Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act) (Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 21, 46 and 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1),

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions (2),

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (3),

Whereas:

(1) Past crises, especially the early days of the COVID-19 crisis, have shown that the free movement of goods, persons and services in the internal market and its supply chains can be severely affected. That can have consequences on cross-border trade between Member States, thus creating obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market. Furthermore, during those crises, appropriate crisis management tools and coordination mechanisms were either lacking, did not cover all aspects of the internal market or did not allow for a timely and effective response to such crises.

(2) In the early phase of the COVID-19 crisis, Member States introduced barriers to free movement in the internal market as well as diverging measures regarding the supply of goods and services that were of critical importance or were indispensable for responding to the crisis, which were not always justified. Ad-hoc measures taken by the Commission in order to re-establish the functioning of the internal market, based on the existing rules, were not sufficient. The Union was not sufficiently prepared to ensure efficient manufacturing, procurement and distribution of crisis-relevant non-medical goods, such as personal protective equipment. Measures to ensure the availability of crisis-relevant non-medical goods during the COVID-19 crisis were necessarily reactive. The COVID-19 crisis also revealed insufficient information sharing and an insufficient overview of manufacturing capacities across the Union, as well as vulnerabilities related to intra-Union and global supply chains.

(3) Furthermore, uncoordinated measures restricting the free movement of persons had a particular impact on sectors that rely on mobile workers, including workers in border regions, who played an essential role in the internal market during the COVID-19 crisis.

(4) It was possible for the Council, through the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements, to exchange information and coordinate certain actions with regard to the COVID-19 crisis, while Member States acted independently in other situations. However, actions by the Commission were delayed by several weeks due to the lack of Union-wide contingency planning measures and a lack of clarity as to which national authority should be contacted to find rapid solutions to the impact of the crisis on the internal market. In addition, it became clear that uncoordinated restrictive actions taken by the Member States would further aggravate the impact of the crisis on the internal market. It emerged that there is a need for arrangements between the Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as regards contingency planning, technical level coordination and cooperation, and information exchange. Additionally, it became clear that the lack of effective coordination between Member States exacerbated the shortages of goods and created more obstacles to the free movement of services and persons.

(5) Representative organisations of economic operators claimed that economic operators did not have sufficient information on the restrictions to free movement or crisis-response measures introduced by the Member States during the COVID-19 crisis. That was due, inter alia, to a lack of transparency from authorities of the Member States, to economic operators not knowing where to obtain such information, to language constraints and to the administrative burden implied in making repeated inquiries in all Member States, especially in a constantly changing regulatory environment. That lack of information prevented economic operators from making informed business decisions regarding the extent to which they could exercise their right to free movement or continue cross-border business operations during that crisis. It is necessary to improve the availability of information regarding national and Union-level restrictions on free movement and crisis response measures.

(6) Despite the initial lack of coordination, the internal market rules played a key role in mitigating the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in ensuring a swift recovery of the Union economy, namely by precluding unjustified and disproportionate national restrictions contained in the unilateral responses by the Member States and by providing a strong incentive to find common solutions, thus promoting solidarity.

(7) Events linked to the COVID-19 crisis have highlighted the need for the Union to take a coordinated approach and be better prepared for possible future crises, especially considering the continuing effects of climate change which result in natural disasters, as well as global economic and geopolitical instabilities. Other crises which might require a quicker response to prevent barriers to free movement in the internal market and to avoid severe disruptions to supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of activities in the internal market include, for example, forest fires, earthquakes or large-scale cyber attacks. The fact that such crises constitute exceptional and sudden events of extraordinary nature and scale implies that such events are reasonably unexpected. As it is not known what kind of crises could arise next and have a severe impact on the internal market and its supply chains in the future, it is necessary to provide for an instrument that would apply in the event of a wide range of crises having an impact on the internal market.

(8) The impact of a crisis on the internal market can hinder the functioning of the internal market in two ways. It can give rise to obstacles to free movement or it can cause disruptions to supply chains. Disruptions to supply chains can exacerbate shortages of goods and services in the internal market and hinder production, which leads to additional barriers to trade and to the distortion of competition between Member States and between private operators, thereby disrupting the proper functioning of the internal market. Disruptions to supply chains can also lead to the emergence or likely emergence of diverging national measures to address those supply chain issues, leading to the activation of an internal market emergency mode. This Regulation should address these types of impacts on the internal market and introduce measures to avoid obstacles to free movement or supply chain disruptions that create shortages of crisis-relevant goods or services.

(9) In order to avoid an unnecessary administrative burden on Member States, incidents reported by means of the ad hoc alerts for early warning referred to in this Regulation should be defined in such a manner that they exclude events that have a negligible foreseeable consequence on the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, or on the supply chains of goods and services that are indispensable to the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities in the internal market.

(10) In order to ensure that the framework of measures laid down by this Regulation is able to deploy its full effect in the context of the internal market vigilance and the internal market emergency modes, the Commission should be empowered to set out detailed arrangements regarding crisis preparedness, cooperation, exchange of information and crisis communication. Those detailed arrangements, taking the form of a contingency framework, should set out the specific technical and operational aspects of the mechanisms for exchanging information between the Commission and the Member States. Furthermore, it should lay down arrangements for operational coordination between the Commission and the Member States regarding crisis communication. In this context, a dedicated inventory of all the competent authorities of the respective Member States involved in the implementation of the framework laid down by this Regulation should be set up on the basis of the information communicated by the Member States. That inventory should indicate, in particular, the roles and responsibilities assigned to the competent authorities of their respective Member States during the internal market vigilance and emergency modes in accordance with national law. The arrangements between the Commission and the Member States should also cover the secure exchange of information concerning consultation of the economic operators and social partners with respect to their respective initiatives and actions to mitigate and respond to the effects of a potential crisis.

(11) The measures set out in this Regulation should be deployed in a coherent, transparent, efficient, proportionate and timely manner, having due regard to the need to maintain vital societal functions, including public security, public safety, public order or public health. This Regulation should not affect the competence of the Member States with respect to, for example, national policies of public health and should be without prejudice to the responsibility of the Member States to safeguard national security and their power to safeguard other essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state and maintaining law and order. This Regulation should therefore be without prejudice to matters related to national security and defence.

(12) This Regulation provides the necessary means to ensure, during times of crisis, the continued functioning of the internal market, of the businesses that operate in the internal market and its strategic supply chains, including the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, and the availability of crisis-relevant goods or services to citizens, businesses and public authorities. In addition, this Regulation establishes a forum for appropriate coordination, cooperation and exchange of information. Furthermore, it provides the means for the timely accessibility and availability of the information needed for a targeted response and adequate market behaviour by businesses and citizens during a crisis.

(13) Where possible, this Regulation should allow for anticipation of events and crises by allowing the Union to continue building on ongoing analysis concerning critically important sectors of the internal market economy.

(14) By reinforcing the resilience and preparedness of Union industry with regard to critical raw materials, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) complements this Regulation, which allows the Commission, during an internal market vigilance mode or internal market emergency mode, to activate targeted measures when a threat to or a disruption to the supply of goods of critical importance emerges, including with regard to critical raw materials.

(15) This Regulation should not duplicate the existing framework for medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures under the EU Health Security Framework, including Regulations (EU) 2022/123 (5), (EU) 2022/2370 (6) and (EU) 2022/2371 (7) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 (8) regarding crisis preparedness and response in the area of health. The EU Health Security Framework should take precedence over this Regulation as regards supply chain disruptions and shortages of medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures where the conditions of that framework are met. Therefore, medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures within the meaning of Regulations (EU) 2022/2371 and (EU) 2022/2372 should, where they have been included in the list adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2372, be excluded from the scope of this Regulation, except in relation to the provisions relating to the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, during an internal market emergency, and in particular those designed to re-establish and facilitate free movement.

(16) This Regulation should complement the IPCR arrangements operated by the Council under Council Decision 2014/415/EU (9) as regards the Council’s work on the impact on the internal market of cross-sectoral crises that require decision-making in relation to contingency planning and the implementation of vigilance and emergency measures. This Regulation should be without prejudice to the IPCR arrangements operated by the Council under Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1993 (10).

(17) This Regulation should be without prejudice to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). This Regulation should complement the UCPM and should support it, where necessary, as regards the availability of critical goods and the free movement of civil protection workers, including their equipment, for crises that fall under the remit of the UCPM.

(18) This Regulation should be without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11), including its general framework for the temporary introduction or prolongation of internal border controls and the notification system for the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls.

(19) This Regulation should be without prejudice to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12) on crisis management, as set out in Articles 55 to 57 thereof, implemented by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/300 (13).

(20) This Regulation should be without prejudice to the European Food Security Crisis preparedness and response Mechanism. Nevertheless, food products should be governed by the free movement provisions of this Regulation, including those concerning restrictions to the right to free movement. The measures concerning food products can also be reviewed as regards their compliance with any other relevant provisions of Union law.

(21) This Regulation should be without prejudice to the ability of the Commission to enter into consultations or to cooperate, on behalf of the Union, with relevant authorities of countries outside the Union, in accordance with Union law, with particular attention paid to developing countries, with a view to seeking cooperative solutions to avoid disruptions to supply chains, in compliance with international obligations. This may involve, where appropriate, coordination in relevant international fora.

(22) One of the challenges identified during the COVID-19 crisis was the lack of a network for ensuring preparedness and information sharing between the Member States, on the one hand, and between the Member States and the Commission, on the other hand. Therefore, the achievement of the objectives pursued by this Regulation should be supported by a governance mechanism. At Union level, this Regulation should establish an Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Board (the ‘Board’), composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the Commission, to facilitate cooperation, exchange of information and the smooth, effective and harmonised implementation of this Regulation. The Board should provide advice to and assist the Commission on specific questions, including the consistent implementation of this Regulation, facilitating cooperation among Member States, and it should analyse and discuss relevant topics relating to imminent or ongoing crises.

(23) The Commission should chair the Board and provide its secretariat. Each Member State should appoint a representative and an alternate representative. The Chair should invite a representative from the European Parliament as a permanent observer. In order to receive relevant advice on the activities of the Board and allow appropriate participation of experts, the Chair should be able to invite experts to take part, as observers, in the work of the Board and to attend specific meetings, on an ad-hoc basis, where such attendance is relevant considering the agenda of the meeting. With a view to ensuring a coherent and coordinated Union response to various crises which might have an impact on the functioning of the internal market, the Chair should also invite representatives of other crisis-relevant bodies at Union level as observers to the relevant meetings of the Board. With a view to promoting international cooperation, the Chair should invite representatives of international organisations and countries outside the Union to take part in relevant meetings of the Board in accordance with the relevant bilateral or international agreements. The Chair should be able to invite observers to contribute to the discussions with relevant expertise, information and insights, but observers should not take part in the formulation of opinions, recommendations or advice of the Board.

(24) The Board should have specific tasks in the context of the contingency framework, the internal market vigilance mode and the internal market emergency mode. Those tasks include the exchange of views and the provision of advice to the Commission with respect to the assessment of the criteria which are to be taken into consideration when activating the different modes as well as with respect to the assessment of whether the specific preconditions for the deployment of concrete response measures are met. The Commission should take the utmost account of opinions, recommendations or reports adopted by the Board.

(25) In the interest of guaranteeing the confidentiality of the information received pursuant to this Regulation, the Board is encouraged to provide in its rules of procedure that its members and observers are not to disclose trade and business secrets and other sensitive and confidential information acquired or generated in application of this Regulation and are to respect professional secrecy obligations equivalent to those applicable to members of staff of the Commission.

(26) In order to ensure greater transparency, accountability and coordination, particularly in times of crises, the competent committee of the European Parliament should be able to invite the Chair of the Board to appear before that committee. The European Parliament should be informed as soon as possible of any Council implementing acts proposed or adopted. The Commission should take into account elements arising from the views expressed through the emergency and resilience dialogue carried out under this Regulation, including the relevant resolutions of the European Parliament.

(27) Furthermore, in order to enhance involvement of key stakeholders, in particular representatives of economic operators, social partners, researchers and civil society, the Commission should set up a stakeholder platform to facilitate and encourage voluntary response to internal market emergencies.