Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1720 of 6 August 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foil in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) By Implementing Regulation (EU) No 217/2013 (2), the European Commission imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls, originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(2) By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/915 (3), the European Commission, re-imposed the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review (the ‘previous expiry review’). Following an anti-circumvention investigation the Commission, through Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1475 (4), extended the measures to imports from Thailand.

(3) The anti-dumping measures currently in force on the imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) range between 14,2 % and 15,6 % on imports from the sampled cooperating exporting producers, 14,6 % on the non-sampled cooperating companies and a duty rate of 35,6 % on all other companies from the PRC.

(4) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry (5) of the anti-dumping measures in force on the imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’), the Commission received a request for review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(5) The request for review was submitted on 4 March 2024 by three Union producers, ALEURO Converting Sp. z o. o., CeDo Sp. z.o.o. and ITS B.V. (‘the applicants’), representing 33 % of the total Union production of certain aluminium foils in rolls. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(6) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 3 June 2024, the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the PRC (‘the country concerned) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published on 3 June 2024 a notice of initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (6) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(7) The investigation of the continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury will cover the period from 1 January 2020 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(8) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicants, other known Union producers, exporting producers, importers and users in the Union known to be concerned and the authorities in the PRC of the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate. All interested parties had the opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No interested party submitted comments and/or requested a hearing.

(9) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(10) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the representativity in terms of volume of production and sales of the like product, which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 33 % of the estimated total volume of production of the like product in the Union. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received, and the Commission confirmed the provisionally selected sample which is representative of the Union industry.

(11) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(12) No unrelated importer came forward and provided the requested information.

(13) The Commission invited in the Notice of Initiation the users and their representative associations, trade unions and representative consumer organisations to make themselves known and cooperate. No users in the Union or their associations came forward.

(14) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in the countries concerned to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(15) No exporting producers in the country concerned provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample.

(16) The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in China within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’).

(17) The Commission sent questionnaires to Union producers. The same questionnaires had also been made available online on the day of initiation (7).

(18) Questionnaire replies were received from the three sampled Union producers.

(19) Neither the GOC nor any producer or exporting producer in China provided a questionnaire reply. The Commission informed the exporting producers and the GOC of the consequences of the lack of cooperation in the investigation.

(21) On 16 May 2025, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(22) The comments made by interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate. The parties who so requested were granted a hearing.

(23) The product under review is the same as in in the original investigation and in the previous expiry review, namely aluminium foil of a thickness of 0,007 mm or more but less than 0,021 mm, not backed, not further worked than rolled, whether or not embossed, in low-weight rolls of a weight not exceeding 10 kg currently falling under CN codes ex 7607 11 11 and ex 7607 19 10 (TARIC codes 7607 11 11 11, 7607 11 11 19, 7607 19 10 11 and 7607 19 101 9) (‘the product under review’).

(24) The product under review is generally used as a consumer product for packaging and other household/catering applications (‘aluminium household foil’ or ‘AHF’)

(25) The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in the People’s Republic of China currently falling under CN codes ex 7607 11 11 and ex 7607 19 10 (TARIC codes 7607 11 11 11, 7607 11 11 19, 7607 19 10 11 and 7607 19 10 19).

(27) These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(28) During the review investigation period, imports of the product under review from the PRC continued to enter the Union albeit at significant lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation. According to Eurostat, imports of AHF from the PRC accounted for about 1,02 % (640 tonnes) of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 13,4 % market share (12 994 tonnes) during the original investigation and 1,8 % (1 519 tonnes) during the previous expiry review. While imports from the PRC continued, their volume was significantly lower than during the original investigation, indicating that trade defence measures influenced the level of imports.

(29) As mentioned in recital 19, none of the producers or exporters from the PRC cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of the PRC that due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings with regard to the PRC. The Commission did not receive any comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard.

(30) Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available. Such information included, in particular, information contained in the expiry review request and combined with other sources of publicly available information deemed appropriate, such as official company websites and official statistics, in particular Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) (8) and Eurostat.

(31) Given the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show, with regard to the PRC, the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission initiated the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(32) In order to obtain information, it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in Section 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC.

(33) In Section 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it had provisionally selected Türkiye as an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine other possibly appropriate countries in accordance with the criteria set out in first indent of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(34) On 20 February 2025, the Commission informed by a note (‘the FOP Note’) interested parties on the relevant factors of production, as identified in the review request, and sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In that note, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified Türkiye as an appropriate representative country. It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG & A’) and profits based on the 2023 financial report of Sedat Tahir A.Ş, a producer of AHF in the representative country. No comments were received from the parties.

(35) According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(36) However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred to hereinafter as ‘SG & A’).

(37) As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(38) The Commission examined the evidence on the file to decide whether significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation exist in the PRC, rendering the use of domestic prices and costs in that country inappropriate. That analysis covered the following evidentiary elements on the various criteria relevant to establish the existence of significant distortions.

(39) First, the evidence contained in the request included the following elements pointing to the existence of significant distortions.

(40) The applicant argues that the market of Small AHF Rolls is being served to a significant extent by enterprises that operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the PRC authorities. In this regard the applicant stated that the government and the CCP maintain structures that ensure their continued influence over SOEs and refers to a January 2019 OECD study on SOEs in the aluminium sector showing how State ownership influences relevant industrial policies and how State ownership translates into government support. In addition, the 2021 annual report of China Aluminium International Engineering Corporation Limited (‘Chalieco’) explains that the company is controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (‘SASAC’). Furthermore, the applicant states that Findings of the US Department of Commerce (‘DOC’) in its countervailing investigation of certain aluminium from China established that 37 % of domestic aluminium consumption in China is from SOEs. Finally, the request refers to a report by a representative of the Party Committee of China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association which evidences that development of Chinese aluminium production is undertaken according to the general policy guidelines.

(41) The request also considers that the Chinese State presence in Small AHF Rolls firms allows the State to interfere with respect to prices or costs. According to the applicant, the GOC preserves its influence in SOEs through the appointment and removal of key management personnel in SOEs, which is the main responsibility of SASAC. Both SOEs and private Chinese companies also host internal Party committees capable of exercising government and Party influence over their corporate governance and business decisions as expressly provided for under Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. It is also reported that in recent years, CCP has taken steps to increase the strength and presence of Party committees within companies. Furthermore, Chinese aluminium producers are regrouped under the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association, which is supervised by the Party Construction Bureau of the SASAC and the Department of Raw material Industry of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

(44) Beyond the plans, the government’s intervention in the sector has taken the form, inter alia, of export-related measures, including export duties, export quotas, export performance requirements and minimum export price requirements on different raw materials for aluminium.

(45) Finally, according to the applicant, the price of key inputs such as energy and electricity are found to be influenced by different types of government intervention. Other types of government intervention leading to market distortions include the stockpiling policy through the State Reserve Bureau and the role of the Shanghai Futures Exchange. In addition, several trade defence investigations have established that the Chinese government has consistently granted different types of State support measures to aluminium producers. The extensive intervention of the GOC in the aluminium sector has led to overcapacity, which is arguably the clearest illustration of the implications of the GOC’s policies and the resulting distortions.

(46) Then the applicant underlines the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws stating that regarding bankruptcy rules, Chinese bankruptcy system delivers inadequately on its main objectives such as to fairly settle claims and debts, and to protect the rights of creditors and debtors. The applicant concludes that much like any other sector in the Chinese economy, producers of Small AHF Rolls are subject to the Chinese bankruptcy, corporate and property rules, and are therefore also subject to the distortions resulting from the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of these law.

(47) In the request, the applicant also argues that wage costs are being distorted. In this regard, the request mentions that a system of market-based wages cannot fully develop in the PRC because workers and employers are impeded in their rights to collective organization. In support of this argument, the request mentions the existence of only one trade union which is legally recognized which is subject to the leadership of the CCP in addition to the fact that senior positions in the trade union were occupied by senior party figures in SOEs or by managers in non-state enterprises, hampering their ability to efficiently represent workers’ interests. In addition, the PRC has still not ratified a number of major international conventions of the International Labor Organization and the mobility of the Chinese workforce is affected by the household registration system, which provides that only local residents of a given administrative area are granted access to the full range of social security and public welfare benefits.