Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/4 of 17 December 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of titanium dioxide originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (353) The Commission noted that Plastika Kritis provided no new evidence in that regard. The Commission pointed out, however, that a potential remedy exists for such practices if they were to occur: any industry experiencing such practices could request the initiation of a dedicated anti-dumping or anti-circumvention case, provided that all the conditions in the basic Regulation are met.

• (354) In light of this and in the absence of new evidence, the Commission maintained its conclusions on this point from recitals (339) - (343) above.

• (355) On the basis of the above, the Commission could not conclude that any of the elements for an end-use exemption of TiO2 used in production of masterbatches are met and thus rejected this request.

7.3.3.   Paints and coating industry

• (356) Multiple users from the paint and coatings industries expressed opposition to the duties on the grounds of Union interest after the imposition of the provisional duties.

• (357) Sherwin-Williams, one of the users who submitted a questionnaire reply, did not provide any comments on the provisional Regulation. Given the new, lower, dumping margins, the Commission concluded that the impact on Sherwin-Williams will be even less pronounced than estimated in the provisional Regulation.

• (358) AkzoNobel and PPG claimed that duties at the proposed level will have a major impact on their cost of production and margin erosion, not only on account of more expensive TiO2 from China, but also that that Union producers will raise their prices too.

• (359) ASEFAPI, PPG, Teknos and AkzoNobel claimed that there was no possibility to pass on cost increases to customers. Such cost increases will make paint and coating producers uncompetitive and promote the importation of the finished products (paints) into the Union. AkzoNobel claimed that imports of paints and varnishes into the Union were already increasing.

• (360) PPG claimed that, with the current level of duties, imports from China will become unviable, even if crucial due to lack of capacity in the Union and the need to diversify sources of supply. PPG thus pleaded that the Commission revises the duties downwards to strike a fairer balance.

• (361) The Commission noted that it had already concluded that TiO2 represents a minor amount in the cost of production of paints and estimated that profitability of paint producers would not be seriously affected. No new evidence was brought forward to contest that conclusion.

• (362) Similarly, while limited evidence was provided to show that paint producers operate under longer contracts, making it difficult to implement instant price increase, no evidence was provided to show that they could not increase prices in negotiation with their customers, nor that that competition from abroad is increasing and jeopardising their position on the market.

• (363) Smaller producers such as Teknos further claimed that the interest of paint and coating industry was not sufficiently considered, a claim also echoed by CEPE. CEPE claimed that SMEs in the coating industry will become less competitive and might have to shut down production, while larger producers could relocate their production outside the Union. CEPE thus pleaded to mitigate the impact on the SMEs active in this sector.

• (364) ASEFAPI similarly claimed that the price increase associated with anti-dumping duties endanger the viability of many SMEs which are ASEFAPI members, particularly since the TiO2 users’ market is highly fragmented, so their market power is constrained. Some of ASEFAPI’s members particularly have large clients in the automotive sector, reducing their bargaining power when trying to pass on price increases.

• (365) ASEFAPI furthermore provided a table showing by how much an increase in price of TiO2 as the main raw material would increase the cost of production of ten different paints, enamels, and printing inks formulations.

• (366) The Commission noted that this table provided limited insight into several elements needed to appropriately assess the impact on proposed duties on users. These include: the share of revenues generated from the products using TiO2 in total revenue of those companies; the share of TiO2 bought from China compared to other sources; the share of TiO2 costs in total manufacturing costs of the product; profitability on sales of products using TiO2; and profitability of the total company.

• (367) The Commission also pointed out that none of the SMEs members of ASEFAPI or CEPE submitted a questionnaire reply which would give insight into those elements to the Commission.

• (368) Nonetheless, the Commission acknowledged that many of the members of CEPE and ASEFAPI are SMEs which might not necessarily have the resources to fill in the questionnaire replies and instead rely on their industry associations to represent their interest.

• (369) Thus, while it remained unclear to what extent paint and coating producers are actually exposed to competitive pressures from imports into the Union and what effect the duties might have on profits of smaller producers, it could not be excluded that competitiveness of numerous SMEs could be affected. However, on the basis of the cost structure of paint producers that the Commission observed in AkzoNobel’s and Sherwin-Williams questionnaires, this impact will likely be the least pronounced of all the categories of users analysed in this section.

• (370) In their comments on final disclosure, one user, Teknos and four associations of paints and coatings manufacturers - ASEFAPI, CEPE, HCA, and Fédération des Industries des Peintures, Encres, Couleurs, Colles et adhésifs, Résines (‘FIPEC’) - contested the Commission’s conclusions on the Union interest analysis with regard to this sector.

• (371) First, CEPE, FIPEC and Teknos submitted that the Commission should have given more attention to the construction sector in its analysis. They further claimed that construction projects are declining in the Union, and that even a small increase in the price of a raw material (in this case, paints and coatings) could put the sector’s survival at risk, since it does not have the margins to absorb price increases.

• (372) Second, all four associations disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion from recital (369) above, that impact on the paint and coating segment of the downstream industry will be the least pronounced of all the categories of users examined in this section.

• (373) To that end, all four associations provided their own calculations of cost increases, based on assumptions that TiO2 represents 30 % - 50 % in raw material costs of a paint producer. ASEFAPI specifically highlighted that it had brought forward data specifying more significant cost increases.

• (374) Furthermore, they claimed that the Commission’s findings were based on two large companies (AkzoNobel and Sherwin Williams) and therefore they were not representative for the broader industry, particularly SMEs. They reiterated their claims that SMEs can absorb the duties to a lesser extent, and they cannot pass them on to their clients as they have limited bargaining power.

• (375) Third, the associations claimed that countries near the Union borders, such as the UK, Türkiye, and others, will be able to import TiO2 from China without the burden of the additional anti-dumping duties, which will make local paints and coatings producers more competitive against Union paint producers. HCA requested for a protection mechanism from such imports. Similarly, they claimed that paints and coatings imported from China could undercut Union painting manufacturers due to lower production costs.

• (376) Fourth, the associations also claimed that Union exports of paints and coatings will also suffer from increased prices, making the Union users of TiO2 less competitive on foreign markets as well.

• (377) Finally, the associations stressed that it is imperative to maintain the users’ competitiveness, since these companies are more numerous and employ many more people that the Union industry producing TiO2. The associations further claimed that duties mainly benefit non-Union companies, since majority of Union producers are subsidiaries of companies headquartered abroad. ASEFAPI also argued that the duties would not favourably impact the Union producers of TiO2 as they lack production capacity, therefore users would buy TiO2 from other third countries and thus the duties would ultimately benefit non-EU producers of TiO2.

• (378) HCA further suggested several measures to soften the impact on competitiveness of the Union industries in form of tax breaks and financial support for domestic industries. None of these, however, are within the ambit of trade defence investigations.

• (379) The Commission analysed these claims and reached the following conclusions:

• (380) First, as the Commission already stated in the provisional Regulation, no companies active in the construction sector came forward in the investigation to oppose the duties. Similarly, no parties provided sufficient evidence on the situation in the construction sector other than a few broad claims, nor did they meaningfully substantiate the impacts of the anti-dumping duties with regard to it. Compared with the volume of submissions, evidence, and data on all the other claims submitted and examined in this investigation, those on construction sector were very limited. The Commission thus took the construction sector into account to the extent that the Commission and the parties considered relevant and as far as information was available.

• (381) While CEPE and Teknos, in their submission on final disclosure, provided certain reports outlining the situation and future prospects of the Union, and in particular the German, construction sector, they did not provide evidence to substantiate the claims mentioned in recital (371) above. In particular, they did not substantiate or quantify to what extent the costs of paint would increase, nor to what extent could the construction sector even be impacted by any increase.

• (382) On the other hand, the fact that no companies from the construction sector registered as interested parties to oppose the duties suggests that they do not expect to be significantly impacted by the duties on TiO2.

• (383) Second, the Commission acknowledged that ASEFAPI, its comments on the provisional Regulation, provided some data showing the share of the cost TiO2 can have in certain paint formulas and what could be the increase in costs for those formulas with different levels of duties. The Commission duly analysed that data and took it into account for final disclosure, as explained in recitals (365) to (366) above.

• (384) The Commission repeated that this data only showed an estimate of how much a certain increase in the price of TiO2 would increase the cost of production of ten different paints, enamels, and printing inks formulations. However, this data did not show which users it came from, how profitable these users were, how many other types of products they produced and sold and at what cost, what were their sources of supply, etc.

• (385) The Commission could thus not draw from this data any meaningful conclusion on the share of Chinese TiO2 in the supply mix of any users, nor their performance and profit levels. Therefore, the Commission could not adequately estimate what is their exposure to imports from China and, consequently, what impact the duties would have on such users. While this data was, in addition, not verified, the only conclusion that could be drawn from this data is that some paints contain higher than average share of TiO2 in their costs of production.

• (386) On the other hand, as already stressed above, AkzoNobel and Sherwin Williams provided questionnaire replies, which were verified. These replies were, by the nature of the questionnaire, comprehensive and contained all the above elements that the Commission would need to assess, thus showing a full picture of the performance of each of those producers: their costs of production and share of TiO2 in them were averaged across all paints that each company produces, while the share of Chinese imports in their total cost structure was isolated. Such questionnaire data, completed and verified, allow for a more accurate insight into how a paints and coating producer could be affected.

• (387) On the basis of such data the Commission could conclude that TiO2 represents a much lower share in total raw material costs of a paint producer, when averaged across all paint formulations, than what ASEFAPI, CEPE, FIPEC, and HCA present on the basis of certain individual formulations. The share of TiO2 in total cost of production was even lower.

• (388) Even in Sherwin Williams’ case, which filled out the questionnaire only at the level of its two most affected plants, the share of TiO2 in total raw material costs was much lower than suggested 40 % – 50 %, and lower than for all other categories of users which submitted questionnaire replies (i.e., decor paper, graphic white inks, and MW producers).

• (389) On that basis, as explained above in recital (369), the Commission concluded that a paint producer, even an SME, would be, on average, less impacted by duties on TiO2 due to a relatively low share that TiO2 represents in a paint producer’s cost structure. With no new evidence brought forward to contest it, the Commission maintained this conclusion.

• (390) No new evidence was brought forward in regard to the third claim either. The Commission pointed out, however, that for any alleged dumping practices on paints and coatings coming from China, a legal remedy existed in the form of a dedicated anti-dumping investigation. If the users have evidence of such practices, they have the possibility to bring their own complaint to the Commission.

• (391) Similarly, a protection mechanism exists for circumvention of duties alleged by HCA. An industry experiencing circumvention practices can request the initiation of a dedicated anti-circumvention case, provided that all the conditions in the basic Regulation are met.

• (392) Likewise, no new evidence was brought forward in regard to the fourth claim. While the overall cost structure of downstream users might be affected, no comprehensive evidence was presented to show to what extent paints and coatings industry relies on exports, to which destinations, and what would be the overall effect on their performance in those markets. The Commission thus did not have a comprehensive picture and could not verify the veracity of this claim.

• (393) Finally, the Commission pointed out that, even if some of the Union producers are a part of multinational conglomerates headquartered abroad, that does not exclude them from the definition of Union industry within the meaning of Article 4 of the basic Regulation. Indeed, the companies themselves are established according to relevant Member States’ laws and they are not related to any exporter or importer from the country concerned.

• (394) Teknos and the four associations made additional claims that paints industry is particularly sensitive to price changes, that reduction in Union TiO2 production over the past years has already made them more dependent on imports, and that the imposition of duties will negatively affect the EU Green Deal goals, since duties will lead to increased imports of paints into the Union, which will result in additional emissions associated with their transport. They further claimed that the duties will negatively affect jobs in downstream industries and investment in the Union, as higher costs of production will lead to layoffs and make paints and coatings sector less appealing for new investment. These claims were not supported by meaningful verifiable evidence, however, and were thus rejected by the Commission.

7.3.4.   Decor paper producers

• (395) At definitive stage, Felix and Munksjö maintained their position that, even if the Commission did not exclude laminate-grade TiO2 from the product scope, it should grant end-use exemption for its use in decor paper production, providing new claims and evidence in that regard.

• (396) The users reiterated their claims that all the criteria which the Commission took into account in previous cases of end-use exemptions were met. These include: the particularity of the downstream product, availability of supply, share of the product concerned in the cost structure, the ability of the user to absorb the duties, and the impact of the exemption on the effectiveness of the measures.

7.3.4.1.   Particularity of the product

• (397) The users stressed again how laminate-grade TiO2 is specifically designed to serve the purposes of the decor paper production, echoing the arguments laid out in recitals (119) to (122) above. The users also claimed that the qualification process for new grades takes about one year on average.

• (398) Following the analysis from section 2.1.3.2 above and in light of all the evidence available, the Commission maintained its conclusion that, even if laminate-grade TiO2 does not have sufficiently different basic physical, chemical, and technical characteristics compared to other types of TiO2 to be excluded from the product scope, there is a particularity to this product, given that it is tailored and mainly suitable for use in a specific application – production of decor paper.

• (399) This particularity is evidenced by significant presence of phosphorus in the coating of TiO2 molecule. New evidence that Felix and Munksjö submitted showed that it has to be at the level of at least 0,5 % on the dry mass of the product for it to be useful in decor paper applications. At the same time, as was already claimed before, the electrical surface charge resulting from its thick surface coating helps the molecule attach to the wood pulp fibres.

• (400) The Commission concluded in recital (139) above, that the latter characteristic might be also relevant for use of TiO2 in production of other products based on wood pulp fibres (such as ordinary paper). This prevented the Commission from concluding that this is a basic technical characteristic different from other types of TiO2, or at least TiO2 used in other applications. However, this characteristic is indeed one of the elements making laminate-grade TiO2 particular, insofar that it makes laminate-grade TiO2 unsuitable for use in other general applications, such as paints and coatings.

7.3.4.2.   Availability of supply

• (401) On availability of supply, Felix, Munksjö and CEPI also disagreed with the conclusion that, even in the total absence of TiO2 imports from China, there would be sufficient alternative sources of supply available to decor paper producers, both within the Union and from other third countries (like UK or Mexico).

• (402) The two users submitted that it is unrealistic to expect that Union producers would significantly increase the supply of laminate-grade TiO2, which is furthermore more expensive to produce than most other grades. Since laminate-grade TiO2 only accounts for around 12 % of total TiO2 market (compared to 60 % for coatings and 25 % for plastics), focussing on larger market segments allows for economies of scale and a larger customer base, making those grades more profitable.

• (403) As they did at provisional stage, the two users submitted new evidence in the form of multiple, more recent, exchanges with the Union producers, which showed that the latter were able to offer only limited quantities of laminate-grade TiO2.

• (404) The two users have furthermore made a new claim on estimated the supply gap for laminate-grade TiO2 in the Union, on the basis of the figures in the provisional Regulation and the share of the plants which regularly produce laminate-grade TiO2 in the total Union production capacity.

• (405) Due to the spread of their portfolio across many types of TiO2 which is in demand in the Union market, the two users estimated that the Union producers could satisfy only around one third of total Union demand for laminate-grade TiO2. This is in line with the estimates that the two users made in their previous submissions addressed in recital (53) of the provisional Regulation.

• (406) On availability of supply from other sources, the two users made a new claim that just because they sourced significant volumes from other countries in the investigation period, that does not mean that those sources could supply additional volumes which would cover for the volumes currently sourced from China.

• (407) In addition, in their submission of 30 May 2024, Felix and Munksjö demonstrated that weather events in Mexico caused significant production disruptions, jeopardising stability of supply. The two users claimed that this underscores the importance of diversified sources of supply. CEPI reiterated this argument in its comments on the provisional Regulation.

• (408) Felix and Munksjö also provided a TZMI report from April 2023, which forecasts an increase in demand in the Americas in 2024. Users claimed that this increase in demand will reduce Chemours’ ability to supply the decor paper market in the Union. This same claim was also echoed by CEPI.

• (409) As concerns the UK as a potential alternative source of supply, Felix and Munksjö have provided new evidence to show that local suppliers have limited capacity to supply adequate quantities of laminate-grade TiO2 to the Union.

• (410) The two users further argued that both the UK and Mexico produces only chloride process TiO2, while their Chinese suppliers mostly produce via sulphate process. Although switch between the two is technically possible, this would incur additional costs to reformulate the parts of their portfolios which uses sulphate process TiO2.

• (411) The two users also brought new evidence claiming that only some of eleven Union producers regularly produce laminate-grade TiO2.

• (412) The complainant claimed that Felix and Munksjö provided no evidence to support that Union producers could not satisfy the demand of the laminate paper industry, and that the only thing preventing the Union producers from producing sufficient quantities of laminate-grade TiO2 is unfair competition from China.

• (413) The complainant on the other hand claimed that there is no reason why Chemours plant in Mexico would not be able to export sufficient quantities to the Union, submitting TZMI market intelligence data to corroborate that claim. According to this data and nameplate capacity in Mexico, there was a total of [140 000 – 180 000] tonnes of spare capacity in Mexico during the investigation period. [^ntr54-L_202500004EN.000101-E0054]

• (414) First, the Commission notes that, in line with Article 6 of the basic Regulation, it based its assessment on the verified information submitted by the cooperating users for the investigation period. Information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period was not collected or verified. Concerning the sourcing of the cooperating users, the verified questionnaire replies showed that they sourced the predominant part of their laminate-grade TiO2 from other third countries during the investigation period, while they sourced a much lower share (10 to 40 %) of their laminate-grade TiO2 from China and the Union producers represented the lowest share of their source of laminate-grade TiO2. This analysis showed that the cooperating users had an established and well-functioning supply channels with other third countries.

• (415) In light of all the new evidence presented, the Commission concluded that Felix and Munksjö might indeed face difficulties in buying the required volumes from available sources in the Union and the UK, due to producers choosing to prioritise other, bigger, market segments.

• (416) The Commission could not exclude, however, that this is due to the Chinese dumped imports keeping prices of laminate-grade TiO2 uncompetitively low, unattractive to the Union producers. There is evidence on the file to corroborate that assertion.

• (417) On the basis of verified macro questionnaire data on nameplate production capacity for those five Union producers, and under the assumptions that (i) laminate-grade TiO2 makes up 12 % of total Union demand for TiO2, and that (ii) the remaining 50 % of the decor paper market players have the same share of the suppliers in their supply mix as Felix and Munksjö taken together, the Commission assessed the available spare capacities for production of laminate-grade TiO2 in the Union.

• (418) As was established in recital (270) of the provisional Regulation the Commission estimated that the average consumption in the Union during the period considered was 1,14 million tonnes. The Commission thus based its estimations on the demand for laminate-grade TiO2 on the average yearly consumption during the period considered.

• (419) The Commission’s estimation has thus shown that the above five Union producers, if they would be producing at 90 % nameplate capacity and dedicating 12 % of that production to laminate-grade TiO2, they could indeed satisfy just above 1/3 of total Union laminate-grade TiO2 demand.

• (420) However, even such limited supply would be enough to cover around 90 % of total supply of laminate-grade TiO2 which decor paper producers would source from China, should those imports disappear completely. This is an extreme scenario as the purpose of the measures is not to stop imports altogether but to ensure that they enter the Union market at fair prices.

• (421) Notwithstanding the conclusion in recital (414) above, the Commission also examined the information submitted by interested parties on the availability of additional supply from Mexico for the period following the IP.

• (422) Examining the data submitted by the complainant and mentioned in recital (413), the Commission noted that the spare capacity figures might be overstated, since they seem to assume that no capacity was dedicated to domestic Mexican demand. In addition, there is evidence on the file that global demand was low during the investigation period.

• (423) Therefore, it could be expected that the actual available capacity in Mexico in a normal year would be less. This conclusion is reinforced with other estimates from TZMI, which show that actual spare capacity in 2024 in the whole Central and South American region will be half of the figure in recital (413) above.

• (424) Nonetheless, the Commission estimated that even in a more conservative scenario, if Mexican producers would also allocate 12 % of production to laminate-grades TiO2, there would be around four times as much available capacity for laminate-grade TiO2 production than what is needed to account for the remaining 10 % of supply of laminate-grade TiO2 coming in from China (see recital (419) above), in the unlikely scenario that the latter disappear completely. [^ntr55-L_202500004EN.000101-E0055]

• (425) At the same time, the weather events which disrupted supply from Mexico in summer 2024 can be considered as exceptional circumstances which cannot lead to the conclusion that Mexico would not be an adequate source of supply in the future.

• (426) The Commission thus concluded that there exist available spare capacities in the Union and Mexico alone (not even considering the UK) to replace the total volumes of laminate-grade TiO2 purchased by the cooperating users from China, provided that level playing field is re-established and producers can commit 12 % of their production capacity to laminate-grade TiO2. Therefore, it rejected the claims made by the users in question.

7.3.4.3.   Impact of duties on the users and impact of the exemption on effectiveness of the duties

• (427) Felix and Munksjö also contested the Commission’s conclusion on the impact of duties on their business. Specifically, they pointed out that the Commission’s estimate in recital (430) of the provisional Regulation that their profitability would decrease by [2–3] percentage points fail to take into account the indirect effects of the duties.

• (428) They argued that the first of those effects was that the users would need to switch from grades produced via the sulphate process to the more expensive grades produced via the chloride process and would have to bear additional costs associated with the reformulation of existing recipes.

• (429) Users further claimed that, as a result of the anti-dumping duties, Union producers were expected to significantly increase their prices for existing volumes too. After the provisional measures came into force, the two users provided evidence on negotiations with their Union suppliers, indicating that these suppliers would indeed be increasing prices in the near future. The users additionally provided a TZMI estimate on TiO2 price evolution in the near future, published in June 2024, similarly predicting price increases of TiO2 in the Union.

• (430) Furthermore, the users claimed that these cost increases will make Chinese producers of decor paper comparatively even more competitive, incentivising further increase in dumped imports of decor paper. This would also further stifle the users’ ability to increase prices to their customers.

• (431) The users furthermore stressed that, since TiO2 costs make up such a large share in their total costs of production, they will not be able to absorb the duties, resulting in a dire impact on their business. At the same time, the unwarranted switches from sulphate grades (currently sourced from China) to chloride grades (which are mostly available in the Union and from other third countries), will result in additional imminent costs.

• (432) In addition, using TZMI and TTO data, the users provided calculations on the estimated cost advantage that the Chinese decor paper producers would have compared to the Union ones. These showed that, as a result of an increase in TiO2 prices, the cost advantage of Chinese decor paper producers would increase from 24 % in the investigation period to 31 % in 2025.

• (433) The users claimed that this will not only result in loss of sales volumes to Chinese competition, but also in their inability to adjust the pricing and thus prevent them from staying profitable in the market.

• (434) Finally, the two users claimed that the end-use exemption would not have an impact on the effectiveness of the measures.

• (435) In this respect, the users maintained that majority of the TiO2 imports from China would not be affected by the potential exemption, referring to the Commission’s conclusion from recital (428) of the provisional Regulation, that laminate-grade TiO2 accounts for around 12 % of total demand. Furthermore, as the Union producers mainly focus on other TiO2 applications, the impact of the exemption on the Union industry will also be limited.

• (436) Furthermore, the two users presented that the end-use exemption is both a burdensome procedure for companies that want to benefit from it, and that customs authorities have continuous supervision over the goods under the procedure and can retroactively collect duties if they consider that the goods are not used for the designated end-use, while no users other that decor paper producers could thus benefit from the exemption.

• (437) Concerning these claims, the Commission first clarified that its analysis rested on simulating the increased costs of TiO2 which these users currently source from China, with all other things (including the volumes, types, and sources of supply) remaining equal. This resulted in the estimated [2–3] percentage points decrease in profitability. [^ntr56-L_202500004EN.000101-E0056] At the same time, the costs associated with reformulation which the users estimated, although not insignificant, would be a one-off cost which would be furthermore minor compared to their usual total costs of production. In light of the above analysis, the Commission maintained its finding in recital (430) of the provisional Regulation, that the duties would likely have a negative impact on Felix and Munksjö’s profitability.

• (438) However, the Commission noted that the dumping margin found in the definitive stage of the investigation is lower than the dumping margin established in the provisional Regulation. Therefore, the Commission did a new assessment of the impact of the definitive duties on the profit margins of the two users. The analysis showed that the impact of the definitive duty at the level of the lower dumping margin on those two users’ profitability would be by around 1 percentage point less than the impact found in the provisional Regulation.

• (439) The Commission thus concluded that, even if the Union industry raised its prices which were, in fact, found to be supressed by the dumped imports from China as explained in recital (217), the impact of definitive duties on these two users would likely not be more significant than as determined in the provisional Regulation, given the low share of Union supply in their supply mix.

• (440) At the same time, however, laminate-grade TiO2 represents around 12 % of total Union TiO2 demand and [15 – 17] % of total sales volumes of sampled exporting producers in the investigation period. The Commission therefore considered the potential impact on the effectiveness of the duties to be disproportionally high if this end-use exemption was granted.

• (441) In addition, as established above, evidence on the file show that at least some of the Union producers were not producing sufficient quantities of TiO2 due to uncompetitive prices on the Union market.

• (442) The Commission thus concluded that, absent Chinese dumped imports, production is expected to shift back to the Union producers if prices adequately increase.

• (443) Moreover, even if laminate-grade TiO2 is particular, there are five producers in the Union which are able to produce it, as well as alternative sources of supply both in Mexico and the UK. As indicated above, the Commission’s estimates provide that there is sufficient capacity available to cover even for the, extremely unlikely, total disappearance of Chinese imports, showing sufficient availability of supply.

• (444) Finally, with regard to the claim mentioned in recital (430) above, the Commission reiterated that any allegation of dumping practices in the decor paper industry and of the consequent injury of the Union industry are investigated in the separate anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of decor paper originating in China [^ntr57-L_202500004EN.000101-E0057] and are outside the scope of this proceeding.

• (445) After final disclosure, Felix, Munksjö, and LB made comments disagreeing with the above findings on end-use exemption. The two users claimed that Commission’s assessments of availability of supply are based on overly optimistic assumptions.

• (446) First, the users claimed that the Commission’s estimates failed to consider the cyclicality of the TiO2 market, as those calculations were based on consumption figures and capacities in a period of low demand.

• (447) Second, the users claimed that the TiO2 market segment which comprises 12 % actually consists of decor paper and normal type of paper. While decor paper indeed takes up the majority of that share, it is unrealistic to expect that the producers will increase the share of laminate-grade TiO2 in their product mix to 12 %, i.e., the level higher than is market share of it.

• (448) Third, the users claimed that it would be unrealistic to expect that Union producers would allocate a larger share of their production capacity to laminate grade TiO2, since they benefit from economies of scale in the other segments.

• (449) Fourth, the users claimed that such hypothetical potential increase of supply is invalidated by the fact that numerous Union producers were not willing to increase their supplied quantities even after the imposition of provisional measures.

• (450) Finally, LB Group similarly claimed that there is a very limited number of suppliers of laminate-grade TiO2 globally. They disputed the Commission’s conclusion that there are 5 plants in the union capable of producing laminate-grade TiO2 while production capacity expansion is unlikely since production of this type of TiO2 requires dedicated production lines to avoid contamination of other grades with phosphorus compounds.

• (451) In addition, LB Group pointed to the provisional conclusions in the anti-dumping investigation currently ongoing in Brazil, [^ntr58-L_202500004EN.000101-E0058] where the authorities decided to grant the end-use exemption for TiO2 used in production of decor paper.

• (452) Concerning the users’ first argument, as the Commission already explained in recital (418) above, the Commission made its assessments on the availability of supply on the basis of the demand in an average year, and not the investigation period, which was a time of low demand. Likewise, in recital (419) above, the Commission based its estimates on production levels at 90 % of nameplate capacity of Union producers. The Commission’s estimates of the supply gap in the (already unlikely) scenario of complete disappearance of Chinese supply were thus, by design, conservative, rather than optimistic.

• (453) As concerns the second argument of the users, the Commission noted that in previous submissions the users also operated under the assumption that decor paper alone accounts for 12 % of the total TiO2 demand [^ntr59-L_202500004EN.000101-E0059] and did not previously dispute this assessment. Nevertheless, even if the actual share of demand for laminate-grade TiO2 would be lower, this means that TiO2 producers would have to dedicate even lesser share of their total capacity to this market segment, making the Commission’s estimates even more conservative and further reinforcing the Commission’s conclusion on available capacities.

• (454) Third, the Commission considered that the assertion that Union producers would not increase the share of laminate-grade TiO2 in their portfolio does not have merit. First, Union producers already produce other, more niche, types of products, even if these benefit from economies of scale to a lesser extent. Second, producers already produce laminate-grade TiO2 even in the current quantities. It is then safe to assume that, if they start producing more, they will benefit from economies of scale in that segment even further, making it economically enticing to increase production quantities.

• (455) As concerns the users’ fourth claim, the Commission already addressed this argument in recitals (415) and (416) above. While the Union producers may not have immediately committed higher volumes to laminate grade TiO2 production, it is reasonable to expect that they would, once level-playing field is definitively restored.

• (456) Finally, the claim raised by LB Group about the number of Union producers capable of producing laminate-grade TiO2 is not supported by any evidence. Furthermore, the Commission took Felix’s and Munksjö’s own claims on the number of Union (and also other) producers which could produce laminate-grade TiO2 as the starting point in its assessment.

• (457) Finally, as concerns the fact that Brazilian authorities granted an end-use exemption in that case, the Commission pointed out that this decision by another investigating authority has no relevance or bearing on the case at hand as it is taken under different legal framework and under different factual and economic circumstances. In any event, by contrast to the case in Brazil, a large part of the Union industry produces this product and has opposed the exemption. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

• (458) On the basis of the above, the Commission rejected the end-use exemption request for laminate-grade TiO2.

7.3.5.   Graphic inks producers

• (459) Three users requested a product exclusion or end-use exemption for graphic TiO2 for the production of white inks: Sun Chemical, Flint Group GmbH (‘Flint’), and Siegwerk.

• (460) Flint contested the Commission’s findings concerning its request for an end-use exemption for graphic TiO2 and claimed five factual and legal errors in Commission’s provisional findings.

• (461) First, although this has no bearing on its request for an end-use exemption, Flint claimed that it is incorrect that it purchases a limited amount of TiO2 for purposes other than producing white inks, as concluded in recital (57) of the provisional Regulation.

• (462) Second, Flint disagreed with the conclusion that graphic TiO2 does not have particular physical, chemical, and technical characteristics compared to other types of TiO2. To that end, Flint reiterated its claim from its first submission, citing Kronos’ promotional claims on graphic TiO2, which state that “that this type of TiO2 has exceptionally high gloss resulting from optimized, very intensive milling process, maximum opacity, and very low abrasion.” In addition, “[g]raphic TiO2 has unique whiteness, and chemical resistance, which are critical for ink applications.”

• (463) Flint referred to the Commission’s findings from recitals (57) and (58) of the provisional Regulation, that there is “a specific know-how to producing [graphic TiO2,] mastered by only a limited number of [TiO2] producers” and that “Flint has […] provided evidence demonstrating that [TiO2 types which Flint has been testing from different producers] generally do not reach satisfactory quality levels.”

• (464) Flint concluded that it follows that graphic TiO2 must have particular physical, chemical, and technical characteristics that distinguish it from other types of TiO2.

• (465) Third, contrary to the Commission’s finding that graphic TiO2 does not have a well-defined end-use due to a large number of inks recipes that Flint has for their products, Flint claimed that, while they do use TiO2 in many recipes, all of those products are white inks. There is thus a single end-use for graphic TiO2 defined as: material used to manufacture white inks.

• (466) Fourth, Flint claimed that it is irrelevant for an end-use exemption whether customs authorities can verify that it is indeed graphic TiO2 used for production of white inks. What matters in granting the end-use exemption is the specific use of the product in question, which does not have to differ from other types of products subject to anti-dumping duties.

• (467) Fifth, Flint argued that its profits in fact will be significantly affected by the proposed anti-dumping duties. Flint provided calculations on the impact on its profitability in the white inks segment of its business, which showed that the duties would, contrary to the Commission’s provisional findings, decrease its profitability by around 9 percentage points, turning it loss-making.

• (468) Flint further stressed that the impact of the duties on Flint’s total business cannot be determinative for end-use exemption request, since Flint is a diversified group with numerous products. This would unjustifiably discriminate between single-product and diversified businesses. Instead, impact on the business segment at hand should be assessed.

• (469) Flint reiterated that all the other requirements for granting an end-use exemption were met.

• (470) First, Flint claimed that end-use exemption for graphic TiO2 would not reduce the effectiveness of the duties, since graphic TiO2 makes up for around 3 % of total TiO2 demand. Flint further noted that the complainant did not mention graphic TiO2 in the complaint, nor did they engage with Flint’s end-use exemption request at the provisional stage of this investigation. This would mean that not even the complainant is concerned about possible effects this exemption might have on the effectiveness of the duties.

• (471) Second, Flint reiterated that graphic TiO2 makes up a very significant share of cost of production of white inks and pointed to the Commission practice in the PVA case, where this was one of the grounds for granting an end-use exemption request. [^ntr60-L_202500004EN.000101-E0060]

• (472) Finally, Flint reiterated that graphic TiO2 is a highly specific product for which users could not switch suppliers, which was a ground for granting the end-use exemption in previous Commission practice. [^ntr61-L_202500004EN.000101-E0061] Flint claimed that, since the anti-dumping duties will make it economically unfeasible to source graphic TiO2 from China, duties would in essence leave Flint with only one major supplier as a source for bulk of its TiO2.

• (473) Another producer of white inks, Siegwerk, provided calculations showing that the production of white inks would no longer be viable in the Union if measures are imposed, due to competitive pressure from imports from third markets like Türkiye. It is thus likely that the Union white inks capacity closes down or relocates outside the Union.

• (474) Siegwerk claimed that the relocation would likely have further negative effects: producers of packaging which rely on white inks producers would likely follow suit in relocating their production outside the EU, since it is cheaper and simpler to import coloured packaging to their customers in the Union, rather than importing white inks (as the transport of inks is less cost efficient and requires more care due to its hazardous nature).

• (475) Furthermore, Siegwerk provided evidence showing that over the last decade, 10 percentage points of solvent-based inks volume has relocated from the Union to Türkiye. This trend is thus likely to accelerate if the anti-dumping measures are applied.

• (476) Claims were also made that certain TiO2 grades required for use in inks applied to packing in speciality uses (medicinal, food packaging, cosmetics, etc., all of which require higher safety standards as they come in contact with products for human consumption) are not available on the Union market. Therefore, the users have no choice but to supply such grades from China, and the cost increase resulting from the imposition of anti-dumping duties would make this production unprofitable.

• (477) In response, the complainant did not give detailed data on the graphic TiO2 production by the Union industry, but claimed that it had, in general, sufficient capacity to supply the market if level playing field is restored.

• (478) In light of the new evidence and claims presented above, the Commission reassessed its conclusions from the provisional Regulation.

• (479) As concerns Flint’s arguments presented in recitals (461) and (462) above, the Commission noted that these are only pertinent in relation to product exclusion analysis. Since Flint did not make a request for the Commission to reassess its analysis of its product exclusion request at the definitive stage, the Commission considered those arguments as moot.

• (480) Concerning the argument mentioned in recital (476), the comments did not specify which grades of TiO2 these concerns, so the Commission could not verify the veracity of those claims.

• (481) Concerning the particularity of graphic TiO2, the Commission has already concluded in recital (57) of the provisional regulation that there is indeed a specific know-how to producing it, mastered by only a limited number of producers in the Union and in China. As was also confirmed in the merger case Huntsman/Rockwood, [^ntr62-L_202500004EN.000101-E0062] due to specific nature of this product, white inks producers have limited possibilities to switch to other producers.

• (482) As Flint has shown, using other types of TiO2 in its applications would result in much poorer performance of inks on the packaging, affecting customers’ perception.

• (483) As concerns Flint’s argument from recital (466) above, the Commission noted that Flint clarified in the definitive stage that, while it uses other TiO2 grades in two specific applications, these were neither white inks nor was it using graphic TiO2 grade for those applications. In any case, these represented less than 1 % of Flint’s total use of TiO2. On the other hand, Flint has shown that over 99 % of its TiO2 consumption is in formulations for white inks.

• (484) Regarding the availability of supply, Flint has shown that it can only purchase graphic TiO2 from one supplier in the Union and two suppliers in China. There are no available suppliers in other third countries. Siegwerk claimed that they purchase their TiO2 form a few other Union and Chinese suppliers too, but for over 50 % of their formulations they have only one certified supplier.

• (485) On the basis of all the evidence available, the Commission maintained its conclusion from recital (58) of the provisional Regulation that there is a very limited number of suppliers worldwide who can produce graphic TiO2 at the adequate quality level, and, to the Commission’s knowledge, they are present only in the Union and China.

• (486) As concerns the complainant’s claims that it could supply the market if level playing field is restored, the Commission considered this unlikely for the graphic TiO2 market. Namely, the total Union production capacity is only around 80 % of Union consumption in a normal year. With the new information available at the definitive stage, the Commission estimated that the demand for graphic TiO2 is around 2,5 % of the total TiO2 market. The only Union supplier known to be producing graphic TiO2 at the satisfactory quality level would have to dedicate around 7 % of its total capacity to supply the graphic TiO2 demands in the Union and that producer did not claim that it intended to make this commitment.

• (487) The Commission thus concluded that available sources of supply for the graphic TiO2 are very limited both globally and within the Union.

• (488) As concerns Flint’s estimates on the impact of the measures on its profitability, the Commission accepted their estimate and reversed its conclusions. Using the same methodology to estimate the impact of the duties at the new, lower dumping margin level, the Commission still found that measures would make Flint loss-making in the white inks segment of business.

• (489) Due to the similar cost structure, similar impact could be expected on Sun Chemical and Siegwerk, although the Commission does not know their level of exposure to Chinese suppliers as they did not submit a questionnaire reply.

• (490) In light of the above and new evidence submitted by Siegwerk on competitiveness of the Union white inks business, the Commission concluded that measures would have a significant impact on white ink producers and on the employment they generate. On top of this, further potential knock-on effects on downstream packaging industry could have further negative consequences on employment in the Union.

• (491) At the same time, the Commission estimated that white ink producers represent around 2,5 % of the total EU TiO2 market and this type of TiO2 is not produced by the vast majority of Union producers. Based on the data available to the Commission, Union industry’s sales of Graphic TiO2 represented around 0,5 % of their total sales in the investigation period and around 5 % of total imports from China.

• (492) Furthermore, the complainant did not directly oppose the end-use exemption request for the graphic TiO2. In addition, white inks producers have to rely on a very limited number of producers worldwide which are able to supply graphic TiO2 at the adequate quality level, with only one such producer being in the Union, and the others in China.

• (493) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that granting an end-use exemption to white inks producers would not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the measures.

• (494) Furthermore, the Commission concluded that it is in the interest of the Union, to grant an end-use exemption to imports of graphic TiO2 originating in China for use in the production of white inks for printing.

• (495) In their comments on final disclosure, the complainant disagreed with this decision. The complainant also opposed the use of the term “graphic TiO2” which, according to their claim, had been unknown to the TiO2 industry. Flint made a subsequent submission disputing complainant’s claims.

• (496) In its comments on final disclosure, Siegwerk also requested clarification on the term “end-use” throughout this Regulation, noting also that the term “graphic TiO2” is not defined in customs law.

• (497) Thus, as a preliminary point, the Commission pointed to the original request for end-use exemption made by Flint and described in recital (32). The request for the end-use exemption was made and assessed in the context of Article 254 of the Union Customs Code.

• (498) As interested parties have rightly noted, “graphic TiO2” is not defined in the customs legislation nor is it necessarily a term uniformly used throughout the TiO2 industry. “Graphic TiO2,” instead, is just an abbreviation which was used in numerous documents in this investigation (including submissions from the complainant) to easily refer to the types of TiO2 that are used as a pigment in the production of white inks in the graphic ink industry. [^ntr63-L_202500004EN.000101-E0063]

• (499) As explained in this Regulation, the Commission decided to exempt from anti-dumping duties TiO2 if it is imported for use in the production of white inks for printing, under the procedures and conditions laid out in the Union Customs Code. No definition of “graphic TiO2” is thus neither required nor implied for the purpose of effecting this end-use exemption, since it operates on the basis of the intended use of the product.

• (500) The Commission then proceeded to analyse the remainder of complainants’ comments on the final disclosure, and Flint’s counterclaims.

• (501) First, the complainant asserted that the Commission’s conclusion is based on the data of one single user (Flint), and that the Commission should have conducted an assessment of the impact of duties on the white inks industry on a more representative number of graphic TiO2 users.

• (502) Second, the complainant claimed that it was incorrect that users could only purchase graphic TiO2 from one supplier in the Union and two suppliers in China, as the Commission purportedly concluded in recital (484) above.

• (503) The complainant went on to argue that there is a large capacity of one Union producer available that can be dedicated to the Union ink market, if a level playing field is restored. At the same time, there are several suppliers in the Union which sell TiO2 to the white inks industry.

• (504) The complainant furthermore disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion that the one Union user known to be producing graphic TiO2 would not dedicate 7 % of its total production capacity to satisfy demand in the Union.

• (505) In addition, the complainant claimed that the Commission did not request any information from the non-sampled Union producers on their production of graphic TiO2. The Commission cannot thus reasonably allege that there is only one Union supplier known to be producing graphic TiO2 at satisfactory quality level.

• (506) Third, the complainant contested the methodology that the Commission used to assess the impact that anti-dumping measures might have on users, white ink producers, compared to the impact that the end-use exemption could have on the Union producers.

• (507) The complainant pointed out that in the 2021 anti-subsidy investigation on imports of aluminium converter foil (‘ACF’) from China, [^ntr64-L_202500004EN.000101-E0064] the Commission did not grant the end-use exemption because, while ACF was relevant for only a part of total production of the user in question, the Commission could not determine what impact the duties would have had on the user’s total profitability. [^ntr65-L_202500004EN.000101-E0065] The complainant contended that in this case, since white inks represent only a part of Flint’s portfolio, the Commission should reach the same conclusion as in the above referred ACF case.

• (508) By contrast, the complainant claimed, that this end-use exemption would have a severe negative impact on Union producers which produce TiO2, and this should have been specifically analysed. They argued that should the end-use exemption be granted, the Union producers would no longer be able to sell graphic TiO2 in the Union market.

• (509) Finally, the complainant claimed that there was high risk of circumvention associated with this exemption. It would introduce significant challenges in verifying the nature of this product, and graphic TiO2 could thus be misdeclared or diverted to other end-uses.

• (510) Flint, on the other hand, claimed that complainant’s comments on this end-use exemption were not bona fide, since they only made comments opposing Flint’s request after the final disclosure, almost a full year after Flint originally made the request.

• (511) Furthermore, Flint argued that the Commission should reject complainant’s arguments on how end-use exemption could be used to undermine the effectiveness of the duties. The very nature of this customs procedure does not permit for any misdeclaration while the procedure precisely ensures that TiO2 is not diverted to other end uses.

• (512) Flint further claimed that it is irrelevant that only Flint submitted a questionnaire response, as the Commission has previously granted end-use exemptions at the request of just one cooperating user. [^ntr66-L_202500004EN.000101-E0066]

• (513) As regard the first argument made by the complainant, the Commission noted that among the three users that requested the end-use exemption, only Flint submitted a questionnaire reply which was verified. However, Sun Chemicals and Siegwerk both made written submissions and hearings were held with them and the Commission was thus able to complement Flint’s verified data with additional insights.

• (514) The Commission pointed out that, on the other hand, complainant made only one submission regarding this end-use exemption request in the course of the investigation, where it furthermore contested only the arguments made by Sun Chemical. At the same time, while Flint submitted its request for end-use exemption in the first ten days of the investigation and made several subsequent submissions in support of its claims, as Flint correctly pointed out, the complainant never contested those arguments..

• (515) On the basis of the information available to the Commission, it was estimated that these three users represent around 70 % of Union production of white inks. Thus, the Commission considered that their situation is representative of the white inks industry and made its conclusions on the information that it had available.

• (516) Second, contrary to the complainant’s assertion, the Commission did not conclude in recital (484) that the entire white inks industry can buy graphic TiO2from one supplier in the Union and two suppliers in China, but rather that this the case for Flint. Indeed, as the remainder of this recital shows, other users might also buy graphic TiO2 from other suppliers too, in limited quantities.

• (517) As concerns the assertion that the Commission did not request any information from the non-sampled Union producers on their production of graphic TiO2, the Commission had information from the users’ side that some of the users are buying limited quantities from non-sampled Union producers. The Commission again reminded that the arguments made by the white inks producers on availability of supply were never meaningfully contested.

• (518) This particularly pertains to Flint’s arguments on the specific know-how necessary to product TiO2 that works well in white inks, the existence of which and the fact that it was only mastered by a small number of producers was already established in merger case Huntsman/Rockwood. Following this merger, furthermore, the know-how of one of the two Union market leaders in graphic TiO2 had to be divested, and it was purchased by what is now LB Group which continued supplying that TiO2 grade to the Union.

• (519) The complainant brought no evidence throughout the investigation that would contest this and thus negate the conclusion that the availability of graphic TiO2 grades which are of satisfactory quality is very limited globally to only a handful of producers in the Union and in China. Nothing in verified questionnaire replies from sampled Union producers brought that conclusion into question either. The Commission thus found no reason to reach out to the non-sampled Union producers.

• (520) As concerns the available capacity of the one Union producer to supply the market, while they might have theoretical capacity, the Commission already concluded it unlikely that they would dedicate 7 % of this capacity to supply what is only 2,5 % of the market.

• (521) The complainant did not bring any evidence that would suggest otherwise. To the contrary, its own claims from the comments on final disclosure suggest that there is no economic incentive to do so.

• (522) Third, the Commission disagreed with the complainant’s assertion that the Commission applied different methodology that in ACF case. The Commission assesses each request on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the facts and information available. Thus, the fact that in ACF case the impact on total profitability of the user could not be estimated does not make the factual situation comparable to this case. At any rate, it is clear from the case-law that the lawfulness of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties must be assessed in the light of legal rules and, in particular, the provisions of the basic regulation, not on the basis of the alleged previous practice of the EU institutions in taking decisions. [^ntr67-L_202500004EN.000101-E0067]

• (523) Indeed, as the Commission elaborated in recitals (488) to (490), when analysing the overall picture, including the high incidence of TiO2 in cost structure of white inks and new evidence brought on volatility of white inks business, as well as potential knock-on effects downstream packaging industry, the Commission concluded that measures would have a significant impact on white ink producers.

• (524) At the same time, the Commission expressed doubt about complainant’s assertions that this end-use exemption will have a severe negative impact on Union producers. As already stated, graphic TiO2 represents a very small share, 2,5 %, of the total market, and even less in terms of the share of sales of the one Union producer which is most competitive in this market.

• (525) Furthermore, the complainant did not substantiate why any of the Union producers, which are and have been selling graphic TiO2 to the Union in the previous years, in spite of Chinese competition, would now suddenly not be able to do so.

• (526) Finally, the complainant did not meaningfully substantiate its claims on risk of circumvention. End-use exemption is a customs procedure through which customs authorities verify whether the imported products were indeed subject to a specific use. The Commission thus found no reason to believe that TiO2 could be misdeclared or diverted to other end-uses as a result of this exemption.

• (527) The Commission therefore rejected the complainants claims regarding the end-use exemption for the production of white inks for printing.

7.3.6.   Other factors

• (528) Multiple interested parties also made claims on the insufficient supply of TiO2 in the Union. They stated that they have faced many supply shortages in the past and when the economy picks up again, prices will rise and there will not even be sufficient quantities of TiO2 available from Union producers.

• (529) The complainant contested those claims, stating that they are ready to meet the Union demand once level playing field is restored. Furthermore, the complainant also argued that multiple capacity expansions are planned in other countries such as the UK, Saudi Arabia and USA.

• (530) The Commission acknowledged that the total Union capacity is insufficient to meet the total Union demand. In addition, the capacity expansions claimed by the complainant could not be verified against reliable evidence.

• (531) Nonetheless, on the basis of the information and evidence available to the Commission, there are ample capacities of TiO2 available worldwide, and at least indications that capacity expansion will continue in the coming years in regions other than China. Even if imports from China would disappear completely, these could compensate for potential supply gap.

7.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (532) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons against the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on titanium dioxide originating in China.

• (533) However, to limit any possible serious impact on the users that are heavily dependent on TiO2 in their production and in order to mitigate the possible serious adverse effects that anti-dumping duties might have on a large number of such users, while at the same time ensuring protection to the Union industry exposed to the injurious effects of dumped imports from China, the Commission considered modulation of duties.

• (534) In their comments on the final disclosure, several interested parties reiterated their comments that the anti-dumping rate of 32,3 % is too high and will make their businesses uncompetitive, and that the Commission should reduce the duty rates.

• (535) All individual and specific comments on Union interest have been addressed. Moreover, as explained in section 8.2 below, the Commission changed the form of the measures. The duties will not be collected as a percentage of a declared invoice value, but rather as a fixed amount per kilogram, regardless of the value of the invoice. As explained in recital (533) above and section 8.2 below, this is expected to soften the impact of duties on the users.

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

• (536) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

8.2.   Form of the measures

• (537) As explained in recital (533) above, the Commission considered appropriate to modify the form of the measures. As multiple parties have claimed, the investigation period coincided with a downturn in the demand cycle for TiO2. According to the market intelligence available to the Commission, it is expected that both demand and prices keep increasing in the foreseeable future, at least until the end of 2025.

• (538) The Commission thus considered that the imposition of duties in the form of specific duties will soften the impact of the duties on the users as, in a rising market, the share of duties in the total price of Chinese TiO2 will be less than if duties are imposed as ad valorem duties. In particular, the Commission’s estimates have shown that, already on the basis of the investigation period data collected from the users, measures in the form of specific duties would soften the impact on the investigation period profitability of the decor paper and white inks producers by between 0,2 and 0,5 percentage points, all other things remaining equal.

• (539) Furthermore, users of very specialised TiO2 grades, such as those imported by AAKO, the price of which is several orders of magnitude higher than the more commonly used grades, will thus be minimally impacted by the measures.

• (540) At the same time, the level of duties would allow the Union industry to recover from the effects of injurious dumping in the context of rising demand and prices and decreasing raw material costs [^ntr68-L_202500004EN.000101-E0068]. The Commission thus concluded that in view of the specific circumstances of this case imposing measures in the form of specific duties will strike a proper balance between the interest of the users and the Union industry’s need for protection from dumped imports.

• (541) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, and as a fixed amount per kg should be as follows:

Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)	Definitive duty rate (%)	Definitive specific duty (EUR/kg)
LB group	32,3	53,4	32,3	0,74
Anhui Gold Star group	11,4	53,0	11,4	0,25
Other cooperating companies	28,4	53,3	28,4	0,64
All other companies	32,3	53,4	32,3	0,74

• (542) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities.

• (543) In their comments on final disclosure, LB Group suggested that it would be more appropriate to set separate specific duties for sulphate process TiO2 and for chloride process TiO2, due to the traditional price differences between the two.

• (544) The Commission reminded in that regard that, as already elaborated in recitals (67) to (71) of the provisional Regulation, and confirmed in recitals (81) to (84) above, the Commission rejected the request to conduct separate injury and causation analyses for the products coming from the two production processes. This would have been a prerequisite for calculating individual anti-dumping duties for sulphate process TiO2 and for chloride process TiO22.