Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1450 of 13 July 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron (other than cast iron) or steel (other than stainless steel), of circular cross-section, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in the PRC during the period between 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015 (‘original investigation period’);

(b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and

(c) it has either actually exported the product under review originating in the PRC or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the original investigation period.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 July 2023.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/804 of 11 may 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron (other than cast iron) or steel (other than stainless steel), of circular cross-section, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm, originating in the People’s Republic of China, OJ L 121, 12.5.2017, p. 3.

(3) OJ C 193, 12.5.2022, p. 5.

(4) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2603

(5) Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations (2020/C 86/06) (OJ C 86, 16.3.2020, p. 6).

(6) 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.

(7) According to the applicant, the estimated production volume in the PRC in 2021 of the product under review was 2,3 million tonnes. The verified production volume of the cooperating Chinese exporting producers was almost 260 thousand tonnes.

(8) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 149); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 36, 17.2.2022, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 of 24 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel consigned from Taiwan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 16, 25.1.2022, p. 36); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 of 15 December 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain utility scale steel wind towers originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 450, 16.12.2021, p. 59); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 145).

(9) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 80; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 208, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 59, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 149-150.

(10) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 64; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 192, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 46, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 115-118

(11) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 66; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 193-4, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 47, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 119-122. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs.

(12) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 68; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recitals 48-52, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 123-129.

(13) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 74; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 202, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 53, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 130-133.

(14) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 75; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 54, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135.

(15) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 76; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 204, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 55, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 136-145.

(16) Commission staff working document SWD (2017) 483 final/2, 20.12.2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2017)483&lang=en

(17) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 of 5 April 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 92, 6.4.2017, p. 68); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/688 of 2 May 2019 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain organic coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 116, 3.5.2019, p. 39).

(18) OECD, State-owned Firms behind China’s Corporate Debt, Economics Department Working Papers no. 1536, February 2019.

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/state-owned-firms-behind-china-s-corporate-debt_7c66570e-en

(19) Introduction to the Plan for Adjusting and Upgrading the Steel Industry.

(20) Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment) issued by Order No 9 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 27 March 2011, and amended in accordance with the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) issued by Order No 21 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 16 February 2013.

(21) Marketplace, ‘Industrial Policy: If China does it, why can’t we?’, 1 March 2021.

https://www.marketplace.org/2021/03/01/industrial-policy-if-china-does-it-why-cant-we/

(22) See: https://en.citicsteel.com

(23) See CITIC Limited Annual Report 2021. 20220421630869.pdf (citic.com)

(24) See CITIC Annual Report 2021, page 144. 20220421630869.pdf (citic.com)

(25) See: https://www.miit.gov.cn/jgsj/ycls/gzdt/art/2020/art_8fc2875eb24744f591bfd946c126561f.html (accessed on 24 February 2023).

(26) See Section IV, Subsection 3 of the 14th FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry.

(27) See Section II, Subsection 1 of the 14th FYP on Developing Scrap Steel Industry.

(28) See the Hebei Province’s Three Year Action Plan on Cluster Development in the Steel Industry Chain, Chapter I, Section 3; available at: https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20200717/1089773.shtml (accessed on 24 February 2023).

(29) See the Henan Implementation Plan for the Transformation and Upgrade of the Steel Industry during the 14th FYP, Chapter II, Section 3; available at: https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20211210/1192881.shtml (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(30) Jiangsu Province’s Work Plan Steel Sector Transformation and Upgrade and Layout Optimisation 2019-2025; available at: http://www.jiangsu.gov.cn/art/2019/5/5/art_46144_8322422.html (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(31) Shandong Province’s 14 FYP on the Steel Industry Development; available at: http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/art/2021/11/18/art_15681_10296246.html (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(32) Shanxi Province’s 2020 Steel Industry Transformation and Upgrade Action Plan; available at: http://gxt.shanxi.gov.cn/zfxxgk/zfxxgkml/cl/202110/t20211018_2708031.shtml (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(33) Liaoning Dalian Municipality’s 14 FYP on Developing Manufacturing Industry: ‘ By 2025, the industrial output value of new materials will reach 15 million yuan, and the level of equipment and key materials guarantee ability is obviously improved.’; available at: https://www.dl.gov.cn/art/2021/12/20/art_854_1995411.html (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(34) Zhejiang Province’s Action Plan to Foster a High Quality Development of the Steel Industry: ‘ Foster enterprise mergers and reorganisation, accelerate the concentration process, reduce the number of steel smelting enterprises to approximately 10 enterprises ’; available at: https://www.dl.gov.cn/art/2021/12/20/art_854_1995411.html (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(35) Page 38 of the 2021 Annual Report of CITIC Pacific special steel; available at: file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2022/2022-3/2022-03-11/7877748.PDF (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(36) Ibid, p. 39.

(37) Report, Part III, Chapter 14, p. 346 ff.

(38) See People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035, Part III, Article VIII, available at: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan/ (accessed on 23 February 2023).

(39) See in particular Sections I and II of the 14th FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry.

(40) See the 14th FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry, p. 22.

(41) See the Hebei Tangshan Municipality Iron and Steel 1+3 Action Plan 2022, Chapter 4, Section 2; available at: http://www.chinaisa.org.cn/gxportal/xfgl/portal/content.html?articleId=e2bb5519aa49b566863081d57aea9dfdd59e1a4f482bb7acd243e3ae7657c70b&columnId=3683d857cc4577e4cb75f76522b7b82cda039ef70be46ee37f9385ed3198f68a (accessed at 23 February 2023).

(42) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635, recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508, recitals 143-144.

(43) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

(44) If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

(45) After disregarding Bulgaria, which is a member of the EU, the following ‘upper middle income’ countries could be considered for the process of identifying the possible representative country: Albania, American Samoa, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, North Macedonia, Paraguay, Peru, Russian Federation, Samoa, Serbia, South Africa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu and Venezuela.

(46) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33) as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/749 of 24 February 2017 (OJ L 113, 29.4.2017, p. 11).

(47) https://www.gtis.com/gta/

(48) Available at: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ilo.org%2Filostat-files%2FDocuments%2FExcel%2FIndicator%2FEAR_4MTH_SEX_ECO_CUR_NB_A_EN.xlsx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (last viewed on 11 February 2023).

(49) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/83a87978-en/1/3/2/24/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/83a87978-en&csp=3445743d6909dcc02824b5f0a2e07895&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book (last viewed on 14 February 2023).

(50) https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/Mexico/, (last viewed on 14 February 2023).

(51) https://www.cre.gob.mx/IPGN/index.html, (last viewed on 14 February 2023).

(52) https://ir.tenaris.com/static-files/ddffd7cb-994e-493a-b85a-2586f03046c6, (last viewed on 14 February 2023).

(53) https://ir.tenaris.com/static-files/ddffd7cb-994e-493a-b85a-2586f03046c6, (last viewed on 14 February 2023).

(54) Excluding the Union market.

(55) The average price on the captive market was presented in ranges for reasons of confidentiality.

(56) Based on GTA. The statistics concerned imports from China into the third countries concerned. Also the HS codes containing products with a diameter inferior or equal to 406 mm were removed in order to reflect the definition of the product under review.

(57) Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 111 and Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 7.166.

(58) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(59) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).