Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/81 of 13 January 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel plated or coated with tin originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (332) Import prices from other third countries were higher than Union industry prices in 2020 and 2021, and at the same level in 2022. They were 7 % lower than the Union industry’s prices in 2023, and 10 % lower in the investigation period.

• (333) However, the volume of those imports and their market share has been low and, furthermore, significantly decreased between 2020 and the investigation period. They could thus not have exerted nearly as significant an impact on the Union industry as Chinese imports, which increased significantly in both volume and market share.

• (334) The notable exception to the above are imports from India, which increased by 4 000 tonnes between 2020 and the investigation period, gaining 0,6 % in total market share over that period, and were sold to the Union at prices lower than Chinese imports in all years except 2021.

• (335) However, since total Union demand in the investigation period was at over 2 million tonnes, the Commission considered that any impact such increase in imports from India could have had on the Union market was negligible and could not have caused injury to the Union industry, even if their prices were below Union industry’s prices.

• (336) Furthermore, prices of Chinese imports were on average 14 % lower than Union industry prices in 2023 and 19 % lower in the investigation period. We thus concluded that imports from third countries could not have caused injury to the Union industry.

5.2.3.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (337) The quantity of exports of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 13

Export performance of the sampled Union producers

	2020	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
Export quantity (tonne)	986 312	980 151	858 804	746 431	752 726
Index	100	99	87	76	76
Average price (EUR/tonne)	783	870	1 590	1 469	1 370
Index	100	111	203	188	175
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.	Source: Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

• (338) Union industry’s export volumes evolved similarly as their sales to the Union: they have been gradually decreasing from 2020 to the investigation period, notably without the uptick observed in the Union market in 2022, further reinforcing the conclusion that this was an exceptional year on the Union market.

• (339) However, this decrease in export volumes was just 24 % between 2020 and the investigation period, while the sales to the Union market fell by 36 % over the same period.

• (340) The average export price increased until 2022, where it more than doubled compared to 2020. From 2022 export prices started decreasing but stayed at 75 % above the 2020 prices during the investigation period.

• (341) Furthermore, export prices were slightly lower than sales prices to the Union in 2020 and 2021, but higher in 2022, 2023 and the investigation period.

• (342) The Commission thus concluded that the export performance of the Union industry was not the cause of the suffered injury.

5.2.4.   Cost of production and investments

• (343) CISA and Steelforce argued that the injury to Union industry was self-inflicted: as the costs of production were going up and the Union industry was nonetheless increasing investments significantly.

• (344) First, the Commission clarified in that regard that the global increase in cost of production and, notably, in raw materials and energy had affected all market players to a similar extent as evidence by the fact that prices of imports from all other third countries including China increased considerably over the period considered. Consequently, such an increase in costs was not an element that was unique to the Union industry only.

• (345) At the same time, neither CISA, Steelforce nor any other interested party presented evidence that would indicate that other market players, such as Chinese exporting producers, would have been affected differently.

• (346) As explained in recitals (291) and (294), the Union industry’s investments during the period considered were required to comply with environmental standards or were necessary in order to maintain existing capacities by making essential repairs and replacements.

• (347) The Commission thus concluded that the rising costs of production did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry in the investigation period. Similarly, investments required by law or necessary to maintain safe production cannot be considered to have contributed to the injury of the Union industry.

5.2.5.   Long term contracts between Union producers and users

• (348) As explained in recital (317), sales of the Union industry in the Union market were typically based on yearly contracts with customers that fix prices for the following year with a possibility for only exceptional adjustments. This means that prices cannot follow short-term cost variations that happen within the given year. The Union industry thus need some time to adjust its prices to changes in market conditions. In fact, throughout 2021, they were constrained to offer prices negotiated in Q4/2020 whereas production costs increased by 15 % from 2020 to 2021. However, as explained in recital (318), disruptions in the market in 2021 and the consequent decrease in imports from China at low prices allowed Union producers to negotiate significantly higher prices for 2022 reflecting their increased production costs and to regain their profitability.

• (349) Therefore, the time lag between the increase of raw materials cost and the increase of the sales prices due to the yearly contracts did not appear to prevent the Union industry from adapting its sales prices to the increasing cost of production over the period considered. As a result, the Commission provisionally concluded that fixing the sales prices in yearly contracts did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury found.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (350) In a shrinking market, and after the Union market was temporarily shielded from Chinese imports in 2021, imports from China were increasing in volume and gaining market share in 2022, 2023 and the investigation period, at the expense of sales volumes and market share of the Union industry, which were decreasing in step.

• (351) Such Chinese imports were coming into the Union at prices which undercut Union prices, causing price suppression and depression. With 2022 being the only exception when the Union industry was, as a consequence of market uncertainties in the year before, able to achieve prices sufficiently high to cover their costs of production. The Chinese dumped imports were dragging down Union industry’s profitability, which was already lossmaking at the beginning of the period considered.

• (352) No other factors were found to be causing such injury to the Union industry.

• (353) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of decrease in consumption, imports from other third countries, and export performance of the Union industry on the Union industry’s negative developments in terms of loss of sales volumes, prices, and declining profitability was limited, if any.

• (354) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. The injury consisted mainly of loss of market share, price undercutting, suppression, and depression, and falling profitability.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

• (355) In the present case, the complainant claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, regarding hot-rolled steel. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of sampled exporting producers would be higher than their injury margin.

6.1.   Injury margin

• (356) The injury would be removed if the Union industry was able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

• (357) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

• (358) As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. As not all sampled Union producers could provide reliable data to show profitability on sales to unrelated customers in the Union before the increase of imports from the country concerned, the Commission established the target profit to determine the non-injurious price at 6 %, in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation.

• (359) On this basis, the non-injurious price was calculated, by applying the above-mentioned profit margin of 6 % to the cost of production during the investigation period of the sampled Union producers.

• (360) In accordance with article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence presented by the sampled Union producers, the Commission established an additional cost for each Union producer, from which it deducted the actual cost of compliance with such conventions during the investigation period for the respective producer, leading to a result of [0 – 70] EUR/tonne. This difference was added to the non-injurious price mentioned in recital (359) above.

• (361) On this basis, the Commission calculated a final target unit price ranging from 1 323 to 1 821 EUR/tonne for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin (see recital (358) above) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period on a type-by-type basis and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d).

• (362) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in China, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

• (363) The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see recitals (220) to (227) above).

Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)
Baosteel Group: — Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. — WISCO-Nippon Steel Tinplate Co., Ltd.	14,1 %	44,8 %
Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.	47,1 %	60,8 %
Other cooperating companies not sampled	25,3 %	50,5 %
All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	62,6 %	70,0 %

6.2.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

• (364) As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in the country concerned regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

• (365) However, as the margins adequate to remove injury are higher than the dumping margins, the Commission considered that, at this stage, it was not necessary to address this aspect.

6.3.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (366) Following the above assessment, provisional anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Company	Provisional anti-dumping duty
Baosteel Group: — Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. — WISCO-Nippon Steel Tinplate Co., Ltd.	14,1 %
Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.	47,1 %
Other cooperating companies not sampled	25,3 %
All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	62,6 %

7. UNION INTEREST

• (367) Having decided to apply Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, and users.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (368) The Union industry consists of four producers, whose sales and market share deteriorated significantly during the second half of the period considered, with a consequent negative impact on its profitability, inventory level, and employment. The Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury caused by the dumped imports from the country concerned.

• (369) If provisional measures are not imposed it is likely that, as a result of the price pressure from the dumped imports, loss of market share, and accumulated losses will force the Union industry to cease production of tinplated products. However, following the imposition of anti-dumping provisional measures it is expected that the sales volumes and prices of the Union industry on the Union market will rise, thus improving profitability and other financial indicators of this industry and preventing closure of production facilities.

• (370) The Commission therefore concluded provisional anti-dumping measures would be in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and traders

• (371) One importer, Steelforce, submitted the questionnaire reply which was verified. The Commission services also held a hearing with Steelforce where the company elaborated on its position.

• (372) Steelforce employs around [50-70] people and represented a large share of the total Chinese imports during the investigation period. The importer claimed that the imposition of duties would be against the Union interest. Since the majority of Steelforce’s arguments in support of that claim concerned the impact the duties would have on users, these comments are analysed together with the users’ comments in section 7.3 below.

• (373) Assessing the impact that the duties would have on this importer, the Commission noted that even though Steelforce imported a significant share of total Chinese imports into the Union, it also imported many other products. In fact, resale of tinplated products represented only a relatively minor share of the company’s total turnover.

• (374) Considering that the company was profitable in the investigation period in all segments of its business and that it held a significant share of the tinplated products imports market, while also having a majority of its business not related to tinplated products, the Commission concluded that this importer would not be significantly adversely affected by the duties.

• (375) Considering that no other importers or traders came forward to oppose the duties, the Commission concluded that the duties are not likely to have a significant negative effect on the situation of importers and traders in the Union.

7.3.   Interest of users

• (376) Two users provided questionnaire replies, Massilly Holding S.A.S (‘Massilly’) and Trivium Packaging B.V. (‘Trivium’). Massilly and another user, Pirlo Holding GmbH (‘Pirlo’), also provided comments opposing the imposition of duties, as did one user association, Metal Packaging Europe (‘MP’E).

• (377) Massilly, Pirlo, and MP Eall claimed that the imposition of duties would be against the Union interest, as it would have a severe negative impact on users’ businesses. Steelforce made similar claims, particularly in the context of the protection that the tinplated products sector already has with the safeguard measures.

• (378) Steelforce and MPE further claimed that there is insufficient production capacity in the Union and thus imports are essential to guarantee stability of supply, as Union users are already facing significant delays on deliveries from Union producers. Furthermore, since there is high demand for tinplated products globally, spare capacities for exports to the Union are limited and, in any case, protected by the safeguard measures.

• (379) Furthermore, MPE, Steelforce, Pirlo, and Massilly claimed that anti-dumping duties would strain the profitability of metal can manufacturers, since their main market (packaged food and beverages industry) is extremely price sensitive, and they cannot pass on the price increases to their downstream customers. In addition, any increase in price would hurt their competitiveness against the manufacturers of other types of packaging, notably plastic and Tetra Pak.

• (380) Steelforce and Massilly claimed that this would furthermore be detrimental to Union environmental policies since steel cans have much higher recyclability than other types of packaging.

• (381) Steelforce and CISA further claimed that anti-dumping duties would harm the whole supply chain, notably the canned food industry, accelerating divestment outside of the Union. Since imports of downstream products (empty cans) or finished products (cans filled with food/beverages) to the Union are increasing, anti-dumping duties on tinplated products will surely contribute to such divestment trends.

• (382) With respect to the safeguard measures mentioned in recital (244) and the claims by interested in this respect summarised in recitals (363) and (378), the Commission noted that safeguard measures do not have as a purpose and cannot protect against dumped imports. As mentioned in recital (244), the Commission took into account the duties paid for quantities of the product under investigation imported above the duty-free tariff-rate-quotas fixed by the safeguard measures, and found that the undercutting margin was still significant, between [15 - 25] %.

• (383) As concerns available capacities, the Union industry’s capacity surpassed the total Union tinplated product demand by almost one million tonnes even in the highest demand year of 2020. In addition, imports from multiple third countries have been consistently sold to the Union market. The Commission therefore concluded that there is no risk of shortage of supply.

• (384) Regarding the impact of duties on the users, the questionnaire replies from Trivium and Massilly showed that tinplated products represent around [35-55] % in their total costs of production, while they source a relatively minor share of their tinplated products from China.

• (385) Both Massilly and Trivium were profitable in 2023, and Trivium maintained similar levels of profitability in the investigation period while Massilly did not provide profitability figures for the investigation period.

• (386) Based on the available, unverified, data the Commission estimated that even with 50 % duty on Chinese tinplated products that these users purchase, with all other elements remaining unchanged, the overall costs of production of these two users in the segment of the business relying on tinplated products would increase by less than 2 %.

• (387) The Commission thus concluded that these users, even if they could not pass on a part of cost increase to their customers, would still remain profitable and the impact of duties on them would be negligible.

• (388) The claims on increased competition from abroad in downstream sectors and the switch to other materials in the packaging industry as supposed result of anti-dumping duties were not substantiated by comprehensive evidence. The Commission was thus not able to verify the veracity of those claims nor quantify how serious such impact might be.

• (389) In the same vein, the Commission could not estimate to what extent the duties would thus negatively affect its environmental policies.

• (390) The Commission thus concluded that users would not be significantly negatively affected by the imposition of duties.

7.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (391) As shown above, the Union tinplated products industry is in precarious state, as it has been lossmaking for the better part of the period considered. The Commission noted in that regard that the cooperating importer and both users which submitted questionnaire replies were, on the other hand, profitable.

• (392) Similarly, on the basis of the data it had available from cooperating users, the Commission could not conclude that the business of a tinplated product user would be seriously negatively affected by the duties. A 2 % increase in cost of production could not be as detrimental to a user as consistently deteriorating business environment is for the Union producers.

• (393) Finally, one of the users itself in its questionnaire reply mentioned that Union producers offer service flexibility and short lead times, indicating that users themselves benefit from the presence of Union producers and thus it is in their interest for the industry not to disappear.

• (394) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of tinplated products originating in China at this stage of the investigation.

8. PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

• (395) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

• (396) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of tinplated products originating in China in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins (recital (363) above). The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.

• (397) On the basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Company	Provisional anti-dumping duty (%)
Baosteel Group: — Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. — WISCO-Nippon Steel Tinplate Co., Ltd.	14,1 %
Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.	47,1 %
Other cooperating companies not sampled	25,3 %
All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	62,6 %

• (398) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China.’ They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

• (399) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

• (400) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (401) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in quantity after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in quantity could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation.

• (402) In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

9. REGISTRATION

• (403) As mentioned in recital (3), the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

• (404) In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should cease/be discontinued.

• (405) No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

10. INFORMATION AT PROVISIONAL STAGE

• (406) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE’s website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

• (407) Comments were received from Baosteel Group and Shougang Jingtang, but none of these comments raised any concerns regarding the accuracy of the calculations, and the Commission will address the comments made by those parties in the definitive stage.

11. FINAL PROVISIONS

• (408) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

• (409) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Company	Provisional anti-dumping duty	TARIC additional code
Baosteel Group: — Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. — WISCO-Nippon Steel Tinplate Co., Ltd.	14,1 %	89LB
Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.	47,1 %	89LC
Other cooperating companies listed in Annex	25,3 %
All other imports originating in China	62,6 %	8999

Article 2

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 1 shall apply for a period of six months.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 January 2025.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

less than 0,5 mm) coated with a layer of metal containing, by weight, 97 % or more of tin. Since the product covered by this investigation is broader than this definition, the Commission decided to use ‘tinplated products’ instead to define the product under investigation.

By 2025, the industrial output value of new materials will reach 15 million yuan, and the level of equipment and key materials guarantee ability is obviously improved.’; available at: https://www.dl.gov.cn/art/2021/12/20/art_854_1995411.html (accessed on 5 December 2023).

Foster enterprise mergers and reorganisation, accelerate the concentration process, reduce the number of steel smelting enterprises to approximately 10 enterprises ’; available at: https://www.jiaxing.gov.cn/art/2022/4/20/art_1228922756_59529426.html (accessed on 14 October 2024).

ANNEX

CHINESE COOPERATING EXPORTING PRODUCERS NOT SAMPLED

Company Name	TARIC additional code
Jiangsu Youfu Sheet Technology Co., Ltd.	89LD
Hesteel Group Hengshui Strip Processing Co.,Ltd. and Handan Steel Group Hengshui Cold Rolling Steel Co., Ltd.	89LE
Handan Jintai Packing Material Co., Ltd.	89LF
Jiangsu Suxun New Material Co., Ltd.	89LG
Jiangyin Comat Metal Products Co., Ltd.	89LH
GDH Zhongyue (Qinhuangdao) Tinplate Industrial Co., Ltd. and GDH Zhongyue (Zhongshan) Tinplate Industry Co., Ltd.	89LI

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/81/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)