Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/770 of 4 March 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Image omitted; see official source	Official Journal of the European Union	EN Series L
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	2024/770	5.3.2024

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union ¹ (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1.   Previous investigations and measures in force

• (1) By Regulation (EU) 2018/140 of 29 January 2018 ², the European Commission imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’, ‘China’ or ‘the country concerned’) (‘the original measures’).

• (2) These measures were amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/261 ³ on 14 February 2019. The anti-dumping duties currently in force are at rates ranging from 15,5 % to 38,1 %.

1.2.   Request for an expiry review

• (3) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry ⁴ the European Commission (‘the Commission’) received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

• (4) The request was submitted on 28 October 2022 by Eurofonte (‘the applicant’) on behalf of seven Union producers representing more than 70 % of the Union industry of certain cast iron articles in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

1.3.   Initiation of an expiry review

• (5) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 27 January 2023 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union ⁵ (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

1.3.1.   Review investigation period and period considered

• (6) The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022 (‘review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2019 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

1.3.2.   Interested parties

• (7) In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission in order to participate in the investigation. The Commission specifically informed the applicant, all known Union producers, the known producers in the People’s Republic of China and the authorities of the People’s Republic of China as well as known importers, users and traders about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate in the investigation.

• (8) Among the interested parties that came forward was the China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Machinery & Electronic Products (‘CCCME’). Following the judgment of the Court in case C-478/21P ⁶, the Commission decided on 6 November 2023 to request CCCME to provide a Power of Attorney for one or more of the Chinese exporting producers it claimed to represent in order to confirm its status as a representative association of exporters of the dumped product. The CCCME did not provide such Power of Attorney, so the Commission rejected it as an interested party. CCCME did not comment on the rejection of its interested party status either.

• (9) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

1.3.3.   Sampling

• (10) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

Sampling of Union producers

• (11) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union in 2022, as well as the sales geographical coverage. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 46 % of the total Union production of the like product. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample, but no comments were received. The Commission thus confirmed the provisionally selected sample as the definitive sample.

Sampling of importers

• (12) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

• (13) Two unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample.

Sampling of exporting producers in the PRC

• (14) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

• (15) Nine exporting producers in the country concerned provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned and the authorities of the country concerned, were consulted on the selection of the sample. No comments were made.

• (16) However, following the request to complete the questionnaire for exporting producers one of the sampled companies informed the Commission of their intention not to cooperate. Accordingly, the Commission selected a new sample of exporting producers, but again one of the sampled companies informed the Commission that it would not cooperate. In this manner the Commission amended the sample three different times and invited a total of five exporting producers to complete the questionnaire. None of these companies provided a questionnaire reply.

1.3.4.   Replies to the questionnaire

• (17) The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’).

• (18) The Commission sent questionnaires to all sampled companies, to the European association Eurofonte a.s.b.l. and to five exporting producers. The same questionnaires had also been made available online ⁷ on the day of initiation.

• (19) Questionnaire replies were received from the three sampled Union producers, from the European association Eurofonte a.s.b.l. and from two unrelated importers, Fundición Dúctil para Obras Publicas S.A. and Capa – Engenharia e Construções Metalomecânicas S.A. None of the users provided a questionnaire or came forward during the investigation.

• (20) Because there was no cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers or the GOC, the findings with regard to the likelihood of dumping and injury were made on the basis of facts available pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation. The Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union was informed accordingly. No comments were received.

1.3.5.   Verification

• (21) The Commission sought and verified the information made available by the cooperating parties for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest.

• (22) Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Union producers

• — EJ Picardie SAS, France

• — MeierGuss GmbH & Co. KG, Germany

• — Fundiciones de Odena SA. Spain.

1.3.6.   Subsequent procedure

• (23) On 18 December 2023, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

• (24) The comments made by interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate. Eurofonte was the only part filing comments that supported the Commission’s findings. No hearings were requested.

2. PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product under review

• (25) The product subject to this review is certain articles of lamellar graphite cast iron (grey iron) or spheroidal graphite cast iron (also known as ductile cast iron), and parts thereof. These articles are of a kind used to:

• — cover ground or sub-surface systems, and/or openings to ground or sub-surface systems, and also

• — give access to ground or sub-surface systems and/or provide view to ground or sub-surface systems.

• (26) The articles may be machined, coated, painted and/or fitted with other materials such as but not limited to concrete, paving slabs, or tiles (‘the product under review’).

• (27) The following product types are excluded from the definition of the product under review:

• — channel gratings and cast tops subject to standard EN 1433, to be fitted as a component on channels in polymer, plastic, galvanised steel or concrete allowing surface water to flow into the channel,

• — floor drains, roof drains, cleanouts and covers for cleanouts, subject to standard EN 1253,

• — step irons, lifting keys, and fire hydrants.

2.2.   Product concerned

• (28) The product concerned by the expiry review investigation is the product under review originating in the PRC currently falling under CN codes ex 7325 10 00 and ex 7325 99 10 (TARIC codes 7325100031 and 7325991060).

2.3.   Like product

• (29) As established in the original investigation this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics, as well as the same basic uses:

• — the product concerned when exported to the Union;

• — the product under review produced and sold on the domestic market of the PRC;

• — the product under review produced and sold by the exporting producers to the rest of the world; and

• — the product under review produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

• (30) These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

3. DUMPING

3.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (31) During the review investigation period, imports of certain cast iron articles from the PRC continued albeit at lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation (i.e. from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016). According to Eurostat, imports of cast iron products from the PRC accounted for about 4,7 % of the Union market in the review investigation period, compared to 27,3 % market share during the original investigation. In absolute terms the volume of imports from the PRC went down from 147 186 tonnes in the original investigation period to 22 146 tonnes during the review investigation period.

• (32) As mentioned in recital 20, none of the exporters/producers from the PRC cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of the PRC that due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings with regard to the PRC. The Commission did not receive any comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard.

• (33) Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular, information submitted with the request for review and information obtained from cooperating parties in the course of the review investigation (namely, the applicant and the sampled Union producers).

3.2.   Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation for the imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the PRC

• (34) Given the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show, with regard to the PRC, the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission initiated the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

• (35) In order to obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC.

• (36) In point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine possible appropriate countries in accordance with the criteria set out in the first indent of Article 2(6a) of the Basic regulation.

• (37) On 31 May 2023, the Commission informed interested parties by a note to the file of the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Türkiye as the representative country. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of certain cast iron articles. In addition, the Commission informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A’) and profits based on aggregated financial statements from Company Accounts Statistics ⁸ for 892 profitable companies active in the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities, commonly referred to as NACE, category 24.5 ‘cast iron articles of metals’, producers in the representative country, compiled by the Central Bank of Türkiye and the Turkish Statistical Institute. No comments were received.

3.3.   Normal value

• (38) According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

• (39) However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is refereed hereinafter as ‘SG&A’).

• (40) As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

3.3.1.   Existence of significant distortions

• (41) In recent investigations concerning the steel sector in the PRC ⁹, the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present.

• (42) In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles ¹⁰. In particular, the Commission concluded that in the steel sector, which is the main raw material to produce the product under review, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation ¹¹, but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation ¹². The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces ¹³. Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC ¹⁴. In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the steel sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation ¹⁵, as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC ¹⁶.

• (43) Like in previous investigations concerning the iron and steel sector in the PRC, the Commission examined in the present investigation whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the request, as well as in the Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations ¹⁷ (‘Report’), which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under review. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC as also found by its previous investigations in this respect.

• (44) The request alleged that the Chinese economy, as a whole, is widely influenced and affected by substantial governmental interventions, in view of which domestic prices and costs of the Chinese steel industry cannot be used in the present investigation.

• (45) More specifically, the request pointed out that against the background of the ‘socialist market economy’ doctrine enshrined in the PRC Constitution, the omnipresence of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) and the government influence over the economy by means of strategic planning initiatives, the GOC’s interventionism takes various forms, namely administrative, financial and regulatory. As a consequence, the request concluded that not only the domestic sales prices of cast iron are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs, including raw materials, energy, land, financing or labour, are also distorted because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention.

• (46) The request provided examples of elements pointing to existence of distortions, as listed in the first to sixth dash of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. In particular, referring to a number of publicly available information sources, such as the Report, previous Commission investigations in the steel sector, Chinese legislation, as well as to additional sources, the applicant submitted that:

• — The Chinese State does not only actively formulate and oversee the implementation of general economic policies by individual State-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’), but it also claims its rights to participate in operational decision-making in SOEs. This is typically done through the rotation of cadres between government authorities and SOEs, through presence of party members in SOEs executive bodies and of party cells in companies, as well as by shaping the corporate structure of the SOE sector. In exchange, SOEs enjoy a particular status within the Chinese economy. This status entails a number of economic benefits, in particular the shielding from competition and the preferential access to relevant inputs, including financing, land and energy. This control and policy supervision is particularly pressing in the steel sector where a substantial degree of ownership by the Chinese Government persists and where the GOC aims to consolidate 60 % of the iron and steel production to around ten large-scale enterprises by 2025.

• — In view of the general applicability of the legislation on CCP presence in companies, it cannot be assumed that the ability of the GOC to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms would be different with relation to the product under review compared to the steel sector in general. The State is therefore in the position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms, in particular through the CCP cells in enterprises, state-owned and private alike, including with respect to the producers of cast iron and the suppliers of their inputs.

• — The State’s presence and intervention in financial markets as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. For example, the 13^th and 14^th FYP put measures in place that enable the GOC to increase and control the supply, distribution and ownership of raw materials, namely through restrictions on export volumes and an export licencing regime alongside with investment restrictions that drive down the domestic prices and enable downstream industry access to cheaper raw materials, thus impeding market forces from operating normally. In particular, this has been found to be the case in the steelmaking raw materials market as well as with respect to iron ore, both key upstream inputs for the product under review. Moreover, China recently imposed export tariffs and put in place VAT rebates concerning, inter alia, steel scrap, pig iron, crude steel, recycled steel raw materials and ferro-chrome, which are all main raw materials for the product under review.

• — On the level of allocation of financial resources, the financial system in the PRC is dominated by the State-owned commercial banks. Those banks, when setting up and implementing their lending policy need to align themselves with the government’s industrial policy objectives rather than primarily assessing the economic merits of a given project. Furthermore, bond and credit ratings are often distorted for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the risk assessment is influenced by the firm’s strategic importance to GOC – resulting in the presence of ‘zombie companies’ that aggravate capital misallocation -and the strength of any implicit guarantee by the government. Moreover, borrowing costs have been kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth, which has led to the excessive use of capital investment with ever-lower returns on investment and no signs of credit tightening.

• — Workers and employers are impeded in their rights to collective organisation and mobility by the hukou household registration system, which limits access to the full range of social security and other benefits. This leads to wage costs being distorted since they do not result from normal market forces or negotiation between companies and the work force.

• — The GOC’s energy policy over-incentivises the production of coal, which is used in the production of cast iron articles and thus distorts their price in China.

• — In addition, the preferential allocation of resources to certain domestic producers is particularly obvious in relation to ownership of land and land-use rights in China, with all land owned by the State, its allocation remaining solely dependent on the State and authorities often pursuing political goals including the implementation of the economic plans – as laid down in the 13^th FYP – when allocating land.

• (47) In conclusion, the request took the position that prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the Basic Regulation. On that basis, according to the request, it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case.

• (48) The GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file, including the Report and the additional evidence provided by the applicant, on the existence of significant distortions and/or appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand.

• (49) Specifically in the sector of the product under review, i.e. the iron and steel sector, a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation. Both public and privately owned enterprises in the sector are subject to policy supervision and guidance. Examples entail the Baowu Steel Group – which is an SOE under the central SASAC ¹⁸ – and its subsidiaries Chongqing Iron & Steel Company Ltd. ¹⁹ and Maanshan Iron & Steel Company Limited ²⁰; the Baotou Steel Group – an SOE held by the Inner Mongolian Government ²¹ -, the Angang Steel Group – an SOE under the central SASAC ²², as well as the Shougang Group – an SOE 100 % held by the Beijing State-Owned Asset Management Ltd. ²³ Since there was no cooperation from Chinese exporters of the product under review, the exact ratio of the private and state-owned producers could not be determined. However, while specific information may not be available for the product under review, the sector represents a sub-sector of the iron and steel industry and the findings concerning the iron and steel sector are therefore deemed indicative also for the product under review.

• (50) The latest Chinese policy documents concerning the iron and steel sector confirm the continued importance which the GOC attributes to the sector, including the intention to intervene in the sector in order to shape it in line with the government policies. This is exemplified by the MIIT Guiding Opinion on Fostering a High Quality Development of Steel Industry which calls for further consolidation of the industrial foundation and significant improvement in the modernization level of the industrial chain ²⁴, by the 14^th FYP on Developing the Raw Material Industry according to which the sector will ‘adhere to the combination of market leadership and government promotion’ and will ‘cultivate a group of leading companies with ecological leadership and core competitiveness’ ²⁵, or by the 2023 Work Plan on the Stable Growth of the Steel Industry ²⁶ which sets the following objectives: ‘In 2023, […]the investment in fixed assets in the entire industry shall maintain a steady growth, and the economic benefits shall be significantly improved; the industry’s R & D investment shall eventually reach 1,5 %; the industry’s added value growth shall reach about 3,5 %; in 2024, the industry development environment and industry structure shall be further optimized, the move towards high-end, intelligent, and green products shall continue, and the industry added value growth shall exceed 4 %’, and which foresees government mandated corporate consolidation of the steel sector: ‘[e]ncourage industry-leading enterprises to implement mergers and acquisitions, build world-class super-large iron and steel enterprise groups, and foster the optimal layout of national iron and steel production capacity. Support specialized enterprises with leading power in particular steel market segments to further integrate resources and create a steel industry ecosystem. Encourage iron and steel enterprises to carry out cross-regional […] mergers and reorganizations […]. Consider giving greater policy support for capacity replacement to iron and steel enterprises that have completed substantive mergers and reorganizations.’

• (51) Similar examples of the intention by the Chinese authorities to supervise and guide the developments of the sector can be seen at the provincial level, such as in Hebei which plans to ‘steadily implement the group development of organizations, accelerate the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, focus on promoting the cross-regional merger and reorganization of private iron and steel enterprises, and strive to establish 1-2 world-class large groups, 3-5 large groups with domestic influence as the support’ and to ‘further expand the recycling and circulation channels of scrap steel, strengthen the screening and classification of scrap steel.’ ²⁷ Moreover, Hebei’s plan in the steel sector states: ‘Adhere to structural adjustment and highlight product diversification. Unswervingly promote the structural adjustment and layout optimization of the iron and steel industry, promote the consolidation, reorganization, transformation and upgrading of enterprises, and comprehensively promote the development of the iron and steel industry in the direction of large-scale enterprises, modernization of technical equipment, diversification of production processes, and diversification of downstream products’.

• (52) Similarly, the Henan Implementation Plan for the Transformation and Upgrade of the Steel Industry during the 14^th FYP foresees the ‘construction of characteristic steel production bases […], build 6 characteristic steel production bases in Anyang, Jiyuan, Pingdingshan, Xinyang, Shangqiu, Zhouou, etc., and improve the scale, intensification, specialization and specialization of the industry. Among them, by 2025, the production capacity of pig iron in Anyang will be controlled within 14 million tons, and the production capacity of crude steel will be controlled within 15 million tons.’ ²⁸

• (53) Further industrial policy objectives can also be seen in the planning documents of other provinces, such as Jiangsu ²⁹, Shandong ³⁰, Shanxi ³¹, Liaoning Dalian ³² or Zhejiang ³³.

• (54) As to the GOC being in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation, due to the lack of cooperation from the side of the exporting producers, it was impossible to systematically establish existence of personal connections between producers of the product under review and the CCP. However, there are some specific examples available concerning the product under review. Moreover, given that the product under review represents a subsector of the metal sector, information available with respect to steel producers is relevant also to the product under review.

• (55) For instance, the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Baotou Steel Union, belonging to the Baotou Steel Group serves also as the company’s Party secretary, with the chairman of the company’s trade union being the deputy Party secretary ³⁴. In the same vein, within the Shougang Group, the chairman of the Board of Directors serves as the Party Committee secretary while the Deputy Executive Manager is a member of the Party Committee ³⁵. Likewise, a leading figure of the Hongguang Handan Company stated publicly that without the care and support not least through guarantees provided by the GOC and CCP, which is involved with more than 20 members in Hongguang Casting Co. Ltd., the undertaking would not have succeeded the way it did ³⁶. A further example of CCP allegiance can be found in Article 3 of the China Foundry Association pursuant to which it accepts the business guidance, supervision and management by the respective party entities, e.g., the SASAC and Ministry of Civil Affairs, and provides the necessary conditions for its participation ³⁷.

• (56) Further, policies discriminating in favour of domestic producers or otherwise influencing the market in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation are in place in the sector of the product under review. The investigation identified further documents showing that the industry benefits from governmental guidance and intervention into the iron and steel sector, given that the product under review represents one of its subsectors.

• (57) The iron and steel industry keeps being regarded as a key industry by the GOC ³⁸. This is confirmed in the numerous plans, directives and other documents focused on the sector, which are issued at national, regional and municipal level. Under the 14^th FYP, the GOC earmarked the iron and steel industry for transformation and upgrade, as well as optimization and structural adjustment ³⁹. Similarly, the 14^th FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry, applicable also to the iron and steel industry, lists the sector as the ‘bedrock of the real economy’ and ‘a key field that shapes China’s international competitive edge’ and sets a number of objectives and working methods which would drive the development of the sector in the time period 2021-2025, such a technological upgrade, improving the structure of the sector (not least by means of further corporate concentrations) or digital transformation ⁴⁰. Moreover, the abovementioned (see recital 50) Work Plan on the Stable Growth of the Steel Industry demonstrates how the focus of the Chinese authorities on the sector is put into the wider context of the GOC steering the Chinese economy: ‘[s]upport steel companies to closely follow the needs of new infrastructure, new urbanization, rural revitalization, and emerging industries, dock with major engineering projects related to the “14th Five-Year Plan” in various regions, and make every effort to ensure steel supply. Establish and deepen upstream and downstream cooperation mechanisms between steel and key steel-using sectors such as shipbuilding, transportation, construction, energy, automobiles, home appliances, agricultural machinery, and heavy equipment, carry out production-demand docking activities, and actively expand steel application fields’ ⁴¹.

• (58) In addition, with respect to iron ore – a raw material used for the production of the product under review – according to the 14th Five-Year Plan (‘FYP’) on Developing the Raw Materials Industry, the State plans to ‘rationally develop domestic mineral resources. Strengthen the exploration of iron ore […], implement preferential tax policies, encourage the adoption of advanced technology and equipment to reduce the generation of mining solid waste’ ⁴² leading to the establishment of a system for the reserves of iron ore output and mineral lands that will ‘become an important measure to stabilize the iron ore market price and ensure the safety of the industrial chain’ ⁴³. In provinces, such as Hebei, the authorities foresee the following for the sector: ‘new project investment discount subsidy; explore and guide financial institutions to provide low-interest loans for iron and steel enterprises to switch to new industries, and at the same time, the government will provide discount subsidies’ ⁴⁴. In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of the main raw materials used in the manufacturing of the product under review. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely.

• (59) The product under review is also affected by the distortions of wage costs in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, as also referred to above in recitals 42 and 46. Those distortions affect the sector both directly (when producing the product under review or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC) ⁴⁵.

• (60) Moreover, no evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the sector of the product under review is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, as also referred to above in recitals 42 and 46. The abovementioned (see recital 50) Work Plan on the Stable Growth exemplifies also this type of government intervention very well: ‘Encourage financial institutions to actively provide financial services to steel companies that implement mergers and reorganizations, layout adjustments, transformation and upgrading, in accordance with the principles of risk control and business sustainability.’ Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

• (61) Finally, the Commission recalls that in order to produce the product under review, a number of inputs is needed. When the producers of the product under review purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors.

• (62) As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product under review are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth.

• (63) In sum, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under review, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. On that basis, and in the absence of any cooperation from the GOC, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, as described in the following section.

• (64) No evidence or argument to the contrary has been adduced by the GOC in the present investigation.

3.3.2.   Representative country

3.3.2.1.   General remarks

• (65) The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

• — A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank ⁴⁶;

• — Production of the product under review in that country ⁴⁷;

• — Availability of relevant public data in the representative country;

• — Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference should be given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection.

• (66) As explained in recital 37, the Commission issued a note to the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value on 31 May 2023. This note described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria, informed interested parties of its intention to consider Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

• (67) In line with the criteria listed under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission identified Türkiye as a country with a similar level of economic development as the PRC. Türkiye is classified by the World Bank as an ‘upper-middle income’ country on a gross national income basis. Furthermore, Türkiye was identified as a country where the product under review is produced and where relevant data was readily available.

• (68) Finally, given the absence of cooperation and having established that Türkiye was an appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

3.3.2.2.   Conclusion

• (69) In the absence of cooperation, as proposed in the expiry review request and given that Türkiye met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected Türkiye as the appropriate representative country.

3.3.3.   Sources used to establish undistorted costs

• (70) In the note on relevant sources to use for the determination of the normal value, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the Union producers, based on the information provided in the expiry review request duly updated where more accurate information was available. The Commission also stated that in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) ⁴⁸ to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. In addition, the Commission stated that it would use information from: the Turkish Statistical Institute ⁴⁹ for establishing undistorted costs of electricity, gas and labour, the Türkiye Investment Office ⁵⁰ for water and from Türkiye Petrolleri ⁵¹ for fuel.

After disclosing the note on relevant sources to use for the determination of the normal value, the Commission found that the increase in prices of electricity and natural gas in Türkiye outpaced the inflation rate in Türkiye. In addition, the information on prices of electricity and natural gas in the second half of 2022 were not published by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Therefore, the Commission decided to use the undistorted cost of electricity and natural gas in Malaysia, as set out in recital 81. Indeed, Malaysia is a country with a level of economic development similar to the PRC. In addition, it was also used as representative country in other similar investigations.

• (71) The Commission also stated that to establish SG&A costs and profit, it would use the financial data from Company Account Statistics for 892 companies active in NACE category 24.5, as set out in recital 37.

• (72) The Commission further informed the interested parties that a number of factors of production (such as packaging, other accessories and parts) all individually represented a small share, ranging from 1 to 10 %, of total raw material costs in the review investigation period. The Commission therefore intended to treat these other factors of production as ‘consumables’ and expressed these consumables as a percentage of the total cost of raw materials. These factors of production accounted for 16 % and 7 % of the total raw materials costs for ductile iron products and for grey iron products respectively.

• (73) In addition, the Commission included a value for manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. The Commission established the ratio of manufacturing overheads to the direct costs of manufacturing, based on data of Union producers provided by the applicant, which provided specific information for that purpose.

3.4.   Undistorted costs and benchmarks

3.4.1.   Factors of production

• (74) Considering all the information based on the request and subsequent information collected during the proceeding, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production of certain cast iron articles

Factor of Production	Commodity Code	Undistorted value (CNY)	Unit of measurement
Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials
Scrap of Iron or Steel	72044910	3,31	KG
Coke and semi-coke of coal	27040010	3,34	KG
Pig iron	720110	3,82	KG
Scrap of Cast Iron	72041000	2,20	KG
Ferro-alloy – FeMn	72021900	22,08	KG
Ferro-alloy – FeSi	72022100	15,24	KG
Ferro-alloy – FeSiMg	72029930	21,25	KG
Ferro-alloy – others	72029980	24,20	KG
Silicon Carbide Briquettes	28492000	11,4	KG
Steel frames	730890980018	34,90	KG
Paints	32081090	42,14	KG
Limestone	252100	7,49	KG
Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy
Electricity	N/A	0,52 CNY/Kwh	Kwh
Natural Gas	N/A	0,20 CNY/Kwh	Kwh
Water	N/A	10,17 CNY/M3	M3
Fuel	N/A	4,63 CNY/L	L
Labour	Labour	Labour	Labour
Labour	N/A	36,56 CNY/hour	Hours

3.4.1.1.   Raw materials

• (75) The production processes of certain cast iron articles are globally similar, with no significant differences between the production processes in the PRC, the Union and other countries. The production process and factors of production differed slightly depending on whether the cast iron article was made of grey iron or made of ductile iron. Both of these types of cast iron articles were exported from the PRC to the Union.

• (76) To establish the undistorted price of raw materials, as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country, as reported in GTA to which import duties were added. An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries, excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council ⁵². The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in recital 63that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. After excluding imports from the PRC into the representative country, the volume of imports from other third countries remained representative.

• (77) For the factors of production limestone (commodity code 252100) and ferro-alloy (others) (commodity code 72029980), according to GTA statistics, there were no or insignificant import quantities into Türkiye during the review investigation period, meaning that the resulting final average import prices were not sufficiently representative. In light of the unavailability of other data, on the Commission had to base itself on the information provided in the review request. during the review investigation period, limestone represented 2 % of total raw material costs of ductile cast iron products and ferro-alloy (others) represented 1 % of total raw material costs of grey cast iron products. As the value used for these factors of production had no appreciable impact on the dumping margin calculations, regardless of the source used, the Commission decided to include those costs into consumables.

• (78) In view of lack of cooperation and absence of other elements on file, based on the data provided by the applicant, and taking into account the inclusion of certain costs into consumables as explained in recitals 72 and 77, the Commission established the ratio of consumables to the total raw material costs at 25 % for ductile iron products and 16 % for grey iron products. These percentages were then applied to the undistorted value of the raw materials to obtain the undistorted value of other raw materials and consumables.

• (79) Normally, domestic transport prices should also be added to these import prices. However, considering the absence of cooperation as well as the nature of this expiry review investigation, which is focused on finding whether dumping continued during the review investigation period or could reoccur, rather than finding its exact magnitude, the Commission decided that adjustments for domestic transport were unnecessary. Such adjustments would only result in increasing the normal value and hence the dumping margin.

3.4.1.2.   Labour

• (80) The Turkish Statistical Institute publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Türkiye ⁵³. The Commission used the statistics for 2020, which were the latest available, for average labour cost for the economic activity ‘Manufacture of basic metals’ under NACE code 24 according to NACE Rev.2 classification. The hourly average labour costs thus obtained were further adjusted for inflation using the labour cost index ⁵⁴ to reflect the costs for the review investigation period.

3.4.1.3.   Energy

• (81) The electricity prices in Malaysia were publicly available on the website of the electricity utility company TNB ⁵⁵. The Commission used tariffs applicable to customers in the ‘medium voltage’ category. The natural gas prices in Malaysia were publicly available on the website of the energy commission ⁵⁶. The Commission used natural gas tariffs applicable to industrial users in the fourth quarter of 2021 and selected a consumption band in line with the applicant’s consumption of natural gas.

3.4.1.4.   Fuel

• (82) Türkiye Petrolleri (Turkish Petroleum) publishes the average prices for fuel oil in the different cities in Türkiye. In line with the review request, the Commission used the average fuel prices for Istanbul Anadolu for the period from January 2022 to December 2022 ⁵⁷. Since fuel prices fluctuate only marginally between cities, Istanbul Anadolu was considered an appropriate proxy for the whole of Türkiye.

3.4.1.5.   Water

• (83) For the price of water, the Commission used the average applicable prices in Türkiye for the cost of water for industrial use as presented by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Investment Office ⁵⁸.

3.4.1.6.   Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A and profits

• (84) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

• (85) To establish an undistorted value of the manufacturing overheads given the absence of cooperation from the exporting producers, the Commission used facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. Based on the data provided by the applicant, the Commission established the ratio of manufacturing overheads to the total manufacturing and labour costs. This percentage was then applied to the undistorted value of the cost of manufacturing to obtain the undistorted value of manufacturing overheads.

• (86) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A and profit, the Commission relied on the most recent available financial data for 892 Turkish companies active in NACE category 24.5, as set out in recital 37.

3.4.2.   Calculation of the normal value

• (87) Based on the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type (cast iron articles of grey iron and cast iron articles of ductile iron) on an ex-works basis, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (88) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the applicant in the review request on the usage of each factor (materials, energy and labour) for the production of certain cast iron articles. The Commission multiplied the usage of each factor by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country Türkiye.

• (89) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost was established, the Commission added the manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profit, as noted in section 3.4.1.6. Manufacturing overheads were determined based on data provided by the applicant. SG&A and profit were determined based on the average of the values reported for the 892 Turkish companies active in NACE category 24.5 for 2022 ⁵⁹. The Commission added the following items to the undistorted costs of manufacturing:

• — Manufacturing overheads, which accounted in total for [20-25] % of the direct cost of manufacturing for ductile iron products and [15-20] % for grey iron products ⁶⁰,

• — SG&A and other costs, which accounted for 10,07 % of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’), and

• — Profits, which amounted to 7,98 % of the COGS, were applied to the total undistorted costs of manufacturing.

• (90) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

3.5.   Export price

• (91) In the absence of cooperation by exporting producers from the PRC, the export price was determined by using CIF prices extracted from Eurostat data, corrected to get to an ex-works level. Thus, the CIF price was reduced by the sea freight and insurance cost and domestic transport cost. Domestic Chinese and international transport costs were based on information provided by the applicant in the request for review.

3.6.   Comparison

• (92) The Commission compared, per product type, the normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

3.7.   Dumping margin

• (93) On this basis, the difference between the export price and the constructed normal value was found to be significant (over 60 %). It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF DUMPING

• (94) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, the relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union, and the attractiveness of the Union market. It is recalled that due to the non-cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, as well as the GOC, the analysis was based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, in particular the request for review, GTA statistics and other available information.

4.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC

• (95) In the absence of cooperation by the GOC and the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission based its findings regarding production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC on the information provided by the applicant in its request for review.

• (96) The investigation has shown that there was a general overcapacity in the production of certain cast iron articles in China during the period considered. The production capacity ⁶¹ in China during this period was estimated to be 1 031 292 tonnes per year. According to the applicant’s market intelligence, Chinese actual production and sales amounted to 408 654 tonnes per year, which indicated an estimated spare capacity of 622 638 tonnes during the review investigation period. This spare capacity, which was more than total Union consumption during the same period, could be diverted to the Union if the current measures would cease to apply.

• (97) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Chinese exporting producers have significant spare capacities, which could be used for exports to the Union in large quantities at dumped prices if the measures were allowed to lapse.

4.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (98) Based on the information provided in the expiry review request, the Union market for certain cast iron articles remained attractive to Chinese exporters. Since the original investigation, imports from the PRC have decreased both in absolute and in relative terms. The market share previously held by the PRC has in part been taken over by other third countries, such as India and Türkiye, which have increased their export volumes of the product under review to the Union since the previous investigation. At the same time, the PRC was still the third largest exporter of certain cast iron articles to the Union during the investigation period. This shows that the Union is an attractive market for exporters from China.

• (99) The Union market for certain cast iron articles is one of the largest in the world, with a consumption of 467 544 tonnes during the review investigation period. According to the expiry review request, Chinese foundries have established links with importers and distribution networks over many years of exporting to the Union. Evidence provided by the applicant in the expiry review request showed that Chinese producers were offering cast iron articles at low prices during the review investigation period. In addition, the US market, one of the biggest markets in terms of size, is protected by trade defence measures at a level of 25,52 % ⁶² against China, which reduces access of the Chinese producers to that market. These measures have been prolonged for another 5 years in March 2022. As a result, this would likely lead to a further increase of Chinese exports to the Union, should the current measures lapse.

• (100) Even with the measures in place, Chinese exports to the Union continued and have non-negligible market share which showed that the Union market remains attractive to Chinese exporting producers.

• (101) Therefore, based on the significant overcapacity in the PRC and the attractiveness of the Union market, the Commission concluded that, should the current measures lapse, it is likely that the Chinese exporting producers would redirect exports towards the Union in large quantities, at dumped prices.

4.3.   Conclusion

• (102) In view of its findings on the continuation of dumping during the review investigation period and on the likely development of exports should the measures lapse, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures on imports from the PRC would result in the continuation of dumping.

5. INJURY

5.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (103) The like product was manufactured by 22 producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

• (104) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 467 544 tonnes. The Commission determined this figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as verified questionnaire replies from producers in the Union and the macro questionnaire reply submitted by Eurofonte. As indicated in recital 11, three Union producers were selected in the sample representing 46 % of the total Union production of the like product.

5.2.   Union consumption

• (105) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market and import data from Eurostat.

• (106) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Total Union consumption	451 373	432 522	484 501	467 544
Index	100	96	107	104
Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.

• (107) Overall, the Union consumption increased by 4 %. Actually, the market of cast iron articles fluctuates with the economic growth on the Union market and more specifically with the volume of infrastructure projects i.e. in the water and transport sector. In 2020, European Union’s economy contracted due the pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns and so did consumption of cast iron articles that dropped by 4 %. The year 2021 was a year of economic rebound, leading to a peak in consumption of +12 %. In 2022, public works in the Union slowed down leading to a decrease in consumption of cast iron articles (–3,5% in comparison to 2021).

5.3.   Imports from the country concerned

5.3.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned

• (108) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the Union consumption as set out in recital 106. Imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
Volume of imports from the country concerned (tonnes)	48 352	34 451	28 385	22 146
Index	100	71	59	46
Market share (%)	10,7	8,0	5,9	4,7
Index	100	74	55	44
Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.	Source: Macroeconomic data questionnaire provided by the Union industry and Eurostat data.

• (109) Imports of the product under review from the PRC decreased steadily by 54 % over the period considered. They decreased first by 29 % between 2019 and 2020, then by 18 % between 2020 and 2021 and finally they decreased by 22 % between 2021 and the RIP. As a result, their market share more than halved, falling from 10,7 % in 2019 to 4,7 % in the RIP.

5.3.2.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price difference

• (110) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data.

• (111) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

	2019	2020	2021	Review Investigation period
China	1 000	951	1 123	1 436
Index	100	95	112	144
Source: Eurostat Comext.	Source: Eurostat Comext.	Source: Eurostat Comext.	Source: Eurostat Comext.	Source: Eurostat Comext.

• (112) Overall, the average import price from China increased by 44 %. It first decreased by 5 % between 2019 and 2020 and subsequently increased by 18 % between 2020 and 2021 and 28 % between 2021 and the RIP.

• (113) In view of the non-cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average sales price of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, with the weighted average import price of the product under review from the PRC from Eurostat, established on a CIF basis, including the anti-dumping duty.

• (114) This price comparison showed a difference between the average export sale price and the average Union industry sales price of 6 %. Without the anti-dumping duties, the difference amounted to 25 %.

5.4.   Imports from third countries other than the PRC

• (115) The aggregated volume of imports into the Union, as well as the market share and price trends for imports of cast iron articles from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 5

Imports from third countries