Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3137 of 13 December 2024 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 as regards the list of air carriers banned from operating or subject to operational restrictions within the Union

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005 on the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community and on informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating carrier, and repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/CE ¹, and in particular Article 4(2) thereof,

Whereas:

• (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 ² establishes the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union.

• (2) Certain Member States and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (‘the Agency’) communicated to the Commission, pursuant to Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, information that is relevant for updating that list. Third countries and international organisations also provided relevant information. Based on the information provided, the list should be updated.

• (3) The Commission informed all air carriers concerned, either directly or through the authorities responsible for their regulatory oversight, about the essential facts and considerations, which would form the basis of a decision to impose an operating ban on them within the Union or to modify the conditions of an operating ban imposed on an air carrier, which is included in the list set out in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

• (4) The Commission gave the air carriers concerned the opportunity to consult all relevant documentation, to submit written comments and to make an oral presentation to the Commission and to the EU Air Safety Committee.

• (5) Within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/660 ³, the Commission informed the EU Air Safety Committee about the ongoing consultations with the competent authorities and air carriers of Armenia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Suriname and Tanzania. The Commission also informed the EU Air Safety Committee about the aviation safety situation in Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nepal and Sierra Leone.

• (6) The Agency informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about the technical assessments conducted for the initial evaluation and the continuous monitoring of Third Country Operator (‘TCO’) authorisations, issued pursuant to Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014 ⁴.

• (7) The Agency also informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about the results of the analysis of ramp inspections carried out under the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft programme (‘SAFA’), in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 ⁵.

• (8) In addition, the Agency informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about the technical assistance projects carried out in third countries affected by an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006. Furthermore, the Agency provided information on the plans and requests for further technical assistance and cooperation to improve the administrative and technical capability of civil aviation authorities in third countries with a view to helping them assure compliance with applicable international civil aviation safety standards. Member States were invited to respond to such requests on a bilateral basis in coordination with the Commission and the Agency. In that regard, the Commission reiterated the usefulness of providing information to the international aviation community, particularly through the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (‘ICAO’) Aviation Safety Implementation Assistance Partnership tool, on technical assistance to third countries provided by the Union and Member States to improve aviation safety around the world.

• (9) Eurocontrol provided the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee with an update on the status of the SAFA and TCO alarming functions, including statistics about alert messages for banned air carriers.

Union air carriers

• (10) Following the Agency’s analysis of information resulting from ramp inspections carried out on the aircraft of Union air carriers, as well as standardisation inspections carried out by the Agency, and complemented with information stemming from specific inspections and audits carried out by national aviation authorities, Member States and the Agency, acting as competent authorities, took certain corrective and enforcement measures, and informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about those measures.

• (11) Member States and the Agency, acting as competent authorities, reiterated their readiness to act, as necessary, in the event that pertinent safety information indicates imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance by Union air carriers with relevant safety standards.

Air carriers from Armenia

• (12) In June 2020, air carriers certified in Armenia were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/736 ⁶.

• (13) During the first quarter of 2024, ICAO conducted a Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (‘USOAP’) visit at the Civil Aviation Committee of Armenia (‘CAC’), identifying a serious safety deficiency in the area of air carrier certification. The audit revealed that the certification process of Armenian air carriers was based on outdated requirements and lacked a structured and systematic approach for the issuance of Air Operator Certificates (‘AOC’).

• (14) Furthermore, the audit revealed noteworthy challenges in Armenia’s ability to ensure effective aviation safety oversight, with a notable reduction in its Effective Implementation score and critical weaknesses in areas such as Resolution of Safety Issues and Surveillance Obligations.

• (15) With regard to the serious safety deficiencies in the area of air carrier certification, a dedicated support initiative was launched in April 2024 with the aim of resolving this situation expeditiously. By August 2024 the situation had been resolved, albeit additional efforts are needed to address other safety oversight issues identified during the USOAP audit, for which the CAC has developed a corrective action plan.

• (16) On 13 November 2024, as part of the Commission’s continuous monitoring activities, a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and the CAC. During the meeting, the recent developments and progress made in strengthening the CAC’s safety oversight system were examined, including updates on regulatory and operational improvements.

• (17) It could be noted that Armenia has made progress in updating its aviation safety regulations and oversight capabilities in response to observations from the Union on-site assessment visit conducted in 2020. This progress includes the hiring and training of personnel, revising regulations and associated implementation procedures, conducting oversight activities, and taking enforcement measures, such as grounding unsafe aircraft and strengthening air carrier compliance.

• (18) Despite these efforts, the technical meeting of 13 November 2024 concluded that there remains insufficient evidence to justify relaxing operational restrictions on air carriers certified in Armenia imposed by Regulation (EU) 2020/736. Further assessments of the evidence supporting the measures enacted by the CAC are required to determine the appropriate next steps to be taken, including the eventuality of a new Union on-site assessment visit to Armenia in 2025.

• (19) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Armenia.

• (20) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Armenia with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

Air carriers from Iraq

• (21) In December 2015 and November 2023, the air carriers Iraqi Airways and Fly Baghdad were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2322 ⁷ and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2691 ⁸, respectively.

• (22) On 22 October 2024, as part of the Commission’s continuous monitoring activities with regard to the overall safety situation in Iraq, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority (‘ICAA’), a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and the ICAA. During the meeting, the ICAA presented updates on its efforts to enhance its legislative and regulatory framework, as well as its oversight performance.

• (23) During the meeting the ICAA noted that in July 2024 it had engaged a consultancy team to support its regulatory development and strengthen its oversight capacities. Progress has been reported in implementing recommendations from technical assistance projects conducted by the Agency in 2017 and 2023, particularly in aligning flight operations and personnel licensing procedures with Commission Regulations (EU) No 965/2012 and No 1178/2011 ⁹.

• (24) The ICAA informed the Commission about the amendments made to the Iraqi Civil Aviation Law, which is currently in the final stages of approval. Additionally, the ICAA has made progress in addressing resource gaps by recruiting four flight operations inspectors and one cabin safety inspector, with efforts ongoing to hire two additional airworthiness inspectors. Furthermore, it has initiated the development of the Iraqi State Safety Program (‘SSP’) and is updating the rulemaking procedures and inspector training in areas such as dangerous goods and fatigue risk management. However, the implementation of these updates remains incomplete.

• (25) Whilst acknowledging these efforts, the ICAA continues to face challenges, including critical shortages in qualified personnel for helicopter and airworthiness inspection. To address this, the ICAA has commenced a five-year training program for 14 newly recruited cadet aeronautical engineers, aimed at qualifying them as airworthiness inspectors and reducing reliance on international experts.

• (26) The Commission requested the ICAA to confirm a date for the postponed Union on-site assessment visit, which was originally planned for the first quarter of 2024 but rescheduled at the ICAA’s request to the fourth quarter of 2024. In response, the ICAA has proposed further rescheduling the visit to the second or third quarter of 2025, with a preference for September 2025, depending on the progress achieved in the interim.

• (27) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers from Iraq.

• (28) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Iraq with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of all those carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

• (29) Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards.

Air carriers from Kyrgyzstan

• (30) In October 2006, air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006 ¹⁰.

• (31) On 16 July 2024, as part of its continuous monitoring activities, the Commission held a technical meeting with representatives from the State Civil Aviation Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic (‘SCAA’).

• (32) During that meeting, the SCAA provided an update on its efforts to address the safety deficiencies that had led to the inclusion of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, as well as other measures taken to improve the safety oversight capacity and capability of the SCAA.

• (33) On that occasion the Commission presented the SCAA with the results of the assessment conducted on the basis of the information and documentation provided by the SCAA at the beginning of 2024. The assessment covered areas such as training programs, oversight processes, the occurrence reporting system, licensing procedures, and overall operational effectiveness.

• (34) The Commission’s assessment revealed several shortcomings in the SCAA’s training programs for its staff. The training program for inspectors, while containing the necessary elements related to their duties, lacked clear implementation and scheduling details, notably as regards the inclusion of the required on-the-job training courses for newcomers.

• (35) The Commission noted that the number of inspectors appeared insufficient to assure an effective oversight of Kyrgyzstan’s aviation sector. The shortage of administrative support staff imposes an additional strain on the inspectors who must perform additional administrative tasks, thereby limiting their ability to focus on certification and surveillance. In terms of financing and resources, the SCAA referenced planned increases in salaries and resources but did not provide specific details regarding budgetary provisions.

• (36) The assessment also highlighted deficiencies in the SCAA’s occurrence reporting system, notably as regards the lack of a comprehensive incident and accident database. Furthermore, it was found to be unclear and ineffective, with no systematic approach to collecting and analysing incident and accident data.

• (37) The Commission identified several gaps in the SCAA’s oversight activities. Oversight of several air carriers and maintenance organisations was either incomplete or had not been conducted at all. The oversight documents provided were vague and lacked the procedural detail necessary for effective evaluation. Additionally, no compliance system or internal audit unit had been established, despite claims of preparations for ISO 9001 certification. That raised further concerns about the SCAA’s ability to ensure consistent adherence to international safety standards.

• (38) On 24 October 2024, at the request of the SCAA, a second meeting took place in Brussels during which the SCAA acknowledged the challenges it faces. In response to these challenges, the SCAA presented a strategic transformation plan aimed at aligning Kyrgyz aviation standards with international safety standards. Under its current leadership, the SCAA has initiated several organisational improvements, such as restructuring its internal framework, introducing a new financial model, and completing a gap analysis aligned with international safety standards. These efforts reflect the SCAA’s commitment to addressing deficiencies in safety oversight and strengthening its cooperation with the Commission.

• (39) Recognising the importance of sustained and measurable progress in improving safety oversight capabilities shown by the SCAA, the Commission emphasises the need for the SCAA to continue providing clear evidence of substantial improvement before considering a future Union on-site assessment visit to Kyrgyzstan. To support these efforts, the Commission, through the Agency, will implement a dedicated technical assistance project in 2025. This initiative will focus on evaluating the SCAA’s roadmap, delivering targeted training, and enhancing internal oversight procedures, with the ultimate objective of achieving compliance with international safety standards, and facilitating Kyrgyzstan’s removal from the EU Air Safety List.

• (40) There is, however, currently insufficient substantiated evidence to confirm that the SCAA has effectively resolved all the safety deficiencies that led to the operating ban imposed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006.

• (41) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan.

• (42) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

Air carriers from Pakistan

• (43) In March 2007, Pakistan International Airlines (‘PIA’) was included in Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 235/2007 ¹¹, and subsequently removed from that Annex in November 2007, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2007 ¹².

• (44) As a follow-up to the EU Air Safety Committee deliberations in May 2024, experts from the Commission, the Agency and Member States held a technical meeting on 18 and 19 September 2024. During the first day, the corrective action plan submitted by the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (‘the PCAA’), and subsequently reviewed by the Commission and the Agency, was assessed. The PCAA provided clarification and substantiating documentation as requested. On the second day, a series of spot checks were performed in the areas of Flight Operations, Personnel Licensing, Airworthiness, Quality Management System (‘QMS’) and Safety Management System (‘SMS’). Those checks were unplanned remote checks, with the objective of obtaining more information on the authority’s ability to carry out effective oversight, after the Union visit in November 2023.

• (45) In 2020, the TCO authorisations of PIA and Vision Air were suspended by the Agency. The suspension will last until the Agency has verifiable evidence that the PCAA can conduct effective oversight of its air carriers, that oversight deficiencies have been corrected, and that air carriers have properly addressed all findings. The information now obtained would assist the Agency in considering a decision on a possible lifting of the suspensions of PIA and Vision Air TCO authorisations, as well as the granting of a TCO authorisation to Airblue Limited.

• (46) The technical meeting concluded that all elements of the corrective action plan have been addressed and no serious deficiencies have been observed. There is still work to do, but all the steps taken seem solid and coherent.

• (47) The conclusions of the technical meeting found that the PCAA is in the process of shifting from a reactive towards a proactive safety oversight approach. In that regard, the PCAA has solved the lack of inspecting staff in the Flight Standards area, which was a critical issue at the time of the Union on-site assessment visit. In order to prevent the re-occurrence of a similar situation a number of actions have been taken, including better rationalisation of activities, task-appropriate job profiles, the use of tools to calculate resources vis-à-vis evolving needs, securing of sufficient budget for recruitment and training, a staff retention policy, and measures to avoid conflict of interest between inspectors and the organisations under their oversight.

• (48) The conclusions of the technical meeting acknowledged that the PCAA has made considerable progress to address the most serious safety deficiencies. There is still room for improvement in aspects such as identification of the findings, their correct categorisation and management. Improvement is also expected in ramp inspections, as the training of ramp inspectors has only been accomplished recently. As far as inspector training is concerned, the current team of inspectors in Flight Standards is fully trained, but still needs experience. Follow-up on all those elements in the mid and long term is required. The PCAA has agreed to regularly inform the Commission on progress made in this regard.

• (49) The latest AOC inspections of Airblue Limited and PIA have been reviewed. No major flaws were identified.

• (50) Improvement is necessary in the QMS area. Whereas control of documentation remains suboptimal, important progress has been noted. This includes ensuring consistency of findings and their management equally across all areas, as well as the implementation of a single software for the management of findings in all areas.

• (51) The development of an SSP is in the early stages. The PCAA is committed to implement it as soon as possible, namely the occurrence reporting and risk classification.

• (52) Overall, no significant safety issues were found. After the technical meeting it can be concluded that the PCAA has made substantial progress, evidenced by the information gathered during that technical meeting.

• (53) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Pakistan.

• (54) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Pakistan with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

• (55) Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards.

Air carriers from Suriname

• (56) In July 2010, following an initial listing in June 2006 and a subsequent removal in November 2007, Blue Wing Airlines was again listed in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Regulation (EU) 590/2010 ¹³ due to verified evidence of serious deficiencies involving the air carrier, as identified by shortcomings reported in ramp inspections carried out by Member States, as well as two fatal accidents.

• (57) On 26 June 2023 the Commission and the Agency organised a remote technical meeting with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Suriname (‘CASAS’). This meeting took place on the basis of a number of exchanges with the CASAS, as well as Blue Wing Airlines, in the period from November 2018 till May 2022, for the purpose of relaunching formal consultations with the CASAS considering the time elapsed since the initial contact in May 2019. In this regard, on 11 September 2023, the Commission requested a comprehensive set of information and documentation from the CASAS for the purpose of assessing the safety oversight capacity and capability of the CASAS for the eight air carriers certified in Suriname, of which one, Surinam Airways, has held a TCO authorisation since July 2016.

• (58) The results of the assessment of the information and documentation provided by the CASAS showed serious safety deficiencies, evidenced by the incomplete status of basic oversight programmes, doubts on training and qualification of the inspecting staff, repetitive serious findings, and poor management of findings.

• (59) On 23 October 2024, a technical meeting was held between experts from the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and the CASAS. On that occasion, the deficiencies identified during the assessment of the information and documentation received were confirmed, both in terms of nature and numbers.

• (60) Namely, concerns remain on the ability of the CASAS to ensure an effective oversight of the air carriers under its surveillance. This is evidenced by the situation of the Directorates of Flight Operations and Personnel Licensing, which appear to be severely understaffed, and by the oversight programmes which are not delivered as planned. The training and qualification of inspectors is also a concern. The approval and extension of AOCs is a worrying aspect, as many of the necessary procedures do not exist, and those presented are very basic and not fit for purpose. This indicates that the CASAS’ oversight activities are mostly carried out on an ad hoc basis. The recurrence of the same serious findings in audit reports in different years was also noted. Moreover, it was found that most of the authority procedures are not in line with the latest updates of the international safety standards.

• (61) Considering the CASAS’ apparent lack of progress in terms of assuring an appropriate level of safety oversight capacity and capability, the Commission informed the EU Air Safety Committee that it intends to organise a Union on-site assessment visit in Suriname in the first quarter of 2025.

• (62) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Suriname.

• (63) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Suriname with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

• (64) Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards.

Air carriers from Tanzania

• (65) Air carriers certified in Tanzania have never been included in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

• (66) Air Tanzania Company Limited (‘Air Tanzania’) applied for a TCO authorisation on 23 August 2023. The Agency assessed Air Tanzania’s TCO application in accordance with the requirements as set out in Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014.

• (67) The Agency, in conducting its assessment, raised concerns regarding the lack of ability by Air Tanzania to respond to identified safety deficiencies. Notably, it found that Air Tanzania failed to maintain control over its flight training programme, particularly as regards assuring the inclusion in recurrent flight crew training of all types of emergencies and abnormal procedures, such as engine, airframe or system malfunctions, fires, and other critical scenarios. In view of the considerable number of serious deficiencies identified during its assessment, the Agency determined that this situation indicates a systemic weakness within the air carrier that compromises safety and poses a serious hazard to flight operations. Furthermore, that resulted in Air Tanzania failing to demonstrate compliance with the relevant international safety standards.

• (68) Air Tanzania’s inability to address such safety deficiencies was further evidenced by the submission of an unacceptable corrective action plan to resolve the identified issues. As a result, Air Tanzania failed to demonstrate compliance with the applicable international safety standards. The Agency concluded that further assessment would not lead to the issuance of an authorisation to Air Tanzania, as the air carrier did not meet the requirements of Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014. Consequently, on 12 April 2024, the Agency rejected Air Tanzania’s TCO application on the grounds that it did not meet safety requirements.

• (69) On 2 May 2024, the Commission, within the framework of Regulation (EU) No 2111/2005 and Regulation (EU) 2023/660, requested a comprehensive set of information and documentation from the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (‘TCAA’). That request was made to assess the safety oversight capacity and capability of the TCAA over air carriers certified in Tanzania.

• (70) The requested information covers key aspects of the TCAA’s organisational structure, staff qualifications, training programmes, and oversight processes, including the management of safety deficiencies, corrective actions, and occurrence reporting systems. Additionally, the request seeks details on accidents and incidents, the certification and licensing processes for AOC holders and pilots, as well as the oversight of continuing airworthiness and aircraft maintenance organisations.

• (71) The requested information and documentation were provided by the TCAA on 7 June 2024 and revealed significant shortcomings in staff allocation and oversight effectiveness, particularly a lack of clarity on how inspectors are distributed across key functions, raising concerns about the adequacy of resources to effectively oversee airworthiness, flight operations, and personnel licensing.

• (72) Moreover, the training and qualification processes for inspectors were found to be insufficient, lacking clear guidelines for specialised training, structured performance evaluations, and recurrent training. These deficiencies may compromise the capability of the TCAA personnel to carry out effective safety oversight. Furthermore, the TCAA’s oversight procedures were either incomplete or entirely absent in some critical areas, such as the oversight manuals for a key domain like Personnel Licensing.

• (73) Records of the TCAA’s certification and oversight activities revealed several deficiencies, including inconsistent usage of forms for special approvals, insufficient surveillance of air carriers’ continuing airworthiness, inadequate follow-up on safety findings, unresolved corrective actions over extended periods, and recurring safety issues that failed to address root causes.

• (74) On 10 October 2024, as part of its continuous monitoring activities, the Commission, the Agency, and representatives of the TCAA held a technical meeting. On that occasion, the TCAA outlined its role as the regulator of Tanzania’s civil aviation sector, operating under Tanzania’s Civil Aviation Act and ICAO Annexes, with the declared objective of ensuring safety in compliance with international safety standards. Nevertheless, significant challenges persist in the effective implementation of these regulations, preventing full alignment with international safety standards.

• (75) Furthermore, the TCAA presented its ongoing initiatives to strengthen its safety oversight system. These include the development of performance-based surveillance plans, the implementation of a comprehensive Inspector Training System, and the revision of civil aviation regulations to align with evolving ICAO standards. These efforts are supported by plans for capacity building within the aviation sector and increased engagement with industry stakeholders to facilitate the effective implementation of regulatory requirements. While acknowledging these measures, persistent shortcomings such as gaps in inspector training, unresolved audit findings, and inadequate procedural documentation underscore the need for further actions to strengthen oversight mechanisms.

• (76) By letter dated 18 October 2024 the Commission informed Air Tanzania, as well as the TCAA, that the case of Air Tanzania had been placed on the agenda of the EU Air Safety Committee meeting to be held between 19 and 21 November 2024, and that both Air Tanzania and the TCAA would be given the opportunity of being heard before the EU Air Safety Committee in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

• (77) Air Tanzania, as well as the TCAA were heard by the EU Air Safety Committee on 20 November 2024. Air Tanzania’s presentation during the hearing detailed efforts to address findings stemming from the TCO authorisation process, including an SMS gap analysis, revisions to the Safety Management Manual, alongside updates to operational manuals and the Minimum Equipment List. The airline also developed a thirty-six-month recurrent training plan addressing Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, winter operations, and dangerous goods handling. Additionally, it introduced procedures for route and aerodrome qualification tracking and controls for hard-time and life-limited components to improve operational and airworthiness practices.

• (78) The EU Air Safety Committee members expressed concerns over Air Tanzania’s approach to the overall management of findings, and in particular its root cause analyses. It was observed that many of the root causes presented by the air carrier merely reiterated the findings, without performing a comprehensive analysis to identify the underlying systemic or procedural deficiencies. An example of this was Air Tanzania’s identification of the sixteen Level 2 findings as the root cause for the Level 1 finding related to the non-compliance with the applicable requirements of Annex 1 (Part-TCO) of Regulation (EU) No 452/2014. This clearly demonstrated Air Tanzania’s failure to address the fundamental reasons behind the air carrier’s inability to meet these requirements. This lack of a deeper examination weakens the effectiveness of the proposed corrective actions, as they address the symptoms rather than resolving the underlying systemic weaknesses.

• (79) The information provided by Air Tanzania was not sufficient in nature to address the safety deficiencies from which the decision by the Agency to refuse the TCO authorisation emanated. The Corrective Action Plan (‘CAP’) provided by Air Tanzania, notably the associated root cause analysis, did not demonstrate the air carrier’s ability to implement appropriate measures to assure compliance with international safety standards.

• (80) During the hearing, the TCAA presented its regulatory framework and emphasised its commitment to ensuring safety oversight in line with international safety standards. The TCAA reported its immediate actions following the rejection of Air Tanzania’s TCO authorisation by the Agency, including a special audit that identified critical areas for improvement, such as an ineffective SMS, staff shortages, and organisational inefficiencies.

• (81) Furthermore, the TCAA informed the EU Air Safety Committee that, in response to the findings issued by the Agency, a dedicated team of inspectors was established to evaluate and verify the revised CAP developed by Air Tanzania. According to the TCAA, these efforts have resolved eleven out of nineteen findings, with the remaining findings at various stages of implementation. The specific actions described by the TCAA during the hearing, such as the approval of revised training programs, amendments to operational manuals, and the verification of critical updates like commander upgrade training, crew recency records, and compliance with airworthiness directives, were not substantiated by any evidence. Moreover, it appeared during the hearing that the TCAA also did not fully adhere to the principles of root cause analysis, casting doubt on the adequacy and effectiveness of their assessment of the CAP provided by Air Tanzania.

• (82) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, it is therefore assessed that the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union should be amended to include the air carrier Air Tanzania in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

• (83) In view of the apparent deficiencies identified from the exchanges with the TCAA, the Commission will carry out, with the assistance of the Agency and the support of Member States, a Union on-site assessment visit to Tanzania.

• (84) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Tanzania with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

• (85) Further action could be taken by the Commission as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards.

• (86) Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 should therefore be amended accordingly.

• (87) Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 recognise the need for decisions to be taken swiftly and, where appropriate, urgently, given the safety implications. It is therefore essential, for the protection of sensitive information and the traveling public, that any decisions in the context of updating the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban or restriction within the Union, apply immediately after their adoption.

• (88) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the EU Air Safety Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 is amended as follows:

• (1) Annex A is replaced by the text in Annex I to this Regulation;

• (2) Annex B is replaced by the text in Annex II to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 December 2024.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Apostolos TZITZIKOSTAS

Member of the Commission

ANNEX I

‘ANNEX A

LIST OF AIR CARRIERS WHICH ARE BANNED FROM OPERATING WITHIN THE UNION, WITH EXCEPTIONS

¹⁴

’

ANNEX II

‘ANNEX B

LIST OF AIR CARRIERS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE UNION

¹⁵

’

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/3137/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)