Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 of 23 June 2023 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (1),

Having regard to the joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1) On 31 July 2014, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (2), concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

(2) Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 gives effect to certain measures provided for in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP (3).

(3) On 23 June 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217, amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP.

(4) Activities whose object or effect is to circumvent the prohibitions laid down in Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 undermine the purpose and effectiveness of the Union’s restrictive measures.

(5) In order to minimise the risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures, Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 prohibits the transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, goods and technology suited for use in aviation or space industry and jet fuel and fuel additives, exported from the Union.

(6) The Union and third countries, as members of the international community, defend the principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and uphold the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

(7) The Union recognises the efforts made by national authorities in many third countries to stem the flow of goods, technology and services that are covered by the restrictive measures adopted by the Union in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The Union should further support third countries in that endeavour with all available means.

(8) In order to address the circumvention of the Union’s restrictive measures through third country jurisdictions, the Union should rapidly strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through diplomatic engagement with, and the provision of increased technical assistance to, the third countries in question. In order to develop, together with Member States, a fully coordinated approach to that effect, the Commission will brief the Council on a regular basis.

(9) Further action should be taken rapidly in cases where the Union’s efforts in the framework of bilateral or multilateral cooperation do not yield the intended result of preventing circumvention of the restrictive measures adopted by the Union in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by persons or entities in third countries. Such action should be targeted, proportionate and solely aimed at depriving Russia of the resources which allow it to pursue its war of aggression against Ukraine.

(10) The Union should adopt the appropriate individual measures addressing the involvement of third-country operators in facilitating circumvention. Such measures may include individual designations under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (4) or other measures under Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, such as adding entities to Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, including on the basis of information and suggestions received from Member States.

(11) The Union will re-engage in a constructive dialogue with the third country in question following the adoption of such individual measures, with a view to ensuring that remedial measures are put in place to deter other operators from engaging in similar conduct. The Council will be informed about that re-engagement and its outcome.

(12) Where, following the adoption of individual measures and further engagement with the third country, it is manifest, given the volume, type or systemic nature of the ongoing circumvention, that those steps are insufficient or inadequate to prevent such circumvention in or via the third country concerned, the Union should be able to take further measures.

(13) To that effect, Decision (CSFP) 2023/1217 has introduced the possibility to take exceptional, last-resort measures restricting the sale, supply, transfer or export of sensitive dual-use goods and technology, or goods and technology that might contribute to the enhancement of Russia’s military, technological or industrial capacities or to the development of Russia’s defence and security sector, in a way that strengthens its ability to wage war, and whose export to Russia is prohibited under Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 to third countries whose jurisdiction is demonstrated to be at a continuing and particularly high risk of being used for circumvention.

(14) Before a proposal is submitted to the Council to proceed to those last-resort measures, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission will brief the Council on the technical details, on the outreach actions taken and on enforcement measures.

(15) Decisions to include a third country and targeted goods or technology in the scope of that measure should be based on the inclusion by the Council, acting unanimously, of the relevant country and goods or technology in Annex XIV to Decision 2014/512/CFSP.

(16) When deciding whether to include targeted goods and technology and the third countries concerned by that last-resort measure, based on that proposal, the Council should take into account a thorough technical analysis by the Commission on the circumvention issues in question, including available trade data demonstrating that the alternative measures taken have been ineffective, as well as information about the efforts carried out by the Union to address the matter with the third country in question, and a clear indication that such efforts were not successful.

(17) Before including a third country on the list of countries concerned by that measure, the Union should inform and actively seek the views of the government of that third country on the basis of the preliminary findings set out in the technical analysis by the Commission and the Union’s intended remedial action. The Council will be informed of all steps of the engagement and of the outcome. The Council will only adopt such a decision after the final outreach to that third country has been concluded.

(18) The Council should review the content of Annex XXXIII to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 at regular intervals, on the basis of thorough technical information by the Commission. Such review needs to take into account the objectives of the measure and the result of the continuous engagement with the third countries concerned, including measures proposed by the third countries on how to address circumvention.

(19) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 adds 87 new entities to the list of legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex IV to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, namely the list of entities directly supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex in its war of aggression against Ukraine, on which tighter export restrictions regarding dual-use goods and technology, as well as goods and technology which might contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector, are imposed. In particular, taking into account the direct connection between Iranian manufacturers of military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Russia’s military and industrial complex, four additional entities in third countries involved in the manufacturing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and their provision to Russia should be added to that list. In addition, in view of the key enabling role of electronic components for use by Russia’s military and industrial complex in supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine, it is also appropriate to include on that list certain other entities in third countries involved in the circumvention of trade restrictions as well as certain Russian entities involved in the development, production and supply of electronic components for Russia’s military and industrial complex.

(20) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 expands the list of items which contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector by adding items which have been used by Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine and items which contribute to the development or production of its military systems, including electronic components, semiconductor materials, manufacturing and testing equipment for electronic integrated circuits and printed circuit boards, precursors to energetic materials and precursors to chemical weapons, optical components, navigational instruments, metals used in the defence sector and marine equipment. Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 also extends the list of restricted firearms, their parts, essential components and ammunition, and adds other types of arms.

(21) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 imposes further restrictions on exports of goods which could contribute to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities.

(22) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 prohibits the sale, license or transfer in any other way of intellectual property rights or trade secrets, as well as the granting of rights to access or re-use any material or information protected by means of intellectual property rights or constituting trade secrets, related to the goods and technology whose sale, supply, transfer or export, to a person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia is prohibited.

(23) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 also extends the suspension of the broadcasting licences in the Union of five Russian media outlets under the permanent control of the Russian leadership, and the prohibition against broadcasting their content.

(24) Russia has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilisation of its neighbouring countries and of the Union and its Member States. In particular, the propaganda has repeatedly and consistently targeted European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as civil society, asylum seekers, Russian ethnic minorities, gender minorities, and the functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States.

(25) In order to justify and support its war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has engaged in continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeted at civil society in the Union and neighbouring countries, gravely distorting and manipulating facts.

(26) Those propaganda actions have been channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation. Such actions constitute a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security. Those media outlets are essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine, and for the destabilisation of its neighbouring countries.

(27) In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, it is necessary, consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information as recognised in Article 11 thereof, to introduce further restrictive measures to suspend the broadcasting activities of such media outlets in the Union or directed at the Union. The measures should be maintained until the war of aggression against Ukraine is put to an end, and until Russia, and its associated media outlets, cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union and its Member States.

(28) Consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as recognised in Articles 11, 16 and 17 thereof, those measures do not prevent the media outlets and their staff from carrying out activities in the Union other than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. In particular, those measures do not modify the obligation to respect the rights, freedoms and principles referred to in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in Member States’ constitutions, within their respective fields of application.

(29) In order to ensure consistency with the process provided for in Decision 2014/512/CFSP for suspending broadcasting licences, the Council should exercise implementing powers to decide, following an examination of the respective cases, whether the restrictive measures are to become applicable on the date specified in Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 in respect of several entities listed in Annex XV to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.

(30) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 extends the prohibition on the transport of goods by road in the Union by trailers and semi-trailers registered in Russia, including when hauled by trucks registered outside of Russia.

(31) Attempts to circumvent Union restrictive measures have resulted in a sharp increase of deceptive practices by vessels transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Consequently, Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 prohibits access to ports and locks in the territory of the Union by vessels engaged in ship-to-ship transfers where the competent authorities have reasonable cause to suspect that a vessel is in breach of the ban on importing seaborne Russian crude oil and petroleum products into the Union or is transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products purchased above the price cap agreed by the Price Cap Coalition. That prohibition applies to all vessels, irrespective of their flag of registration, and to any ship-to-ship transfers carried out at any point during the voyage to a Member State’s ports or locks. In any event, vessels will be prohibited from accessing ports and locks in the territory of the Union if they do not notify the competent authority at least 48 hours in advance about a ship-to-ship transfer occurring within specific geographical areas. In addition, that prohibition will further reinforce the measures adopted by Member States to protect their coasts from potential environmental accidents caused by such ship-to-ship transfers.

(32) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1217 also prohibits access to ports and locks in the territory of the Union by vessels which competent authorities have reasonable cause to suspect of illegally interfering with, switching off or otherwise disabling their shipborne automatic identification systems (AIS) when transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products in breach of SOLAS Regulation V/19, point 2.4. That prohibition does not apply in circumstances where the shipborne AIS can be legitimately turned off in accordance with international agreements, rules or standards that provide for the protection of navigational information, such as navigation through high-security-risk waters. That prohibition also applies to all vessels, irrespective of their flag of registration, and for any illegal interference with the navigation system at any point during the voyage to a Member State’s ports or locks.

(33) The assessment by the competent authorities in the context of those port access prohibitions should be made on the basis of a risk analysis allowing the competent authority to evaluate whether there are sufficient factual circumstances to suspect a breach. For instance, that risk analysis should take into account whether vessels have complied with any prenotification requirements of ship-to-ship transfers and other relevant legal obligations or have notified the transport of dangerous goods or polluting goods, namely crude oil and petroleum products (5). The Commission should also publish notices of behaviour at risk of maritime sanctions in order to support the competent authorities’ risk analysis including by making use of the appropriate information technology tools.

(34) The Commission, with the assistance of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), should support the competent authorities through, inter alia, the monitoring and notification of suspicious ship-to-ship transfers and incidents of illegally interfering with, switching off or otherwise disabling of the shipborne AIS, and facilitating the exchange of information based on the Union Maritime Information and Exchange System (‘SafeSeaNet’), which enables the receipt, storage, retrieval and exchange of information for the purpose of maritime safety, port and maritime security, marine environment protection and the efficiency of maritime traffic and maritime transport. National competent authorities within the meaning of Commission Directive 2014/100/EU (6) should provide their port authorities, if different, with access to that system without delay. Using SafeSeaNet, the Commission, with the assistance of EMSA, should support national competent authorities to monitor any vessels of interest, in particular those navigating within the 200 nautical miles limit from Member States’ coastlines, with all means available.

(35) In order to mitigate forum shopping, competent authorities in a Member State which deny access to a vessel should immediately exchange information on such denial with the other competent authorities of the Member States via the existing platforms at their disposal. The Commission should work closely with EMSA to immediately facilitate any technical adjustments to SafeSeaNet based on the competent authorities’ notifications.

(36) Prohibitions relating to port access apply to any vessel, whether it is moored at a port or at anchorage within the jurisdiction of a port of a Member State. In the case of the Gulf of Finland, those prohibitions relate to any vessel, whether it is moored at a port or at anchorage that is located in the territorial waters or internal waters of a Member State.

(37) Appropriate exemptions and derogations are provided for to allow such vessels access to ports and locks in the territory of the Union for maritime safety, including environmental concerns, for saving life at sea and for humanitarian purposes.

(38) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/884 (7) and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 (8) provide that Member States are to take all necessary measures to obtain supplies which are alternative to imports by pipeline of crude oil from Russia, so that those imports are made subject to the prohibitions as soon as possible. In line with this objective, the temporary derogation granted to Germany and Poland for the supply of crude oil by pipeline from Russia through the northern section of the Druzhba oil pipeline should end. The import of oil which originates in Kazakhstan or another third country and is transiting through Russia via the Druzhba oil pipeline is not prohibited.