Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/844 of 13 March 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of electrolytic manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (118) Daxin, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that recital (220) of the provisional Regulation, stating that, ‘despite no undercutting found on a transaction-by-transaction basis for two out of the three sampled exporting producers, the average price of total Chinese imports into the Union market was around [5 %–9 %] lower than the Union industry’s average price, throughout the period considered’ was not supported by facts. These parties highlighted that the three sampled Chinese exporting producers accounted for nearly 99 % of the volume of total Chinese exports of EMD to the Union in the investigation period, including all cooperating exporters and other exporting producers. Therefore, nearly 99 % of the total exported EMD from China in the investigation period was not or was slightly undercutting prices of the Union producers.

• (119) The Commission highlights the conclusion stated in the recital (202) of the provisional Regulation indicating that the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 65 % of the total Chinese exports to the Union during the investigation period. It is therefore noted that no undercutting found on a transaction-by-transaction basis for two out of the three sampled exporting producers represented less than half of the total Chinese imports. As stated in the recital (215) of the provisional Regulation, the prices of imports were estimated on the basis of Eurostat, dividing the total values of Chinese imports by the total volume of those imports. As a result, the average price of total Chinese imports into the Union market was around [5 %–9 %] lower than the Union industry’s average price, throughout the period considered. The claims of the parties were therefore dismissed.

• (120) Daxin, CCCMC and GMIA further claimed that the Commission did not adequately assess price differences between different grades of EMD, namely that the provisional injury analysis was based on alleged Union price suppression caused by lower-priced imports from China related mainly to Chinese exports of lower EMD grades, and thus normally lower priced.

• (121) As provided in recital (221) of the provisional Regulation, price suppression was established on average import price of total Chinese imports, thus all EMD quality grades were taken into account. The argument of the parties was therefore dismissed.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (122) In the absence of comments on the effects of the dumped imports, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (257) to (263) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

• (123) In the absence of comments on the imports from third countries, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (264) to (266) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (124) In the absence of comments on the export performance of the Union industry, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (267) to (269) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.3.   Other factors

• (125) Following provisional disclosure, Daxin, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that the loss of sales and market share by the Union industry was caused by other factors, namely Union industry’s inability to supply the Union users with the high-quality EMD ¹⁹ in sufficient volumes, especially in the second half of the period considered, and thus the users needed to resort to Chinese imports. Said parties asserted that one of the two Union producers (Autlan) did not manufacture high-quality EMD and did not show intent in manufacturing it in the future. Therefore, a lack of certification was allegedly a reason why the Union industry either lost their sales of high-quality EMD and/or for capacity reasons could not fully benefit from the new and increasing demand for high-quality EMD.

• (126) The two cooperating users (Duracell and Varta) supported the above claim, adding that Union industry was not able to satisfy the Union EMD demand, while the imports from other third countries were extremely limited and did not form a viable alternative. The downstream users had no other option but to rely on imports from China.

• (127) The investigation confirmed that Union users (battery producers) required varied quality of EMD ²⁰ in their dry cell battery production, according to parameters specific to each user. As established in recital (316) of the provisional Regulation, all grades of EMD follow the same production process, while, as established in recital (25) of the provisional Regulation, both carbon-zinc and alkaline EMD share the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics and are used for the same purposes (dry-cell battery production). The same is true for alkaline EMD, regardless of the quality claimed. In addition, none of the sampled Chinese or Union producers reported or demonstrated any difference between the consumption rates of the factors of production between what is claimed as different quality grades of EMD in the investigation period. The Commission therefore could not establish a universal dividing line between ‘high’ and ‘standard’ quality alkaline EMD, but this distinction is, rather, specific to each user. In its analysis, the Commission therefore refers to ‘standard’ and ‘high-quality’ EMD when either of the cooperating users considers the EMD it purchases to be either of high-quality or not.

• (128) The investigation confirmed that the Union industry provided all three different qualities of EMD to the users during the period considered. The two cooperating users only used alkaline EMD in their production – both standard and high-quality. The share of EMD sourced by the cooperating users from the Union industry (overall) represented around [55–65] % of the total EMD they sourced in the investigation period, which included the high-quality alkaline grade EMD of around [25–35] % of their total purchases from the Union industry in the investigation period. Autlan provided two of the three major Union users with the standard quality EMD during the period considered ²¹ and had ongoing certification for supplying the third user. The second Union producer (Tosoh) supplied the three major Union users (including the two cooperating ones) with the standard quality EMD and two of them with the high-quality EMD during the same period. Tosoh had ongoing certification for supplying the third user with the high-quality EMD.

• (129) The Union industry increased the level of high-quality alkaline grade EMD from 2019 by [0,8–1,8] million kg but lost their high-quality alkaline grade EMD volumes by [11 %-16 %] from 2021 to the investigation period to the benefit of imports from China, which confirms that neither the certification, nor the capacity reasons were hindering the Union industry to supply high-quality EMD. It is also noted that the Union industry reduced by half the level of its investments resulting in a drop of 45 % during the period considered, therefore any potential investments in increasing quality or capacity were impossible. If the definitive anti-dumping measures were imposed on EMD from China, it would allow the Union industry to invest in high-quality EMD, which is currently hindered by the dumped imports, loss of market share and low profitability. On this basis the claims were rejected.

• (130) Following final disclosure, CCCMC and GMIA disagreed with the Commission, reiterating that the alleged injury was not caused by the imports of EMD from China, but rather by the Union industry’s inability to supply or to supply in sufficient quantity the high-quality alkaline grade EMD and alleged that the Commission’s assessment was incomplete, as detailed below.

• (131) CCCMC and GMIA alleged that the Commission did not properly distinguish which EMD manufacturers can produce high-quality EMD, referred to in their submission as ‘high drain performance’ EMD, claiming that it is the users who determine the quality grade, and not the producers. In that regard, the Commission reiterated its explanation from recital (127), explaining that the distinction was precisely made on the users’ definition of EMD quality, and not on the producers’ definition of it. Namely, the Commission considered as ‘high-quality’ EMD only that alkaline EMD which was qualified as high drain by either of the users. All other alkaline EMD was, for the sake of simplicity, considered and referred to as ‘standard’ quality.

• (132) CCCMC and GMIA further requested identification of chemical, technical, physical and processability characteristics for high and standard quality EMD, as well as identification on which characteristics where critical for the battery production, noting that these characteristics were not the same and the market clearly distinguishes alkaline batteries labelled as premium (long lasting). The Commission clarified that, as noted in recital (127), carbon-zinc and different qualities of alkaline EMD ‘shared’ the same basic physical, chemical, and technical characteristics and were used for the same purposes (dry-cell battery production). This did not imply that the parameters of each physical, chemical, and technical characteristic were identical, but, as provided in the same recital, they were specific to each user. Specifics of these parameters were therefore confidential and company specific. This information therefore could not be disclosed. The Commission further noted that if some of the alkaline batteries in the market were labelled as premium (long lasting), this did not imply that only the high-quality EMD was used in their production, while the parties did not provide any evidence to the contrary.

• (133) CCCMC and GMIA criticised the Commission for not acknowledging that Autlan consistently failed to meet users’ certification for the high-quality EMD. The Commission referred to recital (127), where it was noted that Autlan provided two of the three major Union users with the standard quality EMD during the period considered ²² and had ongoing certification for supplying the third user. This, indeed, acknowledged that Autlan did not supply high-quality EMD in the period considered, whereas, as noted in the further recital (128), the Union industry (as a whole) provided all three different qualities of EMD to the users during the period considered.

• (134) CCCMC and GMIA finally added that they received no adequate disclosure enabling them to check the data on high-quality alkaline grade EMD of the Union industry. The Commission noted that the data per product types produced and sold was confidential and company specific, since it contained individual volumes and values of the Union producers (or Chinese exporting producers). Therefore, this data could not be disclosed. The claims of the parties were therefore dismissed.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (135) On the basis of the above and in the absence of any other comments, the Commission concluded that none of the other factors examined at provisional stage as well as at definitive stage was capable of having any relevant impact on the injurious situation of the Union industry. Thus, none of the factors, analysed either individually or collectively, attenuated the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry to the effect that such link would no longer be genuine and substantial, confirming the conclusion in recitals (277) to (279) of the provisional Regulation.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

• (136) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

• (137) The complainant claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to carry out an assessment regarding the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of the sampled exporting producers, whose main raw material was found to be subject to the distortion, would be higher than their underselling margin.

6.1.   Underselling margin calculation

• (138) As provided by Article 9(4), third subparagraph of the basic Regulation, and given that the Commission did not register imports during the period of pre-disclosure, it analysed the development of import volumes to establish if there had been a further substantial rise in imports subject to the investigation during the period of pre-disclosure and therefore reflect the additional injury resulting from such increase in the determination of the underselling margin.

• (139) Based on data from the Surveillance 3 database ²³, import volumes from China during the four weeks period of pre-disclosure were 45 % lower than the average import volumes in the investigation period on a four-week basis. On that basis, the Commission concluded that there had not been a substantial rise in imports subject to the investigation during the period of pre-disclosure.

• (140) Therefore, the Commission did not adjust the underselling margin in this regard.

Target profit

• (141) Following provisional disclosure, the Union producers contested the level of basic profit [6–8] % used for the non-injurious price calculation ²⁴, claiming that:

• — it was insufficient for a capital-intensive industry and did not allow for the continuous investments in the R&D,

• — low-priced Chinese imports had an effect on the Union market throughout the hole period considered, since they were depressing prices and profitability of the Union producers throughout the whole period considered,

• — Tosoh reiterated that 1997–2001 were unaffected by dumping practices and are indicative for the target profit that could be achieved by the Union industry,

• — Tosoh claimed that in accordance with the Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation profit margin of at least 6 % must be applied to each producer that is a part of the Union industry,

• — Tosoh claimed that Tosoh Japan has demonstrated [11-20 %] profit level applicable to the EMD industry in anti-dumping investigation ongoing in Japan,

• — Autlan claimed that the actual profitability of Tosoh did not reach the standard for this industry during the period 2018–2020 due to low capacity utilisation, while Tosoh did not confront its own production capacity, but claimed that its operations were negatively affected in 2020 by specific circumstances in the company.

• (142) First, the Commission noted that the reiterated claims of the Union industry to use 15 % profit level applicable to the chemical industry, as well as profit levels achieved in 1997–2001 (before the imposition of anti-dumping duties on EMD imports from South Africa ²⁵) were already dismissed in the provisional regulation and were not further challenged by any new evidence. Second, the Union producers did not demonstrate that the achievable profit levels by Tosoh Japan in Japanese market were achievable by the Union industry on the Union market. Third, the Commission considered that the circumstances disclosed by Tosoh in 2020 were business decisions and did not dispute the level of profit achieved that year.

• (143) The Commission confirmed that in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, it established the basic profit taking into account factors such as the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. The Commission considered that the profit achieved by the Union industry in 2019 was more appropriate than the one achieved in 2020, established in the provisional stage. In fact, in 2019 the price of Chinese imports was higher than in 2020 and its volumes were still significantly lower than in the IP and the Union industry made much higher investments than in subsequent years when both the level of investments and the level of profitability of the Union industry started to drop. The Commission therefore considers that the profit achieved by the Union industry in 2019 reflects the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition and thus used this level of a basic profit [7-9 %], for the non-injurious price calculation while the claims of the parties were dismissed.

• (144) Following final disclosure, both Union producers challenged the Commission’s conclusions on the basic profit used to calculate the underselling margin, claiming that it was inadequate for the EMD industry. Autlan and Tosoh claimed that the Commission had sufficient evidence to conclude that Tosoh was affected by exceptional circumstances during 2018–2020 and its profit should not have been used for the purpose of calculating the basic profit ²⁶. Autlan further argued that the Commission could not have established a basic profit of [7–9] % for the Union industry if it had adequately taken into account the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development, pointing to its own financial indicators in that regard. Tosoh further added that the Commission should instead use 1997–2001 profitability, as it represents the last period unaffected by dumping practice, since from 2002 to 2019 dumped South-African imports of EMD depressed the profitability of the Union’s EMD industry, which were then replaced by dumped Chinese imports. Autlan finally disagreed with the Commission’s finding that the Union producers did not demonstrate that the profit levels achievable by Tosoh Japan in the Japanese market were achievable by the Union industry on the Union market.

• (145) First, the Commission recalled that the basic profit level is established at the level of the Union industry as a whole, i.e. taking into account the profit levels of all Union producers, unless exceptional circumstances that affected their profit margin can be demonstrated for a particular producer. The Commission examined the evidence submitted by Tosoh and concluded that the circumstances disclosed by Tosoh affecting the company’s operations in the period 2018–2020 were business decisions and resulted in the level of profit achieved in each year. The Commission therefore proceeded to establish a level of basic profit for the Union industry as a whole in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. Since basic profit was established for the Union industry as a whole, Autlan’s profit level was therefore adequately taken into account. Furthermore, as noted in the recitals (154) and (155), the investments, R&D and innovation expenses under normal conditions of competition as established at the provisional Regulation, recital (289) were added to the basic profit, leading to a target profit of [8–11] %.

• (146) As the case-law highlighted by Autlan in its comments stipulates, ‘the Commission has a broad discretion as to the choice of the method for calculating the injury margin, provided that such discretion is exercised in accordance with the guarantees conferred by the EU legal order in administrative procedures and by ensuring that its choice leads to plausible results’ ²⁷. The Court of Justice further specifies that ‘the Commission also enjoys discretion in determining [the target profit] margin’ ²⁸. It is precisely within that discretion that the Commission already concluded that the profit levels achieved in 1997–2001 could not be considered representative for the state of the Union industry today, more than 20 years later, and were thus not considered appropriate. This conclusion was not challenged by new evidence and the claims were therefore dismissed.

• (147) Similarly, neither Autlan nor Tosoh presented any new arguments which would change the Commission’s conclusion that the Union producers did not demonstrate that the profit levels achievable by Tosoh Japan in the Japanese market were also achievable by the Union industry, as a whole, on the Union market.

• (148) Finally, the Commission disagreed with the assertion that the 1997-2001 period was the last unaffected by dumping practice, since anti-dumping measures against imports of EMD from South Africa were continuously in place between 2002 and 2019, restoring the level playing field in the Union market. Nonetheless, from the evidence submitted by the complainants, the Union industry still achieved the highest level of profitability in 2019.

• (149) On the other hand, Daxin, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that the Commission should have used the year 2020 as the most appropriate year to establish basic profit, since several financial indicators were better in that year and noting specifically the absence of volume and price pressures from imports. The Commission already acknowledged these factors in recital (143). This does not, however, impinge on the fact that the Union industry achieved higher profitability in the year 2019 than in 2020, still before market conditions turned sharply to the negative. Since this was a level of profitability actually achieved, it was considered as a ‘level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition’.

• (150) The Commission therefore maintained its conclusion that the profit level which the Union industry achieved in 2019 was the most appropriate level to be used as the target profit.

Investments, research and development (‘R&D’) and innovation expenses

• (151) Xiangtan contested the calculation of the difference between investments, R&D and innovation expenses, since, according to the statements made at the group level ²⁹ of Autlan, a record number of 93 investment projects were completed and the company met all financial commitments, operational and investment needs efficiently during the year. Xiangtan also added that Autlan acquired Cegasa Portable Energy and its Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide plant in February 2020, which became Autlan EMD and such large capital investment affected the group’s ability to make investment in R&D. Likewise, Xiangtan claimed that Tosoh’s financial statements ³⁰ recorded a year-to-year increase of R&D expenses from as of 31 March 2021 to 31 March 2023. Therefore, Tosoh is also able to make investments in changing equipment and R&D.

• (152) Autlan replied to the comment providing that the same annual report indicated that Autlan had four business units: Autlan Manganese, Autlan EMD, Autlan Energy and Autlan Metallorum. Thus, the 93 investment projects did not relate to the EMD business unit, but to Autlan Manganese business unit, as stated in the same report. Also, the EMD business unit represented 3,63 % of the total sales turnover of the group.

• (153) Indeed, as stated in recital (289) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission verified the investment plans, refused and postponed projects, purchase orders of the two Union producers that were eventually not carried out, demonstrating that these investments were genuinely planned. The information verified referred exclusively to Autlan EMD, S.L. located in Oñati (Guipuzcoa), Spain and Tosoh Hellas Single Member S.A. located in Sindos, Greece. The claim of the party was unfounded by any substantial evidence and therefore dismissed.

• (154) The Commission thus remained with the difference between investments, R&D and innovation expenses under normal conditions of competition as established at the provisional Regulation, recital (289). Such difference, expressed as a percentage of turnover, was [1–2] %.

• (155) This percentage was added to the basic profit of [7–9] % mentioned in recital (143), leading to a target profit of [8–11] %.

Future environmental costs

• (156) Xiangtan, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that future environmental costs should not be added to the target price calculation for the following reasons:

• — the Union producers received free Emissions Trading System (‘ETS’) allowances for the period considered. Therefore, the basic profit of [7–9] % already included the benefit of these allowances,

• — China had its own carbon emissions trading mechanism, therefore Chinese future cost should have adequate comparison,

• — the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’) would impose same costs on Chinese exporting producers; therefore those costs should offset ETS compliance costs for the Union industry.

• (157) As provided in the note to file on the future environmental cost calculation ³¹, no direct future costs linked to the ETS that were related to the cost of purchase of the emission permits were established in this case. The only established indirect future costs linked to the ETS were related to the cost of purchase of the electricity. Therefore, the ETS allowances directly received by the Union producers did not contribute to the further calculation of the target price. As for the Chinese carbon cost, they were irrelevant since, for the calculation of the injury margin, the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in the IP was compared to the weighted average non-injurious price of the Union industry. Finally, there was no evidence that CBAM would apply to EMD imports. On this basis the claims were rejected.

• (158) Daxin, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that the Commission’s note to the file ³² concerning indirect future compliance costs did not provide essential explanation and evidence for the adjustment (e.g. it did not specify whether the Union producers had free versus paid emission allowances in the investigation period, or if this situation will change in the coming period 2024–2028) and that it did not provide the relevant actual calculations (e.g. calculation of the electricity CO2 factor). Interested parties therefore had no basis to check and verify the calculations/conclusions in Section 2.2 of the note to the file. All this information needs to be disclosed.

• (159) The Commission noted that, as explained in the note to the file referred to above, the indirect future compliance costs linked to the ETS were related to the cost of purchase of the electricity, therefore they did not relate to free or paid emission allowances. The method of calculation of the indirect future compliance costs, including its three steps, was explained in the note to the file and the result at each step was provided within a range. The data of the Union producers was confidential and company specific, since it contained individual electricity consumption rates and cost. Therefore, this data could not be disclosed, and the claim of the parties was dismissed.

• (160) Daxin, CCCMC and GMIA requested the Commission to justify its use of the Bloomberg figures for Allowances Projection Price in EUR/tCO2 used for the future environmental cost calculation and suggested another source, Statista, without substantiating why Bloomberg data was less reliable.

• (161) The Commission noted that the source suggested by the parties based average carbon price expectations on the report ‘GHG Market Sentiment Survey’ prepared for the International Emissions Trading Association (‘IETA’) by PwC. This report contained information derived from a variety of sources and PwC and IETA had not sought to establish the reliability of those sources or verified the information so provided, as indicated within the report ³³. The source used by the Commission was based on Bloomberg (Bloomberg New Energy Finance) and included the average projections from several entities ³⁴, that were verified and continually updated by Bloomberg service. For this reason, the average price from several sources was considered more reliable than from the source suggested by the parties. The Commission therefore maintained the source established and updated the calculation with the latest figures available.

• (162) Tosoh claimed that the future cost of purchasing CO2 emission allowances were not reflected in the provisional calculations, since Tosoh incurred investments during the period considered to reduce the future need of ETS allowances.

• (163) The Commission confirmed that, as provided to Tosoh in its individual disclosure and the note to the file ³⁵ on the future environmental cost calculations, the Commission examined the ETS costs incurred during the investigation period, as well as the amount of ETS allowance that will need to be purchased over the period 2024–2028 and reported by the two Union producers, when applicable. The Commission took into account, inter alia, the free ETS allowances received for the investigation period and the ETS allowances carried over from previous years and the expected need of ETS allowances. The Commission calculated the direct future costs linked to the ETS (allowances to be purchased multiplied by their price). After establishing projected ETS allowance prices, the Commission compared an average cost for the period 2024–2028 to the costs during the investigation period. Since no positive difference between the two values was found, no direct future costs were established. The Commission also noted that any investments incurred during the period considered to reduce the need of ETS allowances were taken into account when establishing the cost of production during the investigation period and this cost of production was used for establishing the target price. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

Product comparability

• (164) Daxin requested an adjustment between product type A (alkaline) and product type C (carbon-zinc) for the purpose of the injury margin calculation, since type A required more electricity, steam, rinsing agent and labour. However, as indicated in recital (127) above, neither Daxin, nor any other sampled Chinese producer reported any difference between the consumption rates of the factors of production for these two product types. The adjustment therefore was not warranted.

• (165) Following the final disclosure, Daxin claimed that the rejection of the adjustment between product types A and C was not justified and that the Chinese producers had no obligation to prove that the two product types were different. Daxin reiterated its claim that the injury margin should be evaluated and calculated based on the same type of products and therefore consider unfair to use product type A to compare product type C when calculating the injury margin.

• (166) The Commission considered that as none of the cooperating sampled exporting producers provided any data concerning the differences in terms of production of the two types of products, the Commission could not apply such an adjustment. For that reason, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Commission concluded that no adjustment was warranted.

• (167) In view of the above changes to the underselling calculations and the changes to the dumping margins explained in Section 3.5 above, the table under recital (297) of the provisional Regulation is updated as follows:

6.2.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove injury to the Union industry in relation to the PRC

• (168) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that it was necessary to assess whether there are distortions with regard to the product under investigation within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, which would render a duty lower than the margin of dumping insufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports of the product under investigation.

• (169) As explained in the amending notice, the complainant provided sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in China regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined the alleged distortions to assess whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

• (170) The investigation confirmed that there were no VAT refunds on exports of manganese ore in the country concerned. This was verified during the verification visits in China and cross-checked against the official government tax list. VAT refund reduction or withdrawal are listed in Article 7(2a), second subparagraph of the basic Regulation, as one of the relevant raw material distortions.

• (171) The investigation also established that the manganese ore accounted for more than 17 % of the cost of production of the product under investigation in the country concerned as required by Article 7(2a), fifth subparagraph of the basic Regulation, both on the country level and for each individual sampled company.

• (172) The analysis of domestically sourced ores showed that the prices of cooperating exporting producers were lower in comparison to the benchmark, with discounts between 10 % to 63 %.

• (173) Therefore, the Commission concluded that manganese ore was subject to a significant distortion within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

• (174) Xiangtan, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that the distortion caused by the lack of the VAT refund on export of manganese ore was unfounded, as this situation had been in place since 2004 and therefore the markets would have been rebalanced in the last 20 years. The Commission considered that the effects of the distortion was not undermined by its duration. Since there was objective evidence that this distortion existed, this claim was rejected.

• (175) Xiangtan further claimed that China was a net importer of manganese ore as its local ore was of a poor quality and therefore there was no international benchmark for it. Xiangtan further claimed that the low concentration ore mined in China was below 20 % manganese concentration and therefore did not fall under the same HS code 2602 00 as the manganese ore used for the benchmark. The Commission noted that Xiangtan did not present any evidence which would prove that there was no market for the lower concentration ore outside of China. As the domestically mined ore, despite not falling under the same CN code, was used by Chinese EMD producers together with the imported higher concentration ores, the Commission considered that the impact of the distortion affected the Chinese market on all types of manganese ores and therefore Xiangtan’s claim was rejected.

• (176) Xiangtan, CCCMC, GMIA and Guiliu contended that the 17 % threshold stipulated in the basic Regulation was not met for manganese ore, arguing that different types of manganese ore should be evaluated separately. The Commission, however, dismissed this claim. It determined that due to the substantial variability in content, the primary factor is the manganese content in the ore. Thus, it concluded that all manganese ores should be treated as one unified raw material.

• (177) Guiliu contended that since they imported the majority of their ores, using a weighted average price would be more appropriate for comparing prices with international prices. The Commission considered that Guiliu still benefited from a pricing distortion due to their domestically sourced ore which was obtained at prices below the benchmark, thus rendering the weighted average approach unsuitable. This claim was therefore dismissed.

• (178) Autlan and Tosoh claimed that the raw material distortions affected not only the manganese ore but also the energy inputs used by the Chinese exporting producers and asked the Commission to extend the scope of its investigation. As explained in recital (170), the Commission established raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation regarding manganese ore applicable to all sampled exporting producers. Therefore, it did not consider necessary to investigate further the existence of other raw material distortions. Consequently, this claim was dismissed.

6.2.1.   Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation

• (179) Having concluded that there is raw material distortion in China, as defined by Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was in the Union interest to determine the amount of definitive duties in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all pertinent information to this investigation, including the spare capacities in China competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies in accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. In order to conduct this assessment, the Commission added specific questions in the questionnaires to all interested parties. The two Union producers and the two cooperating users provided response to those questions.

6.2.1.1.   Spare capacities in the exporting country

• (180) On the basis of information provided by Tosoh ³⁶, spare EMD production capacity in China was estimated at around [190 000 000–205 000 000 kilograms] ³⁷. By contrast, the Union market had a size of [36 000 000–38 000 000] kilograms. In relative terms, spare capacities in China are therefore of an enormous magnitude.

• (181) The Commission therefore concluded that a significant spare capacity existed in China and that, if used, this spare capacity had the potentiality to increase the global supply of the product under investigation, depress prices and consequently undermine the effectiveness of the measure if not set at the level of dumping.

6.2.1.2.   Competition for raw materials

• (182) As regards competition for raw materials, the Commission established that there is no value added tax refunds on exports of manganese ore in the country concerned and the price of manganese ore in China was significantly lower than its price in representative international markets (see recitals (169) and (171)). As set out in recital (172) above, the Chinese raw material market of manganese ore was considered to be distorted.

• (183) As a result, value added tax refund withdrawal on exports of manganese ore in China restrain the export of manganese ore mined in China. By artificially increasing the level of raw materials supply, the GOC exerts a downward pressure on prices of domestic manganese ore. The Chinese EMD producers pay less for domestic manganese ore than what they would have otherwise had to pay if the export restriction had not been in place. This creates a comparative disadvantage for the Union industry compared to the exporting producers in China.

• (184) In addition, based on the source provided by Autlan ³⁸, China has the fourth largest mine production of manganese ore in the world after South Africa, Gabon, and Australia and can still rely on vast reserves of ore; two of the sampled EMD exporting producers in China own manganese ore mines, i.e. are vertically integrated ³⁹, and use the domestic manganese ores to produce the product under investigation. At the same time, the Union producers of EMD depend on the supplies of the manganese ore from third markets. The Commission therefore concluded that, while manganese ore is available to the Union industry, it is available at a higher price than for its competitors in China. The Union industry is therefore at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Chinese exporting producers.

• (185) Guiliu claimed that, according to the source provided ⁴⁰, the Chinese manganese ore market comprises of over 80-95 % of imports hence the manganese ore market in China is not distorted. In addition, domestic production and mining of manganese ores in China are mainly low-level manganese ores, while the majority of consumption and demand are for high-grade manganese ores.

• (186) As provided in the recital (183) above, EMD producers in China, including two of the sampled ones, use the domestic manganese ores to produce the product under investigation despite its claimed low-level manganese content. The exporting producers in China have an unfair advantage since they have access to artificially low domestic manganese ore prices due to the domestic regulations explained in recitals (170) to (173). The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

6.2.1.3.   Effect on supply chains for Union companies

• (187) As explained in recital (306) of the provisional Regulation, the main use of EMD is for the production of carbon-zinc and alkaline dry cell batteries, representing above 90 % of its use. The main (but not the only) users are the three major battery producers in the Union. Two of these battery producers cooperated with the investigation, Varta and Duracell, representing [67–73] % of the Union consumption of EMD. As noted in the recital (179), both cooperating users provided their response to the questions on the Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation.

• (188) Both cooperating users were against the higher measures, claiming that these would disproportionately affect their production of dry-cell consumer batteries, which was highly dependent on imports from the country concerned, especially for high-quality EMD, as described in recital (127) above, and did not have a viable alternative. Duracell claimed that the ability of users to switch suppliers and diversify their sourcing is an essential consideration in assessing whether the anti-dumping measures can be imposed on the higher dumping margin: (i) reiterating that the Union industry at present was unable to offer Union users a viable alternative; (ii) the supplies of EMD from third countries were very limited in their available quantities, were expensive, and were not yet certified with the two cooperating users. It is reminded that due to processability requirements for EMD use by Union users in their production of batteries, the EMD must pass through stringent testing and internal approval procedures, prior to obtaining certification for industrial use. The certification of a new EMD supply source was, therefore, a lengthy process without any guarantees of success.

• (189) Both cooperating users claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures at the higher dumping margin would make Union users loss-making. They added that the Union battery manufacturing industry as a whole was already facing increasing pressure to remain profitable due to the increase of the costs of other raw materials used in the production of their products, such as increased energy costs, and had very limited ability to pass on the important cost increase to their final customers, as the battery market was highly price driven and the use of batteries from different brands was interchangeable, despite the brand recognition. The pressure on profitability due to increased production costs was further intensified by a simultaneous increase in competition on the EU and global battery markets, from non-EU, and most notably Chinese competitors. Finally, the extreme detrimental impacts on users caused by the non-application of the lesser duty rule were more serious than the potential negative impacts of lower anti-dumping duties on the whole Union industry. Besides, there was no indication that anti-dumping measures would incentivise the Union industry to make the necessary investments in quality improvement but would rather reinforce the existing duopoly of the Union EMD producers’ allowing them to set prices without investing in innovation.

• (190) First, the Commission made simulations on the profitability of both cooperating users on the basis of the definitive dumping and injury margins, assuming that sources and volumes of EMD purchases and turnover achieved on downstream products remain equal to those in the investigation period. Raw materials, electricity, and labour costs were adjusted, where available, to reflect the post-IP changes. The results of simulations established that the overall annual profit of one user in particular would be seriously affected in a negative way (the user would become loss-making) if duties were imposed on imports from China pursuant to Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. This user would not be able to absorb the cost of higher-level anti-dumping duty within its other activities at the group level. The overall annual profit of the other user would also be affected, but to a lesser extent. At the same time, even if it is expected that, due to the relief offered by higher measures, the Union industry would be in a position to sell more volumes to the users at competitive prices, should one of the users shut down its business in the Union, the Union EMD producers would in turn directly lose more than a third of their own sales volume. This would be to great detriment of the Union industry given the importance of volumes sold to these users which, as explained in recital (306) of the provisional Regulation, are their main customers.

• (191) Second, the Commission made a dynamic simulation on the profitability of both cooperating users on the basis of the definitive dumping margins, assuming that the users increased their sales price of alkaline batteries by 3 % ⁴¹. The result of this simulation established that one user would still become loss-making. The overall annual profit of the other user would still be negatively affected but to a much lesser extent. Nonetheless, Duracell argued that the users were unable to fully pass-on cost increases to their final customers due to intense competition. Any previous price increase was supported by improvements in the performance of batteries. In addition, the users could never fully pass-on their sharply rising costs of the raw materials due to the rising imports of Chinese batteries of comparable quality. The imposition of anti-dumping measures at the higher dumping margin level would render the competition on prices between the Union and the Chinese producers of consumer batteries even more difficult, considering the disadvantage Union users would have against their Chinese competitors who source their EMD inputs from suppliers without any duties.

• (192) Third, the Commission also made a dynamic simulation on the profitability of both cooperating users on the basis of the definitive dumping margins, assuming that the potentially loss-making user would shift all of its Chinese EMD supplies to its certified and sampled exporting producer that had a lower anti-dumping duty established. The result of this simulation established that this user would still become loss-making.

• (193) Fourth, the Commission considered a hypothetical simulation where the users replaced all of their imports of EMD from China with imports from Colombia and Japan, at average import prices from these countries into the Union during the investigation period. In fact, Tosoh claimed that Japan, South Korea, and Russia were also important exporting countries and Autlan claimed that one of the users’ overseas factory was already importing EMD from Columbia. As established in Sections 4.3.1 and 5.2.1 of the provisional Regulation, out of the abovementioned countries, only Colombia and Japan exported EMD into the EU and were for that reason the only countries considered in this simulation. Nonetheless, the Commission considered that this situation in which users switch to importing EMD from any third countries would be very unlikely, since (i) there were no spare capacities in these third countries and they historically served their own or nearby markets; (ii) it has never been cost-effective for the Union users to import from third markets other than Colombia, while the statistics show that these imports have historically been very low; (iii) the two cooperating Union’s users did not certify any EMD quality from these sources, making this at best a long-term solution, if at all plausible.

• (194) Fifth, the Commission considered a hypothetical simulation where the Union’s EMD producers increased their production capacities following the imposition of the anti-dumping measures. However, the immediate effect of the duty at the dumping margin level on one particular user would make this impossible, since the Union’s EMD industry might lose more than one third of their sales, should this user become loss making and lose its business. Thus any increases in production capacities by the Union’s EMD industry would not be feasible, should the duty be imposed at the dumping margin level.

• (195) Finally, the users downstream industry (consumer batteries producers) had around 1 850 employees in the IP, which significantly outweighed the number of [130–142] employees in the Union’s EMD industry. Therefore, should the anti-dumping duty be imposed on the level of the dumping margins, significant amount of jobs would be jeopardised by the potential negative financial results of the downstream users.

6.2.1.4.   Other factors

• (196) Tosoh claimed that if the anti-dumping measures were imposed on injury, given the nature of the Chinese economy and the ability of the Chinese government to direct and steer exports through particular market participants, there was a significant risk that exports could be channelled through the exporter with zero duty. By contrast, duties imposed would be much more uniform if the injury margin was disregarded, which would diminish the circumvention risk.

• (197) The Commission noted that zero duty rate may hardly pose any risk of channelling exports, given a very small number of players in the market and the need of users to have certified material. In any case, as explained in recital (228) below, the Commission also envisaged special measures in order to ensure the proper application of individual duties. Thus, any shifts in the trade patterns could be easily identified and addressed by the relevant Commission services.

• (198) Tosoh also noted that the Chinese imports of the product under investigation would receive a competitive advantage due to the different regulation of greenhouse gas emissions between China and the Union, since the product under investigation was not included in the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) preliminary list. Conversely, imposing measures on the product under investigation would promote fair treatment and equal trading conditions.

• (199) The Commission noted that that the aim of the anti-dumping measures was to restore fair trading between the Union and its trading partners, while the CBAM effects were not in the scope of the present investigation.

• (200) The same Union producer further claimed that anti-dumping duties imposed at the level of the dumping margin would safeguard the very existence of the Union EMD industry, safeguard security of supply of EMD and, hence, dry cell battery production in the Union. The anti-dumping duty on imports from China of between 18 and 50 % would affect the cost of production of the Union’s dry-cell battery manufacturers only by between less than 3 % and 7,5 %. Moreover, given the injury levels and the competitive pressure resulting from other sources of EMD supply, it would be wrong to assume that prices of EU-origin EMD would increase by anywhere near the full equivalent of the dumping duties imposed.

• (201) Following the recalculated definitive anti-dumping duties (recital (98) above) and the analysis on the effect on supply chains for Union companies (recitals (190)-(195) above), the anti-dumping duties imposed at the higher dumping margin level would directly threaten Union’s EMD industry by a potential loss of [35 %-40 %] of their sales volumes. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

6.2.1.5.   Parties’ comments following the final disclosure

• (202) Following the final disclosure, Autlan and Tosoh contested the Commission analysis in Section 6.2.1.3. above.

• (203) Tosoh pointed out that one of the three major users, Advanced Power Solutions NV (‘APS’), did not cooperate in the investigation. Tosoh then cited Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, stipulating that ‘[i]n the absence of cooperation the Commission may conclude that it is in accordance with the Union interest to apply paragraph 2a of this Article’, claiming that the Commission should have inferred from this non-cooperation that imposing duties on the higher (dumping margin) level would not be against its interest, or at least should have analysed APS’ publicly available financial reports in its analysis.

• (204) The Commission notes that its conclusion in recital (214) regarding the likely disproportionally negative effect of the higher dumping level duty on supply chains for Union companies was based on information available on the two cooperating users representing [67–73] % of the Union consumption of EMD as well as the Union’s EMD industry itself. The non-cooperating user’s weight in the Union’s consumption was less than one third and there was no substantiated information on the case file that would overturn the Commission’s conclusion in the recital (214). The argument of the party was therefore dismissed.

• (205) Tosoh and Autlan further argued that the Commission’s profitability simulations were faulty because they take into account the effects of high post-IP cost increases in (some of the) costs of producing batteries, while not reflecting realistic price increases for batteries, especially in the light of consumer price increases in the Union. Tosoh also argued that the Commission did not provide concrete information on why it limited its ‘dynamic’ simulation to 3 % increases in 2022. Furthermore, Tosoh submitted that the Commission did not specify how the post-IP data would render the conclusion ‘manifest [sic] unsound’ nor whether the post-IP data used is ‘manifest, undisputed, lasting, not open to manipulation and does not stem from deliberate actions by interested parties’, citing Commission’s conclusions in previous cases ⁴².

• (206) The Commission noted in that regard that, to make the profitability simulations as relevant to the current market realities as possible, it indeed adjusted only the reported costs of raw material ⁴³, electricity ⁴⁴, and labour costs ⁴⁵ of Union users, as such adjustments could be made either on the basis of the verified information submitted by the parties or publicly available data, precisely to ensure that the data used is reliable. The Commission furthermore noted that parties did not substantiate why the 3 % battery price increase included in the simulation in recital (191) was not realistic. As noted in recital (191), this increase took place also in the past and was based on the verified data of the cooperating users and was specific to the consumer batteries, contrary to the consumer price index that involves a market basket of various consumer goods and services. The claim of the parties was therefore dismissed.

• (207) Both Autlan and Tosoh alleged that the conclusion of the Commission made in recital (194) means that the immediate effect of duties imposed on the dumping margin level would be stoppage of production of one of the users. The Commission clarified that this was not the correct interpretation of the conclusion presented in that recital. The immediate effect that such higher duties would have on the user is that they would lead to an increase in its cost of production, which, in turn, as recital (194) reads, ‘might’ result in the loss of this business.

• (208) Tosoh further took issue with the Commission’s conclusion that the increase in users’ manufacturing costs if duties were imposed at the level of the dumping margin could not be passed on to consumers, especially since the Commission noted in recital (311) of the provisional Regulation that there is a possibility of ‘transferring part of this cost increase to the consumers.’ The Commission noted in this regard that it was undertaking here a delicate balancing exercise to determine which level of cost increase could be passed onto consumers and, thus, which level of cost increase would be feasible for the cooperating users. As already established in recital (311) of the provisional Regulation, only a part of the cost increases caused by imposition of duties at the level of the lower, underselling, margins could be passed on to consumers. If duties would be imposed on the higher, dumping margin level, costs would increase even further, naturally making it even harder to pass such higher cost increase onto consumers. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

• (209) Autlan further presented the claims made by Varta in its press release made on 14^th November 2023, where Varta claims improvements in its business ⁴⁶, as contradicting Commission’s conclusions on negative profitability of users. The Commission noted in that regard that, while such statements do present a positive picture, they do not show quantifiable financial situation relevant for the assessment of the user’s profitability. The Commission in its hypothetical scenarios, on the other hand, relied on verified granular data supplied by the cooperating users in the course of this investigation. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed as not substantiated.

• (210) Autlan additionally argued that the root cause for the precarious situation of the Union users are the dumped imports of dry-cell consumer batteries from China, rather than the cost of procuring EMD. Tosoh, to the contrary, claimed that taking into account the imports of Chinese dry-cell consumer batteries as a factor in the analysis in recital (191) above amounted to raising the question of potential dumping practices in products (dry-cell consumer batteries) that are unrelated to the current investigation. The Commission noted that it was indeed not in the scope of this procedure to estimate the claimed dumping practices on dry-cell consumer batteries. Therefore the comment made by Autlan had to be rejected. At the same time, contrary to Tosoh’s claim, the Commission was not raising a question about dumping practices concerning imports of dry-cell consumer batteries from China, but merely acknowledged the reality that those imports are present in the Union market as competition for batteries made by Union users. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

• (211) Autlan claimed that the Commission did not sufficiently analyse effects on supply chains of the users arguing, in essence, that if the duties were imposed on the level of the underselling margin, the Union industry would not be sufficiently protected and would remain unable to recover from injurious dumping. This would, furthermore, be contrary to the Union interest in the light of Commission’s Critical Raw Materials initiative ⁴⁷, which lists battery grade manganese as one of the strategic raw materials. The Commission reminded that anti-dumping measures served the purpose of restoring fair trade and the assessment on which level of duties would be sufficient to remove injury to the Union industry, as stated in recital (282) and concluded in recitals (295) to (297) of the provisional Regulation. At the same time, as stated in recital (179), the analysis of what effect different duties would have on the Union as a whole is herewith undertaken in the context of the Union interest test pursuant to the Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, where the effect on the Union industry as well as the users of the product under investigation are taken into account. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

• (212) Tosoh and Autlan went on to contest the hypothetical simulations presented by the Commission in recitals (192) and (193), claiming that the users would realistically diversify their supplies as much as possible, including increasing purchases from the Union industry. The Commission commented in that regard that under both of those simulations the Commission considered the most optimistic scenarios, whereby the totality of supplies affected by the highest dumping margins were replaced by the most cost-competitive alternatives (either within China in recital (192) or completely from other third markets in recital (193)). Those scenarios therefore already considered the best outcomes that the users could theoretically attain. The Commission further added in that regard that, through the fivesimulations in recitals (190) to (194), the Commission assessed, based on the data it had available, the likelihood of different ways in which cooperating users could cope with higher costs of EMD currently sourced from their suppliers in China, and the likely effects those would have on their profitability. The analysis under these simulations should thus be considered as a whole, rather than looking at simulations individually. Since almost none of the simulations showed positive outcomes for the cooperating users, the Commission concluded that, on balance, the users would most likely be negatively affected by imposition of duties at the level of the dumping margins, and their manoeuvring room was limited. The claims of the parties were therefore dismissed.

• (213) Finally, Tosoh argued that it was deprived of its process rights due to non-disclosure throughout the investigation, resulting in limitations in verifying the origins of the data and the methodologies employed in the Commission’s assessment of the effect of dumping duties on the user industry. The Commission noted that the information submitted by the cooperating users, on which it based its conclusions after verifying it, was available on the case file throughout the investigation. This argument was therefore dismissed.

6.2.1.6.   Conclusion on Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation

• (214) On that basis, the Commission did carefully weigh all the elements and could not conclude that it is in the Union’s interest to determine the amount of duties in accordance with Article 7(2a), namely it was not in the interest of the Union to set the level of the measures at the level of dumping in view of the disproportionally negative effect this is likely to have on supply chains for Union companies. The Commission therefore confirmed that the measures should be set in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, on the basis of underselling margins.

6.3.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (215) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (216) Following the provisional disclosure, CCCMC and GMIA claimed that the Union’s EMD market prior to 2020 was non-competitive (duopoly), having only two producers whose capacities could historically supply the Union’s demand and were profitable since they could pass all cost increases to their customers. Therefore, neither the excess prices of the Union producer, target profit/injury margin figures, nor the Union producer’s price decline can be justified, once the effective competition was restored in the Union EMD market in the second half of the period considered via imports from China. If the duopoly was restored by the anti-dumping measures it would harm the competition on the Union’s market and would have a negative effect for the downstream producers in the long term.

• (217) As noted by the Commission in the recital (286) of the provisional Regulation, only a limited number of chemical producers in the world were involved in the EMD production process. The fact that there were only two Union producers that managed to achieve profit during the first half of the period considered did not constitute a non-competitive situation on the Union market, since the consumption in the Union market was supplied by the Union producers as well as all available importing countries having the production of EMD including China. Besides, the anti-dumping duties do not create the non-competitive situation on the Union market but ensure fair competition between the Union and the exporting producers of the country concerned. The claim of the party was therefore rejected.

• (218) In the absence of any other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (301) to (303) of the provisional Regulation.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers/traders

• (219) In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (304) to (305) of the provisional Regulation.

7.3.   Interest of users

• (220) Following the provisional disclosure, Duracell claimed that the cost impact of anti-dumping measures on Union users was underestimated in the provisional findings, while the Union users’ profitability was unsubstantiated by any evidence. Finally, both cooperating users affirmed that if the lesser duty rule was not applied, Union users would become unprofitable, risking the survival of their operations in the Union.

• (221) As provided in the provisional findings, the analysis of the users’ data was based on verified questionnaire replies provided by these users, taking into account the data on sources, volumes and prices before duties of purchases and turnover achieved on downstream products, including the profitability level achieved in 2021–2022. Indeed, the declining profitability trend of the users was noted in these years. However, the Commission estimated that if the definitive anti-dumping measures remained at the level of injury margin, the users would still maintain positive profitability even when taking into account the level of anti-dumping duties and assuming that the increased cost would not be passed on to their customers.

• (222) In the absence of any other comments regarding the interest of users, the conclusions set out in recital (319) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed. Comments that concern the interest of users in the context of the effect on supply chains for Union companies within the meaning of Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation were addressed under Section 6.2.1.3 of the present Regulation.

7.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (223) On the basis of the above, the conclusions set out in recital (320) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

• (224) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

• (225) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

• (226) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.