Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1330 of 10 July 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of lysine originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (125) The Commission maintained that the cash flow trend was explained in recital 278, and the return on investments in recital 280 of the provisional Regulation. Even though the cash flow improved in the investigation period due to sales from stock, it remained negative throughout the period considered. The seemingly improving trend of return on investments in the investigation period was attributed to lower loss in profitability than in the previous years, caused by low production in the investigation period. The effect of Chinese imports on the decrease in production volumes was described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the provisional Regulation. The claims were rejected.

• (126) In absence of any comments, recitals 276 to 281 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.   Conclusion on injury

• (127) All claims of the parties following the provisional Regulation were rejected. The Commission therefore concluded, based on the findings disclosed in the provisional Regulation, that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation and recitals 282 to 286 of the provisional Regulation were, therefore, confirmed.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (128) CCCMC, CESFAC and Vall Companys alleged that the provisional Regulation did not adequately address the causal link between Chinese imports and the Union industry’s sales and whether lysine imports from China actually caused the material injury of the Union industry. It therefore relied partly on CESFAC’s own (alternative) import data, which the Commission rejected, as duly explained under Section 4.3 above.

• (129) CCCMC, CESFAC and Vall Companys argued that the evolution of the Union industry’s sales volumes has no correlation with the evolution of the Chinese imports, in particular as Chinese imports decreased in volume between 2021 and 2022 and the Union industry did not take advantage of that decrease, as its sales dropped as well in 2022. However, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 of the provisional Regulation, consumption dropped significantly between 2021 and 2022, much stronger than the volume of Chinese imports, and therefore there was no scope for the Union industry to recover some of the volumes lost to Chinese markets, had that been possible in terms of costs and prices. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (130) CCCMC also claimed that the Commission had not demonstrated the price undercutting and that the Chinese imports caused the Union industry’s price depression and price suppression. In this respect, the Commission noted that the prices of dumped Chinese imports were much lower than the sale prices of the Union industry and the import prices of lysine from Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea (Table 12 of the provisional Regulation). It is therefore evident that the price of Chinese lysine, with a dominant position on the Union market throughout the entire period considered, exercised price suppression and price depression to the Union industry and also on imports from other non-Chinese sources. The Commission therefore rejected the claim.

• (131) Following final disclosure, CCCMC alleged that the positive attribution test of the impact of the Chinese imports through their volume, price effects, and impact on the Union industry is not met and that the Chinese imports had not caused injury to the Union industry. CCCMC claimed that the Commission did not examine in sufficient detail how the volumes and prices of the subject imports interacted with the prices of domestic like products over the period considered in order to cause price undercutting and suppression and injury to the Union industry.

• (132) The Commission disagreed and considered that a sufficient level of analysis in this respect was disclosed in Section 4 of provisional Regulation and in the final disclosure document (reflected in Section 4 of this Regulation). The claim was dismissed.

• (133) In the absence of other comments, recitals 288 to 291 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

• (134) CESFAC and Vall Companys submitted that third country imports were a significant contributor to the injury claimed by the Complainant during the period considered, in particular in 2022, and that the Commission had failed to assess the impact of other third countries’ imports on the injury during the period considered.

• (135) The Commission recalled that the Commission had analysed the role that imports from other third countries could have had on the injury of the Union industry under recitals 292 to 298 of the provisional Regulation. In that analysis, it had concluded (i) that the market share of non-Chinese third countries decreased between 2020 and the IP by 4 % and it stood at [20 %-25 %] in the investigation period; and (ii) that the import prices of dumped Chinese imports were much lower than the sale prices of the Union industry and the import prices of lysine from Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea, three of the four other sources of imports; whereas prices of imports from the USA were at similar levels – but import volumes from the USA had been halved from 2020 to the investigation period. CESFAC and Vall Companys did not question those findings, and the claim was therefore rejected. The revision of the Chinese import data for lysine in the investigation period, as explained in recitals 79 and shown in the revised Table 3, had an impact on the market share in the investigation period of third non-Chinese exporting producers of lysine. The Commission disclosed ranges in Table 12 of the provisional Regulation. The new market shares remain in the ranges disclosed in the provisional Regulation.

• (136) In the absence of other comments, recitals 292 to 298 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (137) CESFAC and Vall Companys claimed that export sales representing 20 % of the Union industry’s total sales is a significant share and not be taken lightly in the Commission’s analysis.

• (138) The Commission maintained, for the reasons explained in recitals 300 and 301 of the provisional Regulation (notably, volume, volume trend and prices) that these sales did not attenuate the causal link.

• (139) Following final disclosure, CCCMC alleged that the poor export performance, self-imports, and focus shift from lysine to specialty products and poor pre-existing financial situation did break the alleged causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury found.

• (140) The Commission maintained, as explained in recitals 300 and 301 of the provisional Regulation, that the Union industry exports decreased linearly with the decrease in production in the period considered. The Commission already demonstrated in the Section 4.3 of the provisional Regulation and the final disclosure document (reflected in Section 4.3 above) that the decrease in production was due to Chinese imports. With regard to the claim on self-imports, the Commission explained in recital 303 of provisional Regulation that those imports were considered marginal and intended to improve the cash flow position of the Union industry. Similarly, in recital 310 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission explained that the production of other amino acids is separate from the production process of lysine and does not have impact on the capacity utilisation of the lysine plant. The Commission also maintained that the claim on the poor pre-existing economic situation of the Union industry was addressed sufficiently in recital 312 of the provisional Regulation. The claim was rejected.

• (141) In the absence of other comments, recitals 299 to 301 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.3.   Other factors

• (142) In absence of any comments, recitals 302 to 313 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (143) All claims of the parties following the provisional Regulation were rejected. The Commission therefore concluded, based on the findings disclosed in the provisional Regulation, that the dumped imports from the PRC caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate or break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Injury margin

• (144) CCCMC, CESFAC and Vall Companys claimed that no information concerning the investment plans and postponed projects has been provided in the non-confidential file and that this amount should not be used in the calculation of the target profit, specifying that ‘normal conditions of competition’ should not be equated to ‘ideal conditions of competition’ and that the assessment of the target profit must be conducted with reference to the actual (normal) conditions of competition in the market at issue.

• (145) The complainant submitted that the main aspects of its strategy were to industrialise the production of glycolic acid and to create additional production capacity for valine and the two projects required significant investments. Due to the poor economic performance caused by dumped lysine from China, the complainant was never in the position to materialise these investments.

• (146) The Commission recalled that in the provisional Regulation and a Note to the File ¹⁸, it had explained that it had verified the information provided by the complainant in this regard and found the claim to be warranted. It had also explained how it had established the relevant adjustment. For reasons of confidentiality, no details could be provided on the complainant’s investment plans and postponed projects. The Commission considered that under normal conditions of competition, the market would not be distorted by dumped imports causing injury. The verified claim on investments foregone could clearly be linked to the distorted market situation and the Commission therefore confirmed that an adjustment therefore of the target price under Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation was warranted.

• (147) Following final disclosure, CCCMC alleged that essential facts were not demonstrating that adjustments under Article 7(2)c of the basic Regulation were justified. CCCMC claimed the investments foregone could not be clearly linked to the distorted market situation.

• (148) The Commission maintained that for reasons of confidentiality, the information contained in the Note to the File mentioned in recital 146 above was deemed sufficient to substantiate that the postponed investment plans were linked to the dumped Chinese imports. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (149) Secondly, CCCMC and CESFAC disagreed with the Commission’s calculation of Union industry’s current and future environmental costs performed under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, also with a view to adjusting the target price. CCCMC claimed that the environmental standards applied by the Commission artificially inflated the target price and that the WTO rules do not permit the use of anti-dumping policies to enforce environmental or labour standards extraterritorially. CCCMC also disagreed with the calculation of future cost of emission allowances, claiming that the figure calculated by the Commission is overstated, and submitted that the complainant has consistently received more free ETS allowances that it needed to cover its actual emissions. The complainant disputed CCCMC’s claim that the EU lysine industry received more allocations than it needed to cover its actual emissions, and it submitted that CCCMC took into account only data for one installation in the French registry, and that the production of amino acids is not eligible for the compensation of indirect CO2 costs associated with electricity.

• (150) The Commission rejected the claim of CCCMC and CESFAC. It noted that the amount of ETS allowances received is based on the production volume of previous years. For the next several years, the complainant will therefore receive fewer allowances, since its production volume in recent years was lower due pressure from the dumped imports. The figures used are thus realistic, verified amounts and not overstated, as claimed by the parties. As regards the alleged WTO incompatibility of the inclusion of current and future environmental costs in the target price, the claim was unsubstantiated and based on the incorrect assumption that the calculation of the target price has extraterritorial effects or was meant to enforce environmental or labour standards in third countries.

• (151) CESFAC and Vall Companys also stated that the Commission’s methodology to calculate ETS cost seems to be based on the total pollutant emissions volume currently attributed to the complainant, rather than emissions associated with lysine production only. The Commission clarified that it established the estimated future additional costs only in relation to the production of the product concerned and the upstream products generating CO2 emissions. The methodology was explained in the mentioned Note to the File.

• (152) CCCMC further disputed a target profit of 10,69 % as an unrealistic and unreasonable scenario. The Commission recalled that the methodology for calculation of the target price is set out in recitals 318 to 326 in the provisional Regulation and it strictly follows the provisions of Article 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. The Commission applied a reasonable profit margin, as set out in the basic Regulation, of 6 %. Subsequently, the Commission calculated 4,69 % in investments foregone, R & D, innovation (IRI) and ETS based on the verified figures of the Union industry. CCCMC did not explain why it considered the resulting adjustment unrealistic and unreasonable and the claim is therefore rejected.

• (153) Following final disclosure, CCCMC reiterated that the Commission’s approach to establish the target profit of 10,69 %, comprising of basic profit, IRI and ETS cost, was incorrect. CCCMC alleged that the Union industry was lossmaking throughout the period considered and that it was factually and legally unjustified to apply a profit margin of 6 %. CCCMC claimed that, in the absence of profit of Union industry, the target profit should have been established at 6 %.

• (154) The Commission explained in recital 320 of the provisional Regulation that, as the Union industry suffered losses during the entire period considered and the Union industry data could not be used, the Commission established a profit margin at 6 % as a basic profit. Furthermore, the level of investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation of 4,69 % under normal conditions of competition was calculated based on the verified investment plans of the Union industry, as explained in recital 146 above, and added to the basic profit to obtain the target profit.

• (155) The Commission considered that that CCCMC is correct that in the absence of profit by the Union industry because of significant imports from China throughout the period considered, the basic profit should indeed be established at 6 % in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation ¹⁹. However, the Commission observed that this basic profit is set as a minimum and not a maximum level pursuant to Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. Moreover, this basic profit needs to be adjusted in case when the Union industry makes a legitimate claim that the target profit should include an amount of R & D and innovation expenses foregone. 4,69 % represents only that amount which is to be added to the basic profit. The interpretation of CCCMC would lead to the illogical conclusion that an industry in the circumstances of lysine industry would be entitled to the profit of 6 % irrespective of whether it successfully claims that it had had such investments foregone.

• (156) The Commission therefore observed that the overall target profit established of total 10,69 %, that is including a basic profit and R & D investments under normal conditions of competition, is in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation.

• (157) In any case, even if the claim was accepted and the overall target profit was to be set at 6 %, the resulting injury margins would have been still significantly higher than the dumping margins, which set the level of the duties, for all parties. The Commission therefore considered the claim moot as it would not have had an impact on the duty level for any of the exporting producers.

• (158) In the absence of comments, recital 328 of the provisional Regulation was confirmed. Therefore, the definitive injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

Company	Definitive injury margin (%)
Meihua Group: — Jilin Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd — Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd	158,9
Heilongjiang Eppen Biotech Co., Ltd	155,9
Other cooperating companies	157,5
All other imports originating in PRC	158,9

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (159) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The amount of the definitive duty is set out in recital 204 below.

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (160) CESFAC and Vall Companys claimed that Eurolysine and its predecessors have promised to increase production of lysine on many occasions and have consistently failed to deliver on this promise despite receiving prolonged protection and substantial financial support from the French state.

• (161) The Commission reiterated that due to the overwhelming presence of dumped Chinese imports on the Union market at prices below the Union industry’s cost of production, the Union industry was eventually forced to adjust the production volumes to very low levels.

• (162) The complainant submitted that since the initiation of the investigation, the demand for European produced lysine increased, which in turn increased Eurolysine’s production, and alleged that the Union industry has plans to massively scale up production of lysine and increase the Union output of the amino acid (such as lysine, tryptophane, valine, isoleucine, leucine and arginine) through an investment plan of EUR 130 million between now and 2030 with the view to developing Eurolysine’s production capacity, improving its energy efficiency and modernising existing facilities. The complainant stressed that a failure to adopt the anti-dumping measures would result in closure of Eurolysine’s facilities.

• (163) In the absence of other comments on the interests of the Union industry, recitals 331 to 335 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and traders

7.2.1.   Security of supply

• (164) European Feed Manufacturers’ Federation (FEFAC) alleged that the anti-dumping measures may disrupt lysine imports as Union production and other third countries cannot replace imports from China and satisfy the Union demand. The Danish Grain and Feed Association (DAKOFO) submitted that by restricting imports from China, the proposed duties risk creating a monopolised market, limiting supply options for EU feed producers and increasing price volatility.

• (165) Barentz further alleged that the combined capacity of the Union industry and third countries (excluding China) is insufficient to meet the Union consumption of lysine, which was during the investigation period approx. 435 000 tonnes. Barentz stressed that the Union industry and other third countries can supply for around 41 % of the total EU demand of lysine, while the EU industry alone could only supply 18 % of the EU demand, resulting in a shortage of 59 % to meet demands of users. Barentz concluded that the EU users and importers of lysine will be forced to continue to procure most of their lysine demand from China and pay the anti-dumping duty, which would result in an increased costs of lysine for animal feed producers and farmers.

• (166) The complainant submitted that the position of FEFAC was predicated on a number of incorrect assumptions, namely that the Union industry production of lysine will remain static and will not increase should measures be imposed, that Chinese suppliers will withdraw from the European market should the measures be imposed, that non-Chinese third country suppliers do not satisfy the regulatory requirements to sell lysine to EU feed users. The complainant further noted that there are vast overcapacities in China, which will be targeted to the Union market in view of latest trade measures in Brazil and the US.

• (167) With regards to the unused production capacities of lysine in Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and the USA, the complainant submitted that these exporting producers have in the past supplied more volume to Union customers before the significant increase of lysine shipments from China, i.e. prior to the period considered. The complainant asserted that the spare capacities in non-Chinese third countries was between 500 000 – 600 000 tonnes in 2023. The complainant concluded that the anti-dumping measures will increase the attractiveness of the Union market for lysine producers in the Union and in third countries through fair competition.

• (168) With regard to production and additional spare production capacity in non-Chinese third countries, the Commission noted that there was a huge overproduction of lysine in China in the period considered (approx. 2 500 000 tonnes of production, while only 300 000 tonnes were consumed domestically). Overall, based on the analysis of the data on the production capacity and production in Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea and USA as reported in Feedinfo, the Commission noted that there were additional unused production capacities in the third non-Chinese countries totalling 500 000 tonnes ²⁰ in 2023. These additional spare capacities, which are higher than the total size of the EU market, are complementary to the 100 000 tonnes of lysine which were already imported from non-Chinese third countries in the investigation period. On that basis, the Commission expected that, as the imposition of definitive measures would restore a competitive market situation in the Union with higher prices, these measures would be an incentive to third country producers to increase their EU sales. Over the last years, non-Chinese third countries could only export liquid lysine to the Union as that market segment was not targeted by Chinese imports which focussed on the largest product group lysine HCl and lysine sulphate. That situation changed with the measures in place. The analysis above therefore confirmed that the security of supply is not at risk; the EU industry will significantly increase its production and sales volumes, Chinese imports will not be halted and there will be an increased offer of non-Chinese imports on the market which, if needed, could satisfy the entire demand for imported lysine. As explained in recital 162, the Union industry resumed its production of lysine. The complainant submitted production data demonstrating a substantial increase of production since July 2024 with a view of reaching the full production capacity in 2026 ²¹.

• (169) The Commission further considered that the definitive anti-dumping duties, which are set at the level of dumping, were not prohibitive. This is for the following reasons: first, the underselling margins were well above the level of the duties (see the Table in recital 204); second, based on the prices observed in the period considered, the price of imports from China (Table 4 in the provisional Regulation) with the definitive anti-dumping duties would be in a similar price range with the prices of imports from the non-Chinese third countries (Table 12); third, the impact of the duty on users is limited, as explained in Section 7.3.2 below. Therefore, Chinese imports to the Union were expected to continue, albeit in lower volumes, as they remain competitive, even with the anti-dumping measures in place. The measures were expected to guarantee a continued and increasing supply from the Union producer and restore a level playing field without blocking Chinese imports. The Commission therefore considered that, when level playing field is restored, the other third country non-Chinese lysine producers would be able to adjust to the market conditions and increase the imported volumes of lysine to the Union, if needed. The argument is rejected.

• (170) In the absence of other comments on the interest of importers, the comments made on the interest of importers were rejected. Therefore, recitals 336 to 340 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.3.   Interest of users and consumers

7.3.1.   Increased costs for feed producers and farmers

• (171) The Danish Grain and Feed Association (DAKOFO) alleged that the proposed anti-dumping duties will result in an additional annual cost of approximately DKK 230 million (EUR 30,8 million) for Danish feed producers and that these costs will ultimately be passed on to livestock farmers, reducing their global competitiveness and increasing food production costs in Denmark and the Union.

• (172) DAKOFO urged the Commission to consider alternative measures that address concerns without harming the competitiveness of EU feed and livestock producers, such as to facilitate investment in additional lysine production capacity within Europe, reducing dependency on imports through market-driven rather than protectionist measures, and to streamline approval processes for alternative feed ingredients and ensure that European feed producers have access to raw materials at competitive global prices.

• (173) Barentz and CESFAC alleged that the adoption of anti-dumping measures will negatively affect the Union interest as the negative impact on the whole value chain of lysine in the Union would outweigh the interests of the complainant, and the imposition of anti-dumping measures would create a significant increase in the cost of animal feed and weaken competition on the Union market. CESFAC further submitted that downstream user industry generates small profit margins and that animal feed represents approximately 65 % of the costs to produce pork and poultry products.

• (174) Barentz submitted that farmers will face higher costs, which they will have to pass on to their customers due to very low profit margins. Barentz feared that with measures in place farmers will become less competitive compared to livestock producers from third countries who are not facing increased lysine costs and may even benefit from a lower lysine price because Chinese exporters might divert their lysine volumes to third countries.

• (175) With regard to the comments of DAKOFO and Barentz on the impact of the duty on the financial position of farmers, the Commission noted that these claims were unsubstantiated. In any event, the Commission considered that an additional cost of animal feed production of less than 1 % to the animal feed producers (see recital 179 below) did not necessarily translate into an additional cost to the farmers, depending on what the former can pass on their costs to the latter. The additional cost increase resulted in any event to a much smaller cost increase of pork and poultry meat, as animal feed is an important but not the only element in the breeding costs. That claim was therefore rejected.

• (176) The Commission addressed the other comments of DAKOFO, CESFAC and Barentz under Section 7.3.2.

7.3.2.   Impact assessment submitted by FEFAC

• (177) The European Feed Manufacturers’ Federation (FEFAC) submitted an impact assessment of the provisional anti-dumping duties for lysine imports from China. The study was based on simulations performed in seven Union regions (covering 25 Member States) and explored different lysine price increase scenarios as a consequence of the introduction of the anti-dumping measures against a baseline corresponding to the average price of lysine sulphate and lysine HCl over the period January 2023 to March 2024. FEFAC concluded that a potential cost increase would occur in the production costs of industrial feed for pig and poultry in the range of 1,11 %-1,51 % at the EU-combined level, translating into increased production costs of industrial feed for pig and poultry of EUR 300 to 400 million depending on the scenarios, and an estimate of extra cost of EUR 100 to 140 million for home mixing. With regard to soybean meal consumption, FEFAC estimated that potential increased demand between 450 000 and 600 000 tonnes.

• (178) With regard to FEFAC’s impact assessment, the Commission identified several material flaws, notably with regard to the calculation of the CIF-prices which overestimated the impact of the duties as provisionally established. The Commission also noted that FEFAC’s scenarios were based on the duty levels in the provisional Regulation, which were significantly higher than those finally established.

• (179) In view of the revised duty levels, the Commission assessed their impact based on the verified questionnaire reply of the sole cooperating user Vall Companys, an important animal feed and meat products producer. The Commission applied definitive anti-dumping duties to their lysine purchases in the investigation period and established that the cost share of lysine in their costs of production of animal feed products would increase by less than 1 %. This is under the worst-case scenario assumption that all other circumstances (purchase sources, purchase prices net of duties, feed formulas) remain equal, which is unlikely as economic operators can be expected to adapt to changed circumstances and, as a result, reduce their costs through purchasing from cheaper sources (e.g. other non-Chinese third countries), purchasing from sources without anti-dumping duties, or changing the feed formula for lower lysine content. The Commission considered amongst other that the users may switch to cheaper lysine suppliers (whether or not subject to anti-dumping duties) or adjust their feed formula recipes for lower content of lysine.

• (180) On that basis, the Commission maintained that the impact of the measures on animal feed producers is very limited.

• (181) Following final disclosure, FEFAC alleged that since the initiation of the investigation, the price quotation of lysine increased by 47 %, which in turn would have further impact on the lysine users (estimated EUR 220-240 million for feed industries and EUR 300 million for home mixing) than calculated in FEFAC’s initial impact assessment.

• (182) The Commission noted in recital 214 below that, based on the Eurostat import statistics, prices of Chinese imports have increased post investigation period, and they were 9 %-15 % above average prices in the investigation period, not 47 %. The Commission concluded in recital 179 above that the cost share of lysine in their costs of production of animal feed products would increase by less than 1 %. Even with lysine price increase of 9 %-15 %, the cost impact on animal feed remains under 1 %. The claim was rejected.

• (183) CESFAC and Vall Companys submitted that a cost increase of animal feed of less than 1 % translated into approximately EUR 220 million for all Union producers of animal feed, and considered the additional cost important in view of the low profits of animal feed producers and meat producers.

• (184) The Commission noted the arguments brought forward by CESFAC and maintained that the impact of additional cost, and the possibility of lysine users to absorb or pass on this additional cost, had been carefully analysed by the Commission. The Commission concluded in recital 179 above that a cost increase of animal feed of less than 1 % can be absorbed, or passed on, by the downstream industries.

7.4.   Other factors

7.4.1.   Environmental concerns

• (185) Barentz and FEFAC alleged that the main option to replace lysine as a feed additive is to use crude protein raw material sources such as soybean and, with the anti-dumping duties in place, the consumption of soybean in animal feed will increase. Soybean is a less cost-efficient solution for animal feed production caries a negative environmental effect, since the production of soy is linked to deforestation in third countries and the usage of soybean in animal feed would contribute to increased emissions of methane, nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide in the Union. FEFAC estimated in its impact assessment an increase of 3 % in usage of soyabean meal, which translates into a figure of 500 000 tonnes of higher demand for soyabean meal that would need to be imported from third countries. DAKOFO reiterated the negative environmental and economic consequences and submitted that, to compensate for the higher lysine prices, Danish feed producers can adjust feed formulations, leading to an increased annual demand for soybean imports by approximately 20 000–40 000 tons per year, translating into a loss to the Danish feed producers by EUR 1-2 million.

• (186) On the environmental concerns, the complainant emphasised that the carbon footprint of lysine produced in the Union is five times lower than the carbon footprint of lysine produced in China, and three times lower than the lysine produced in non-Chinese third countries. Therefore, it argued that the continued import of Chinese lysine is contributing to the issue of carbon leakage, and undermining Green Deal and other environmental ambitions of the Union.

• (187) The Commission analysed the claims on negative environmental impact and noted that the impact assessment lacked proper correlation between increased price of lysine and the percentage of feed volumes that would switch to soybean as a source of crude lysine. While the impact assessment identified correctly that soybean can be used in the animal feed to substitute lysine, it failed to provide conclusive results on the increased imported volumes based on a number of incorrect assumptions in the impact assessment. Moreover, even if soybean meal imports were to increase in the Union, such imports would be subject to the EU regulation on deforestation-free products ²², which would address any concerns of an environmental nature. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (188) Following final disclosure, CESFAC and Vall Companys alleged that the Commission did not assess the security of supply of soybean meal with regard to the US tariffs and subsequent countermeasures by third countries. CESFAC and Vall Companys submitted that the US tariffs on Chinese imports and the subsequent retaliatory measures adopted by China had disrupted the global trade flows of soybeans. CESFAC and Vall Companys claimed that imports of Brazilian soybean to China would increase in the future to the detriment of imports of US soybean to China, causing direct competition to imports of Brazilian soybean to the Union. CESFAC and Vall Companys further expected the price of soybean to increase due possible shortages on the Union market, caused by increased imports of soybean to China, and the EU Deforestation Regulation.

• (189) The Commission noted that since the beginning of 2025, the US tariffs and subsequent retaliatory measures had been constantly evolving and therefore it was difficult to establish impact on imports of soybean to the Union. With regard to the imports of soybean from Brazil, the Commission noted EU-Mercosur trade agreement would reduce export tariffs that Mercosur had imposed on exports to the EU of soybean products, which are one of the key materials to feed for EU livestock. The Commission also noted that CESFAC and Vall Companys acknowledged that price fluctuation impact soybean imports, too. This assertion did not contradict the ‘least-cost formulation principle’. On the contrary, with increase price of soybean, the animal feed producers will likely opt for lysine.

7.4.2.   Interchangeability of different forms of lysine for users

• (190) FEFAC alleged that not all EU compound feed producers are equipped to process liquid lysine and, therefore, imports of lysine HCl and lysine sulphate from China remain necessary. In the same vein, CESFAC claimed that solid forms of lysine in powder and liquid forms of lysine are not interchangeable for users from a practical or technological perspective and that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would disproportionately affect small and medium-sized feed producers, pre-mixers and on-farm feed producers which rely on solid forms of lysine produced by Chinese exporting producers and cannot switch to liquid forms of lysine.

• (191) The complainant alleged that the Spanish consumption of liquid lysine was substantially higher in the past years, which indicates that customers are not limited to lysine HCl and lysine sulphate. The complainant claimed that Spanish feed companies are able to consume much higher quantities of liquid lysine without the need to invest in new equipment and that the increase in liquid lysine consumption between 2023 and 2024 confirms that with the positive effect of the anti-dumping investigation, non-Chinese lysine suppliers are already coming back to the EU market since the investigation was initiated and they will continue if measures are definitively imposed.

• (192) With regard to the possibility of users to switch, if need be, from dry to liquid or vice versa, the Commission found that data from FeedInfo show that the consumption of liquid lysine was much higher in 2021 than in the following years ²³. As China does not export liquid lysine to the EU, this evolution can be attributed to the loss of quantities and market share of non-Chinese third countries and the Union industry. Feedinfo also shows an increase in liquid lysine consumption between 2023 and 2024, which suggests that a number of users are already able to change between dry and liquid lysine. Furthermore, the complainant submitted data from specialised market intelligence proving that lysine HCl imports from non-Chinese third countries increased significantly in 2024 (from 207 tonnes in Q1 to 3 262 tonnes in Q4), following the initiation of the investigation, while no lysine HCl was exported by the non-Chinese third countries in the period considered ²⁴. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the animal feed producers will continue having both options of dry and liquid lysine even with a decrease of imports from China.

• (193) Secondly, the Commission noted that the reason that liquid lysine was the most important product type imported in the Union from other non-Chinese countries in the period considered was not related to the inability of third country producers to produce or sell lysine HCl or lysine sulphate, but due to the overwhelming presence on the market of Chinese imports of lysine HCl and lysine sulphate, resulting in price depression. With measures imposed, it will be attractive again for third country producers to sell products other than liquid lysine in the Union. In a standard manufacturing method, the lysine producers obtain liquid lysine first, which is subsequently transformed into lysine HCl or lysine sulphate by a drying equipment. It is therefore a simple process for the lysine producers to transform liquid lysine to powdered form of lysine. The Commission rejected the argument.

• (194) In the absence of other comments on the interest of users, recitals 341 to 347 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.4.3.   Strategic interest of the Union

• (195) CESFAC and Vall Companys questioned whether Eurolysine’s sales volumes on the Union market will rise following the implementation of the anti-dumping measures. CESFAC and Vall Companys expressed concerns that Eurolysine, following acquisition by Group Avril, will sell significant volumes of lysine for captive use to support Avril’s own animal feed business, Sanders, and will not sell lysine supply to its competitors in the animal feed sector.

• (196) The complainant rejected that there is any risk that Eurolysine’s takeover by Groupe Avril would leads to any foreclosure of lysine supply on the Union market. It underlined that Eurolysine remains an independent business unit within Groupe Avril, which moreover is not a vertically integrated feed company and that therefore, from Eurolysine’s perspective, Sanders is a potential customer such as Vall Companys and any other. It also noted that Sanders is, moreover, not buying significant volumes of lysine. The Commission welcomed complainant’s assurance that Union industry’s lysine will not be reserved for a captive use and rejected the claim on that basis.

• (197) CESAC claimed that the renewal of the duty-free autonomous tariff quotas for imports of lysine HCl and liquid lysine (tariff quota 0925 63) and imports of lysine sulphate (tariff quota 0929 25) by the Council ²⁵ demonstrates that Eurolysine continues to produce insufficient quantities of lysine to supply the Union users, that EU users that produce animal feed and pharmaceuticals continue to depend upon lysine imports, and that it continues to be in the Union’s interest to ensure an adequate supply of lysine and avoid any market disturbances. CESFAC alleged that the provisional anti-dumping duties are in conflict with the duty-free autonomous tariff quotas, and therefore of Union interest.

• (198) The Commission noted that the current quotas are periodically revisited by the Council in order to ensure that their continued existence does not conflict with any other Union policy. As the investigation was ongoing at the time of the approval of the duty-free autonomous tariff quotas and the definitive determinations were not reached yet, the Commission does not consider the provisional anti-dumping duties in conflict with the duty-free autonomous tariff quotas for lysine.

• (199) Furthermore, the Commission noted the Joint statement of Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and France about the European chemicals industry ²⁶ calling for an EU Critical Chemicals Act at the Competitiveness Council on 12 March 2025 ²⁷, classifying lysine among the critical chemicals. Considering that eight Member States directly mention lysine as a critical chemical for the Union to protect, the Commission weighted their position in the assessment of the Union interest. The Commission also considered that, in view of significant overproduction in China, maintaining Union production of lysine contributes to the economic security of the Union. The argument that anti-dumping duties conflict with the duty-free autonomous tariff quotas was rejected.

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest.

• (200) In the absence of other comments on Union interest, recital 348 of the provisional Regulation was confirmed.

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

• (201) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

• (202) Following final disclosure, Eppen alleged that due to the limited source of supply and in particular the insufficient supply from the Union industry, Union users will have to continue importing lysine from China and pay the anti-dumping duty, which will result in increased costs for animal feed producers and farmers. Eppen submitted that a Minimum Import Price, or fixed duties per tonne, would be a more appropriate form of the anti-dumping measures.

• (203) The claim was not substantiated and Eppen failed to explain why a fixed duty would be more appropriate. In addition the Commission underlined that fixed duties are unlikely to constitute an effective remedy for goods that are subject to significant price variations over time. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (204) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
Meihua Group: — Jilin Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd — Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd	47,7	158,9	47,7
Heilongjiang Eppen Biotech Co., Ltd	58,2	155,9	58,2
Other cooperating companies listed in the Annex	53,1	157,5	53,1
All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	58,2	158,9	58,2

• (205) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

• (206) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission ²⁸. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (207) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

• (208) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (209) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

• (210) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

• (211) Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

8.2.   Definitive collection of the provisional duties

• (212) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation.

8.3.   Retroactivity

• (213) As mentioned in Section 1.2, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

• (214) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

• (215) Pursuant to Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation, there needs to be, ‘in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, a further substantial rise in imports which, in the light of its timing and volume and other circumstances, is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied’.

• (216) For this analysis, the Commission first compared the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures. The Commission established an increase of Chinese imports by 32 %. Also when comparing the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation up to and including the month in which provisional measures were imposed, the Commission observed an increase of Chinese imports, by 43 %.

• (217) However, since the initiation of the current investigation, prices of Chinese imports have increased, and they were 9 %-15 % above average prices in the investigation period. The Commission has no information on the file that in spite of such price increase the Union industry would be additionally injured.

• (218) On that basis, and in particular in view of the significant price increase of Chinese imports since the initiation of the investigation, the Commission concluded that the conditions as set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation for the retroactive application of the definitive anti-dumping duty were not met.

9. FINAL PROVISION

• (219) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council ²⁹, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (220) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver opinion on the measures provided for in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)	TARIC additional code
Meihua Group: — Jilin Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd — Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd	47,7	89IE
Heilongjiang Eppen Biotech Co., Ltd	58,2	89IF
Other cooperating companies listed in the Annex	53,1
All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	58,2	8999

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/74 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

• (a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023);

• (b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

• (c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 July 2025.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

’ (2017), 48 Aquaculture Research, Volume 134, available at Comparison of L-lysine·HCl and L-lysine sulphate in the feed of Penaeus monodon and re-evaluation of dietary lysine requirement for P. monodon – Niu – 2017 – Aquaculture Research – Wiley Online Library.

• — 2021: 4 500-6 500 tonnes;

• — 2022: 4 000-6 000 tonnes;

• — 2023: 2 500-4 500 tonnes;

• — 2024: 3 500-5 500 tonnes.

ANNEX

Cooperating exporting producers in the People’s Republic of China not sampled

Name	TARIC additional code
Anhui BBCA Biochemical Co., Ltd.	89IG
CJ (Liaocheng) Biotech Co., Ltd.	89IH
Dongxiao Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	89IJ
Qiqihar Longjiang Fufeng Biotechnologies Co., Ltd.	89IK

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1330/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)