Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2758 of 12 December 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Image omitted; see official source	Official Journal of the European Union	EN Series L
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	2023/2758	13.12.2023

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union ¹ (‘the basic regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/477 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on measures that the European Union may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures ², and in particular Article 1 thereof,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1.   Previous investigations

• (1) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 ³, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel, originating in the Federative Republic of Brazil (‘Brazil’), the Islamic Republic of Iran (‘Iran’), the Russian Federation (‘Russia’) and Ukraine (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

• (2) On 18 January 2021, following a request lodged by the European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’ or ‘the applicant’), the Commission initiated a partial interim review limited in scope to an examination of dumping as far as one Russian producer, PAO Severstal, was concerned. However, on 18 March 2022, EUROFER, withdrew its request and the review investigation was subsequently terminated by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/624 ⁴.

1.2.   Request for an expiry review

• (3) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry ⁵ the Commission received a request for an expiry review of the original measures pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

• (4) The request for review was submitted on 4 July 2022 by EUROFER on behalf of the Union industry of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in recurrence and continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

1.3.   Initiation of an expiry review

• (5) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, the Commission initiated, on 5 October 2022, an expiry review with regard to imports to the Union of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union ⁶ (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

1.4.   Termination of measures against Ukraine

• (6) On 23 November 2022 the applicant withdrew its request for an expiry review investigation of the original measures as far as Ukraine was concerned. The Commission subsequently, on 16 February 2023, decided to terminate the expiry review investigation as far as imports from Ukraine were concerned in accordance with Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation and to continue the review investigation regarding imports from Brazil, Iran and Russia ⁷.

• (7) Given that the expiry review investigation vis-à-vis Ukraine was terminated, the original measures against imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel, originating in Ukraine automatically lapsed 5 years after the imposition of the original measures.

1.5.   Measures in force

• (8) The anti-dumping measures currently in force, and which are subject to this expiry review investigation, are hence those applicable to imports from Brazil, Iran and Russia (‘the countries concerned’). The measures are imposed in the form of a fixed duty per tonne and the duty rates range between 54,50 and 63,00 EUR/tonne for Brazil, 57,50 EUR/tonne for Iran and between 17,60 and 96,50 EUR/tonne for Russia.

1.6.   Review investigation period and period considered

• (9) The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 (‘review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2019 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

1.7.   Interested parties

• (10) In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, known Union producers, the known producers and the authorities in the countries concerned, known importers, users, traders as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate.

• (11) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

1.8.   Comments on initiation

• (12) The Commission received comments on initiation from the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation (‘GOR’), the Federal Government of Brazil (‘GBR’), represented by the Mission of Brazil of the European Union, and the Brazilian producers Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais S.A (‘USIMINAS’) and Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (‘CSN’).

• (13) The GOR recalled that the Union’s sanctions resulting from Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine affected the imports of the product concerned. It added that on 26 March 2022 the Union imposed an import ban on Russian iron and steel products and alleged that since the second quarter of 2022 Russian imports of almost all types of HRF stopped. According to the GOR, these sanctions have a long-lasting nature and at the time of the investigation there were no signs that they would be softened. Therefore, the GOR claimed that the Commission should consider that sanctions have a bearing for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation of dumping – notably for the assessment of the attractiveness of the Union market and of the applicant’s statement in the Request that third country markets could not absorb Russian steel capacity ⁸. In relation to the attractiveness of the Union market, the GOR argued that disruption of trade flows and supply chains due to the sanctions reduced the attractiveness of the Union market for Russian suppliers due to the perceived risk of trade restrictions. Moreover, according to the GOR, rekindling trade ties between the Union and Russia will require a lot of time and efforts. Finally, the GOR also claimed that likelihood of recurrence of injury could not be established due to the imposition of the Union’s sanctions.

• (14) First, as regards the GOR’s claim that Russian imports of almost all types of HRF stopped as of the second quarter of 2022, the Commission noted that the fourth package of sanctions, to which the GOR referred to, imposed an import ban on only 21 out of 24 CN codes mentioned in recital 42 ⁹. However, importantly, according to Article 3g, paragraph 2 of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2022/428, this import ban did not apply to the execution until 17 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 16 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. Therefore, except for the last 13 days of the review investigation period, sanctions did not have any impact on the imports of the product concerned from Russia. In addition, an import ban on the remaining 3 CN codes was imposed only after the review investigation period by virtue of the eighth package of sanctions ¹⁰. This latter import ban did not apply to the execution until 8 January 2023 of contracts concluded before 7 October 2022. Therefore, imports of the product concerned from Russia could continue also in the second quarter of 2022. Second, concerning the prospective impact of the sanctions on the product concerned from Russia, the Commission recalled that those sanctions are linked to Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine and the underlying geopolitical situation. Their scope, modulation, and/or duration are therefore unpredictable. Furthermore, anti-dumping measures have a lifetime of five years. Considering these uncertainties and the fact that the Council may further amend the precise scope and duration of sanctions at any moment, the Commission found that they did not preclude the initiation of a review investigation and they cannot have a bearing in its conclusions on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, neither with regard to the attractiveness of the Union market, nor with regard to the diversion of export flows to the Union due to the situation in third country markets, and on the likelihood of recurrence of injury. In particular, the GOR did not bring any evidence to support the view that specifically the resumption of dumped imports of the product concerned from Russia will require a lot of time and efforts. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (15) The GOR furthermore claimed that the information referred to in the request concerning the planned capacity expansion, based on the OECD report on Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity for 2021 ¹¹, was not accurate. In particular, the GOR alleged that none of the steelmaking projects in Russia listed in the request had been implemented and that the company Don-Metal was a trader of metal scrap and not a producer. In addition, according to the GOR, the company Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK) was not expanding its capacity, as reported in the request based on a press report of Steel Business Briefing (‘SBB’) but was carrying out environmental modernization of the existing steelmaking production.

• (16) The Commission noted that, even without considering the pieces of evidence contested by the GOR, the evidence of overcapacity submitted by EUROFER ¹² in the request remained unchallenged. While it is true that an expiry review is a forward-looking exercise and that planned capacity expansion can indeed play a role in assessing whether dumping is likely to continue or to recur, existing overcapacity – as opposed to future overcapacity – is a much stronger indicator of likelihood. Therefore, the request included sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the expiry review and this claim was rejected.

• (17) Furthermore, the GOR claimed that Annex 5 of the non-confidential version of the request did not include the dumping calculation for Russia and that the bundle of annexes labelled as ‘HRFS_ER_Annexes_Part1’ did not include any data on the export price.

• (18) The Commission noted that, while the file in Annex 5 labelled as ‘Dumping margin calculation 4 countries’ inadvertently included only the first page of the document, the request for review provided all the necessary elements for the dumping calculation ¹³ and indicated the resulting average dumping margin for the countries concerned ¹⁴. Indeed, as shown by recital 19, the GOR run the dumping calculation for Russia based on the data of the request for review and provided comments on it. In particular, concerning the data on the export price, as it was clear from the request for review ¹⁵, EUROFER based the export prices for its calculation on CIF prices from Eurostat data, which are publicly available, and, alternatively, on FOB prices from Trade Data Monitor (‘TDM’) export data, both appropriately adjusted to EXW prices. As explained in the request for review ¹⁶, TDM export data were provided in Annex 6. Annex 6 was part of the bundle of annexes mentioned by the GOR, the same as Annex 5. Therefore, this claim was rejected. In any case, on 18 November 2022 EUROFER submitted the complete Annex 5 so that all interested parties could submit comments in due course.

• (19) Finally, the GOR claimed that the only export price that it could find in the request for review was the Russian export price to the Union from Eurostat which, for the period identified in the request, was set at EUR 823 per tonne ¹⁷. When comparing it with the normal value for the same period, adjusted by the estimated inland freight, thus corresponding to EUR 650-750 per tonne, it argued that Russian imports were not dumped on the Union market.

• (20) The Commission noted that in the request for review EUROFER submitted two sets of Russian domestic prices in Annex 5: EXW prices from the Developing Markets Steel Review published by MEPS International Ltd. (‘MEPS’) and CPT prices from SBB ¹⁸. As shown in Annex 5, EUROFER calculated the dumping margin in the request based on domestic data from MEPS. Indeed, data from MEPS were provided also for Brazil and Ukraine (contrary to data from SBB, which were only available for Russia) and EUROFER calculated the dumping margin consistently across three of the countries concerned with data from the same source. Then, EUROFER made two parallel dumping calculations, comparing domestic prices from MEPS both to export prices from Eurostat and from TDM at EXW level. In both instances, EUROFER found dumping. Instead, the GOR arbitrarily chose to use only CPT domestic prices from SBB. Then, it adjusted CPT domestic prices from SBB to EXW level by the estimated inland freight. Conversely, it did not make any adjustment to the CIF export price from Eurostat. Therefore, it wrongly compared EXW domestic prices with CIF export prices. Thus, the claim was rejected.

• (21) USIMINAS stated that the methodology used by EUROFER to show the prima facie existence of recurrence of dumping of imports from Brazil, and in particular for determining the Brazilian export using data from Türkiye, Chile and Portugal, is not applicable in this case, and has been misapplied. According to USIMINAS, pursuant to Articles 2(8) and 2(9) of the basic Regulation, the export price can only be constructed when there are no exports to the Union. Given that in this case, there were exports from Brazil to the Union during the reporting period, USIMINAS argued that the request for review should have used the actual export prices of Brazil to the Union and thus the Commission was wrong to accept the information submitted in the request for review.

• (22) The Commission recalled that in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, an expiry review shall be initiated where the request for review contains sufficient evidence that the expiry of the measures would likely result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. In the request for review, the applicant argued that the expiry of the measures would result in the recurrence of dumping from Brazil, and that imports would flood back the Union market at dumped prices, in line with their current prices in third country markets. To support its argument, and in view of the small volumes of imports from Brazil to the Union during the reporting period, the applicant used export prices from Brazil to all third countries, and separately to Türkiye, Chile and Portugal. The Commission considered that these prices were a relevant element for its assessment of the merits of the file, and that together with other information provided by the applicant, constituted sufficient evidence, meeting the requirements of Article 11(2) for the initiation of the investigation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (23) USIMINAS, claimed that the Commission should not have accepted EUROFER’s cumulative analysis as sufficient prima facie evidence for initiation of the case. Furthermore, USIMINAS, CSN, and the GBR submitted that a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports from the countries concerned was not warranted, in light of the different conditions of competition between imports from Brazil and the imports from the other investigated countries, the negligible import volumes, and the price development of imports from Brazil.

• (24) The Commission disagrees with this claim. Indeed, the request for review claimed a fragile situation for the Union industry with a likelihood of recurrence of injury. The applicant thus had to provide evidence about the likely evolution of Brazilian imports in the absence of measures. In this respect, the request looked at factors such as overcapacity in Brazil, the price level of Brazilian exports to third countries, and the attractiveness of the Union market (including an undercutting calculation for Brazil). All of these factors were analysed individually for Brazil rather than on a cumulative basis. The actual volume of imports was indeed provided on a cumulative basis, but this was not as such the basis for reaching a conclusion on recurrence of injury. Therefore, the request for review was deemed to contain sufficient evidence for initiation of the case.

1.9.   Sampling

• (25) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

1.9.1.   Sampling of Union producers

• (26) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of representativity in terms of size of the production and sales volume of the product under review whilst the geographical location was also considered. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 25 % of the estimated total production volumes and 26 % of sales of the like product in the Union. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No substantive comments were received and the provisional sample was confirmed.

1.9.2.   Sampling of importers

• (27) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

• (28) However, no unrelated importer came forward and provided the requested information.

1.9.3.   Sampling of producers in the countries concerned

• (29) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all producers in the countries concerned to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Missions of Brazil, Iran and Russia to identify and/or contact other producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

• (30) Four producers in Brazil provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample.

• (31) In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two groups of producers made up of three producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available, covering 98 % of the total export volume to the Union from Brazil in the review investigation period. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known producers concerned, and the authorities of Brazil were consulted on the selection of the sample. No comments were received on the sampling.

• (32) In the case of Iran, one producer submitted a sampling reply. Therefore, in view of the low number of producers coming forward, sampling was not necessary.

• (33) In the case of Russia, the Commission did not receive any sampling replies from the Russian producers.

1.10.   Replies to the questionnaire

• (34) The Commission sent links to questionnaires to the only Iranian producer who came forward, to the sampled Brazilian, and Union producers. The same questionnaires had also been made available online ¹⁹ on the day of initiation.

• (35) Questionnaire replies were received from the three sampled Union producers, the two sampled Brazilian groups of producers and the Iranian producer.

1.11.   Verification

• (36) The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest. The Commission performed remote cross-checkings (RCCs) of the information provided by the following companies via videoconference:

Union producers

• — ArcelorMittal Poland (Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland)

• — Tata Steel Ijmuiden (IJmuiden, The Netherlands)

• — ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe AG (Duisburg, Germany)

Exporting producer in Iran

• — Mobarakeh Steel Company (Mobarakeh, Esfahan, Iran)

• (37) Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Exporting producers in Brazil

• — ArcelorMittal Brasil S.A (Serra, Brazil)

• — Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (São Paulo, Brazil)

1.12.   Disclosure

• (38) On 25 October 2023, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

• (39) The comments made by interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate. USIMINAS requested and was granted a hearing with the Commission services on 10 November 2023.

2. PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product under review

• (40) The product under review is the same as in the original investigation namely certain flat-rolled products of iron, non-alloy steel or other alloy steel, whether or not in coils (including ‘cut-to-length’ and ‘narrow strip’ products), not further worked than hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated (‘HRF’ or ‘product under review’).

• (41) The following products are not covered by this review:

• — products of stainless steel and grain-oriented silicon electrical steel,

• — products of tool steel and high-speed steel,

• — products, not in coils, without patterns in relief, of a thickness exceeding 10 mm and of a width of 600 mm or more, and

• — products, not in coils, without patterns in relief, of a thickness of 4,75 mm or more but not exceeding 10 mm and of a width of 2 050 mm or more.

• (42) The product under review is currently falling under CN codes 7208 10 00, 7208 25 00, 7208 26 00, 7208 27 00, 7208 36 00, 7208 37 00, 7208 38 00, 7208 39 00, 7208 40 00, 7208 52 10, 7208 52 99, 7208 53 10, 7208 53 90, 7208 54 00, 7211 13 00, 7211 14 00, 7211 19 00, ex 7225 19 10 (TARIC code 7225191090), 7225 30 90, ex 7225 40 60 (TARIC code 7225406090), 7225 40 90, ex 7226 19 10 (TARIC codes 7226191091, 7226191095), 7226 91 91 and 7226 91 99.

• (43) Hot-rolled flat steel products are produced through hot rolling. This is a metal forming process in which hot metal is passed through one or more pairs of hot rolls to reduce the thickness and to make the thickness uniform, whereby the temperature of the metal is above its recrystallization temperature. They can be delivered in various forms; in coils (oiled or not oiled, pickled or not pickled), in cut lengths (sheet) or in narrow strips.

• (44) There are two main uses of the hot-rolled flat steel products. First, they are the primary material for the production of various value-added downstream steel products, starting with cold-rolled flat and coated steel products. Second, they are used as an industrial input purchased by end users for a variety of applications, including in construction (production of steel tubes), shipbuilding, gas containers, cars, pressure vessels and energy pipelines.

2.2.   Product concerned

• (45) The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in Brazil, Iran and Russia.

2.3.   Like product

• (46) As established in the original investigation, this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

• — the product concerned when exported to the Union,

• — the product under review produced and sold on the domestic market of Brazil, Iran and Russia,

• — the product under review produced and sold by the exporting producers to the rest of the world, and

• — the product under review produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

• (47) These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

3. DUMPING

3.1.   Federative Republic of Brazil

3.1.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (48) During the review investigation period, imports of product under review from Brazil continued albeit at lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation (i.e. from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016). Imports of HRF from Brazil accounted for about 1,38 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 1,79 % market share during the original investigation. In absolute terms the volume of imports from Brazil decreased from 608 541 tonnes in the original investigation period to 478 692 tonnes in the review investigation period.

3.1.2.   Dumping

3.1.3.   Normal value

• (49) The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represented at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product under review to the Union during the review investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

• (50) The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union for the exporting producers with representative domestic sales.

• (51) The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the review investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that domestic sales were representative for all but one product type exported to the Union market by one of the sampled exporting producer.

• (52) The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the review investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

• (53) The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

• (a) the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

• (b) the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

• (54) In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the review investigation period.

• (55) The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the review investigation period, if:

• (a) the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type; or

• (b) the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

• (56) The analysis of domestic sales showed that more than 80 % of all domestic sales were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the review investigation period.

• (57) For the product type not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A expenses and profit of all transactions made on the domestic market were added to the cost of production of the product type as there were no sales of this product type from other Brazilian producers.

3.1.4.   Export price

• (58) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union to related companies. The related companies located in the Union mainly used HRF to manufacture other products. The investigation did not reveal that the related companies who submitted a questionnaire reply purchased HRF from unrelated companies. Thus, the Commission was not able to confirm whether the related price was an arm’s length price, as compared with the original investigation when the Commission confirmed that the related prices were arm’s length prices.

• (59) Nevertheless, since in an expiry review investigation there is no need to determine a dumping margin but only likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, the Commission considered it appropriate to use such an export price as established in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

3.1.5.   Comparison

• (60) The Commission compared, per product type, the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis as established above.

• (61) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary expenses and packaging.

3.1.6.   Dumping margins

• (62) For the sampled exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product under review, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

• (63) On this basis, the indicative weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was 16,2 % and 18,7 % for the sampled producers respectively. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

• (64) In their comments to the final disclosure CSN claimed that its dumping margin as calculated by the Commission was likely to be overstated. In particular, in view of the fact that the Commission was not able to establish that CSN’s export sales to its related company in the EU were at arm’s length, it was likely that these sales were made at prices that were lower than free market prices. This was because according to CSN, transfer prices are generally lower that free market prices. Furthermore, in view of the high inflation in Brazil and the fluctuation of the exchange rate, it would be more appropriate to calculate the dumping margin using monthly averages for the normal value and export price, rather than averages over the entire review investigation period. Based on such methodology, CSN claimed that there would still be dumping but slightly lower.

• (65) The Commission noted that CSN did not substantiate the claim regarding the transfer price. Furthermore, even if the dumping calculation methodology suggested by CSN would be accepted, the difference in the dumping margin would be small and therefore would not change the conclusions on the continuation of dumping. In view of the above, CSN’s comments were rejected.

3.2.   Islamic Republic of Iran

3.2.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (66) During the review investigation period, imports of HRF from Iran virtually disappeared. The Commission analysed the likelihood of recurrence of dumping in the next section.

3.3.   Russian Federation

3.3.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (67) During the review investigation period, imports of product under review from Russia continued albeit at lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation. According to Eurostat, imports of HRF from Russia accounted for about 3,55 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 4,29 % market share during the original investigation. In absolute terms the volume of imports from Russia decreased from 1 455 436 tonnes in the original investigation period to 1 224 699 tonnes in the review investigation period.

• (68) As mentioned in recital 33, none of the exporters/producers from Russia cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, on 27 October 2022, by way of the Note to the file on the sample of exporting producers, the Commission informed all interested parties that, due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation with regard to the findings relating to Russia. The Commission did not receive any comments in this regard.

• (69) Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular publicly available information such as official company websites, information in the request for review, and information obtained from cooperating parties in the course of the review investigation (namely, the applicant).

3.3.2.   Dumping

3.3.3.   Normal value

• (70) Due to the lack of cooperation from Russian producers, the Commission used facts available for establishing normal value in Russia. To this end, the information submitted by the applicant was used.

• (71) The Commission was not able to retrieve publicly available data on domestic prices of HRF in Russia. Thus, normal value was based on the domestic prices in Russia established from average domestic price lists for hot-rolled coils from MEPS during the review investigation period, to which processing costs were added to obtain the price of HRF. To get to ex-work prices, the inland transport costs were deducted as estimated by the applicant in the request for review.

3.3.4.   Export price

• (72) In the absence of cooperation by the Russian producers, the export price was determined based on CIF Eurostat import data corrected to ex works level. Thus, the CIF price was reduced by the freight train and domestic transport cost as estimated by the applicant in the request for review.

3.3.5.   Comparison

• (73) The Commission compared the normal value and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

3.3.6.   Dumping margin

• (74) On this basis, the indicative dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was around 5 %. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING

4.1.   Federative Republic of Brazil

• (75) Further to the finding indicating the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures lapse. The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in Brazil and the attractiveness of the Union market.

4.1.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in Brazil

• (76) In the request for review, the applicant provided information concerning production capacity, production, consumption and spare capacity in Brazil.

• (77) In terms of spare capacity of HRF, the applicant stated that based on CRU data ²⁰ there was an existing spare capacity for the year 2020 of over 6,6 million tonnes compared to the level of production of HRF in Brazil ²¹. In this regard, the Commission noted that the spare capacity calculations submitted by the applicant use the nominal (‘nameplate’) capacity, that is the maximum capacity that can be theoretically achieved under ideal conditions, for instance, producing a specific product mix and without taking into account any planned or unplanned maintenance breaks. For the calculation of the spare capacity in this case, the Commission considered it more appropriate to use, where available, the production capacity that represents the maximum quantity that can realistically be produced taking such factors into account.

• (78) The investigation revealed that during the review investigation period the sampled exporting producers had increased their capacity utilisation with respect to 2019 and 2020 and were producing close to their production capacity, with utilisation rates of more than 90 %. Therefore, the spare capacity for the sampled exporting producers was found to be limited in the review investigation period. However, this has to be seen in the context of Brazilian imports to the Union continuing at only slightly reduced levels compared to the original period of investigation.

4.1.2.   Exports to third countries and attractiveness of the Union market

• (79) The Commission examined whether it was likely that Brazilian exporting producers would increase their export sales at dumped prices on the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse. Therefore, the Commission analysed the price level of Brazilian producers on their domestic market as well as the Brazilian exports to third country markets and compared them to the price level of the Union industry.

• (80) The investigation revealed that the domestic prices in Brazil of the sampled exporting producers were higher than the prices of the Union industry on the Union market during the period considered, with the exception of the prices of one sampled exporting producer in 2020.

• (81) As concerns the prices to third countries, for the sampled exporting producer with significant export sales to third countries the prices to third countries were generally lower (by 12 % on average) during the period considered than the prices of the Union producers on the Union market. This is consistent with price comparison data from GTA, showing that the export price to third countries of all Brazilian exporters is lower than the prices on the Union market throughout the period considered.

• (82) Furthermore, in order to have an indication of the likely pricing behaviour when exporting to the Union in the absence of measures, the Commission also compared the Brazilian export price to third countries with the Brazilian normal value for the sampled exporting producer that also exported to third countries. The comparison was made at ex-works level. On this basis, the normal value was found to be higher than the export price to third countries, with the difference expressed as a percentage of the CIF frontier price at around 20 %.

• (83) The Commission also noted that in the review investigation period the sampled exporting producers increased significantly the share of the exports to the Union in their total sales, in terms of volume. It is recalled that these sales were made at dumped prices. Thus, it is likely that, should the measures lapse, dumped imports would continue increasing.

• (84) The GBR claimed that the Brazilian HRF producers are focused on serving their domestic and regional markets and have no incentive to increase their exports to the Union.

• (85) The investigation revealed that for the sampled exporting producers more than 50 % of their sales during the RIP were indeed made on the domestic market. However, the aforementioned increase of their exports to the Union as a share of their total sales occurred even if the prices on the Brazilian domestic market were higher than the prices of the Union industry.

• (86) In their comments following disclosure, the GBR reiterated its claim that Brazilian HRF producers lack the incentives to increase their exports to the Union and referred to the alleged focus of Brazilian producers on the domestic and regional markets, the limited spare capacity in Brazil, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and the EU safeguard duties on imports of certain steel products.

• (87) As regards the focus markets and the available spare capacity of Brazilian producers, as mentioned in recital 81, the Union market is more attractive than other export markets. In view of this fact, the limited spare capacity in Brazil would not prevent a further increase of exports to the Union. Therefore, these claims were rejected. As regards the arguments on the CBAM and the safeguard measures, these are addressed in recital 211 below.

4.1.3.   Conclusion

• (88) The Commission concluded that, in view of the fact that Brazilian imports at dumped prices only slightly decreased as compared to the original investigation, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of prices and the fact that prices of exports from Brazil to third countries are below domestic prices, it is likely that Brazilian producers will continue to export to the Union at dumped prices in case the measures are allowed to lapse.

4.2.   Islamic Republic of Iran

• (89) In view of the absence of exports from Iran to the Union during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in Iran, the attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third countries.

4.2.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in Iran

• (90) In the request for review and in subsequent submissions, the applicant provided calculations of the HRF steel capacity and spare capacity in Iran based on two sources of information, Plantfacts and CRU ²². According to these calculations, Iran had at its disposal significant spare capacity in the review investigation period. As in the case of Brazil as explained in recital 77, the Commission considered that these calculations use the nominal capacity and that it would be more appropriate for its assessment to use the production capacity, where available.

• (91) The investigation established that the cooperating exporting producer from Iran was producing close to its production capacity during the review investigation period and therefore, its spare capacity was limited during the review investigation period.

• (92) However, the investigation also revealed that the company had started the construction of a new hot strip mill to increase significantly its HRF steel capacity. According to statements attributed to the managing director of the company in January 2020 ²³, the project would add up to 4,5 million tonnes of annual HRF capacity and was planned for completion within 900 days.

• (93) During the remote cross-check, which was carried out over video-conference, the company stated that the project was facing significant delays, however without providing proper evidence in this regard. Moreover, the company claimed that the new hot strip mill was aimed to serve only the domestic market due to the significant growth that was expected in this market. To substantiate this claim, the company presented an internal forecast showing its projections of the evolution of the domestic market.

• (94) The Commission noted that if the company’s projections materialised (under the most likely scenario for the evolution of the domestic market), taking into account the current market share of the company, the operation of the new hot strip mill would result in a spare capacity, well in excess of 1 million tonnes per annum.

• (95) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that within the next years, there will be significant spare capacity available in Iran, which could be used for exports, including exports to the Union.

4.2.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third countries

• (96) The Commission examined whether it was likely that Iranian exporting producers would start exporting the product under review at dumped prices on the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse. For that purpose, the Commission compared the price level of the exports of the cooperating Iranian producer to third countries to the price level of the Union industry and the price level of the cooperating Iranian producer on the domestic market with the price level of its exports to third country markets.

• (97) The Commission compared the CIF export prices to third countries from Iran, as provided by the cooperating producer in its questionnaire reply, with the Union industry’s prices. Export prices to third countries were found to be at least 14 % lower than the Union industry prices in the review investigation period. Therefore, the Union market is more attractive compared to other possible export destinations of the product under review and Iranian producers have an economic incentive to shift exports to the Union, should measures be allowed to lapse.

• (98) Furthermore, in order to have an indication of the likely price behaviour to the Union in the absence of measures, the Commission also compared the Iranian export price to third countries with the Iranian normal value using the data provided by the cooperating exporting producer for the review investigation period. The comparison was made on an ex-works basis. On this basis, the price difference between the normal value and export prices to third countries established as a percentage of the CIF frontier price was around 3 %. However, during the remote cross-check process it was not possible to verify that the total value of the export transactions had been paid. Therefore, the Commission considered that the actual export prices to third countries could be even lower, and that the above difference between domestic and export prices could be even higher. This suggests that, should measures be repealed, and the prices at which the Iranian exporting producer would export the product concerned to the Union are in line with the other third countries observed during the review, the dumping margins would likely be significant.

• (99) In their comments following final disclosure, the cooperating Iranian producer claimed that the Commission’s assessment was incorrect because there was no continuation of dumping The exporting producer also contested the conclusions in relation to spare capacity. As the comments provided by the company are based on confidential information, the Commission addressed them on a separate document sent to only to the company.

4.2.3.   Conclusion

• (100) The Commission concluded that due to the spare capacity expected to become available in Iran, the attractiveness of the Union market and the fact that prices of exports from Iran to third countries are below domestic prices, there is a high likelihood of recurrence of dumping from Iran in case the measures are allowed to lapse.

4.3.   Russian Federation

• (101) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia, the attractiveness of the Union market and the possible absorption capacity of third-country markets.

4.3.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in Russia

• (102) In the request for review, the applicant provided information concerning production capacity, production, consumption and spare capacity in Russia.

• (103) In terms of production capacity of HRF, the applicant provided two sets of sensitive CRU data subject to copyright ²⁴. In addition, it submitted ²⁵ the OECD report on Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity for 2021 ²⁶. In terms of production of HRF, the applicant provided the same two sets of sensitive CRU data subject to copyright ²⁷, as well as alternative sensitive data from Plantfacts subject to copyright ²⁸. In addition, it submitted an excerpt of the OECD report on Steel Market Developments for the fourth quarter of 2021 ²⁹. In terms of consumption and spare capacity of HRF, the applicant provided a set of sensitive CRU data subject to copyright ³⁰.

• (104) Due to the lack of cooperation of the Russian exporting producers, the Commission based its findings concerning the production capacity of HRF in Russia in the review investigation period on the crude steelmaking capacity reported in the OECD report on Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity, apportioned to HRF based on data from the World Steel Association (‘Worldsteel’). First, the latest OECD report on Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity showed an increasing trend of production capacity of crude steel in Russia ³¹, corresponding to an average of 90,5 million tonnes of crude steelmaking capacity in the review investigation period. Worldsteel reported that HRF (including hot-rolled strip products) and hot-rolled coils (which are, as reported by the applicant, the form in which HRF are usually exported ³²) amounted to an average of 21,7 % of the global export volume of steel finished products (thus excluding ingots and semi-finished products) in the review investigation period ³³. This percentage for HRF was applied to the crude steelmaking capacity in Russia, resulting in a production capacity of HRF in Russia of 19,6 million tonnes during the review investigation period.

• (105) The Commission based its findings concerning the production of HRF in Russia in the review investigation period on apportioned data on crude steel production from Worldsteel. Indeed, Worldsteel reported an average production of crude steel in Russia 74,3 million tonnes during the review investigation period ³⁴. Applying the same share of HRF reported above, the Commission found that Russia produced 16,1 million tonnes of HRF in the review investigation period, as a conservative estimate.

• (106) The Commission based its findings concerning the consumption of HRF in Russia in the review investigation period on apportioned data on crude steel consumption from Worldsteel. In fact, Worldsteel an average consumption of crude steel in Russia of 42,8 million tonnes in the review investigation period ³⁵. Applying the same share of HRF and hot-rolled coils reported above, the Commission found that Russia’s consumption of HRF in the review investigation period amounted to 9,3 million tonnes, as a conservative estimate.

• (107) Based on the above data, the Commission found that Russia had a spare capacity of 3,5 million tonnes when compared to production during the review investigation period, which is 10 % of the free market consumption in the Union. Moreover, when comparing the production capacity with domestic consumption, consumption fell short of capacity by 10 million tonnes during the review investigation period, which is almost 30 % of the free market consumption in the Union.

• (108) Excess in production capacities is an incentive to continue exporting. It is clear that Russian producers must exploit all existing possibilities to increase production to fully benefit from their installed capacities. The most obvious way is to penetrate any open market worldwide and very likely at dumped prices as it is still the case in the current investigation.

• (109) Based on the above facts and considerations, the Commission concluded that Russian producers have sufficient spare capacities, which could be used for exporting HRF at dumped prices to the Union if the measures were allowed to lapse.

4.3.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (110) The Commission examined whether it was likely that Russian producers would increase their export sales at dumped prices to the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse. Therefore, the Commission analysed the price level of Russian producers on their domestic market, as well the price level of Russian exports to third country markets, and compared them to the price level of the Union industry.

• (111) The Russian export volumes and prices used to determine the attractiveness of the Union market were established based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation and based on GTA data and information in the request for review.

• (112) The Commission compared the Russian domestic prices used to establish the normal value with the Union industry’s prices in the review investigation period. The comparison showed that the average Russian domestic prices were 17 % lower than the Union industry’s prices. Prices in the Union were therefore more attractive than prices in Russia.

• (113) Moreover, the Commission compared Russian FOB export prices to third countries from the GTA database, adjusted by the freight train cost from Russia to the Union indicated in the request for review, with the Union industry’s prices. However, the GTA database did not include data for 2022 because Russian customs authorities suspended the publication of statistics until further notice following Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, the Commission used 2021 data and deemed them to be applicable also to the first half of 2022. Export prices to third countries in 2021 were approx. 21 % lower than Union industry’s prices in the review investigation period. Therefore, the Union market is more attractive compared to other possible export destinations of the product concerned and Russian producers have an economic incentive to shift exports to the Union, should measures be repealed.

• (114) Furthermore, in order to have an indication of the likely pricing behaviour to the Union in the absence of measures, the Commission also compared Russian FOB export prices from the GTA database, adjusted for the transport cost in Russia indicated in the request for review, with Russian domestic prices used to establish the normal value. Thus, the comparison was made at ex-works level. For the reasons mentioned above, the Commission used 2021 data and deemed them to be applicable also to the first half of 2022. On this basis, the price difference between Russian export prices to third countries in 2021, adjusted by the transport cost in Russia, and the normal value was approximately 15 % of the CIF frontier price to the Union. The normal value being higher by 15 % confirms that, should measures lapse, Russian exports to the Union would likely be made at a price lower than Russian domestic prices.

4.3.2.1.   Possible absorption capacity of third country markets

• (115) In addition to the above, the Commission found that trade defence measures on exports of the product concerned from Russia are in force in Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America ³⁶. As a consequence, these third country markets, which are significant consumers of steel products, are less attractive for the Russian exporting producers. This is an additional element which supports the finding that Russia’s current production capacity would most likely end in the Union market, should measures be repealed.

4.3.3.   Conclusion

• (116) Considering the significant spare capacity in Russia and taking into account the evidence on the attractiveness of the Union market, the Commission concluded that should the measures lapse, it is likely that the Russian exporting producers would activate the spare capacity and likely even redirect exports from third countries towards the Union market at dumped prices and in significant volumes.

• (117) In view of its findings on the continuation of dumping during the review investigation period and on the likely development of exports should the measures lapse, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures on imports from Russia would result in the continuation of dumping.

5. INJURY

5.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (118) According to the applicant the like product was manufactured by 21 producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

• (119) The total Union production of the product under review during the review investigation period was established at around 70 million tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as the request for the expiry review, the verified questionnaire replies and the macro questionnaire reply submitted by EUROFER. As indicated in recital 26, the Union producers selected in the sample represented 25 % of the total Union production of the like product during the review investigation period.

5.2.   Union consumption

• (120) The product under review is regarded as a primary material for the production of various value-added downstream products, starting with cold-rolled products. Given that the Union industry is mostly vertically integrated and produces both the product under review and downstream products, both the captive and free market were analysed separately, where appropriate.

• (121) The distinction between captive and free market is relevant for the injury analysis because products destined for the captive market are not exposed to direct competition from imports, and transfer prices are set within the groups according to various price policies. By contrast, production destined for the free market is in direct competition with imports of the product concerned, and prices are set according to market conditions. The total free market includes sales of Union producers to unrelated customers and non-captive sales to related companies.

• (122) To provide a picture of the Union industry that is as complete as possible, the Commission obtained data for the entire activity of the Union industry related to the like product and determined whether the production was destined for the captive or the free market. The Commission found that more than 50 % of the total Union production of the like product was destined for the captive market during the review investigation period.

• (123) The Commission established the Union free market consumption on the basis of (a) the sales on the Union market of all known producers in the Union, as reported in the macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER and (b) the imports to the Union from all third countries as reported by Eurostat. The Union captive market consumption was established on the basis of the captive use and captive sales on the Union market of all known producers in the Union, as reported in the macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER.

• (124) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Union consumption

	2019	2020	2021	Review investigation period
Total Union consumption	74 399 168	64 954 323	75 357 797	74 386 585
Index	100	87	101	100
Captive market	42 010 993	36 988 575	40 424 417	39 811 331
Index	100	88	96	95
Free market	32 388 175	27 965 748	34 933 380	34 575 254
Index	100	86	108	107
Source: Eurostat(), Macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER.	Source: Eurostat(), Macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER.	Source: Eurostat(), Macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER.	Source: Eurostat(), Macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER.	Source: Eurostat(), Macro questionnaire reply from EUROFER.

• (125) Total Union consumption sharply dropped by 13 % in 2020 due to a slump in demand caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. This decrease was however followed by a recovery driven by the rebound in steel demand which occurred in 2021 and continued during the review investigation period. Overall, during the review investigation period, total Union consumption was able to bounce back to 2019 levels.

• (126) The captive market consumption trend was nearly identical to the total Union consumption trend, declining sharply in 2020 by 12 %, followed by a recovery in the post-Covid-19 period. Captive market consumption, however, reached only 95 % of 2019 levels.

• (127) Free market consumption followed a similar trend to that of total Union consumption. It decreased sharply by 14 % in 2020 and recovered strongly during the review investigation period, increasing by 7 % compared to 2019.

5.3.   Imports from the countries concerned

5.3.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

• (128) As noted in recital 35, there was no cooperation from any producer in Russia, whereas there was cooperation from one Iranian and four Brazilian producers out of which the Commission sampled two producers.

• (129) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of a comparison between import volumes and the Union free market consumption, as reported in Table 1 above.

• (130) Imports to the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 2

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

	2019	2020	2021	Review investigation period
BRAZIL38	91 725	174 104	185 506	478 692
Index	100	190	202	522
Market share	0,28 %	0,62 %	0,53 %	1,38 %
Index	100	221	189	493
IRAN	3 377	0	0	0
Market share	0,010 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
RUSSIA	1 350 435	1 508 376	2 037 080	1 224 699
Index	100	112	151	91
Market share	4,17 %	5,39 %	5,84 %	3,55 %
Index	100	129	140	85
Volume of imports from the countries concerned	1 468 537	1 682 480	2 158 713	1 616 013
Index	100	115	147	110
Market share	4,46 %	6,02 %	6,36 %	4,93 %
Index	100	134	142	110
Source: Eurostat, Macro Questionnaire reply from EUROFER, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers. Market shares were established by comparing import volumes with the Union free market consumption as reported in Table 1.	Source: Eurostat, Macro Questionnaire reply from EUROFER, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers. Market shares were established by comparing import volumes with the Union free market consumption as reported in Table 1.	Source: Eurostat, Macro Questionnaire reply from EUROFER, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers. Market shares were established by comparing import volumes with the Union free market consumption as reported in Table 1.	Source: Eurostat, Macro Questionnaire reply from EUROFER, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers. Market shares were established by comparing import volumes with the Union free market consumption as reported in Table 1.	Source: Eurostat, Macro Questionnaire reply from EUROFER, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers. Market shares were established by comparing import volumes with the Union free market consumption as reported in Table 1.

• (131) Imports from Brazil fluctuated during the period considered. In 2020, the level of imports to the Union increased, followed by a slight increase and then a sharper increase during the review investigation period. Imports from Iran to the Union stopped completely after 2019. Imports from Russia fluctuated during the period considered. Compared to 2019, Russian imports increased sharply in 2020 and 2021. This was followed by a slight decrease during the review investigation period.

5.3.2.   Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting

• (132) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat and the recalculation done for Brazil as explained in footnote 38.

• (133) In the absence of reliable prices in Brazil, as explained in recital 58, and in the absence of imports from Iran, the Commission could not perform an undercutting calculation from the two countries. Concerning Russia, statistical data from Eurostat was used to establish the undercutting margin, as explained below in recital 138.

• (134) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/ tonne)

	2019	2020	2021	Review investigation period
BRAZIL	467	425	1 035	939
Index	100	91	221	201
IRAN	504	—	—	—
RUSSIA	443	391	744	897
Index	100	88	168	202
The countries concerned	445	394	769	909
Index	100	89	173	204
Source: Eurostat, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers (see footnote 38).	Source: Eurostat, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers (see footnote 38).	Source: Eurostat, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers (see footnote 38).	Source: Eurostat, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers (see footnote 38).	Source: Eurostat, Surveillance statistics, questionnaire replies from the sampled Brazilian exporting producers (see footnote 38).

• (135) With the exception of Iran that stopped exporting after 2019, average prices of the countries concerned followed the same trend during the period concerned. After a drop in prices in 2020, a sharp increase of the average prices was observed between 2021 and the review investigation period, with the exception of Brazil, where prices between 2021 and the RIP dropped. For Russia and Brazil, the average prices of imports more than doubled during the period considered, from 443 EUR/tonne in 2019 to 897 EUR/tonne in the review investigation period for Russia, and from 467 EUR/tonne to 939 EUR/tonne for Brazil.