gkml/202112/t20211227_8357122.html

38

See Jilin province’s website: http://www.jl.gov.cn/szfzt/tzcj/zdxm/ncpjg/201902/t20190215_5605767.html

39

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

40

If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

41

Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value and, in any event, such import data was negligible.

42

https://www.ilo.org/ilostat

43

www.enel.com.co

44

Sodium Gluconate and Glucono Delta-Lactone’s Major Producers Capacity and Output in China in 2021, published April 2022.

45

Corn Products China News July 2022; Corn Products China News September 2022.

46

BBCA Biochemical: 60 000 tonnes, Shandong Fuyang Biotechnology (through Dezhou Heyang Biotechnology): 200 000 tonnes, and Tongliao Zhongyuan Biological Development: 30 000 tonnes.

47

See: http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2022-01/26/content_78011624.htm

48

KComber/CCM and and ThinkReal.

49

Exhibit 23 of the verification report: Chinese export statistics (all destinations)/Chinese export statistics (EU 27 destinations).

50

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/13/2018-24705/sodium-gluconate-gluconic-acid-and-derivative-products-from-the-peoples-republic-of-china

51

See submission of Jungbunzlauer ‘Exhibit 23’.

52

See submission of Jungbunzlauer ‘Exhibit 23’.

53

Sodium Gluconate and Glucono Delta-Lactone's Major Producers Capacity and Output in China in 2021 (marketresearch.com) https://www.marketresearch.com/CCM-International-Limited-v3539/Sodium-Gluconate-Glucono-Delta-Lactone-32039947/#:~:text = In%202017 %E2 %80 %932021 %2C%20the%20output%20of%20sodium%20gluconate%20in,which%20was%205,44 %25 %20lower%20than%20that%20of%202020.

54

China to Europe container freight rate index | Statista

Shipping costs quadruple to record highs on China-Europe ‘bottleneck’ | Financial Times (ft.com)

55

Sodium Gluconate and Glucono Delta-Lactone's Major Producers Capacity and Output in China in 2021 (marketresearch.com) https://www.marketresearch.com/CCM-International-Limited-v3539/Sodium-Gluconate-Glucono-Delta-Lactone-32039947/#:~:text = In%202017 %E2 %80 %932021 %2C%20the%20output%20of%20sodium%20gluconate%20in,which%20was%205,44 %25 %20lower%20than%20that%20of%202020.

56

See page 4 of the open version of Jungbunzlauer’s submission ‘Exhibit 23’ of 18 November 2022

57

See pages 9-10 of the open version of Jungbunzlauer’s submission ‘Exhibit 23’

58

See page 7 of the open version of Jungbunzlauer’s submission ‘Exhibit 23’

59

See pages 1-2 of the open version of Jungbunzlauer’s submission of 21 November 2022

60

See page 2 of the open version of Jungbunzlauer’s submission of 21 November 2022

61

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

62

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

Reading this document does not replace reading the official text published in the Official Journal of the European Union. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies arising from the conversion of the original to this format.

This text is published under EUR-Lex's own terms of reuse, not a Legalize or public-domain licence. EUR-Lex
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu — Source: EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the European Union). Reused under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. Only EU legislation published in the printed Official Journal of the European Union is deemed authentic; consolidated texts are reproduced here for documentation purposes and have been reformatted to Markdown.