Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1342 of 11 July 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of multilayered wood flooring originating in the People’s Republic of China

Image omitted; see official source	Official Journal of the European Union	EN L series
---	---	---
	2025/1342	14.7.2025

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union ¹ (‘the basic Regulation’) and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

• (1) On 16 May 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of multilayered wood flooring (MWF) originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’, ‘the PRC’, or ‘China’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union ² (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

• (2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 4 April 2024 by the European Parquet Federation (‘FEP’ or ‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of MWF in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2.   Registration

• (3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2733 ³ (‘the registration Regulation’).

1.3.   Provisional measures

• (4) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 18 December 2024, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details about the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days. The comments received were addressed in recital 390 of the provisional Regulation.

• (5) On 15 January 2025, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of MWF originating in the People’s Republic of China by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/78 ⁴ (‘the provisional Regulation’).

1.4.   Subsequent procedure

• (6) Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), several parties filed written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation. These parties were:

Importers and distributors

• — F. W. Barth and Co. GmbH (‘Barth’),

• — Puderbach Holzhandel GmbH & Co. KG (‘Puderbach’),

• — Amorim Deutschland GmbH (‘Amorim’) and

• — MEFO Floor GmbH & Co. KG (‘MEFO Floor’).

Chinese exporting producers

• — Forest Group (‘Forest’),

• — Fusong Group (‘Fusong’) and

• — Jinfa Group (‘Jinfa’).

Associations

• — China National Forest Products Industry Association (‘CNFPIA’),

• — The European Parquet Federation (‘FEP’) and

• — The Hardware Association of Ireland (‘HAI’), representing two of its members, Canadia Distributors Limited and the Whiteriver group.

• (7) The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with Forest, Fusong, Jinfa, the CNFPIA and FEP.

• (8) The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions where appropriate.

• (9) The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of MWF originating in China (‘definitive disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the definitive disclosure.

• (10) Following the definitive disclosure, several parties filed written submissions making their views known. These parties were: Amorim, Alliance of MWF Importers (‘AUMI’), Barth, Corà Domenico & Figli Spa (‘Cora Domenico’), CNFPIA, FEP, Holz-Richter GmbH (‘Holz-Richter’), Forest, Fusong, Jinfa, Lovelin of London Ltd (‘Lovelin’), MEFO Floor, Puderbach and Thede & Witte.

• (11) Parties who so requested were also granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with Amorim, Barth, CNFPIA, Holz-Richter, Forest, Fusong, Jinfa and Thede & Witte.

1.5.   Claims on initiation

• (12) In the absence of comments on the initiation of the investigation after the imposition of provisional measures, recitals 20 to 28 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

1.6.   Sampling

• (13) In the absence of comments concerning the sampling of Union producers, importers and exporting producers in China, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 6 to 12 of the provisional Regulation.

1.7.   Investigation period and period considered

• (14) In the absence of comments concerning the investigation period (‘IP’) and the period considered, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recital 19 of the provisional Regulation.

2. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

• (15) In the absence of any comments concerning the product under investigation, the product concerned and the like product, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 29 to 33 of the provisional Regulation.

3. DUMPING

3.1.   Normal value and procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation

3.1.1.   Existence of significant distortions

• (16) In the absence of comments on the existence of significant distortions in the country concerned, the Commission confirmed its findings and conclusions set out in recitals 43 to 137 of the provisional Regulation.

3.1.2.   Representative country and calculation of benchmarks for selling, general & administrative (‘SG&A’) expenses and for profit

• (17) Comments on the choice of the representative country and on the Commission’s calculation of benchmarks for SG&A and profit were provided by the European Parquet Federation (‘FEP’) and its members, acting as complainants in this investigation, four importers, namely Puderbach, Amorim, MEFO Floor and Barth, and by the three sampled exporting producers, i.e. the JINFA group, the Fusong group, and the Forest group.

• (18) FEP supported the Commission’s choice of representative country and the calculation of benchmarks for SG&A and for profit, as set out in the provisional Regulation.

• (19) Puderbach, Amorim, MEFO and Barth claimed that the Turkish companies used in the provisional Regulation to establish SG&A and profit are unsuitable because these companies do not produce the product under investigation. Puderbach, Amorim, MEFO and Barth also stated that there are companies in South East Asia and in Europe (non-EU) which have not been considered by the Commission.

• (20) The Commission noted that none of these parties identified any specific companies in their respective submissions, or any specific countries where companies producing MWF with readily available financial data might be found, neither did they propose any other method to establish SG&A and profit. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

• (21) The JINFA group and the Fusong group claimed that Türkiye is not an appropriate representative country, in particular in comparison to Malaysia. Therefore, these parties argued that Malaysia should be used as the representative country instead of Türkiye.

• (22) The Forest group claimed that the SG&A and profit calculated on the basis of data of the Turkish companies identified by the Commission are unreasonably high and that Malaysian producers should be used instead.

• (23) All three sampled exporting producers stated that in case the Commission maintains the selection of Türkiye as the representative country, it should adjust downwards the benchmarks calculated for SG&A and for profit.

• (24) The above claims and arguments of the sampled exporting producers are presented and addressed in more detail below.

• (25) The JINFA group and the Fusong group claimed that Türkiye is not an appropriate representative country because of its exceptional economic situation and in particular hyperinflation in the year 2023 (i.e. the investigation period), which, in their view, inevitably affected all costs of production and other economic indicators, rending them unreliable as a source for the determination of the normal value. In relation to this claim, they provided the following arguments:

• (a) The requirement of Article 2(6a)(a), second paragraph, first indent of the basic Regulation that the representative country has to have a similar level of economic development is not met by Türkiye because of its high inflation.

• (b) Inflation distorts benchmarks of factors of production (‘FoPs’). The Commission’s argument that benchmarks are largely unaffected by inflation because they are expressed in terms of the stable Chinese Yuan (CNY) might hold for imported factors of production, but does not hold for locally sourced factors of production. This is evidenced by the development of costs of labour and electricity, which, even when expressed in stable currencies such as CNY and EUR, have increased considerably (by 58,6 % and 74 % respectively) in the period between 2022 and 2023.

• (c) The requirement of Article 2(6a)(a), fourth paragraph of the basic Regulation, for an undistorted and reasonable SG&A and profit is not met, due to distortions related to hyperinflation. In particular, JINFA and Fusong claimed that the use of financial data from a country with high inflation would result in overstated profit and SG&A. In this context, they referred to the use of accounting standards developed for financial reporting in countries with hyperinflation, and in particular IAS 29 in the detailed financial report of Orma Orman Mahsulleri Integre Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., (‘Orma’) one of the two companies selected by the Commission for SG&A and profit benchmarks. On this point and providing similar arguments, the Forest group also claimed that the benchmarks for SG&A and for profit, calculated by the Commission on the basis of financial information available for the two Turkish companies, are distorted and should not be used without adjustments.

• (26) With respect to point (a) above, the Commission noted that contrary to what the parties suggest, the requirement for the representative country to have a similar level of economic development does not imply that all main economic indicators need to be at similar levels. The level of economic development of a country is generally assessed by its level of income, and for that purpose, the classification of the World Bank is a criterion that is well established in the Commission’s practice and confirmed by the Union courts ⁵. According to this classification, Türkiye and the PRC were both in the upper middle level income bracket for 2023, and therefore, they had a similar level of economic development, irrespective of their different inflation rates. In view of this, the respective claims were rejected.

• (27) With respect to point (b) above, the Commission noted that the parties appear to conflate cost increases in nominal terms, which can indeed be attributed to inflation, with cost increases in real terms, which are attributable to other factors. In the case of both labour and electricity, there was an increase of cost in real terms for these factors from 2022 to 2023. The labour cost increases were largely a result of policy decisions of the Turkish government, including decisions adopted shortly before the 2023 presidential elections in the country ⁶. Similarly, cost increases in electricity followed similar trends in many other countries and were likely linked to the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. In any event, there is no evidence that these increases in real terms were caused by inflation. In fact, if there is a causal link, it would go in the opposite direction, that is, increase in real costs fuelling inflation, rather than the other way around. In view of these considerations, the respective claims were rejected.

• (28) With respect to point (c) above, at the outset the Commission noted that the requirement for undistorted benchmarks for SG&A and profit in Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation should be placed in its appropriate legal context, that is, significant distortions as defined in Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. In view of this, the Commission considered that the existence of inflation in a country does not automatically render financial data from that country distorted and unreasonable.

• (29) The Commission also noted that there is no evidence of a clear link between inflation and high profitability, in particular for companies operating in manufacturing sectors, such as the MWF sector or the broader wood sector.

• (30) In any event, as explained in recitals 46 and 47 below, the Commission accepted to use an alternative source of financial data for the establishment of an undistorted and reliable benchmark for SG&A and for profit for companies operating in the broader wood sector in Türkiye. This source is readily available and already includes an adjustment for inflation. Consequently, the Commission considered that point (c) is moot and the respective claims were rejected.

• (31) Moreover, all three sampled exporting producers claimed that data from Malaysia are more appropriate for the establishment of reasonable and undistorted benchmarks for SG&A and profit. To substantiate their claim, the sampled exporting producers relied on the following arguments:

• (a) The Malaysian economy did not suffer from hyperinflation and therefore the financial data reported for Malaysian companies do not require adjustments.

• (b) Financial data for the IP (2023) are available for two producers of MWF in Malaysia, but for none in Türkiye. The Commission’s reasoning for dismissing the two Malaysian producers as a source for SG&A and profit is unfounded. In particular, the argument that SG&A functions of Unilin Malaysia are performed by other group entities are speculative and entirely unsubstantiated. Moreover, the argument that the product produced by Kim Teck Lee Timber Flooring Sdn. Bhd (‘KTL’) is niche does not constitute a reason to exclude it, in particular in light of the fact that the Commission used data from Turkish companies that do not produce the product under investigation.

• (c) The Forest group claimed that it identified three additional Malaysian producers of MWF, namely Dominant Enterprise Berhad, Hevea Board Berhad, and KLK Hardwood Flooring Sdn. Berhad and provided a financial statement relating to one of them (KLK Hardwood Flooring Sdn Berhad for 2023) while for the other two it noted that their financial statements were either unavailable for the relevant period, or they showed losses. On this basis, the Forest group requested KLK Hardwood Flooring Sdn to be used together with KTL and Unlin Malaysia for the calculation of SG&A and profit.

• (d) The comparison of SG&A of producers in a possible representative country to that of Union industry or exporting producers has no legal basis, i.e. it is not part of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (e) The consideration of the level of development of the MWF sector has no legal basis (i.e. it is not part of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation) and is contradicted by past Commission practice, for instance in cases Grain-Oriented Flat Rolled Products from China ⁷ and Alkyl Phosphate Esters from China ⁸. Moreover, Malaysia has a sufficiently developed MWF sector and in any event, the Commission has used companies from the broader wood sector, in which Malaysia is very developed.

• (f) If the Commission considers a broader wood sector in Türkiye, it should do the same in Malaysia.

• (32) With respect to point (a), the Commission observed that as explained in recital 162 of the provisional Regulation, the MWF sector is significantly more developed in Türkiye in comparison to Malaysia. The respective argument was therefore rejected.

• (33) With respect to point (b), the Commission noted that its statement in the provisional Regulation on the nature of Unilin (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd’s activities are not speculative. In view of the fact that the company is part of a multinational group and its operations are focused on production, it has been confirmed ⁹ that Unilin (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd only sells its manufactured goods intragroup and does not currently engage in sales with independent parties. For this reason, certain SG&A functions, such as sales, marketing, research and development are to a large extent centralised, and their costs are not included and are not reflected in the company’s reported SG&A. Therefore, it is fully justified not to consider the financial data of this company for the establishment of benchmark for profit and for SG&A.

• (34) Moreover, as regards Kim Teck Lee Timber Flooring Sdn. Bhd, the Commission clarified that it does not consider its levels of SG&A (18,5 %) and profit (8,8 %), both expressed as a percentage of goods sold, unreasonable as such. In view however of the highly specific and non-representative nature of the product produced by this company, the Commission does not consider it appropriate to rely exclusively on this company for the establishment of benchmarks for SG&A and for profit.

• (35) The arguments related to point (b) were therefore rejected.

• (36) With respect to point (c), for two out of the three companies, i.e. Dominant Enterprise Berhad and Hevea Board Berhad, the Commission found no evidence that these companies are indeed producers of MWF, nor did the Forest group provide any such evidence. Moreover, as the Forest group stated, their financial statements were either unavailable for the relevant period, or they showed losses. For the third company, i.e. KLK Hardwood Flooring Sdn Berhad, the Commission noted that the financial report submitted by the Forest group does not concern this company, but the group to which the company belongs, that is, the Kuala Lumber Kepong Berhad group. The group, which has a broad range of activities had an enormous consolidated revenue of about 5,1 billion USD in 2023 (ending 30 September 2023), with a positive profit. In comparison, for the same period, its flooring subsidiary, KLK Hardwood Flooring Sdn Berhad had according to ORBIS a revenue of about 16 million USD, and a negative profit. It is therefore clear that none of the above companies can be used for the establishment of undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A and profit. The respective claims were therefore rejected.

• (37) With respect to point (d), the Commission noted that Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation is not prescriptive as regards the criteria which should be used to consider an SG&A or profit margin as reasonable, leaving to the Commission a rather broad discretion. While indeed the respective margins in the Union or in the country concerned would not be as such appropriate as benchmarks, they can be an additional element to inform the assessment of whether benchmarks in possible representative countries are reasonable. The respective argument was therefore rejected.

• (38) With respect to point (e), the Commission noted that, contrary to what was suggested by the parties, its approach in the provisional Regulation is not contradicted by its practice in other cases. Unlike the present case, in Grain-Oriented Flat Rolled Products from China, the issue was whether the requirement for a similar level of economic development should take a narrow interpretation to concern the specific industrial sector, or as the Commission maintained, it should concern the overall economic development of the country, as reflected in its classification by the World Bank. In case Alkyl Phosphate Esters from China, the issue was whether the allegedly low level of development of a sector in a possible representative country was in itself sufficient to outright dismiss that country, even if there were no other potential representative countries. In the present case, the fact that the MWF sector in Malaysia is underdeveloped called into question the relevance of the available financial data for the establishment of reasonable and undistorted benchmarks for SG&A and for profit. As regards the use of data from the broader wood sector in Türkiye, the Commission considered it likely that the broader wood sector operates in similar conditions as the MWF sector, for instance concerning cost of materials, labour costs, market demand, intensity of competition and technological development. In fact, the larger the MWF sector, the more likely such similarities become. In comparison to the many tens of companies producing MWF in Türkiye, the respective companies identified for Malaysia remain less than five. Moreover, exports of MWF from Türkiye remain significantly higher compared to Malaysia. In view of this, the Commission concluded that financial data from the broader wood sector in Türkiye could be used to establish a reasonable and undistorted benchmark for SG&A and for profit. In any case, Commission's previous practice is not binding as each case is assessed on its own merits. The respective arguments of the parties were therefore rejected.

• (39) With respect to point (f), this is addressed in recital 47 below.

• (40) Exporting producers also argued that if Commission insists on Turkey, it should make downward adjustments to the calculated SG&A and profit. In particular, it should:

• (a) Deduct transport and related costs from the SG&A. In the case of Orma’s financial report, these are reflected in an item amounting to 169 637 781 TL and translated as ‘export, freight and port expenses’;

• (b) Deduct the part of the profit that is separately disclosed as ‘net gain/loss on the net monetary position’ in accordance with IAS 29, as this is a fictitious profit linked to inflation;

• (c) Deduct financial expenses from the SG&A, in particular expenses linked to interest paid, also because they are linked to inflation.

• (41) As regards point (a) above, as explained in recitals 46 and 47 below, the Commission accepted to use an alternative source of financial data. Consequently, the claim concerning transport related costs in Orma’s financial report was rejected.

• (42) As regards point (b) above, the Commission considered that while the separately disclosed item ‘net gain/loss of reporting on the net monetary position’ is linked to inflation, its exclusion cannot be considered an appropriate way to adjust profits for inflation. That is, it cannot be considered that by excluding this item, the resulting profits would represent the profits of the company in the scenario that there was low or no inflation. This is because inflation would also affect revenues and costs that are not included in this item, such as the (nominal) rise in costs of inputs and prices of products of the company.

• (43) Similarly, as regards point (c) above, the Commission considered that the deduction of financial expenses, and in particular interest, would not result in the operating expenses that the company would have to incur in the absence of high inflation. This is because, the company would have to incur a level of financial expenses irrespective of inflation. Moreover, the way financial expenses are affected by inflation, in particular as a percentage of the cost of goods sold, would depend on the precise terms of financing agreements, e.g. the indexing according to inflation or the link to a stable currency.

• (44) The Commission further noted that, irrespective of the merits of the parties’ arguments for adjustments, such adjustments would be possible only for the financial data of Orma, for which detailed financial reports exist. For the other Turkish producer, AGT, such detailed report is not available, and it cannot be presumed that any adjustments appropriate for Orma would be appropriate also for that company.

• (45) As an alternative to adjusting data of individual Turkish producers, the Forest group suggested to establish benchmarks for SG&A and profit based on the Turkish government’s data of the average operating expenses and operating profit of the companies involved in the ‘Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials’, i.e. NACE - C-162 ¹⁰. Forest group considered that this would be the most reasonable approach in the present context and the Turkish government data are official and reliable. Moreover, as regards the SG&A, Forest group suggested to deduct expenses relating to the transport and insurance, handling and loading/distribution, e.g. based on a ratio calculated from the financial statements of Orma.

• (46) The Commission agreed that the data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye on the financial results of companies with activities under NACE – C-162, are official and reliable. Moreover, the Commission noted that, based on the total revenue, they appear to include a much more comprehensive group of companies, and therefore they are significantly less likely to be affected by specificities of individual companies. Moreover, the Commission noted that these data include adjustments for inflation, further strengthening the reliability of the data.

• (47) In view of this, the Commission agreed to use these data to establish new benchmarks for SG&A and for profit. The Commission also noted that it has been unable to find any financial data with a comparable scope, detail and reliability for companies operating in Malaysia.

• (48) The Commission considered that, although not reported under operating expenses, financial expenses are incurred for the operation of the company and therefore, they should be included in the SG&A.

• (49) As regards transport costs and following the claim described in recital 40 above, the Commission noted that in the data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye lacked detailed information on these costs. Therefore, the company’s claim to deduct transport cost from SG&A was rejected.

• (50) As regards the calculation of profit, the Commission initially took into account the operating profit (with inflation adjustments) and the financial expenses reported by the Turkish Central Bank.

• (51) On this basis, SG&A expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted initially to 22,0 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted initially to 9,7 %.

• (52) Following definitive disclosure, the FEP requested that for the calculation of amounts for SG&A costs and for profit, the Commission reverts to the use of the financial data of the Turkish producers identified in the provisional regulation, rather than rely on the data from the Turkish Central Bank for activities falling under NACE-162. The FEP argued that this category includes products which are significantly more distant and different from the product concerned, in terms of production, cost and pricing, therefore making this source of data less reliable and less appropriate.

• (53) The Commission noted that neither of the two Turkish companies identified in the provisional regulation are producers of the product under investigation. The FEP has not explained why in comparison to these two companies (whose data is in all likelihood also included in the data of the Turkish Central Bank), other companies included in the data of the Turkish Central Bank would produce products which are on average significantly more distant and different from the product concerned, in terms of production, cost and pricing. If follows that data pertaining to the operations of numerous companies in the relevant sector, likely including producers of the product under investigation, is a more reliable source for reasonable amounts than data pertaining to two companies that do not produce the product under investigation. The arguments of the FEP were therefore rejected.

• (54) The FEP also noted that for the calculation of a benchmark for profit on the basis of the data from the Turkish Central Bank, the Commission used only the operating profit. According to the FEP, this represents a departure from the Commission’s standard practice. The FEP therefore requested that the profit before tax is used instead, which includes also income and expenses from other operations as well as extraordinary income and expenses.

• (55) The Commission noted that in the data reported by the Turkish Central Bank, the profit before tax included income related to dividends from participations. This income was extraordinarily high in 2023. In view of this, the Commission considered that the profit before tax for this year, which includes this income, would not be an appropriate basis for the calculation of a reasonable amount for profit. This issue does not arise for the financial data for 2022, which as explained in recitals 75 to 76 below, the Commission used for its revised calculations.

• (56) Fusong reiterated its claim that the levels of inflation in Turkiye call into question the appropriateness of Turkiye as a representative country and that Malaysia should be selected instead. In particular, Fusong argued the following:

• (a) High inflation is an important and relevant factor to consider in addition to Gross National Income Classification of the World Bank. According to Fusong, it is undeniable that the more economic indicators in proximity a representative country has in comparison to China, the more reasonable and representative the undistorted values of cost and price established in that country will be. In this regard, Fusong considered that the Court judgment referred to in recital 26 has no bearing on the present case, as the applicant did not contest the similarity in the level of economic development. Moreover, Fusong considered that the choice of Turkiye fails to meet the criterion set by the Court that the Commission must use a third country in which prices are formed in circumstances that are as similar as possible to those in the country of export.

• (b) The locally sourced factors of production, and in particular labour and electricity costs are distorted by high inflation. In this regard, Fusong argued that the decision of the Turkish government to increase the minimum wages and therefore the labour costs was a result of the soaring inflation. Moreover, as regards the effects on the electricity prices in Turkiye of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, Fusong argued that China was not subject to such effects.

• (c) The financial data relied upon by the Commission are not adjusted by inflation and remain distorted and unreliable. In this regard:

• (a) Fusong contested the view of the Commission that there is no evidence of a clear link between inflation and high profitability, in particular for companies operating in manufacturing sectors, such as the MWF sector or the broader wood sector. Fusong claimed that the mandatory application of the accounting standard IAS 29 by Turkish companies as of 2023, as well as the results of the application of this standard in the case of Orma show the existence of such link and that the appropriate way to adjust for inflation is to eliminate the gains on the net monetary position.

• (b) Fusong considered that the Commission has not explained the relevance of significant distortions, as defined in Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation for the assessment of the reliability of financial data, in particular with respect to the effects of inflation. According to Fusong, the establishment of undistorted benchmarks for SG&A costs and for profit, as required by Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, should undoubtedly be based on reliable and undistorted financial data.

• (c) Fusong referred to the Metadata of the source used by the Commission, which indicates that ‘[f]or 2023 data, the study employs financial statements not adjusted for inflation within the scope of the Tax Procedure Law General Communiqué (Sequence No: 555)’, concluding that these data remain distorted and unreliable.

• (d) The Commission erred in considering the size of the MWF sector in Malysia, as the industrial size is not a pre-requisite or predominant criterion for selecting a representative country. Fusong argued that the financial data of Kim Teck Lee Timber Flooring Sdn. Bhd, which the Commission did not consider as unreasonable as such, would be significantly more appropriate than the financial data in Türkiye. Moreover, Fusong argued that instead of relying on data from the broader wood sector in Türkiye, the Commission should have used data from the broader wood sector in Malaysia, identified via research.

• (57) As regards point (a) above, the Commission noted that there is a plethora of indicators that can be used for the assessment of a country’s economy, including multiple indicators for the levels of employment, debt, investment, balance of trade and value added by different sectors. While Fusong considers a need for proximity in as many economic indicators as possible, it does not explain which additional indicators – besides inflation - are relevant for meeting the criteria of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation or what should be their relative weight in the assessment. As regards specifically inflation, accepting Fusong’s argument would imply that in case the country concerned is a country with hyperinflation, only countries with hyperinflation could be considered for the selection of the representative country, which would often make such selection impossible. As to inflation allegedly ‘distorting’ the relevant data, this is addressed in recital 65.

• (58) The Commission further noted that the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, used by the World Bank for the classification of countries into four groups, is measured in a stable currency (USD) and therefore already takes differences in inflation between countries into account. Therefore, using this indicator provides an objective and tractable method to assess whether two countries have a similar level of economic development for the purposes of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, and has been consistently accepted as appropriate for those purposes by the Union courts. As regards the requirement set by case law that the Commission must select a country in which ‘prices are formed in circumstances that are as similar as possible to those in the country of export’, the Court made it clear that by satisfying the criterion of similar level of economic development, this requirement is met.

• (59) In view of the above, Fusong’s claims in point (a) were rejected.

• (60) As regards the labour costs referred to in point (b), the Commission noted that according to the arguments provided by Fusong and the references it provided to substantiate them, the aim of the Turkish government when raising the minimum wages during 2023 was to restore the Turkish citizens’ purchasing power. This means that the Turkish government aimed to restore labour costs to the level that would be commensurate with the level of the overall economic development in the country. In view of this, there is no reason to consider that the level of these costs in the IP (expressed in CNY) was distorted.

• (61) As regards the electricity costs referred to in point (b), the Commission noted that while Fusong appears to concede that their increase (in real terms) is unrelated to inflation, it argues that they should still be considered as distorted because China did not suffer similar increases, and that for that reason, Türkiye does not fulfil the condition of appropriateness to be selected as the representative country. The Commission noted that in view of the established existence of significant distortions in China in the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, the evolution of prices in China is not relevant for the assessment of distortions in potential representative countries.

• (62) In view of the above, Fusong’s claims in point (b) were rejected.

• (63) As regards point (c)(i) the Commission noted that Fusong did not sufficiently substantiate its claim on the alleged link between inflation and high profitability, neither for MWF sector, nor for the broader wood sector. As explained in recital 42, the use of the accounting standard IAS 29 mandated by the Tax Procedure Law General Communiqué (Sequence No: 555) for 2023 does not mean that in the absence of inflation, a company would have realised a level of profits which, in comparison to the profit actually realised, would be lower by the amount reported as net monetary gain. Moreover, the situation of a single company cannot be generalised, neither to the MWF sector, nor to the broader wood sector.

• (64) Notwithstanding the above, the Commission compared inflation rate and profitability in the years from 2020 to 2023, in which the inflation rate in Türkiye experienced significant fluctuations (from 12 % in 2020 to a peak of 72 % in 2022), using the financial data published by the Turkish central bank for companies operating in the broader wood sector (NACE C-162). For profitability, two measures were used, both expressed as a percentage of COGS: a) operating profit; and b) profit before tax and before extraordinary income/expenses ¹¹. It is worth recalling that these data concern an entire sector including more than 2 000 companies and therefore are less likely to be affected by specificities of individual companies. It is clear from a simple observation of the data that the significant increases in inflation were not followed by increases in profitability. This is because, while profits increased ¹², so did the costs. Nevertheless, to quantify this relationship in the data, the Commission calculated the correlation coefficient ¹³, which in this case is negative for both measures of profitability. While the Commission does not claim that this result should be regarded as conclusive evidence of a negative relationship between high inflation and profitability (i.e. profitability going down when inflation goes up), it nevertheless strongly negates Fusong’s claim that hyperinflation results in overstated profitability. This is because if Fusong’s claim were correct, in particular for the period and sector under consideration, the expectation would be to observe in the data a positive or even strongly positive (close to +1) correlation coefficient, which is not the case:

(monetary amounts expressed in thousand TRY)	2020	2021	2022	2023
Inflation rate in Türkiye14	12 %	20 %	72 %	54 %
Operating profit (OP)15	3 999 790	9 958 534	14 072 992	15 253 814
Profit before tax & before extraordinary revenues/expenses (PBT)15	2 535 251	9 096 767	8 995 295	22 990 243
Cost of Goods sold (COGS)15	26 219 734	48 717 078	106 542 623	156 950 213
OP as % of COGS	15,3 %	20,4 %	13,2 %	9,7 %
PBT as % of COGS	9,7  %	18,7  %	8,4  %	14,6  %
Correlation coefficient between inflation rate and profitability (OP as % of COGS)	— 0,65	— 0,65	— 0,65	— 0,65
Correlation coefficient between inflation rate and profitability (PBT as % of COGS)	— 0,36	— 0,36	— 0,36	— 0,36

• (65) As regards point (c)(ii), and as explained in recital 28 the Commission considered that when it comes to the determination of an undistorted amount for SG&A costs and for profit, the meaning of distortions has to be put in its specific legal context, which is the significant distortions listed in Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Without such context, the meaning of distortions remains entirely vague and open-ended. In view of the high number of factors affecting prices in a country, if interpreted differently meeting the requirement for undistorted benchmarks and amounts would become nearly impossible. Moreover, even if the ordinary meaning of ‘distortion’ was to be followed, in CCCME the General Court elaborated on the meaning of ‘distorted data’ in the context of an allegation that the Commission used such data in its construction of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Court found that to be considered as ‘distorted’ it must be demonstrated that such data ‘have been manipulated or are not true to reality’ ¹⁶. Similarly to the applicants in in CCCME, Fusong failed to provide evidence to such effect.

• (66) As regards point (c)(iii), the Commission noted that, contrary to what Fusong suggests, the data published by the Turkish Central Bank include adjustments for inflation, both in the income as well as in the expenses. While these adjustments are not in the scope of the Tax Procedure Law General Communiqué (Sequence No: 555) for 2023, the Turkish Central Bank considered the reported financial data as sufficiently reliable, accurate and informative to be worthy of publication and use.

• (67) In view of the above, the Fusong claims on point (c) where rejected.

• (68) As regards point (d), the Commission clarified that the industrial size is not a criterion as such under Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. However, as explained in recital 38, the fact that the MWF sector in Malaysia is underdeveloped calls into question the appropriateness of the available financial data for the establishment of reasonable and undistorted amounts for SG&A costs and for profit. This is in particular the case because these data are limited to a single company with highly specific activities that are likely non-representative for the MWF sector. The Commission, therefore, did not consider it appropriate to rely exclusively on this company’s data for the establishment of reasonable and undistorted amounts for SG&A costs and for profit. The Commission considered that conversely, the size of the MWF sector in Türkiye makes it likely that the broader wood sector operates in similar conditions as the MWF sector, and therefore the data for the broader wood sector in Türkiye can be used to establish the reasonable and undistorted amounts for SG&A costs and for profit. As regards Fusong’s urge to use data for the broader wood sector in Malaysia, it was explained in recital 47, the Commission was not able to find such data. Moreover, Fusong did not provide such data either, nor did it suggest any possible sources.

• (69) In view of the above, Fusong’s claims on point (d) were rejected.

• (70) Following definitive disclosure Fusong commented on the calculation of the amounts for profit and for SG&A costs and claimed that, whilst the Commission included the financial expenses in the SG&A costs, the same financial expenses were, however, not deducted from the profit which was based on the operating profit rather than on the profit before tax. Therefore, the methodologies applied for the establishment of the amounts for the SG&A costs and for profit were inconsistent and asymmetric.

• (71) The Commission noted that in the financial data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye for companies with activities under NACE – C-162, the income from other operations includes an item called ‘Dividends from participations’. For 2023, which is the year initially used for the Commission’s calculation, this item was extraordinarily high in comparison to all previous years and would have a significant impact if included in the calculation of the amount for profit.

• (72) For this reason, in its calculation of an amount for profit, the Commission initially used in the definitive general disclosure document the operating profit, which does not include the above item, divided by COGS. In its calculation of a reasonable amount for SG&A costs, the Commission used the sum of operating expenses and financing expenses (long- and short-term liabilities), also divided by the COGS.

• (73) The claim of Fusong that the above methodology for the calculation of benchmarks for profit and for SG&A costs is inconsistent and asymmetric was found to be justified. Indeed, while the operating profit should cover also the respective financing expenses in order for the company to be profitable, such financing expenses had been included also in the calculation of the SG&A costs. In other words, the methodology followed in the general disclosure document included financial expenses in both amounts resulting in double counting of financial expenses.

• (74) In order to remedy the double counting, it would be necessary to use the profit before tax which would however include ‘Dividends from participations’ which as explained above in recital 71 were found to be extraordinarily high. It was therefore concluded that using the data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye for companies with activities under NACE – C-162 for 2023 is not appropriate as the profitability of the sector was heavily impacted by that item.

• (75) In view of the above, the Commission revised its calculation of the amounts for profit and for SG&A, using the financial data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye for companies with activities under NACE – C-162 for 2022. In that year, as well as in previous years, the dividends from participations were at minimal levels and therefore had no impact on the overall profitability of the sector. The amount for SG&A costs and for profit based on the 2022 figures were therefore considered by the Commission as reasonable within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (76) For the revised calculation of the undistorted and reasonable amount for profit, the Commission used the profit before extraordinary items divided by the COGS, noting that the profit before extraordinary items is already net of financial expenses. For the revised calculation of the amount for SG&A costs, the Commission used the same approach as in the general disclosure document, i.e. the sum of operating expenses and financing expenses divided by the COGS based on the financial data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye for companies with activities under NACE – C-162 for 2022.

• (77) Following the revision on this basis, SG&A expressed as a percentage of COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 16,1 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 8,4 %. An additional disclosure was issued on 12 May 2025 in this respect (here-after also referred to as ‘ADD’).

• (78) Following definitive disclosure, and referring to the calculation of the SG&A costs on the basis of the data reported by the Central Bank of Türkiye for companies with activities under NACE – C-162 for 2023, Forest reiterated its request for the exclusion of what it considered as extraordinarily high finance expenses. Instead, Forest suggested to calculate the SG&A costs on the basis of operating expenses, or in the alternative, using the finance expenses to COGS ratio of 2022.

• (79) In view of the revision of the calculation of SG&A costs on the basis of the respective 2022 data as explained in recital 76 above, the Commission considered the point moot.

• (80) Following the ADD, the Commission received comments from the FEP, Fusong, and Forest.

• (81) In its comments, the FEP opposed the changes in the calculation of profit and SG&A costs, claiming the following:

• (a) The Commission’s methodology for establishing the undistorted benchmarks for SG&A costs and profit in ADD is misguided and unjustifiably departs from the IP in favour of 2022 data, contrary to the Commission’s past practice. In particular:

• (a) The comparison between 2022 and 2023 of the profit before tax expressed as a percentage of COGS shows that income from dividends in 2023 has no significant impact and

• (b) the use of profit before tax in 2023 would not lead to asymmetries or double counting, and would not be excessive – as evidenced by other cases in which Türkiye was selected as the representative country.

• (b) The determination of profit based on profit before extraordinary items instead of profit before tax is unjustified and incorrect and also goes against past Commission practice;

• (c) The reduced anti-dumping duties calculated in the ADD are too low and insufficient to protect the Union industry from dumped and injurious imports from China; and

• (d) The Commission’s late change of methodology for establishing the SG&A costs and profit benchmarks results in a procedural grievance, as the Commission did not inform the complainants in due time of the reasons for relying on operating profit (while it appears that it did so for exporting producers) and has failed to address the complainants’ earlier comments in this regard thus far.

• (82) As regards points (a) and (b), the Commission noted that in the comparison made by the FEP, the difference in the calculated amount of profit between the year 2022 and 2023 using profit before tax would be about 50 %, and therefore, contrary to what the FEP appears to suggest, would have a very significant impact in the calculation of normal value. In any event, the comparison of results between the year 2022 and 2023 using profit before tax is irrelevant. The issue that the Commission addressed in its additional disclosure is primarily an issue of methodology, which however also affects the dumping calculation. As explained in recital 71 above, the Commission considered that including in its calculation an item that appears both extraordinary and entirely unrelated to the companies’ activities would be incorrect for the purposes of this calculation.

• (83) As regards the use of financial data from a period that does not coincide with the IP, the Commission noted that in any event, past practice is not binding, and each case is assessed on its own merits. According to the case-law, the lawfulness of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties must be assessed in the light of legal rules and, in particular, the provisions of the basic Regulation, not on the basis of the EU institutions’ alleged previous practice in taking decisions (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 10 February 2021, RFA International v Commission, C-56/19 P, EU:C:2021:102, paragraph 79; of 4 October 2006, Moser Baer India v Council, T-300/03, EU:T:2006:289, paragraph 45; and of 18 October 2016, Crown Equipment (Suzhou) and Crown Gabelstapler v Council, T-351/13, not published, EU:T:2016:616, paragraph 107).

• (84) Moreover, the Commission considered that the level of profits used in other cases with Türkiye as a representative country is also irrelevant and cannot be used to assess whether the amount of profit established in the case at hand is reasonable or excessive. In this respect the Commission noted that the cases referred to by the FEP in their submission concern sectors other than the MWF sector or even the broader wood sector.

• (85) As regards point (c), the Commission noted that pursuant to the basic Regulation, the calculation of the dumping margin is entirely independent of the calculation of the injury margin. Therefore, the consideration of the closeness of the dumping margin to the injury margin is entirely irrelevant.

• (86) As regards point (d), the Commission clarified that, contrary to what the FEP suggests, the reasons for using operating profit in the definitive disclosure were made known at the same time to all interested parties.

• (87) In its comments following additional disclosure, Fusong claimed the following:

• (a) The Commission’s decision to disregard the financial data of 2023 and rely on those of 2022 renders the selection of Türkiye as an appropriate representative country particularly problematic and unjustified, and that Malaysia should be chosen instead. To substantiate its claim, Fusong argued that under Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the Commission’s established practice demand that the readily available data, including the financial data, must not only be undistorted and reliable, but also be pertained to the sector of the product under investigation and to the period of investigation.

• (b) The inclusion of certain items under the categories Income/Expenses from other operations, and in particular ‘Dividends from Participations’ in the profit before tax for the determination of the benchmark for profit is erroneous. The ‘Dividends from Participations’ refer to income from investment activities instead of MWF production and sales activities and therefore should be excluded by nature from the calculation of benchmark for profit. The same applies to the other items, such as ‘Dividends from Affiliated Enterprises’, ‘Provisions that are Cancelled’, ‘Income from Sale of Securities’ and ‘Inflation Adjustment Profits’, which are either unrelated to the activities of the product under investigation or purely result from accounting treatment without actual transaction basis.

• (c) The asymmetry in the calculation of profit and SG&A costs persists, because income and expenses from other operations are part of the profit calculation, while they are not part of the SG&A costs calculation. Fusong argued that if the income and expenses from other operations are excluded from both the profit and SG&A calculation, the profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS should be 5,8 %, instead of 8,4 %. If, on the contrary, the Commission considers them necessary to be included in both the profit and SG&A calculation, the SG&A expressed as a percentage of the COGS should be 13,4 % instead of 16,1 %.

• (88) In response to point (a), and as explained in recital 71 above, while the data of 2023 were reliable, they did not allow for the calculation of a reasonable amount for profit and for SG&A costs. The use of data from a period which does not coincide with the IP was justified in the case at hand in the absence of appropriate data for the IP in Türkiye or any other possible representative country for the reasons explained in recitals 46 to 48 and recital 76 above. In this case the Commission used data of 2022, which it considered reliable and sufficiently recent and therefore leading to amounts for SG&A costs and for profit that are ‘undistorted’ and ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the last sub-paragraph of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. Fusong failed to demonstrate the opposite.

• (89) In response to point (b), the Commission considered that income from other operations and expenses from other operations are generally part of the normal operations of a company in a manufacturing sector. Provided that their magnitude is not extraordinary, as shown for instance by comparing it against the key operating items such as turnover or operating profit, they can be included in the calculation of reasonable amounts for profit and for SG&A costs. Fusong failed to show that including such income would lead to amounts for SG&A costs and for profit that are either not reasonable or distorted.

• (90) In response to point (c), the Commission considered that, contrary to what Fusong claims, there is no asymmetry in the calculation. As regards the two alternative calculations suggested by Fusong, the Commission observed that in both alternative calculations, income and expenses from other operations are effectively completely disregarded. For the reasons explained in recital 89 above, the Commission did not consider appropriate to disregard them, and therefore, did not accept Fusong alternative calculations.

• (91) In view of the above, Fusong’s claims were rejected.

3.1.3.   Benchmarks for factors of production

• (92) The Forest group claimed that the use of sawn wood to construct a benchmark for veneers is unjustified, without however providing any elements to substantiate this claim in the open version of its comments.

• (93) The Commission considered that its approach for the establishment of a benchmark for veneers on the basis of the cost for sawn wood is fully justified, in light of the fact that prices of veneers are significantly influenced by the wood species and therefore a benchmark based on a generic HS code regardless of the wood specie would not reflect the real market prices of veneers, as explained in detail in recital 170 of the provisional Regulation. In view of the fact that the Forest group did not provide any elements to substantiate its claims and to contradict the Commission's conclusions, these claims were rejected.

• (94) The Fusong Group claimed that the application of an undistorted benchmark for the main input material, namely oak logs used by the group in the production of the product concerned, was unwarranted. The company asserted that the vast majority of logs are purchased directly from Europe, as it claimed was confirmed by supporting documents presented during the investigation. According to the company, the prices of oak logs are non-distorted and reflect the international market conditions. Moreover, the company stated that purchasing transactions prices were expressed in euro and there is no local production of oak logs due to the natural forestry felling ban. Thus, in Fusong’s opinion, the prices could not be affected by the distortions in China.

• (95) The claims concerning the direct purchasing of logs were not supported by adequate evidence. The Commission was not presented with any evidence confirming that the company purchased a significant quantity of raw materials directly from European suppliers. From the documents and information provided in the investigation by the exporting producer, it is apparent that nearly all logs were purchased from Chinese companies (traders), even though the goods were dispatched from third countries. The company did not present any evidence contradicting the established significant distortion in the PRC, as described in section 3 of the provisional regulation. There was no further elaboration on how the currency used for purchasing affects distortion in the market, and the Commission did not consider this argument relevant to the analysis in this matter. Furthermore, the ban on harvesting oak for commercial use does not preclude the existence of distortion. It must be recalled that the distortion pertains to the entire wood sector, including suppliers, as mentioned in recital 125 of the provisional regulation: ‘When the producers of the product concerned purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to distortions in the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors.’ Given that the vast majority of logs are purchased from Chinese companies, the Commission was unable to positively establish, on the basis of the evidence on file, that the purchase costs of the oak logs by the Fusong Group were not distorted. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (96) Following definitive disclosure, the Fusong Group further claimed that they purchased the vast majority of oak logs from traders based outside mainland China, based outside mainland China, in a third country which cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons. These traders are incorporated under local law and should not be considered as Chinese traders. Moreover, the two main traders are part of the worldwide groups, and one listed on the NASDAQ and is subject to the US stock exchange regulations and governance rules. Fusong repeated that logs are shipped directly from Europe. In Fusong's opinion, the prices are at the market level and therefore benchmark for oak logs should not be applicable.

• (97) The Commission stated that the place of dispatch the goods is irrelevant in the assessment of the price distortion. As it was established in recital 54 the distortion concerns also suppliers. The fact that the company is based outside mainland China, in a third country which cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons, does not change the fact that the trader in fact is a Chinese owned company and is affected by the significant distortions found for the country. It must be noted, that the main supplier, which holding company is listed on the NASDAQ, has a subsidiary company in mainland China, and moreover the beneficial owner and director of the holding company is a member of one of the committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The relations of the trader’s management with the Chinese political body and ownership of the Chinese based company also confirms that purchases via this trader shall be considered as subject to distortions. As regards the second group, the company is located in the same country as the previous one, and their price are at the similar level as the major supplier, what indicates that are also affected by the distortions. Finally all these suppliers are active on the Chinese market and therefore their prices are affected by the significant distortions through forces of competition. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (98) Following the additional disclosure, which did not address the claim on the benchmark prices for logs, Fusong requested the Commission to reconsider its assessment in this regard by referring to the comments on the definitive disclosure. The Commission’s assessment remained unchanged.

• (99) Following definitive disclosure, Fusong argued that if Türkiye is retained as the representative country, benchmarks for labour and electricity should be adjusted downwards, to remove the effects of extraordinary influences in the country such as inflation. Fusong proposed using the average inflation rate in Türkiye over a sufficiently long period prior to 2021, during the years when exceptionally high inflation or any other extraordinary circumstances did not impact the country, in order to reconstruct the labour and electricity costs that should have been borne by local producers during the IP in the absence of such extraordinary influences.

• (100) The Commission noted that for the reasons explained in recitals 60 and 61, labour and electricity costs should not be considered distorted. The Fusong claims on a need for adjustment were therefore rejected.

3.2.   Manufacturing costs

• (101) The FEP also requested a confirmation that the normal value includes an estimate of manufacturing overhead costs, to cover manufacturing costs not included in the factors of production.

• (102) The Commission confirmed that, as explained in recitals 193 to 194 of the provisional Regulation, such costs have been established and included in the normal value.

3.3.   Export price

• (103) In the absence of comments on the export price, recitals 201 to 202 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.4.   Comparison

• (104) Following the provisional disclosure, two exporting producers, namely Fusong Group and Forest Group, claimed that the adjustment of the normal value due to the non-refundable VAT on exports of the product concerned should not apply to them since they actually received a VAT refund. The companies indicated that they received VAT refund for their export sales because they did not export the product concerned under the tariff code 4418 75 . Instead, they claimed to have exported product concerned under other sub-headings, namely 4412 92 and 4412 52 . The companies further claimed that they presented customs export declarations and VAT refund documentation confirming actual receipt of VAT refund.

• (105) The Commission reviewed the claims submitted by the exporting producers regarding the classification of the product concerned under different HS codes. Upon examination, it found no substantive evidence to support the fact that these two exporting producers classified the exports of the products under a different code that HS code under which the product concerned should be classified which is HS code 4418 75 . The Commission did not question the actual declaration of the export sales nor VAT refund forms. It assessed whether the sales for export of the product concerned if declared under the corresponding HS code were subject to VAT refund. The Commission then established that the product concerned, which falls under the HS code 4418 75 , is not subject to a VAT refund. None of the interested parties objected that the definition of the goods falling under HS code 4418 75 in China aligns with the definition used in this investigation nor did they explain why they declared their export sales under a different HS code and not under HS code 4418 75 .

• (106) The two exporting producers referred to the documentation they have presented during the investigation regarding the VAT declarations. However, they have not presented any documentation or rationale to justify a deviation from classifying the product concerned under any other code than 4418 75 . The mere fact that exporting producers declared the product under different code does not confirm its correctness.The Commission, therefore, concluded that the self-declaration of the transaction for exports and its tariff classification by the companies, in the absence of any other documentation confirming that this classification was correct, does not constitute sufficient evidence classifying the product under the code with VAT refund. The companies, by declaring the export sales of the product concerned under the code not corresponding with the definition of the product concerned, effectively decreased the export price by receiving the refund of the VAT.

• (107) The Commission did not find any evidence indicating that the product concerned should be classified under different subheading than 4418 75 , therefore, the normal value was appropriately adjusted by the non-refundable VAT. The exporting producers did not provide any evidence that they should be exempted from the application of this rule, and the sales of the product concerned for export should not be classified under the HS code 4418 75 . Therefore, the claims were rejected.

• (108) In their comments following definitive disclosure, Forest and Fusong reiterated their claim that transport and distribution expenses should have been deducted from the SG&A costs calculation. The parties claimed that, since such expenses have been deducted from the export price, they should also be deducted from the normal value to ensure that the principle of fair comparison is respected. To estimate the transport and distribution expenses, the parties reiterated their proposal to use the readily available detailed financial data of Orma. In particular, they proposed to calculate Orma’s ratio of transport and distribution expenses over its total operating expenses and apply this ratio to the operating expenses reported by the Turkish Central Bank for activities under NACE-162. Moreover, Forest considered that if the Commission cannot estimate the transport and distribution expenses with sufficient precision, it should not deduct transport and distribution expenses from the export price.

• (109) The Commission noted that, when calculating normal value at ex-works level, it would normally deduct transport expenses where such expenses are clearly and separately identified. In this regard, the Commission recalled that in its judgment in CCCME, the General Court first recalled that in accordance with the case-law, if a party claims adjustments under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation in order to make the normal value and the export price comparable for the purpose of determining the dumping margin, that party must prove that its claim is justified. The burden of proving that the specific adjustments listed in Article 2(10)(a) to (k) of the basic Regulation must be made lies with those who wish to rely on them ¹⁷. It follows that, in that case, as in this investigation, it was for the interested parties, in accordance with that case-law, to demonstrate the need for the adjustment requested in support of evidence which they adduced during the investigation ¹⁸.