Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666 of 6 June 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2024-06-07
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 3

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (108) As mentioned above in recital (32), due to the non-cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers, the export price was based on facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, i.e. on the information from Eurostat.
  • (109) In the absence of cooperation by exporting producers from the PRC, the export price was determined based on the available statistics, namely the Comext database (Eurostat). Exports from China during the RIP were made under both the inward processing procedure (‘IPP’) and the normal regime, as shown in recital (137). Calculations were performed on the export price under both regimes, as reasonably available information about the export price to the Union. Since the prices in Comext are recorded at Cost, Insurance, Freight (‘CIF’) level, the ex-works level was established based on the evidence provided in the request for transport cost, handling, ocean and inland freight.

3.5.   Comparison

  • (110) The Commission compared the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

3.6.   Dumping

  • (111) On this basis, the export price was found to be significantly lower (by 50 %) than the constructed normal value. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING

  • (112) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, should the measures be allowed to lapse. The following additional elements were analysed: (1) the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, and (2) the attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third countries, as well as the possible absorption capacity of third country markets and trade defence measures in other export markets.
  • (113) As a consequence of the non-cooperation of Chinese exporting producers and of the GOC, the Commission based its assessment on the facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, namely on information provided in the expiry review request, publicly available information, and information from the GTA database.

4.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC

  • (114) In the request, the applicant provided estimates regarding the production, production capacity and spare capacity of steel ropes and cables in the PRC 75. These estimates were based on the Global Steel Wire Rope Market Research Report, Segment by Major Players, Types, Applications and Regions, 2017-2027 (the ‘Report’) 76. The Chinese production of SRC was estimated at 3,6 million tonnes in 2022, with a growth of close to 10 % since 2019. The production capacity of SRC in the PRC in 2022 was estimated at approximately 6,0 million tonnes, representing 75 % of the estimated global SRC production capacity in 2022. The domestic SRC consumption in China in 2022 was estimated at approximately 3,1 million tonnes. After deducting the estimated exports from China to all countries (estimated at around 0,5 million tonnes), the Chinese spare capacity was estimated at around 2,4 million tonnes. Considering that the Union free market consumption amounted to 0,18 million tonnes (see Section 5.2 below) during the review investigation period, the Chinese spare capacity was more than ten times the Union consumption in the free market.
  • (115) The Commission also compared the spare capacity in the PRC during the review investigation period with the spare capacity during the previous expiry review investigation and noted a significant increase. While the Chinese spare capacity was estimated at around 1,8 million tonnes in the previous expiry review 77, it is estimated at 2,4 million tonnes during the review investigation period of the current investigation. This means that the increase in spare capacity since the last expiry review alone exceeds the entire Union demand. Furthermore, the applicant has provided information that despite the already significant spare capacities, Chinese SRC producers are continuing to add further production capacity 78. There is no indication that such increased spare capacity could be absorbed by the Chinese domestic market, or any third country market.
  • (116) Excess in production capacities is an incentive to continue exporting at dumped prices. It is reasonable to assume that Chinese SRC industry must exploit all existing possibilities to increase production to fully benefit from the significant investments made in installed capacities. The most obvious way is to penetrate the Union market that, for prices and dimension, is the most attractive one, as explained below in Section 4.2, and it is demonstrated by the continuous dumping practices of the Chinese exporting producers, as established in recital (111).
  • (117) Based on the above facts and considerations, the Commission concluded that the Chinese exporting producers have significant spare capacities, which would likely be used for exporting steel ropes and cables at dumped prices to the Union if the measures were allowed to lapse.

4.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third country markets

  • (118) The Commission examined whether it was likely that Chinese exporting producers would increase their export sales to the Union market at dumped prices should measures be allowed to lapse. Therefore, the Commission analysed the price level of Chinese exports to third country markets and compared them to the price level of Chinese exports to the Union market, to determine whether the Union market was attractive in terms of price levels. The Chinese export prices and the attractiveness of the Union market were established based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, namely GTA data and information in the request.
  • (119) In the absence of cooperation by Chinese exporting producers, the Commission used data from the GTA database based on the product category (HS code 7312 10) of the product concerned, as reasonably available information, and focused on five main export markets for China, namely India, South Korea, Thailand, USA, and Vietnam. Exports to these five countries represented more than 50 % of all Chinese exports in the product category mentioned above. It was found that during the review investigation period, the average price of Chinese exports into the Union in that product category was higher than the average Chinese export price to any of these other export markets. The above findings based on GTA statistics for the product category corroborated the information provided in the expiry review request showing that import prices of Chinese SRC to customers in the Union market were higher than in any other main trading partner’s market 79.
  • (120) Based on the available information, as explained in recital (119) above, it was found that exporting producers from the PRC can achieve higher prices in the Union market than in other third countries. This would suggest that the Union market is a highly attractive market given that Chinese exporting producers can generate higher profits on sales to the Union than on their sales to other export markets. Furthermore, given the significant spare capacities of the Chinese SRC producers, as established in recital (114) above, Chinese exporters need to access both large and smaller markets to ensure a certain level of capacity utilisation of the SRC plants. According to the information on the file, Chinese exporting producers of SRC sell to over 80 countries 80. It is reasonable to assume that it is more attractive to increase exports to a single market that can absorb a significant part of the Chinese excess capacity than to several smaller markets, given that selling to large customers in the same region can also reduce shipping, logistics and organisational costs.
  • (121) In addition, based on the available information, the Union market is home to essentially all main SRC user industries, such as fishing, maritime, shipbuilding, oil and gas, mining, forestry, aerial transport, automotive, civil engineering, construction, and elevators, indicating a large market potential for Chinese exporting producers; whereas many of China’s export destinations lack the know-how needed for certain SRC uses 81.
  • (122) In addition, as referred to above in Section 1.1, Chinese exporting producers have been found to circumvent the anti-dumping measures in force. The circumvention attempts and the fact that despite the existence of anti-dumping measures, Chinese SRC producers still maintain a certain presence on the Union market, testify of the attractiveness of the large Union market to Chinese exporting producers.
  • (123) Furthermore, according to the WTO database 82, anti-dumping duties were applicable in 2023 on imports of Chinese SRC into Mexico, Türkiye, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
  • (124) Given the Chinese exporters’ difficulties to sell to these markets, if the current measures were allowed to expire, the Union market would become even more attractive to Chinese exporters seeking to export their excess production and use spare capacity.
  • (125) Based on the foregoing and considering in particular the level of Chinese export prices to the Union compared to other export markets and the broad base of SRC user industries in the Union, it follows that Chinese exporters would have a strong incentive to continue exporting at dumped prices to the Union in significantly higher quantities if the measures were allowed to lapse, considering also that other export markets would not be able to absorb the massive volumes of Chinese SRC that could be produced.

4.3.   Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping

  • (126) The investigation showed that Chinese imports, despite the relatively low import volumes compared to Union consumption, continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the RIP.
  • (127) Moreover, the dumped prices found are confirmed by the analysis of Chinese export prices to other third countries. The Commission also found that sales by the Chinese exporting producers to their most important export markets are made at considerably lower prices than to the Union, and that several countries have imposed trade defence measures against Chinese exports of SRC.
  • (128) Further to the above, the Commission found that the spare capacity in China alone was more than ten times the Union consumption during the review investigation period and that the Union market is very attractive to Chinese exporting producers in view of its size and prices. Considering the significant spare capacity in the PRC and the attractiveness of the Union market, the Commission concluded that should the measures lapse, it was likely that the Chinese exporting producers would activate the spare capacity and likely even redirect exports from third countries towards the Union market at dumped prices and in significant volumes.
  • (129) Consequently, in view of the continued dumping during the review investigation period, the pricing behaviour of the Chinese exporters in third markets, the existing spare capacity in PRC, the size of the Union market and the prevailing prices on that market, and trade defence measures in force against exports of SRC originating in the PRC on other important markets, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that dumping from PRC would continue or, in any event, would recur with significantly increased volumes, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

5. INJURY

5.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

  • (130) The like product was manufactured by around 25 producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.
  • (131) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at 137 910 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of the verified macro data in the questionnaire reply provided by EWRIS. As indicated in recital (25), three Union producers were selected in the sample representing 21 % of the total Union production of the like product.

5.2.   Union consumption

  • (132) The Commission established the total Union consumption (captive and free markets) on the basis of the verified macro data in the questionnaire reply provided by EWRIS (for total sales in the Union market) and of Eurostat data (for imports into the Union).
  • (133) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Total Union consumption 167 316 152 636 158 423 176 498
Index 100 91 95 105
Union free market consumption 165 917 148 919 156 756 175 298
Index 100 90 94 106
Union captive consumption 1 398 3 717 1 668 1 200
Index 100 266 119 86
Source: Eurostat and macro data supplied by EWRIS. Source: Eurostat and macro data supplied by EWRIS. Source: Eurostat and macro data supplied by EWRIS. Source: Eurostat and macro data supplied by EWRIS. Source: Eurostat and macro data supplied by EWRIS.
  • (134) Union free market consumption decreased by 10 % in 2020 and then it increased to a level higher than 2019. By the review investigation period it had increased by 6 % as compared to 2019. Total consumption followed a very similar trend.
  • (135) The decline in 2020 followed by subsequent increase in consumption is explained by the general economic downturn caused by the restrictions imposed in 2020 in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the subsequent economic recovery following the lifting of these measures in the course of 2021. Most of the main user sectors of the product under review tended to influence consumption according to the general economic situation on the Union market.
  • (136) Captive consumption amounted to only about 1 % in three out of four years of the period considered. The Commission considered this share as not material and therefore did not affect the overall conclusions on consumption nor did it have a significant impact on the situation of the Union industry.

5.3.   Imports from the country concerned

  • (137) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Comext data. Also, the market share of the imports was established on the basis of import data from Comext and Union free market consumption. Imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Total volume of imports from China (tonnes) 2 301 2 875 2 177 2 052
Index 100 125 95 89
Market share 1,4  % 1,9  % 1,4  % 1,2  %
Index 100 139 100 84
Normal import regime Normal import regime Normal import regime Normal import regime Normal import regime
Total volume of imports from China (tonnes) 759 987 824 1 230
Index 100 130 108 162
Market share 0,5  % 0,7  % 0,5  % 0,7  %
Index 100 145 115 153
Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP)
Volume of imports from China (tonnes) 1 542 1 887 1 353 821
Index 100 122 88 53
Size relative to the Union market 0,9  % 1,3  % 0,9  % 0,5  %
Index 100 136 93 50
Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext.
  • (138) During the period considered, the total import volumes from China fluctuated from year to year and overall import quantities decreased by 11 % during the period considered.
  • (139) The market share of imports from China decreased by 0,2 percentage points over the period considered. The market share of imports from China remained therefore at a slightly declining but overall stable level during the period considered.
  • (140) The product concerned was imported from China under the normal import regime, subject to anti-dumping duties, and under the inward processing procedure (IPP), not subject to anti-dumping duties.
  • (141) Imports under IPP increased by 22 % between 2019 and 2020 and then decreased by 56 % from 2020 to the review investigation period. Overall, imports under IPP from China decreased by 47 % during the period considered, representing 0,5 % market share in the review investigation period. Imports under this regime would be integrated into downstream constructions before being re-exported. An example being large engineering contracts. As such large fluctuations in quantities are considered normal.
  • (142) Imports under the normal regime increased by 62 % during the period considered. However, in terms of market share these imports only rose from 0,5 % in 2019 to 0,7 % in the review investigation period.

5.3.1.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

  • (143) The Commission established the prices of imports from China on the basis of Comext data as there was no co-operation with the investigation by the Chinese exporting producers.
  • (144) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/ tonnes)

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Total imports Total imports Total imports Total imports Total imports
PRC 1 883 1 663 1 897 2 576
Index 100 88 101 137
Normal regime Normal regime Normal regime Normal regime Normal regime
PRC 2 161 2 014 2 343 2 883
Index 100 93 108 133
Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP) Inward processing procedure (IPP)
PRC 1 746 1 479 1 625 2 117
Index 100 85 93 121
Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext.
  • (145) The average price of total imports from China for the product concerned increased by 37 % over the period considered. The trend of prices was similar for both the normal regime and imports under the IPP.
  • (146) The increase in overall prices as shown in table 9 and import prices from other countries as shown at table 5 followed the trend of Union market prices as evidenced by the Union industry prices.
  • (147) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing:
  • — the weighted average sales prices of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level,
  • — with the corresponding weighted average prices of the imports from Comext, with appropriate adjustments for post-importation costs.
  • (148) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of 20,4 % by the imports from the country concerned on the Union market when anti-dumping duties were taken into account, and 41,3 % without anti-dumping duties.
  • (149) Following an analysis of the Comext Trade statistics, most of Chinese imports were declared under a TARIC code of types with diameters below 12 millimetres. The Commission compared the prices for these imports with similar product types of the Union industry. The result of the comparison showed an even higher undercutting margin (41,2 % with anti-dumping duties and 55,4 % without anti-dumping duties).

5.4.   Imports from third countries

  • (150) The imports of the product under review from third countries were mainly from the Republic of Korea, India, Türkiye and Thailand. The quantities and prices were obtained from Comext.
  • (151) The total volume of imports into the Union as well as the market share and price trends for imports of the product under review from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 5

Imports from third countries

Country 2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Republic of Korea Volume (tonnes) 25 702 20 787 20 707 22 944
Republic of Korea Index 100 81 81 89
Republic of Korea Market share 15,5  % 14,0  % 13,2  % 13,1  %
Republic of Korea Average price (EUR/tonnes) 2 126 1 995 2 154 2 780
Republic of Korea Index 100 94 101 131
India Volume (tonnes) 13 993 12 157 16 941 22 202
India Index 100 87 121 159
India Market share 8,4  % 8,2  % 10,8  % 12,7  %
India Average price (EUR/tonnes) 1 367 1 235 1 352 1 814
India Index 100 90 99 133
Türkiye Volume (tonnes) 16 517 13 439 13 452 18 696
Türkiye Index 100 81 81 113
Türkiye Market share 10,0  % 9,0  % 8,6  % 10,7  %
Türkiye Average price (EUR/tonnes) 1 421 1 395 1 549 1 944
Türkiye Index 100 98 109 137
Thailand Volume (tonnes) 7 803 10 866 8 115 12 215
Thailand Index 100 139 104 157
Thailand Market share 4,7  % 7,3  % 5,2  % 7,0  %
Thailand Average price (EUR/tonnes) 1 716 1 387 1 618 2 224
Thailand Index 100 81 94 130
Other third countries Volume (tonnes) 14 887 13 459 18 293 19 913
Other third countries Index 100 90 123 134
Other third countries Market share 9,0  % 9,0  % 11,7  % 11,4  %
Other third countries Average price (EUR/tonnes) 1 996 1 953 2 289 3 092
Other third countries Index 100 98 115 155
Total of all third countries except PRC Volume (tonnes) 78 901 70 708 77 508 95 970
Total of all third countries except PRC Index 100 90 98 122
Total of all third countries except PRC Market share 47,6  % 47,5  % 49,4  % 54,7  %
Total of all third countries except PRC Average price (EUR/tonnes) 1 779 1 649 1 850 2 388
Total of all third countries except PRC Index 100 93 104 134
Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext. Source: Comext.
  • (152) Total imports from all third countries except China increased by 22 % over the period considered.
  • (153) The share of these imports on total imports increased from 47,6 % in 2019 to 54,7 % in the review investigation period while the import prices increased by 34 % over the period considered.
  • (154) While the share of imports from the Republic of Korea on total imports decreased and the one of imports from Türkiye remained stable during the period considered, the share of imports from India increased from 8 % to 13 % and from Thailand from 4,7 % to 7 %.
  • (155) As outlined in recital (6), the anti-dumping duties in force on imports of the product concerned from China were extended to cover imports of the product under review consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea following anti-circumvention investigations. It should be noted that the imports from Morocco were negligible in the period considered. In addition, the imports from the Republic of Korea in the period considered were from exporting producers exempted from the measures by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 400/2010.
  • (156) During the review investigation period, average prices of imports from third countries except China were lower than the Union industry’s average price and slightly lower than import prices from China under the normal regime (as shown at tables 4 and 5).

5.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

5.5.1.   General remarks

  • (157) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry includes an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.
  • (158) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply provided by EWRIS and related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (159) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.
  • (160) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

5.5.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

5.5.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
  • (161) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Production volume (tonnes) 144 183 130 921 133 927 137 910
Index 100 91 93 96
Production capacity (tonnes) 225 263 225 411 225 263 228 194
Index 100 100 100 101
Capacity utilisation 64 % 58 % 59 % 60 %
Index 100 91 93 94
Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS.
  • (162) The production volume decreased by 9 % between 2019 and 2020 and then increased by 5,3 % between 2020 and the review investigation period. Overall, the production volume decreased by 4 % during the period considered.
  • (163) The production capacity of the Union industry was stable during the period considered.
  • (164) The capacity utilisation decreased during the period considered by 6 % reflecting the falling trend of production as set out in table 6.
  • (165) The Commission noted that the production capacity would vary depending on the mix of product types being produced. Capacity was calculated based on the recent mix of products being produced.
5.5.2.2.   Sales volume and market share
  • (166) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales volume and market share (tonnes)

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Union industry sales volume on the Union free market 84 715 75 336 77 070 77 276
Index 100 89 91 91
Market share 51,1  % 50,6  % 49,2  % 44,1  %
Index 100 99 96 86
Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS.
  • (167) Overall, the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market decreased by 9 % during the period considered.
  • (168) The market share of the Union industry in the Union market decreased by 14 % or 7 percentage points during the period considered, falling to 44,1 % during the review investigation period compared with 51,1 % in 2019.
  • (169) The size of the decline of the market share of the Union industry during the period considered is similar to the increase of the market share of third countries, other than China, as set out in table 5.
5.5.2.3.   Growth
  • (170) The Union industry market position contracted over the period considered. This view was based on the fall in sales volume and market share as shown in table 7.
5.5.2.4.   Employment and productivity
  • (171) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Number of employees 3 291 3 063 3 097 3 186
Index 100 93 94 97
Productivity (unit/employee) 44 43 43 43
Index 100 98 99 99
Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS. Source: Macro data from EWRIS.
  • (172) The number of employees in the Union industry decreased over the period considered by 3 %. The main reduction took place between 2019 and 2020 by 7 % and subsequently increased by the review investigation period. This trend followed the trend of production and sales volume as described in tables 6 and 7. The decrease of the employment between 2019 and 2020 can be explained by the drop of production following the restrictions imposed in relation to the COVID 19 pandemic. Following the lifting of these measures, employment increased again but did not reach the number of employees in 2019.
  • (173) Productivity remained stable over the period decreasing slightly by 1 % between 2019 and the review investigation period.
5.5.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
  • (174) The dumping margin established during the review investigation period was significantly above the de minimis level. At the same time, the level of imports during the review investigation period represented 1,2 % of Union free market consumption. Therefore, the impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was rather limited.
  • (175) Due to the impact of large quantities of imports from third countries and developments in the overall Union economic situation, the Union industry did not recover from the effects of past dumping over the period considered.

5.5.3.   Microeconomic indicators

5.5.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices
  • (176) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonnes)

2019 2020 2021 Review investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market 3 172 3 453 3 734 4 439
Index 100 109 118 140
Unit cost of production 3 102 3 205 3 346 3 911
Index 100 103 108 126
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (177) The average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union increased by 40 % in the review investigation period as compared to 2019.
  • (178) The unit cost of production increased by 26 % during the period considered. More than half of this increase occurred between 2021 and the review investigation period.
  • (179) The increase of unit costs of production is caused primarily by the increase of the costs of the main raw material for producers being wire, or for SRC producers producing their own wire, wire rod. This increase in costs started following the economic recovery after the lifting of the COVID measures and continued after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Moreover, energy costs also increased following the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine.
5.5.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (180) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Average labour costs per employee

2019 2020 2021 Review investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR) 40 841 40 880 43 611 45 430
Index 100 100 107 111
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (181) Labour costs increased by 11 % during the period considered reflecting also salary adjustments to rising inflation.
5.5.3.3.   Inventories
  • (182) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Inventories

2019 2020 2021 Review investigation period
Closing stocks (tonnes) 7 012 6 799 6 051 5 764
Index 100 97 86 82
Closing stocks as a percentage of production 5 % 5 % 5 % 4 %
Index 100 100 100 80
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (183) The level of inventories decreased by 18 % over the period considered. In relation to production, the closing stocks as percentage of the production was reduced by 1 percentage point.
5.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (184) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2019 2020 2021 Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (percentage of sales turnover) -3  % -3  % 2 % 4 %
Index 100 100 266 333
Cash flow (EUR) 432 391 1 357 148 3 545 014 2 560 077
Index 100 314 820 592
Investments (EUR) 4 126 772 2 578 009 1 703 064 4 362 268
Index 100 62 41 106
Return on investments –3,1  % –2,2  % 1,9  % 5,0  %
Index 100 129 261 361
Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers. Source: Sampled Union producers.
  • (185) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. Due to a difficult market situation in certain user sectors at the beginning of the period (e.g. gas and oil mining) followed by the economic downturn in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Union industry made losses in 2019 and 2020. The Union industry then made small profits in 2021 and the review investigation period. This was because of increased demand in certain user sectors (e.g. industrial applications, maritime sector) and also due to the general recovery of the economy. This improved demand meant that the price increases in 2021 and the review investigation period were in excess of the increases in raw material costs, as pointed out in table 9.
  • (186) However, the profitability rate in all four years of the period considered remained below the 5 % target profit for this industry as set out in previous investigations (Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/607 recital (162)) as well as the minimum 6 % target profit set out in Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation.
  • (187) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow improved following the reduction of inventories and the trend of profitability in the course of the period considered.
  • (188) Total annual investments were modest and relatively stable during the period considered. Investments were mostly limited to maintenance and replacement of existing equipment.
  • (189) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It followed the trend of profitability in that it was negative in 2019 and 2020 and improved to small positive figures in 2021 and the review investigation period.

5.6.   Conclusion on injury

  • (190) Imports on the Union market over the period considered were dominated by third countries, in particular those from the Republic of Korea, India and Türkiye. In addition, imports from other third countries rose from around 78 thousand to around 96 thousand tonnes in the review investigation period as shown in table 5. The market share of these imports increased from around 47,6 % in 2019 to 54,7 % in the review investigation period. In contrast, imports from China did not exceed 1,9 % throughout the period considered and were at 1,2 % of consumption during the review investigation period as shown in table 3.
  • (191) In the first years of the period considered, the macro indicators of the Union industry were heavily impacted by the economic downturn, caused by the measures taken in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the difficult economic situation in certain user sectors. Following the economic recovery, after the phasing out of the lockdown measures, the macro indicators improved to a certain degree but overall, the macro indicators demonstrate a continuing injurious situation, both in terms of absolute figures for production and sales and in terms of market share which fell from 51,1 % to 44,1 % in the period considered. The captive market in the review investigation period was around 1 % of total consumption and developments in this market had no real impact on the Union industry.
  • (192) In terms of the micro indicators, the Union industry situation in 2021 and the review investigation was slightly improved as compared to 2019 and 2020. Despite an increase in costs, the industry benefitted from a period of improved market conditions following the phasing out of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021, whereby it could raise its prices enough, so that its profitability, return on investment and cash flow improved. Nevertheless, the profitability of the industry was still below the target profit set in the original investigation (5 %).
  • (193) Taking into account both the macro and micro indicators and especially the decreasing market share, lack of growth, low capacity utilisation and inadequate profitability, the Commission concluded that the Union industry continued to suffer material injury during the period considered within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.
  • (194) The purpose of the injury assessment is to determine whether material injury continued, and if so, whether this injury was caused by imports from China. The Commission concluded that the material injury found was not caused by imports from China being low during the period considered, but by rising imports from third countries gaining significant market share in the context of unfavourable market conditions as explained in recitals (191) and (192).

6. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

6.1.   Analysis

  • (195) In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether material injury originally from Chinese imports would recur should measures against the PRC be allowed to lapse. The investigation has shown that the imports from the PRC were made at dumped price levels during the RIP (Section 3.6, recital (111)) and that there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should measures be allowed to lapse (Section 4.3).
  • (196) To establish the likelihood of recurrence of injury the following elements were analysed: (i) the production capacity and spare capacity available in the PRC; (ii) possible price levels of Chinese imports should measures be allowed to lapse; (iii) the behaviour of Chinese exporting producers in other third countries; (iv) the attractiveness of the Union market; and (v) the impact of Chinese imports on the situation of the Union industry should measures be allowed to lapse.

6.1.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity available in the PRC

  • (197) As explained in recitals (114) and (115) producers in the PRC have significant production capacity in China and, as a result spare capacity, which largely exceeds not only the export quantity to the Union during the RIP, but the total Union consumption during the RIP by more than ten times. The Commission also noted that only the capacities added since the last expiry review by the Chinese producers exceeded already largely the entire Union consumption in the RIP.
  • (198) In addition, as stated in recitals (115) and (116) there were no elements found that could indicate any significant increase of domestic demand of SRC in the PRC or in any other third country market in the near future. The Commission therefore concluded that domestic demand in China or in other third country markets could not absorb the available spare capacity.

6.1.2.   Possible price levels of Chinese imports

  • (199) As mentioned in recital (119) the Chinese export volumes and the attractiveness of the Union market were established based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation and based on GTA data and information in the request.
  • (200) As explained in recital (120), export prices from the PRC to the five main export markets for China, namely India, South Korea, Thailand, USA and Vietnam, were below the Chinese export prices to the Union based on the analysis of available global trade statistics, as set out in recital (119) and (120). These export prices were well below the Union industry prices (by about 60 %). On that basis, it was concluded that the Chinese exporting producers could reduce export prices to the Union even further.
  • (201) Also regarding prices, the undercutting margin of the Chinese imports to the Union market was over 40 %, without taking anti-dumping duties into account, as set out in recital (148). This would indicate that the Chinese imports, at increased volumes, would impose substantial price pressure on the Union industry in the absence of measures.

6.1.3.   Attractiveness of the Union market

  • (202) Taking under consideration this price analysis in the previous recital and recital (120) if the measures were allowed to lapse, the Chinese exporting producers would have a high incentive to divert their exports to the Union where they would achieve higher prices, while still being able to significantly undercut the Union industry sales price. In addition, they would be able to use their spare capacities to increase export quantities to the Union market.
  • (203) In addition, based on available information, the Union market is one of the largest in the world and is home to a wide range of SRC user industries including fishing, maritime, shipbuilding, oil and gas, mining, forestry, aerial transport, automotive, civil engineering, construction and elevators. This demonstrates the attractiveness of the Union market.
  • (204) Furthermore, as pointed out in recital (122), it can reasonably be concluded that it is more attractive to increase exports to a single market than to several smaller markets, given that selling to large customers in the same region can reduce shipping, logistics and organisational costs, and can also ensure a certain level of capacity utilisation of SRC plants.
  • (205) The attractiveness of the Union market is also clear in terms of prices given that Chinese exporting producers can generate higher profits on sales to the Union than on their sales to other export markets.
  • (206) Another indication of the Union market’s attractiveness is the fact that since the beginning of the imposition of the measures, there were attempts for circumvention from Chinese exporters as explained in Section 1.1.
  • (207) It is therefore concluded that the exporting producers in the PRC have the potential and incentive to substantially raise the volume of their exports of SRC to the Union at dumped prices substantially undercutting the prices of the Union industry, should measures be allowed to lapse.

6.1.4.   Impact on the Union industry

  • (208) The Union industry, under the scenario that it keeps the current price level, will not be able to maintain their sales volume and market share against the low priced imports from China. It is highly likely that the Chinese market share would increase rapidly if the measures were allowed to lapse. This would be most likely at the expense of the Union industry since their price level is the highest, especially compared also to the price of imports from China without anti-dumping duties as set out in recital (149). Losing sales volume would lead to an even lower utilisation rate and an increase in the average cost of production. This would lead to a further deterioration of the financial situation of the Union industry and increase the risk of a loss-making situation that already materialised during the period considered.
  • (209) In case the Union industry would decide to lower its price levels in an attempt to keep its sales volume and market share, its financial situation will almost immediately deteriorate and the loss-making situation already observed at the beginning of the period considered is likely to reappear again and even worsen.
  • (210) Under both scenarios, the impact of the expiry of the measures is likely to have a negative impact on the Union industry, including for employment. During the period considered the Union industry was already forced to reduce the product-related employment by 3 % (see table 8). Further deterioration of the Union industry’s situation increases the risk of shutdown of whole producing units.
  • (211) Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the existing measures would lead to a recurrence of injury caused by Chinese imports of SRC and that the already injurious situation of the Union industry will be likely to further deteriorate.
  • (212) It is acknowledged that SRC imports from the Republic of Korea and other third countries, given their high and increasing volume, are factors contributing to the injury suffered by the Union industry. However, this investigation was, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, limited to assessing whether there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury from injuriously-priced Chinese SRC imports should the current anti-dumping measures expire. Given the fragile situation of the Union industry, any significant increase in Chinese imports would worsen that situation due to the significant spare capacities in the PRC, the attractiveness of the Union market and the possible low price levels of Chinese SRC exports to the Union.
  • (213) The Chinese SRC imports are currently entering the Union market in much lower volumes than before the imposition of measures. The import prices, including the anti-dumping duties, have successfully re-established undistorted competitive conditions between Chinese exporters of the product under review and the Union industry. The fact that imports from third countries undercut Chinese imports subject to anti-dumping duties, does not undermine the Commission’s obligations to remain within the framework of this investigation. As set out in (211), the Commission has demonstrated that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the measures would lead to recurrence of injury.

6.2.   Conclusion

  • (214) On the basis of the analysis above the Commission concludes that repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of Chinese dumped SRC imports at prices undercutting the Union industry prices, therefore further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry. As a consequence, the viability of the Union industry would be at serious risk.

7. UNION INTEREST

  • (215) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and suppliers.
  • (216) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.
  • (217) It should be recalled that, in the previous expiry review, the continuation of measures was considered not to be against the interest of the Union. Furthermore, the fact that the present investigation is an expiry review, thus analysing a situation in which anti-dumping measures have already been in place, allows the assessment of any undue negative impact on the parties concerned by the current anti-dumping measures.
  • (218) On that basis, it was examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of a continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it is not in the Union interest to maintain measures in this particular investigation.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (219) The investigation has shown that should the measures expire, this would likely have a significant negative effect on the Union industry and its currently injurious situation would deteriorate further. The expiry of the measures would seriously threaten the viability of the Union industry to the extent that certain Union producers would have to close (or partially close) their operations rendering the Union market more dependent on SRC imports.
  • (220) Therefore, maintaining the anti-dumping measures in force is in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2.   Interest of importers

  • (221) As indicated in recital (29), no importer cooperated in this investigation. It is recalled that in the previous investigations it was found that the impact of the imposition of measures on importers would not be significant. In the absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, it can accordingly be confirmed that the measures currently in force had no substantial negative effect on their financial situation and that the continuation of the measures would not unduly affect importers.

7.3.   Interest of users

  • (222) The product under review is used in a wide variety of applications such as fishing, maritime/shipping, oil and gas industries, mining, forestry, aerial transport, civil engineering, construction, and elevators.
  • (223) As indicated in recital (223), no user cooperated in this investigation. Some of the users of the SRC industry made themselves known supporting the continuation of measures pointing out the importance of a reliable supply chain for SRC products in the EU.
  • (224) Therefore, and in the light of the lack of compelling argumentation to the contrary, it was concluded, that the measures currently in force do not have any substantial negative effect on the economic situation of users, and that thus the continuation of measures would not unduly affect the situation of the user industries.

7.4.   Interest of suppliers

  • (225) Some of the suppliers of the SRC industry, for example wire producers and producers of packaging material, such as wooden cable drums, also came forward supporting the continuation of the measures pointing out also the strategic importance of the SRC industry located in the EU for other sectors, such as the steel industry.

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (226) Therefore, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of SRC originating in the PRC.

8. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

  • (227) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on SRC from the PRC should be maintained.
  • (228) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained on imports of SRC originating in the PRC. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. No comments were received from any of the parties.
  • (229) As outlined in recital (6), the anti-dumping duties in force on imports of SRC from the PRC were extended to cover, in addition, imports of SRC consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Morocco or the Republic of Korea or not. The anti-dumping duty to be maintained on imports of the SRC originating in the PRC should continue to be extended to imports of SRC consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Morocco and the Republic of Korea or not. The exporting producer in Morocco exempted from the measures as extended by Regulation (EC) No 1886/2004 should also be exempted from the measures imposed by this Regulation. The 15 exporting producers in the Republic of Korea exempted from the measures as extended by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 400/2010 should also be exempted from the measures imposed by this Regulation.
  • (230) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council 83 when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.
  • (231) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables including locked coil ropes, excluding ropes and cables of stainless steel, with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 3 mm, currently falling under CN codes ex 7312 10 81, ex 7312 10 83, ex 7312 10 85, ex 7312 10 89 and ex 7312 10 98 (TARIC codes 7312108112, 7312108113, 7312108119, 7312108312, 7312108313, 7312108319, 7312108512, 7312108513, 7312108519, 7312108912, 7312108913, 7312108919, 7312109812, 7312109813 and 7312109819).

2.

The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the CIF net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and originating in the PRC shall be 60,4 %.

3.

The definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to imports originating in the PRC, as set out in paragraph 2, is hereby extended to imports of the same steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco, whether declared as originating in Morocco or not (TARIC codes 7312108112, 7312108312, 7312108512, 7312108912 and 7312109812) with the exception of those produced by Remer Maroc SARL, Zone Industrielle, Tranche 2, Lot 10, Settat, Morocco (TARIC additional code A567) and to imports of the same steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not (TARIC codes 7312108113, 7312108313, 7312108513, 7312108913 and 7312109813), with the exception of those produced by the companies listed below:

Country Company TARIC additional code
The Republic of Korea Bosung Wire Rope Co., Ltd, 568,Yongdeok-ri, Hallim-myeon, Gimae-si, Gyeongsangnam-do, 621-872 A969
The Republic of Korea Chung Woo Rope Co., Ltd, 1682-4, Songjung-Dong, Gangseo- Gu, Busan A969
The Republic of Korea CS Co., Ltd, 31-102, Junam maeul 2-gil, Yangsan, Gyeongsangnam-do A969
The Republic of Korea Cosmo Wire Ltd, 4-10, Koyeon-Ri, Woong Chon-Myon Ulju- Kun, Ulsan A969
The Republic of Korea Dae Heung Industrial Co., Ltd, 185 Pyunglim – Ri, Daesan- Myun, Haman – Gun, Gyungnam A969
The Republic of Korea Daechang Steel Co., Ltd, 1213, Aam-daero, Namdong-gu, Incheon C057
The Republic of Korea DSR Wire Corp., 291, Seonpyong-Ri, Seo-Myon, Suncheon-City, Jeonnam A969
The Republic of Korea Goodwire MFG. Co. Ltd, 984-23, Maegok-Dong, Yangsan-City, Kyungnam B955
Kiswire Ltd, 37, Gurak-Ro, 141 Beon-Gil, Suyeong-Gu, Busan, Korea 48212 A969
Manho Rope & Wire Ltd, Dongho Bldg, 85-2 4 Street Joongang- Dong, Jong-gu, Busan A926
Line Metal Co. Ltd, 1259 Boncho-ri, Daeji-Myeon, Changnyeong-gun, Gyeongnam B926
Seil Wire and Cable, 47-4, Soju-Dong, Yangsan-Si, Kyungsangnamdo A994
Shin Han Rope Co., Ltd, 715-8, Gojan-Dong, Namdong-gu, Incheon A969
Ssang Yong Cable Mfg. Co., Ltd, 1559-4 Song-Jeong Dong, Gang-Seo Gu, Busan A969
YOUNGWIRE, 71-1 Sin-Chon Dong, Changwon City, Gyungnam84 A969

Article 2

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 June 2024.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Council Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999 of 12 August 1999 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China, Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland, South Africa and Ukraine and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports originating in the Republic of Korea (OJ L 217, 17.8.1999, p. 1).

3

Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1) as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 461/2004 (OJ L 77, 13.3.2004, p. 12).

4

Council Regulation (EC) No 760/2004 of 22 April 2004 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999 on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in Ukraine to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Moldova, whether declared as originating in Moldova or not (OJ L 120, 24.4.2004, p. 1).

5

Council Regulation (EC) No 1886/2004 of 25 October 2004 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999 on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in the People’s Republic of China to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco, whether declared as originating in Morocco or not, and terminating the investigation in respect of imports from one Moroccan exporter (OJ L 328, 30.10.2004, p. 1).

6

Council Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005 of 8 November 2005 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China, India, South Africa and Ukraine following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (OJ L 299, 16.11.2005, p. 1).

7

Notice of the expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 203, 11.8.2004, p. 4).

8

Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) No 400/2010 of 26 April 2010 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005 on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in the People’s Republic of China to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not, and terminating the investigation in respect of imports consigned from Malaysia (OJ L 117, 11.5.2010, p. 1).

9

Notice of the expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 311, 16.11.2010, p. 16).

10

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012 of 27 January 2012, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China and Ukraine as extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco, Moldova and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 and terminating the expiry review proceeding concerning imports of steel ropes and cables originating in South Africa pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 36, 9.2.2012, p. 1).

11

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/607 of 19 April 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 101, 20.4.2018, p. 40).

12

Notice of the expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 41, 8.2.2017, p. 4).

14

Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 130, 14.4.2023, p. 8).

15

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 of 11 July 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of steel bulb flats originating in the People’s Republic of China and Türkiye (OJ L 177, 12.7.2023, p. 63); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 of 11 January 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel refillable kegs originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 10, 12.1.2023, p. 36); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 149); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 36, 17.2.2022, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 of 24 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel, originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel consigned from Taiwan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 16, 25.1.2022, p. 36).

16

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 66; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 58; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 80; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 208, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 59.

17

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 45; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 38; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 64; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 192, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 46.

18

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 58; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 40; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 66; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 193-194, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 47. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state-owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs.

19

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 59; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 43; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 68; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recitals 48-52.

20

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 62; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 52; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 74; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 202, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 53.

21

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 45; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 33; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 75; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 54.

22

See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 recital 64; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 recital 54; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 recital 76; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 204, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/95 recital 55.

23

Commission staff working document SWD (2017) 483 final/2, 20.12.2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2017)483&lang=en.

Reading this document does not replace reading the official text published in the Official Journal of the European Union. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies arising from the conversion of the original to this format.

This text is published under EUR-Lex's own terms of reuse, not a Legalize or public-domain licence. EUR-Lex
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu — Source: EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the European Union). Reused under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. Only EU legislation published in the printed Official Journal of the European Union is deemed authentic; consolidated texts are reproduced here for documentation purposes and have been reformatted to Markdown.