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Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/670 of 26 February 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation

Publication 2024-02-27

State In force

Text As published

Department European Commission, TRADE

Source EUR-Lex

articles 4

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API

(173) During the period considered the sales quantity of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union increased by 7 percentage points. Sales dropped in 2020 but recovered after the pandemic.

(174) The Union industry was also able to keep their market share relatively stable between 2019 and 2021 but their market share declined in the RIP. Overall, between 2019 and the RIP, the Union industry’s market share dropped from 30 % to 26 %.

6.5.2.3. Growth

(175) As set out above, both consumption in the Union and sales quantities of the Union industry increased between 2019 and the end of the RIP. Regardless of this growing trend, the Union industry lost 4 % of market share during the period considered. This shows that the Union industry could not benefit from a growing market and could not even maintain its market share.

(176) The Commission also notes the increasing market share of imports from Vietnam during the period considered at the expense of all other players on the Union market.

6.5.2.4. Employment and productivity

(177) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity


	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Number of employees	624	565	653	686
Index	100	90	105	110
Productivity (pieces/employee)	340	321	399	338
Index	100	94	117	99
Source: Questionnaire replies of the Union Industry.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the Union Industry.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the Union Industry.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the Union Industry.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the Union Industry.

(178) The number of employees of the Union industry increased by 10 % during the period considered. Productivity remained relatively stable from 2019 to the end of the RIP.

6.5.2.5. Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past injurious dumping

(179) This investigation established a dumping margin of 82,5 %. The effect of the magnitude of the actual margin of dumping on the Union industry might have been eased by the anti-dumping measures in place, however the Union industry was still not able to maintain its market share, which dropped by four percentage points.

(180) Although the Union industry’s prices increased during the period considered by 9 %, the corresponding unit costs of production increased by 25 %.

(181) The Union industry was unable to increase prices further due to the pressure of the low import prices and in the face of massive increases in the prices of steel and electricity and inflationary pressures on other costs including labour.

(182) In the previous expiry review, the Commission was able to see that the Union industry had started to recover from the effect of past injurious dumping. Both sales quantities and market shares had increased significantly, and their financial situation had improved significantly.

(183) However during this period considered the situation of the Union industry deteriorated again to the point where the industry has again suffered injury.

6.5.3. Microeconomic indicators

(184) The microeconomic indicators are presented below in indexes and also in ranges. This has been done to protect the confidentiality of the two sampled Union producers, as disclosure of the exact data would release the data of one producer to the other.

(185) The indexes are provided to show the trend of the indicator over time, with 2019 at 100. Ranges are also provided to show the magnitude of the indicator.

6.5.3.1. Prices and factors affecting prices

(186) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/piece)


	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union	[270 -300 ]	[270 -300 ]	[270 -300 ]	[310 -330 ]
Index	100	98	99	109
Unit cost of production	[270 -300 ]	[290 -320 ]	[290 -320 ]	[340 -370 ]
Index	100	107	106	125
Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

(187) Sales prices of the sampled Union producers on the Union market remained relatively stable until the review investigation period. Hand pallet trucks are an asset that, once bought, can remain in service for years if not decades. The product is also by necessity a standard one, as the pallet truck has remained the same design, in order to fit the standard pallet. It is therefore not unusual to see prices stay stable over the period considered.

(188) However the sampled Union producers did see an increase of prices of 10 percentage points between 2021 and the RIP.

(189) The cost of manufacturing a hand pallet truck depends in essence on two things, the price of steel and the price of energy. Both costs rose rapidly in 2021 and the RIP, increasing the cost of manufacturing significantly, by 19 percentage points between 2021 and the RIP.

6.5.3.2. Labour costs

(190) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee


	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR)	[35 000 -38 000 ]	[40 000 -43 000 ]	[47 000 -50 000 ]	[47 000 -50 000 ]
Index	100	116	134	132
Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

(191) Labour costs increased by 32 % between 2019 and the end of the period considered, in line with wage increases across the Union economy as a response to inflationary pressures.

6.5.3.3. Stocks

(192) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Stocks


	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Closing stock (pieces)	[5 000 -5 500 ]	[6 000 -6 500 ]	[8 000 -8 500 ]	[6 500 -7 000 ]
Index	100	124	163	138
Closing stock as a percentage of production	3 %	4 %	4 %	3 %
Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

(193) Although the closing stocks of the Union industry increased by 38 % over the period considered, they were low compared to the total quantity produced, and the closing stock as percentage of production remained stable over the period considered.

6.5.3.4. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(194) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments


	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)	10,5 %	6,2 %	–1,1 %	–0,9 %
Cash flow (EUR)	[3 000 000 – 4 000 000 ]	[0 to -1 000 000 ]	[500 000 – 1 500 000 ]	[-3 500 000 to -4 500 000 ]
Index	100	-19	45	- 120
Investments (EUR)	[3 000 000 – 4 000 000 ]	[1 000 000 – 1 500 000 ]	[0 – 500 000 ]	[0 – 500 000 ]
Index	100	32	13	14
Return on investments	47 %	-15 %	30 %	-94 %
Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

(195) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(196) As costs of production increased first between 2019 and 2020 and they further increased between 2021 and the end of the RIP the sampled Union producers were unable to recover their total costs, and the profits that they were able to make in 2019 were unachievable in 2020. In 2021 and the RIP, the Union industry was loss making.

(197) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed in line with their inability to make a profit during the end of the period considered.

(198) Investments, and the return on investments, also show the same trend, as they are linked to the profitability of the companies and their ability to raise capital to finance investments. The end of the period considered also showed increases in both inflation and interest rates on borrowing.

6.6. Conclusion on injury

(199) The previous expiry review found that the Union industry showed a fragile recovery from past dumping. In the current investigation, the Union industry has again suffered injury during the period considered, in particular in 2021 and the RIP.

(200) Such injury can be seen in the losses made by the industry and the necessity to compete with imports from China, Vietnam and Malaysia based on price, given the standard nature of the product itself.

(201) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

(202) However the Commission notes that this injury comes at a time where Chinese imports of HPT were not undercutting the prices of the Union industry.

(203) The Commission therefore concluded that the material injury suffered by the Union industry could not have been caused by the dumped imports from China.

7. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY CAUSED BY DUMPED IMPORTS

(204) The Commission concluded in recital (201) that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. However the Commission could not conclude that this injury was linked to the dumped imports from China.

(205) Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by the dumped imports from China if the measures against were allowed to lapse.

(206) In this respect the following elements were analysed by the Commission:

(a) production capacity and spare capacity in China;

(b) the relationship between export prices from China to third countries and the price level in the Union;

(c) the likely price levels of imports from China in the absence of anti-dumping measures, and their impact on the Union industry, including undercutting and injurious level; and

(d) circumvention

7.1. Spare capacity in China

(207) As set out in recitals (130)–(134), there is substantial production capacity and spare capacity in China to increase exports to the Union market rapidly in the event that the anti-dumping measures are allowed to expire. As established in recital (131), the spare capacity was estimated to be around 1,3 million pieces which equals almost double Union consumption. No other party questioned this data nor provided any other comments.

(208) Capacity utilisation was around 60 %, as set out in recital (131), which indicates that Chinese capacity is far in excess of domestic needs. The spare capacity in China cannot be absorbed by the Chinese market, considering any reasonable expectation of its growth. Therefore, there are strong incentives for Chinese producers to export, in particular to the Union market, even more so if the measures were allowed to lapse.

7.2. Export prices from China to third countries

(209) The request for review provided data on export prices of HPT from China to other countries, in particular the large export market of the United States. This data shows exports continuing in large quantities and lower prices than to the Union.

(210) This data was confirmed by the Commission’s own analysis which was set out in recital (135) to (139) above.

7.3. Likely price levels from China without measures in force

(211) The Commission has considered the data in the request for review and its own analysis which both show the prices at which the Chinese can export to large third country markets, including the United States.

(212) These low prices suggest that, should the measures lapse, import prices from China into the EU would drop to these levels. As shown Table 4, import prices from China during the review investigation period were 204 EUR/piece, which is materially lower than the average sales price of the Union industry [310-330] EUR/piece shown in Table 9, and also below their cost of production [340-370] EUR/piece.

(213) Therefore, it is likely that without anti-dumping duties, the Chinese imports would materially undercut the Union prices.

7.4. Circumvention

(214) The Commission notes in recital (141) that previous investigations have shown circumvention of the measures in force.

(215) First, the measures were found to be circumvented via the Kingdom of Thailand and the measures remain extended to imports consigned from Thailand, whether originating in Thailand or not.

(216) Second, the Chinese exporters also circumvented the measures by mounting a so-called ‘weight indication system’ on their hand pallet trucks – but not integrated in the chassis – and thereby classifying the products in a way to avoid payment of duty.

(217) This evidence of circumvention shows that Chinese producers were willing to circumvent the measures to access the Union market without payment of duties, showing the attractiveness of the Union market to these Chinese producers.

7.5. Conclusion of the likelihood of recurrence of injury

(218) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that should the measures lapse, it is likely that this will result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China at injurious price levels, and therefore further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry.

8. UNION INTEREST

(219) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and end users.

8.1. Interest of the Union industry

(220) All known producers of hand pallet trucks cooperated with the investigation. Two companies were sampled and visited during the investigation and the remaining companies provided information for the macroeconomic indicators via the lawyers acting on behalf of the Union industry.

(221) The Commission concludes that given the injury suffered by the Union industry during the period considered, if the measures lapsed this injury would continue and the economic situation of the Union industry would further deteriorate.

(222) The measures are clearly in the interest of the Union industry.

8.2. Interest of unrelated importers and users

(223) No importers or users cooperated with the investigation.

(224) In all previous investigations the Commission concluded that the measures have not had a serious effect on either importers or users of hand pallet trucks.

(225) In the absence of new evidence, the Commission therefore continues to conclude that the continuation of measures will not affect importers or users to any significant extent.

8.3. Conclusion on Union interest

(226) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of hand pallet trucks originating in China.

9. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

(227) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations based on which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations after this disclosure.

(228) No comments were received.

(229) Based on the conclusions reached by the Commission on likelihood of continuation of dumping, likelihood of recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on hand pallet trucks from China should be maintained.

(230) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to all other companies. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(231) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission ⁴⁰. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(232) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council ⁴¹ when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(233) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts, i.e. chassis and hydraulics, currently falling under CN codes ex 8427 90 00 (TARIC code 8427900019) and ex 8431 20 00 (TARIC code 8431200019), originating in the People’s Republic of China.

For the purpose of this Regulation, hand pallet trucks shall be trucks with wheels supporting lifting fork arms for handling pallets, designed to be manually pushed, pulled and steered, on smooth, level, hard surfaces, by a pedestrian operator using an articulated tiller. The hand pallet trucks are only designed to raise a load, by pumping the tiller, to a height sufficient for transporting and do not have any other additional functions or uses such as for example (i) to move and to lift the loads in order to place them higher or assist in storage of loads (high lifters); (ii) to stack one pallet above the other (stackers); (iii) to lift the load to a working level (scissor lifts); or (iv) to lift and to weigh the loads (weighing trucks).

The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

Company	Anti-dumping duty	TARIC additional code
Zhejiang Noblelift Equipment Joint Stock Co. Ltd	70,8 %	A603
Ningbo Logitrans Handling Equipment Co., Ltd	54,1 %	A070
All other companies	70,8 %	A999

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

The definitive anti-dumping duty set out in Article 1, paragraph 3, is hereby extended to the same product but presented at import with a so-called ‘weight indication system’ consisting of a weighing mechanism not integrated in the chassis, that is to say not integrated in the forks, currently falling under TARIC codes 8427900030 and 8431200050.

The definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’ set out in Article 1, paragraph 3, is hereby extended to imports of the same hand pallet trucks consigned from Thailand, currently falling under TARIC codes 8427900011 and 8431200011, whether declared as originating in Thailand or not.

Article 3

Requests for exemption from the duty extended by Article 2 shall be made in writing in one of the official languages of the European Union and must be signed by a person authorised to represent the applicant. The request must be sent to the following address:


European Commission
Directorate-General for Trade
Directorate G
Rue de la Loi 170/Wetstraat 170, CHAR 04/034
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË
Email: TRADE-TDI-INFORMATION@ec.europa.eu

In accordance with Article 13(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, the Commission, after consulting the Advisory Committee, may authorise, by decision, the exemption of imports from companies which do not circumvent the anti-dumping measures imposed by Article 1, from the duty extended by Article 2.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 26 February 2024.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

Council Regulation (EC) No 1174/2005 of 18 July 2005 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 189, 21.7.2005, p. 1).

Council Regulation (EC) No 684/2008 of 17 July 2008 clarifying the scope of the anti-dumping measures imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1174/2005 on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 192, 19.7.2008, p. 1).

Council Regulation (EC) No 499/2009 of 11 June 2009 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1174/2005 on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from Thailand, whether declared as originating in Thailand or not (OJ L 151, 16.6.2009, p. 1).

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 of 10 October 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts consigned from Thailand, whether declared as originating in Thailand or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 1).

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 372/2013 of 22 April 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China following a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 112, 24.4.2013, p. 1).

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 946/2014 of 4 September 2014 amending Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 imposing a definitive anti- dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China following a ‘new exporter’ review pursuant to Article 11(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 265, 5.9.2014, p. 7).

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1346 of 8 August 2016 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011, as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 372/2013, on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of slightly modified hand pallet trucks originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 214, 9.8.2016, p. 1).

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2206 of 29 November 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 314, 30.11.2017, p. 12).

OJ L 265, 5.9.2014, p. 7.

OJ C 104, 4.3.2022, p. 10.

OJ C 452, 29.11.2022, p. 26.

https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2635.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 of 11 July 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of steel bulb flats originating in the People’s Republic of China and Türkiye (OJ L 177, 12.7.2023, p. 63); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 of 11 January 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel refillable kegs originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 10, 12.1.2023, p. 36); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 149); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 36, 17.2.2022, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 of 24 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel consigned from Taiwan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 16, 25.1.2022, p. 36).

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 66; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 58; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 80; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 208, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 59.

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 45; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 38; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 64; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 192, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 46.

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 58; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 40; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 66; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 193 and 194, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 47. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs.

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 59; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 43; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 68; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recitals 48-52.

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 62; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 52; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 74; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 202, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 53.

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 45; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 33; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 75; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 54.

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 64; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 54; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 76; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 204, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 55.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17).

China Industrial Truck Association http://www.cncma.org/col/gyclfh/fenhuijieshao. List of represented industries with HPT falling into the 8^th category: http://www.cncma.org/article/gyclfh/12957

China Construction Machinery Association http://www.cncma.org/

See CCMA Articles of Association: http://www.cncma.org/article/472

Document available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-02/08/content_5672513.htm (accessed on 14 July 2023).

Document available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (accessed on 14 July 2023).

See details on CCMA’s website: http://www.cncma.org/article/16231 and http://www.cncma.org/article/16893 (accessed on 14 July 2023).

See CCMA’s website: http://www.cncma.org/article/gyclfh/15525 (accessed on 14 July 2023).

World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/Brazil/

Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/economicas/industria/9042-pesquisa-industrial-anual.html?=&t=destaques

https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/secretarias/spe/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de-energia

https://www.globalpetrolprices.com

Request for review, p. 25; Annex 7.

Request for review, Annex 12.

Applicant refers to estimates from Trade Data Monitor (https://www.tradedatamonitor.com) which concur with the data from GTA database, keeping in mind the limitations explained in recital (135).

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/670/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)

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