Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1456 of 17 July 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China

(160) The price of electricity and gas for companies (industrial users) in Brazil is published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (72) for the investigation period. The rates published in the monthly bulletin included the ‘Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços’ (‘ICMS’), a tax levied by the Brazilian states on the circulation of goods and the provision of interstate and inter municipal transportation and communications services. This tax could be claimed back by the industrial users and was deducted from the established benchmark. As ICMS was collected by Brazilian states at the rate ranging from 17 % to 18 % depending on the state, during the investigation period, the Commission recalculated the electricity and gas benchmarks, deducting an average of 17,5 % ICMS. The recalculated electricity benchmark is an average industrial tariff for the IP and is 0,98 CNY/kWh while gas benchmark is 4,32 CNY/m3.

(161) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(162) The manufacturing overheads incurred by the cooperating exporting producers were expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

(163) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG & A costs and profit, the Commission relied on the financial data for years 2023 or 2024, depending on the availability of companies’ data, for three Brazilian companies operating under NACE Code 23.9. These companies are Bozel Brasil S.A., Trevo Industrial de Acartonados S/A and Technosulfur Sistema de tratamento de metais liquidos Ltda as extracted from Orbis. Greca Distribuidora de Asflatos Ltda, also identified in NACE Code 23.9, was disregarded since the latest identified readily available financial statements were from 2022, that is outside the investigation period.

(164) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(165) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the cooperating exporting producers. These consumption rates provided by the cooperating exporting producers were verified during the verification. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country, as described in recitals 144 to 146.

(166) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission added the manufacturing overheads as explained in recital 162.

(167) The SG & A costs and profit determined on the basis of the financial statements of 3 companies as explained in recital 163 were applied to the sum of undistorted manufacturing cost and manufacturing overheads; i.e. the costs of production.

(168) SG & A costs expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 13,25 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 19,68 %.

(169) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(170) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through a related company acting as an importer.

(171) For the exporting producer that exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(172) For the exporting producer that exported the product concerned to the Union through a related company acting as an importer based in the Union, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG & A expenses actually incurred by the related importer, and a profit (of [4-6] % (73)) which was obtained from the two sampled unrelated importers in the Union.

(173) Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

(174) As explained in recital 169, the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG & A and for profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade. Therefore, no adjustments were necessary to net the normal value back to the ex-works level.

(175) Regarding allowances, the Commission found that the HS code under which the product under investigation is classified for exports in the PRC is subject to a non-refundable VAT of 13 %, whereas the normal value had been constructed net of VAT. Therefore, in order to ensure a fair comparison, an upward adjustment of the normal value has been made in accordance with Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation for the exporting producers subject to this VAT. The Commission found no reasons for making any other allowances to the normal value, nor were such allowances claimed by any of the sampled exporting producers.

(176) In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of: customs duty, other import charges, freight, insurance, handling loading and ancillary expenses.

(177) Allowances were made for the following factors affecting prices and price comparability: transport, insurance, handling and loading, packing expenses, credits costs and bank charges. An adjustment was also made for commissions under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation for the related trader of Runbao by deducting a constructed commission (based on the SG & A costs of the related trader and a notional profit of [4-6 %] used by analogy to one applied to related importers, as explained in recital 172 above.

(178) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(180) For the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the margins of the sampled exporting producers, on a weighted average basis.

(181) On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample is 118,88 %.

(182) For all other exporting producers in the PRC, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the IP, that were established on the basis of Eurostat. As mentioned in recital 20, the level of cooperation in this case is very low because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted less than 20 % of the total imports into the Union during the IP.

(183) The Commission recalled that section 10 of the Notice of Initiation (74) had informed interested parties that failure to cooperate, or only partial cooperation, could lead to findings based on facts available under Article 18 of the basic Regulation, potentially resulting in less favourable outcomes for those parties. Given that the interested parties were clearly warned of the consequences of non-cooperation, and that the level of cooperation in this case was particularly low, the Commission deemed it appropriate to determine the residual dumping duty based on the dumping bahaviour observed in relation to a subset of sales by Saite – the sampled exporting producer with the highest dumping margin rep–resenting 7 % of the total export volume of all sampled companies to the Union during the investigation period. These sales were considered a reasonable and representative proxy for the dumping behaviour of the non-cooperating exporters.

(184) The residual dumping margin was therefore set at 136,36 %.

(186) The like product was manufactured by nine producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(187) The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 131 810 tonnes on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, such as data contained in the questionnaire reply of the complainant relating to all Union producers and the questionnaire replies received from the sampled Union producers. As indicated in recital 14, the sampled Union producers represented more than 44 % of the total Union production of the like product.

(188) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of (a) data submitted by the complainant concerning the Union industry’s sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union, as cross-checked with the sales volumes reported by the sampled Union producers; (b) imports of the product under investigation from all third countries as reported in Eurostat.

(190) Consumption in the Union decreased by 20 % during the period considered. Union consumption declined by 3 % from 2021 to 2022, followed by a significant drop of 19 percentage points in 2023. From 2023 to the investigation period, consumption increased by 2 percentage points but remained 20 % below the beginning of the period considered.

(191) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing the volume of imports with the Union consumption.

(193) Imports from the country concerned increased from 140 372 tonnes to 160 549 tonnes over the period considered, an increase of 14 %. After a significant rise of 25 % in 2022, where imports peaked at 175 343 tonnes, volumes declined in 2023 to 151 650 tonnes before partially recovering during the investigation period. The overall increase during the investigation period was 14 %.

(194) The market share of those imports increased from 37 % to 53 % over the period considered, an increase of 42 % in a period of constant declining of Union consumption.

(195) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of data provided by the cooperating exporting producers that represented 4 % of Chinese imports to the Union in the IP.

(197) The average import price from China increased by 8 % over the period considered. Prices first increased by around 44 % to reach 1 169 EUR/ tonne in 2022. This was followed by a drop of 37 percentage points in 2023, with prices falling to 865 EUR/ tonne, before rising slightly to 878 EUR/tonne during the investigation period. The price fluctuation was mainly influenced by fluctuations in the cost of raw materials.

(198) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level, and the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled Chinese producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs.

(199) The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. An adjustment in the PCN was necessary given an identified inconsistency in the PCN description concerning brown fused alumina, as detailed in recital 11. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of between 42,94 % and 61,37 % by the imports from the country concerned on the Union market. Around 99,9 % of the import volumes from sampled exporting producers were found to be undercutting the Union industry’s prices.

(200) In addition to price undercutting, there was also significant price suppression within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. Due to the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports from Chinese exporting producers, the Union industry was unable to raise the prices throughout the IP in line with the development of costs of production and in order to achieve a reasonable level of profit, as set out in Table 8 below. The significant price suppression is confirmed by the data in Tables 4 and 8 as well as the price underselling found on the basis of the data provided by the sampled exporting producers.

(201) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(202) As mentioned in section 1.5, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry.

(203) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in questionnaire reply of the complainant relating to all Union producers, cross-checked where necessary with the questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(204) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(205) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(207) During the period considered, the Union industry’s production volume experienced a consistent and significant decrease of 37 %. From 2021 to 2022, production decreased by 11 %. This downward trend accelerated in 2023, with production falling by 34 % compared to 2021. The decline continued during the investigation period, reaching a low of 131 810 tonnes, a 37 % decrease from the initial volume.

(208) During the period considered, the Union industry’s production capacity remained stable at a level of 305 500 tonnes. Given the decrease in the production volume in the period considered, the capacity utilisation sharply decreased from 69 % in 2021 to 43 % in the IP.

(210) Over the period considered the Union industry’s sales volume decreased significantly by 37 % and its market shared reduced by 22 %, reducing its market share from 41 % in 2021 to 32 % in the IP.

(211) In the context of declining Union consumption, the Union industry suffered significant decreases in production, sales volume, and market share that outpaced the overall Union market contraction. The Union industry's performance deteriorated more sharply than the market, highlighting the industry's particularly vulnerable position during the period considered and negative growth.

(213) The Union industry experienced a decline in employment of 16 % over the period considered, with the total number of employees falling from 1 145 in 2021 to 962 during the investigation period.

(214) In view of the decrease in production and employment the productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured as tonnes per employee produced per year, decreased by 25 % over the period considered. Productivity increased from 2023 to the investigation period by 3 %, this marginal improvement was not due to a recovery in output but rather to a further reduction in the workforce.

(215) All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

(216) This is the first anti-dumping investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past dumping.

(218) Sales prices on the Union market to unrelated parties increased 9 % over the period considered. In 2022, the price increased by 39 % reflecting rising input costs. However, this was not sustained. In 2023, the average price declined and continued to fall during the investigation period, reaching EUR [1 446-1 692] per tonne.

(219) Over the same period, the unit cost of production of sampled union producers increased by 29 %. From 2021 to 2022, there was a significant increase of 49 %. This trend continued in 2023 with a further increase of 5 percentage points, before decreasing in the investigation period. The overall rise in Union prices was primarily driven by the development of raw material prices and the companies’ inability to take full advantage of economies of scale due to a reduction in sales and production.

(221) The average labour costs per employee increased by 15 % over the period considered.

(223) In absolute terms, the stocks of the sampled Union producers declined by 10 % over the period considered. This overall reduction, however, contains significant fluctuations within the period. Specifically, stock levels increased by 6 % between 2021 and 2022, followed by a pronounced decrease of 20 percentage points in 2023. Subsequently, from 2023 to the investigation period, stocks increased again by 4 percentage points.

(224) When production levels are taken into consideration, the percentage of closing stocks as a percentage of production increased by 12 % over the period considered. Notably, this ratio increased by 38 % between 2021 and 2023, indicating a substantial discrepancy between production and stock clearance. Although the Union industry managed to partially realign stock levels with production from 2023 to the IP, the closing stock ratio remained 12 % higher than in 2021.

(225) This trend indicates that despite efforts to align production, the accumulation of unsold stock, particularly during periods of declining production, reflects difficulties in accessing the Union market.

(227) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The profitability of the sampled producers declined significantly over the period considered, falling from nearly [2-6] % in 2021 to approximately [(– 14)-(– 10)] % during the investigation period. Profitability temporary increased in 2022 to [3-7] %, followed by a sharp downturn to a loss of [(– 17)-(– 13)] % in 2023. Despite a partial recovery that followed, profitability remained negative during the investigation period.

(228) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The cash flow was negative throughout the period considered, deteriorating further due to investment expenditures and increase of operational losses. This persistent negative cash flow was sustained by financial support from the ultimate shareholders of the Union producers, who continued to back the companies’ investment programmes despite the challenging financial environment.

(229) The level of yearly investments increased over the period considered by 30 %, it notably increased between 2021 and 2022 by 171 %, to later decrease in the following period until the IP. The increase in investments was primarily aimed at maintaining existing capacities and replacing essential production assets. The investment continued despite severe competition, loss of market share and a financially difficult situation.

(230) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It fell over the period considered by 287 %, starting from [(– 10)-(– 8)] % in 2021 to [(– 41)-(– 35)] % in the investigation period. The negative development showed that, although investments have continued in order to maintain competitiveness, the returns on those investments decreased substantially over the period considered

(231) The sampled Union producers’ ability to raise capital, as explained in recital 227, was based on the financial support from the ultimate shareholders of the Union producers, who continued to back the companies’ investments.

(232) In a context of a substantial decrease of the Union consumption (– 20 %), imports from China increased noticeably during the period considered (+ 14 %), at prices which significantly undercut those of the Union industry. This allowed Chinese exporting producers to reach a market share of 53 % in the IP (up from 37 % in 2021)

(233) In these circumstances, the Union industry’s economic situation worsened as shown by all major macro-indicators presenting a negative trend: production (– 37 %), Union sales (– 37 %) and a significant reduction of its market share (from 41 % to 32 %) in the period considered

(234) In reaction to the pressure of low Chinese import prices, the Union industry tried to reduce costs and adjustments in employment (– 16 %) were undertaken. Investments continued over the period considered in attempt to stay competitive. However, as a result of the pressure exerted by dumped Chinese imports in terms of increased volumes and low prices, Union sales, productivity and return on investments dropped rapidly in the period considered.

(235) The cost of production of the Union industry went up significantly during the period considered (+ 29 %), mainly because of a strong increase in the raw material prices.

(236) The Union industry’s cost increased more than sales prices. Consequently, profitability collapsed in the period considered, from a moderate situation (+ [2-6] %) in 2021 to an unsustainable loss-making scenario ([(– 14)-(– 10)] %) in the IP.

(237) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(238) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, export performance of the Union industry, contraction in EU consumption, increase of energy prices in the Union, competitive disadvantage in the use of the main raw material, lack of adequate level of investment, self-imports of Chinese fused alumina.

(239) The deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry coincided with significant and increasing market penetration of dumped imports from China, which consistently undercut the Union industry’s prices and led to price suppression. In this respect, the evolution of Chinese import volumes and prices, as reflected in tables 3 and 4, suppressed price levels of the Union industry, establishing a causal nexus between the two.

(240) Imports from China increased by 14 % during the period considered, from ca. 140 372 tonnes in 2021, representing a market share of 37 %, to 160 549 tonnes in the IP, representing a market share of 53 %. These increasing low-priced imports prevented the Union industry to increase its prices in line with the increase in the cost of production. Similarly, the decline in market share and sales volume, which in turn resulted in a decrease in production output, had a detrimental effect on the industry's unit production costs due to reduced economies of scale.

(241) This had a strong negative impact on the Union industry. In a situation of increasing costs and price pressure exerted by the Chinese dumped imports, the Union industry was precluded from setting prices and production volumes at sustainable levels, which resulted in a very strong drop in profitability from 4 % to losses (– 13 %), and the consequent deterioration of its financial indicators.

(242) It was, therefore, provisionally concluded that dumped imports from China caused material injury to the Union industry in terms of price and volume.

(244) Compared to China the other third countries had a limited presence in the Union market in the period considered. In the period considered the market shares of the biggest other third countries, Ukraine, United States, Brazil and Bahrain, remained stable, with minimal or no variations, at a level in the IP of 5 %, 2 %, 2 % and 2 % respectively. The combined market share of imports from all third countries except China decreased from 22 % in 2021 to 15 % in the IP.

(245) During the period considered, Ukraine sold at lower prices than China. Bahrain sold at prices slightly below China only during 2022 and the investigation period, while all other countries maintained higher price levels throughout the period considered. Despite their lower pricing, Ukraine accounted for just 5 % of the market, significantly less than China’s dominant 53 % in the IP. Bahrain’s market share was even smaller, at only 2 %. This limited market presence of other third countries indicates that, although Ukraine and Bahrain offered lower prices at some point, their overall impact was insufficient to weaken the causal link between the dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(246) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of imports from other countries does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(248) Export volumes from sampled Union producers declined by 40 % during the period considered, falling from 26 049 tonnes in 2021 to 15 649 tonnes during the investigation period. Average prices of exports increased by 22 % during the period considered.

(249) As explained by the Union industry, the decline in the export performance of the Union producers is explained by the pressure exerted by Chinese producers on other third-country markets, which in turn has caused a decrease in exports by Union producers. The loss of export sales volume in absolute terms is significantly lower than the loss of sales in the Union. Moreover, the average export price for sales to third countries was significantly higher by 21 % than for Union sales throughout the period considered.

(250) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of export performance does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(251) Some parties claimed that the reduction of the Union consumption was a source of the injury.

(252) While Union consumption decreased over the period considered, this only intensified the impact of Chinese dumped imports. Union producer’s sales decreased steeper than Union consumption. Consumption decreased by 20 %, while Union producers’ sales decreased by 37 % over the period considered. Similarly, imports from all other third countries also declined significantly. In contrast, during the same period, Chinese market share increased from 37 % to 53 % as a result of its low-priced imports.

(253) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of the contraction in the Union consumption does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(254) Some parties claimed that the increase of energy prices in the Union was the source of the injury.

(255) Energy is one of the main cost components in the production of fused alumina. However, the investigation revealed that in 2022, when energy prices were significantly higher than in the rest of the period considered, Union producers were still able to generate profits and even improved their profitability compared to the previous year. This was possible because part of the increased energy costs could be passed on to the users.

(256) Notably, in 2023 and in the investigation period, when energy prices had dropped to significantly lower levels compared to 2022, the Union industry was no longer able to adjust its prices accordingly, and profitability collapsed. This indicates that while energy prices do influence production costs the key issue arose when Union producers were prevented from aligning their prices with cost developments due to unfair competition from dumped imports originating in China.

(257) On this basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of energy prices in the Union does not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports from China and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(258) Some parties claimed that the source of the injury was the result of differences in the origin and cost of the raw materials used by European and Chinese producers, distinguishing specifically between bauxite and alumina.

(259) Concerning the alleged disadvantage related to raw materials, the investigation has determined that there are no significant differences in the production processes and the raw materials employed by Chinese and Union producers. With respect to raw material costs, as detailed in Section 3.2.1 above, the Chinese raw material market was found to be distorted.

(260) Some parties claimed that the Union industry suffered from a lack of investment and outdated production facilities, and that this was a source of the injury.

(261) However, the investigation revealed that Union producers had invested in brand new facilities in recent years. Furthermore, as shown in table 11, annual investment levels increased by 30 % over the considered period, indicating that investment activity continued despite the challenging financial environment.

(262) On this basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the alleged lack of investment does not correspond the reality and does not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports from China and the material injury suffered by Union producers

(263) Some parties claimed that the Union industry imported themselves Chinese fused alumina, and that this was a source of the injury.

(264) The investigation concluded that the Union industry imported some quantities of the product in question from China. However, these imports were limited in volume, namely [2 800-3 800] tonnes, representing approximately 1 % of the Union consumption during the IP. The investigation also concluded that the Union industry did not just resell the imported products, but rather processed them before reselling them. This provided added value. The sales of these imports did not undercut the Union producer's own production, and they were insignificant in volume.

(265) Moreover, the fact that Chinese imports increased regardless of the evolution of the Union producer’s self-imports shows that the Chinese imports would have risen and taken the EU’s market share even in the absence of the Union producer's self-imports from China.

(266) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of Union producers’ self-imports from China does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(267) In light of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China that suppressed the Union market price. As a result of the significant increase of dumped imports from China the Union industry was precluded from setting prices and production volumes at sustainable levels, which resulted in strong deterioration of its economic situation.

(268) The economic decline of the Union industry coincided with a sharp rise in low-priced dumped imports from China. These imports consistently undercut Union prices, exerting strong downward pressure on market prices which led to price suppression. As a result, the Union industry was unable to raise prices in line with rising production costs. This led to falling sales, reduced output, and a significant drop in profitability. The timing and scale of these developments establish a clear causal link between dumped imports and the material injury.

(269) The Commission examined alternative factors that could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry. These included imports from other third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, a contraction in Union consumption, rising energy costs, the sourcing and cost of raw materials, an alleged lack of investment and the self-import of Chinese fused alumina. However, none of these were found to attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(270) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(271) In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions for bauxite and alumina within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of the sampled exporting producers would be higher than their injury margin, see recitals 280 to 282.

(272) The injury would be removed if the Union Industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(273) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(274) As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. The basic profit was established based on the historical profitability of the sampled Union industry from 2014 to 2020, prior to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Such profit margin was established at 7 %.

(275) One of the two sampled Union producers provided evidence that its level of investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. The Commission verified the company’s internal records related to investment plans, management decisions and financial statements and found the claims warranted. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R&D and innovation ('IRI') expenses in the IP and the level it could have reached under normal conditions of competition as provided by the Union Industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such difference, expressed as a percentage of turnover, was between 1 % and 3,06 % for each of the sampled companies.

(276) Such percentage was added to the basic profit of 7% mentioned in the recital 273, leading to a target profit of 7 % and 10,06 % depending on the situation of the sampled Union producers.

(277) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available, the Commission established an additional cost of EUR 89,34 per tonne, from which it deducted the actual cost of compliance with such conventions during the IP, namely EUR 72,26 per tonne, leading to a result of EUR 17,08 per tonne. This difference was added to the non-injurious price.

(278) On this basis, the Commission calculated an average non-injurious price of EUR 1 880 per tonne for the like products of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin (see recital 275) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(279) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in the country concerned, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(281) As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in the country concerned regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

(282) However, as the margins adequate to remove injury were higher than the dumping margins, the Commission considered that, at this stage, it was not necessary to address this aspect. Following the above assessment the Commission concluded that it is appropriate to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.

(284) Having decided to apply Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(285) The Union industry comprises nine companies, geographically distributed across Europe, employing approximately 962 workers directly. A majority of these Union producers expressed support for the complaint, and none opposed the initiation of the investigation

(286) Current levels of profitability are unsustainable. The imposition of measures is expected to allow the Union industry to recover parts of the lost market share, and to set prices at levels that at least cover the cost.

(287) The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price suppression and a further reduction of sales, thus translating into more losses and likely closure of production facilities, dismissals and ultimately, the shutdown of entire businesses. Such developments could result in the interruption of the European production with long-term implications for the Union’s industrial resilience and autonomy particularly given that fused alumina, essential for producing steel, other metals, glass, and related materials, has historically been regarded as a sensitive product.

(288) The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of provisional measures is in the interest of the Union industry.

(289) Twelve unrelated importers made themselves known, out of which two replies were submitted outside the deadline. A number of submissions and comments were also received. As mentioned in section 1.5, the Commission selected a sample of two importers, which submitted questionnaires replies.

(290) Several importers argued that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would increase material costs for them and for their customers. These additional costs would be difficult to cover and therefore threaten their profitability and competitiveness. Further claims were made concerning the lack of capacity of the Union industry to meet demand in the Union, hence alleging that measures would create a shortage in the market. In addition, claims were raised concerning the lack of interest of Union producers in supplying certain materials.

(291) The Commission noted that the imposition of duties should not result in the elimination of all imports from the PRC. The imposition of measures is meant to level the playing field after which Chinese exporting producers can continue exporting to the Union at fair prices. Secondly, although the imposition of measures may have a negative effect on the importers importing only from the PRC, in view of the likely increase of imports from other third countries, as referred in section 7.4 below, the importers should be in the position to shift their sources of supply.

(292) Regarding the alleged lack of interest of Union producers in supplying certain materials, the Commission noted that the Union industry produced a broad range of fused alumina products. During the investigation period, as well as in previous years, the Union industry consistently supplied fused alumina in a wide variety of grades and qualities, tailored to satisfy the specific requirements of different user industries.

(293) Concerning the lack of capacity of the Union industry, the Commission address this claim in section 7.4 below.

(294) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally established that any negative impact of the measures on unrelated importers as a whole is expected to be limited and will not outweigh the positive effect of measures on Union producers.

(295) Around 50 users and user associations made themselves known. 18 users submitted questionnaire replies and several more submitted comments.

(296) Claims were raised arguing that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would increase costs for users that would be difficult to pass on to customers and, therefore, threaten their profitability and competitiveness. Some users claimed that the cost increase linked to the imposition of duties could jeopardize their operational sustainability. Some users argued that as a result, the continued viability of certain production activities within the Union could be at risk, potentially leading to downsizing, relocation outside the Union and/or business closures.

(297) The Commission noted that users are mainly active in the production of abrasive and refractory materials, for which fused alumina is a key input material. According to the information provided by the associations, in terms of consumption, the refractory industry purchases approximately 80 000 tonnes annually. The consumption of the abrasives industry is estimated to be between 200 000 and 250 000 tonnes per year. This sector accounts for around 60 % to 70 % of the Union’s total fused alumina demand. In terms of employment, the refractory industry employs approximately 20 000 people in Europe, while the abrasives industry accounts for around 8 400 jobs in Germany and Italy alone. With regard to turnover, the refractory industry generates an estimated EUR 4 billion in annual revenue in Europe. The abrasives industry generates approximately EUR 2,3 billion in annual revenue in Germany and Italy alone.

(298) Based on the information provided in the user’s questionnaires, it was established that, during the IP, the activity related to the product under investigation varied in proportion to their total activity and ranged from 5 % to 30 % of the total turnover for the refractories industry and from 25 % to 85 % of the total turnover for the abrasives industry. On average, in the IP, the activity related to the product concerned represented around 15 % of the total activity of cooperating users within the refractories industries and around 53 % of cooperating users within the abrasives industry.

(299) Users who responded to the questionnaire accounted for approximately 20 % of total Union consumption of fused alumina and around 25 % of the Union’s imports from China. Among these responses, approximately 50 % of the fused alumina used in the abrasives industry originated from China, while the share of Chinese origin was around 65 %-69 % in the refractories industry

(300) The Commission estimated that, if duties are imposed at the proposed level and all other factors remain constant, the cost of production for users could increase by between 10 % and 30 %, depending on the specific company. More specifically, for the refractory industry, the estimated increase in production costs would range from 10 % to 30 %, while for the abrasive industry, the increase is expected to range from 10 % to 23 %. However, it is important to note that these estimates are based on the assumption that all of the fused alumina is of Chinese origin. In reality, the supply to downstream industries is more diverse. For those who responded to the questionnaire, around 50 % of fused alumina used in the abrasives industry and approximately 65 % in the refractories industry originated from China. This suggests that a significant proportion of the supply originates from sources other than China, which would mitigate the overall cost impact of the duties. Furthermore, the actual effect on production costs will vary depending on each company’s specific supply source mix. Those with lower dependency on Chinese sources are likely to experience a more limited cost increase, while those with higher dependency may be more affected. Therefore, the impact of the proposed duties should be assessed in light of these diverse sourcing strategies.

(301) Regarding the potential effect of the measures on profitability, the situation is complex due to the diversity of companies involved. Profitability among users varied across both sectors and individual companies, with some reporting positive margins, while others operated at a loss.

(302) The Commission considered that the impact on the profitability of users would largely depend on two key factors: the ability of users to pass on cost increases to their customers, and the capacity to substitute inputs currently sourced from China with alternative suppliers, provided that the prices of these supplies, after the duties on Chinese imports are imposed, could potentially mitigate the price impact.

(303) With regard to the ability to pass on cost increases, further assessment is required. However, the Commission acknowledges that companies operating in higher margin segments and producing more specialised products are more likely to be able to transfer additional costs to their customers. In contrast, companies manufacturing less specialised products and subject to broader competition, are expected to face greater difficulties in doing so. This is particularly relevant for firms already operating at a loss, which suggests that they have already been unable to raise prices even prior to any imposition of measures.

(304) Concerning the availability of other sources of supply, the investigation, as further explained in section 7.4, established that the Union industry remained a reliable source of supply for fused alumina with sufficient capacity to meet Union users’ demand. It also established that users in the Union are not solely dependent on imports from China. Other third countries, like Bahrain, Brazil, the United States, and Ukraine, as noted in section 5.2.1, are already present in the Union market and are likely to increase their exports to the Union, further reducing reliance on Chinese imports.

(305) Furthermore, as established in recital 244, imports from Bahrain and Ukraine were, in the IP, at lower price than Chinese imports, offering competitive alternatives for Union users. The availability of lower-priced imports from these countries increases supply diversity and also contributes to mitigating the potential impact of measures on Chinese imports, ensuring that Union users continue to have access to economically viable sources of fused alumina.

(306) These findings suggest that the imposition of measures would not result in supply shortages, and that the availability of supply from third countries and the Union, at fair prices, would, to some extent, mitigate potential negative impact on users. However, the economic consequences for user industries may vary significantly, depending on their specific market positioning, cost structures, and their capacity to absorb or pass on cost increases. This impact will be further investigated by the Commission.

(307) Some parties claimed that the Union industry is not capable of supplying the Union market in the quantities required and thus if anti-dumping duties are imposed there is a serious risk of shortage in the Union, including for particular types of the product concerned.

(308) The investigation found this argument to be unjustified. The Union industry has been underutilising its production capacity throughout the period considered. In the IP, the utilisation rate of the Union production capacity was 43 % with additional spare capacity of about 180 000 tonnes. The investigation established that the majority of the spare capacity is either available immediately or can become operational within a very short period of time with minimal investment. The investigation also established that the Union industry’s spare capacity allows to produce all main types of the product concerned. The Union industry’s production capacity broadly corresponds to the Union consumption of 305 360 tonnes during the IP.

(309) Additionally, the investigation revealed that, while the production of fused alumina is concentrated in a few key regions in the world, the existing capacity of the non-Chinese production outside the Union can complement the already substantial production capacity within the Union. As detailed in table 12, imports from third countries are already present on the Union market. The Commission considered that these imports are likely to increase, should the dumped imports from China decrease. It is therefore concluded that the total spare capacity of the Union and third-country producers outside the Union is sufficient to meet Union consumption.

(310) Some parties also argued that the imposition of anti-dumping duties on the product concerned will create a market concentration risk, which may lead to a further increase of prices of the product concerned.

(311) The Commission noted that while it is true that the Union competition rules impose more stringent standards of behaviour on a company that has a significant market share, it is ultimately up to the competition authorities to determine whether there is a dominant position and whether it is abused. In anti-dumping proceedings the Commission examines competition concerns to establish whether, on balance, it would be clearly against the Union interest to impose anti-dumping measures. Such an analysis cannot encompass a competition assessment in the strict legal sense, which can only be carried out by a competent competition authority. In any case, no robust evidence was provided that would suggest that the complainant would engage in anti-competitive behaviour should anti-dumping measures be imposed, aside from its already strong position on the market and its engagement in commercial practices generally regarded as standard, such as differentiated pricing linked to purchase volumes and the nature of existing business relationships. It is recalled that the purpose of imposing anti-dumping measures is to restore a level playing field that has been distorted by the unfair trade practises of Chinese exporting producers. The aim of anti-dumping measures is not to force Chinese exporting producers out of the Union market but rather to create conditions where Union producers and third country producers compete under fair conditions.

(312) Some parties claimed that the certification process for the materials used in their production, both internally and by their clients, is lengthy and complex. It involves rigorous testing and approval procedures to ensure compliance with customer requirements. If measures are imposed, this could imply the need to switch suppliers or materials, which could require a re-certification process and delay in production, potentially affecting contractual obligations.

(313) The Commission noted several mitigating factors that significantly reduce this risk. Both the Union industry and several suppliers from third countries are well-established producers of fused alumina. These suppliers have many years of experience in the market, supplying materials that meet industry standards. Similarly, the Union industry is recognised as a quality producer with the capacity to meet strict certification requirements. Its products are often the first to be certified in the Union, after which alternative sources are considered. Furthermore, the investigation was initiated several months ago, providing users with time to prepare for potential changes, assess alternative suppliers, and initiate certification processes where necessary.

(314) The Commission recognises the legitimate concerns raised by user industries, particularly with regard to their ability to absorb or pass on the cost increases and maintain profitability. Therefore, the Commission considers it appropriate to examine these issues in greater depth. To this end, during the definitive stage of the investigation, the Commission will further assess the extent and impact of these concerns ensuring that any definitive measures adopted are based on a comprehensive understanding of the broader economic implications.

(315) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded, despite the legitimate concerns of user industries, that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China at this stage of the investigation. The measures are considered legally justified and proportionate, as they are necessary to prevent further injury to the Union industry, preserve viability of Union production, and ensure fair competition in the Union. The Commission therefore found it appropriate to impose provisional measures at this stage of the investigation, while committing to further assess the impact on user industries.

(316) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(317) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of product originating in country concerned, in accordance Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission concluded recitals 280 and 281 that the appropriate level to remove injury should be the dumping margin.

(319) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the PRC’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(320) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in in the PRC’.

(321) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(322) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(323) As mentioned in recital 3, the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

(324) In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should cease/be discontinued.

(325) No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken/can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

(326) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(327) No comments on the accuracy of the calculations were received.

(328) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(329) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 17 July 2025.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

(2) OJ C, C/2024/7049, 21.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7049/oj.

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/260 of 10 February 2025 making imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/260, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/260/oj).

(4) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2757.

(5) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923 of 10 July 2024 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of titanium dioxide originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2024/1923, 11.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1923/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120 of 12 October 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2023/2120, 13.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2120/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of silicon consigned from the Republic of Korea and from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or Taiwan or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and the Council (OJ L 211, 12.8.2022, p. 86, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/1394/oj).

(6) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recital 199; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 121; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 125.

(7) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recitals 131-142; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 75; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 83.

(8) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recitals 143-152; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recitals 83-85; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 96. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including the producers in the metallurgical and chemical sectors.

(9) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recital 154; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 86; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 85.

(10) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recital 175; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 86; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 86.

(11) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recitals 178-181; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 106; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 87.

(12) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recital 182; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 106; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/844 of 13 March 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of electrolytic manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2024/844, 14.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/844/oj), recital 43; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 87.

(13) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024 (SWD(2024) 91 final), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en.

(14) Report, Chapter 15.

(15) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recital 199; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recital 121; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recital 125.

(16) Report, p. 6-7.

(17) Ibid., p. 152-171 and p. 207-208, 242-243.

(18) Ibid., p. 40-84.

(19) Ibid., p. 495-496.

(20) See the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), Chongqing Municipal People’s Government, Issuing high-quality development of manufacturing industry in Chongqing, available at: https://www.cq.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxxgkml/szfwj/qtgw/202108/t20210803_9538603.html, accessed on 15 April 2025.

(21) Ibid., Chapter 6, p. 171-179.

(22) Report, p. 120-131.

(23) Article 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See also the Report, p. 47-50.

(24) See also the Report, p. 422 and p. 441.

(25) See at: http://wap.sasac.gov.cn/n2588045/n27271785/n27271792/c14159097/content.html (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(26) See at: http://www.c-chico.com/#/index (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(27) See at: https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202503243354581456.html (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(28) See at: https://www.yfml.com/about-03 (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(29) See at: https://www.cqbosai.com/index.php/company/show/111 and also at https://www.cq.gov.cn/ywdt/jrcq/202411/t20241126_13831013.html (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(30) See at: http://www.lyghz.gov.cn/hzqzxqyj/gfxwj/content/437ba875-02fc-4082-b62f-febf935ced75.html (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(31) Ibidem, Point 1.1.

(32) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202411/content_6990315.htm (accessed on 14 April 2025).

(33) See at https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202503/content_7016126.htm (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(34) See at: http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=f85aaf1621f249c39003ec11de94edac.pdf (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(35) Ibid., Section II.3.

(36) See at: http://gxt.gxzf.gov.cn/wzsy/zwdt/mtgz/t13115758.shtml (accessed on 15 April 2025).

(37) Ibid., Point 15.

(38) See at: https://www.cnfa.net.cn/index.aspx (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(39) See at: https://www.cnfa.net.cn/about/1546.aspx (accessed on 8 April 2025).

(40) Ibidem.

(41) Ibid., Article 21.

(42) See at: https://www.acri.org.cn/ (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(43) See at: https://www.acri.org.cn/aboutAssociation/constitution?id=2 (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(44) See at: https://www.acri.org.cn/associationMember/director?id=3 (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(45) See at: https://www.cmtba.org.cn/ (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(46) See at: https://www.cmtba.org.cn/web/197001/3043.html (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(47) See at: https://www.cmtba.org.cn/web/3/list.html (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(48) See at: https://www.chinalco.com.cn/dqjs/dqjs_djdt/202404/t20240422_126423.html (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(49) See at: https://www.cqbosai.com/index.php/about/team (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(50) See at : https://www.cqbosai.com/index.php/news/m_show/493#:~:text=%E5%85%9A%E5%A7%94%E4%B9%A6%E8%AE%B0%E5%88%98%E5%89%91%E8%A6%81%E6%B1%82,%E5%A4%9A%E6%9B%B4%E5%A4%A7%E7%9A%84%E8%B4%A1%E7%8C%AE%E3%80%82 (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(51) Report, p. 427.

(52) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923, recitals 153-167; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120, recitals 86-100; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394, recitals 81-127.

(53) Report, p. 427.

(54) See at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (accessed on 10 April 2025).

(55) See Section I of the Aluminium Plan.

(56) See Section VIII.2 of the Shandong Plan.

(57) Available at: http://www.yn.gov.cn/ztgg/lqhm/lqzc/djzc/202202/t20220223_236886.html (accessed on 14 April 2025).

(58) See Section III.10 of the Yunnan Plan.

(59) See Section IV.3(3) of the Yunnan Plan.

(60) See Point XI of the Guangxi Decision.

(61) See at: https://www.smx.gov.cn/4036/616899168/1838419.html (accessed on 11 April 2025).

(62) See at: https://www.cq.gov.cn/zt/fjxzcjgxsd/zjqxkfz/202210/t20221014_11190923.html (accessed on 11 April 2025).

(63) See at: http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/info/ztzl/zszhwwmwwzgz/202008/t20200806_20935.html (accessed on 11 April 2025).

(64) See Section VIII.2 of the Raw Materials Plan.

(65) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(66) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj).

(67) Idem.

(68) https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/economicas/industria/9042-pesquisa-industrial-anual.html?=&t=downloads.

(69) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de-energia/boletins/2023-1/ingles/brazilian-monthly-energy-bulletin-january-2023.pdf/view.

(70) http://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm.

(71) https://www.ibge.gov.br/en/statistics/economic/prices-and-costs/17136-national-consumer-pricce-index.html?edicao=36055&t=downloads.

(72) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de-energia/boletins/2023-1/ingles/brazilian-monthly-energy-bulletin-january-2023.pdf/view.

(73) Considering that the data used related to a limited number of parties, information on profit had to be ranged.

(74) See recital 1 above.