Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1189 of 13 June 2025 imposing provisional anti dumping duties on imports of screws without heads originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 7 thereof,

After consulting the Member States,

Whereas:

(1) On 17 October 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of screws without heads (‘screws’) originating in People’s Republic of China (‘China’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 2 September 2024 by the European Industrial Fasteners Institute (‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of screws without heads in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/141 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the Chinese authorities, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

(5) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(6) Apart from the comments on the product scope explained in the Section 2.4 below, no other comments were made on initiation.

(7) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

Sampling of Union producers

(8) In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of of largest production and sales volume of the various product types falling within the scope of the like product in the Union between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024, taking into account the geographical spread. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for around 14 % of production and sales volume of the Union industry. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received. The sample is representative of the Union industry.

Sampling of unrelated importers

(9) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(10) Eight unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of three unrelated importers on the basis of the largest volume of sales of the product concerned in the Union. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known importers concerned were consulted on the selection of the sample. No comments were received.

Sampling of exporting producers

(11) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in China to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(12) One hundred twenty-seven exporting producers in China provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of three exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned and the authorities of China were consulted on the selection of the sample.

(13) Following a comment from a non-sampled exporting producer arguing that one of the companies selected to be in the sample was a trading company rather than an exporting producer, the Commission verified with the sampled company whether that information was correct. Having confirmed the company was indeed a trader, the Commission decided to revise the sample replacing this company with another exporting producer.

(14) The newly selected exporting producer informed the Commission of its decision not to cooperate in the investigation and submit the questionnaire reply. Consequently, the Commission informed this exporting producer that it considered the failure to reply to the questionnaire as non-cooperation in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(15) As a result, the Commission revised the sample a second time and selected a third exporting producer as part of the final sample to replace the non-cooperating producer mentioned in recital (14).

(16) For both revisions of the sample, the Commission applied the same criterion used for the selection of the initial sample, i.e. the largest representative volume of exports to the Union during the investigation period which could reasonably be investigated within the time available.

(17) No exporting producers in China requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation.

(18) Most of the Union producers that were either represented by the complainant, or supporters of the complaint requested to obtain anonymity treatment in order to prevent possible retaliatory actions by customers in the Union that also sourced headless screws from Chinese suppliers. These customers included some large companies with significant market power compared to the Union producers of headless screws that are mostly SMEs. Considering the asymmetry between the Union headless screws producers and users, it concluded that the risk of retaliation alleged by the Union producers represented by EIFI and supporters indeed existed. On this basis, the Commission granted confidential treatment to the name of these companies.

(19) The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in China within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’).

(20) The Commission sent questionnaires to the Union producers, importers and exporting producers. The same questionnaires were made available online (4) on the day of initiation.

(22) The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(23) The product under investigation is screws and bolts, whether or not with their nuts and washers, without heads, of iron or steel other than stainless steel, regardless of tensile strength, excluding coach screws and other wood screws, screw hooks and screw rings, self-tapping screws, and screws and bolts for fixing railway track construction material (‘the product under investigation’).

(24) All screws without heads, namely threaded rods, anchor bolts and U-bolts are used to mechanically join two or more elements. They are used by a variety of consumer industries and in a wide range of final applications, including automotive, renewable energy, electrical appliances, agriculture, mechanical industry in general, and building.

(25) The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in the People’s Republic of China, currently falling under CN codes 7318 15 42 and 7318 15 48 .

(27) The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(28) Manufacturers of Foundation Bolts and Anchor Bolt Cages from the European Wind Energy Sector requested that anchor bolt cages were included in the product scope of the investigation.

(29) The Commission noted however that these products were not covered by the product definition, as set out in recital (23), neither in the complaint of this case and therefore no evidence of dumping and resulting injury justifying an investigation has been provided by the Union industry. The claim was therefore rejected.

(31) The Commission considered that hanger bolts have similar physical and technical characteristics as other screws. The complainant confirmed that the Union industry had capacity to produce hanger bolts. The Commission found at least one Union producer indicating the production of hanger bolts (5). Furthermore, the importer did not substantiate its claim on why the Union industry was incapable of producing hanger bolts of adequate quality. This claim was therefore rejected.

(32) In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation pointing to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with regard to China, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation with regard to the exporting producers from this country having regard to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(33) Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in China to provide information regarding the inputs used for producing screws. Thirty-eight exporting producers submitted the relevant information.

(34) In order to obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(35) No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in China.

(36) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks.

(37) On 5 March 2025, the Commission informed by a note (‘the First Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of screws. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified possible representative countries, namely Malaysia, Thailand, and Türkiye.

(38) The Commission received comments on the First Note from Chinafar Group, Junyue, Brother Group and the European Fasteners Distributor Association (‘EFDA’). The complainant provided comments on these interested parties’ submissions.

(39) On 4 April 2025, the Commission addressed the comments received from interested parties on the First Note by a second note (‘the Second Note’) and informed interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Thailand as the representative country. It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG & A’) and profits based on readily available financial data of three Thai fasteners’ producers, sourced from the Orbis database.

(40) The Commission received comments on the Second Note from Chinafar Group, Junyue, and EFDA. The complainant provided comments on these interested parties’ submissions. All comments are addressed in Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3 below.

(41) Having established the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, as explained in Section 3.2.1 below, and having analysed the comments and information received, the Commission concluded that Thailand was an appropriate representative country from which undistorted prices and costs would be sourced for the determination of the normal value. The underlying reasons for that choice are described in detail in Section 3.2.2 below.

(42) According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(43) However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred hereinafter as ‘SG & A’).

(44) As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(45) In recent investigations concerning the iron and steel sector in the PRC (6), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present.

(46) In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (7). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the steel sector, which is the main raw material to produce the product under investigation, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (8), but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (9). The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (10). Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC (11). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the steel sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (12), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC (13).

(47) Like in previous investigations concerning the steel sector in the PRC, the Commission examined in the present investigation whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the complaint, as well as in the Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations (14) (‘Report’), which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under investigation. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC as also found by its previous investigations in this respect.

(48) The complaint provided examples of elements pointing to the existence of distortions, as listed in the first to sixth indent of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, and alleged that market conditions, in particular costs and prices, in Chinese steel industry are not driven by market forces of supply and demand, but instead are distorted by State intervention in the economy.

(49) The complaint referred to previous anti-dumping investigations concerning the steel industry, and in particular the investigation into the fasteners industry, where the Commission established that the Chinese industry is heavily distorted and therefore, the prices and costs in the PRC could not constitute a proper basis for establishing the normal value (15).

(50) The complaint provided also references to the relevant parts of the Report, and pointed out in particular that: