Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1723 of 6 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels, originating in the People’s Republic of China

(259) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply submitted by the complainant covering data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(260) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(261) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(263) The production volume decreased by 13 % between 2021 and 2022 from about 368 790 tonnes to 319 410 tonnes. This development can be linked to the bad sweetcorn harvest that is described in recital 313, which resulted in lower production volumes. In 2023, the production volume increased by 15 percentage points to about 375 540 tonnes, representing a recovery from the bad harvest in the Union. However, during the investigation period, the production quantity dropped again significantly by 11 percentage points to about 333 970 tonnes, coinciding with the increase of Chinese imports. Overall, the production volume decreased by 9 % over the period considered.

(264) The production capacity of the Union industry showed a steady increase of 8 % over the period considered due to investments that were decided before the increase of the Chinese imports. Between 2021 and 2022, the capacity increased by 3 %, followed by a further increase of 3 percentage points in 2022 and an additional 2 percentage points during the investigation period.

(265) The capacity utilisation followed the trend in production quantity. Between 2021 and 2022, it decreased from 85 % to 71 %, followed by an increase up to 81 %. During the investigation period, capacity utilisation dropped again to 71 %.

(267) Throughout the period considered, the Union sales volume dropped significantly by 21 %. Between 2021 and 2022 the sales volume decreased by 2 % from about 284 880 tonnes to about 279 280 tonnes. In 2023, the sales dropped significantly by 13 percentage points to about 241 040 tonnes. During the investigation, the sales dropped by an additional 6 percentage points to about 225 850 tonnes.

(268) In terms of market share, Union sales decreased from 95 % in 2021 to 91 % in 2022, representing a decrease of 4 %. In 2023, market share dropped significantly to 82 %, a decrease of 14 % compared to 2021. During the investigation period, market share slightly increased by 1 percentage point to 83 %.

(269) The decrease in sales volume in 2022 can be linked to the bad harvest that is mentioned in recital 313 and the reduced production volume that is reported in Table 5. However, the main decrease in Union sales volume in 2023 and the investigation period was due to the market penetration of the Chinese imports at prices which undercut the Union industry as shown in recital 253.

(270) The development of the market share over the period considered was impacted by the same factors and the main loss of market share in 2023 coincided with the increased market share of Chinese imports.

(271) The Union industry lost 12 percentage points of market share over the period considered due to the imports from China. The sales volumes dropped significantly by 21 %. The main loss in market share can be attributed to the imports from China as it coincided with the increased Chinese market share, which increased significantly from 2 % to 15 % over the period considered, and exceeded the reduction in Union consumption that decreased by 9 %. Therefore, the Union industry did not experience any growth in terms of production and sales volumes, despite the expansion in production capacity.

(273) The Union industry employment decreased by 5 % from about 3 460 full time employees (‘FTEs’) in 2021 to 3 456 FTEs during the investigation period. This development largely follows the trend in production capacity shown in Table 5.

(274) As the figures for production and employment are closely linked, productivity in terms of tonnes per employee is in line with the trend of production volume shown in Table 5.

(275) All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

(276) Sweetcorn was subject to a previous anti-dumping investigation. Definitive anti-dumping measures on imports from Thailand were imposed in 2007 (109) and extended following expiry reviews in 2013 (110) and 2019 (111). Following the imposition of measures, the Union industry was able to recover, at least partially its level of profitability and market share.

(278) The average sales price to unrelated customers in the Union increased throughout the period considered by 42 %. Between 2021 and 2022, the average sales price increased by 13 % from [1 302 - 2 028] EUR/tonne to [1 473 - 2 294] EUR/tonne. In 2023, the average sales price increased by an additional 22 percentage points to [1 754 - 2 732] EUR/tonne. In the investigation period, the average sales price increased further by 7 percentage points to [1 843 - 2 870] EUR/tonne.

(279) This apparent positive trend in average sales prices should be seen in the context of important increase of costs, especially raw material cost related to sweetcorn, cans, and energy. Despite the sales price increases, the sampled Union producers were not able to increase prices at sufficient levels, fully in line with the cost increases.

(280) The average unit cost of cost of goods sold increased between 2021 and 2022 by 15 % from [1 146 – 1 784] EUR/tonne to [1 323 - 2 059] EUR/tonne. In 2023, the cost further increased to [1 590 - 2 476] EUR/tonne, representing an additional increase of 24 percentage points compared to 2022. During the investigation period, the average unit cost per tonne increased by 5 percentage points to [1 655 - 2 577] EUR/tonne. As a result, the average import prices during the period considered described in recital 250 remained consistently below the average unit cost of the cost of goods sold.

(282) The average labour costs per employee increased in 2022 by 15 %, followed by a decline of 13 % in 2023. In the investigation period, the average labour costs per employee increased again by 12 %. The increase in the average labour costs was linked to increases in minimum wages due to inflation.

(284) Between 2021 and 2022, the closing stock of the sampled Union producers decreased by 4 % from [72 917 - 113 542] to [70 300 - 109 467] tonnes. However, in 2023, the closing stock increased substantially by 27 percentage points [89 648 - 139 596] tonnes, with an even further increase by an additional 32 percentage points compared to 2021 [112 712 - 175 509] tonnes.

(285) The reduced stock level of 2022 can be linked to the bad harvest in the Union. While the increased level of stocks can be connected to a seasonal effect at the end of the calendar year, the substantial surge in inventories in 2023 and the IP was a clear effect of the rise in dumped imports from China indicating that Union producers were not able to sell their products.

(287) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(288) The profitability decreased by 15 % over the period considered.

(289) Despite being still profitable, the Union industry remained constantly below the target profit of 14 % during the period considered. The trend on profitability should be considered in light of the significant decrease in sales volumes, the decreased production, capacity utilisation, and employment, as well as the significant increase of stock levels and the delayed effect of the tenders and the annual duration of the contracts. In essence, the Union industry was able to maintain a positive profitability level but at the expense of its sales volumes.

(290) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. Between 2021 and 2022, cash flow dropped dramatically by 184 %. In 2023, cash flow decreased further by 225 percentage points. During the investigation period, cash flow recovered to almost the same level as in 2021.

(291) The sampled Union producers continued to invest during the period considered as demonstrated by the investment figures above. Investments increased by 84 % from [5 084 019 - 7 916 544] EUR in 2021 to [9 363 438 - 14 580 211] EUR in 2022. In 2023, investments increased by 96% to [14 746 664 - 22 962 663] EUR. During the investigation period, investments increased by 38 % to [12 310 955 - 19 169 915] EUR. Investments were made for the expansion of production capacity as described in Table 5 and for the replacement of equipment. Overall, the industry is very capital intensive with the need for large investments into production facilities. The Union industry was able to raise the necessary capital. However, in case no measures will be imposed, not only future investments will be at risk but also the future of the existing production plans.

(292) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. Between 2021 and 2022, it decreased by 12 % from [17 - 27] % to [15 - 23] %. In 2023, the return on investment further decreased by 9% to [14 - 21] %. During the investigation period, the return on investment recorded an additional decline by 3 % to [13 - 20] %.

(293) Retailer brand products represented about 70 % of the total sweetcorn sales in the Union during the period considered and about [35 - 55] % of the sampled Union producers’ sales. All retailer brand sweetcorn is sold in the Union through tender processes. During the process of tender sales, Union producers compete indirectly with Chinese exporting producers that sell their products via importers. In order to obtain the necessary insights into the sweetcorn market, the Commission requested detailed information on tenders from the sampled Union producers and importers. Information was requested on the characteristics of the tenders, such as process, timing and other relevant characteristic.

(294) The investigation showed that tenders can be organised in different forms, such as online platforms or through email, telephone, or in-person communication, depending on the business and sales model of the negotiating parties. Tender negotiations take place between May and August of a given year for sales covering the year following the negotiations.

(295) The tender process takes place in different stages. First, Union sweetcorn producers request information from retailers about their need of own and retail brand products. Retailers respond with their volume need. A retailer may also initiate tender discussions by requesting details regarding available volumes that producers can sell to retailers. Retailers usually initiate discussions with multiple producers simultaneously, including Union and non-Union producers. In a second step, sweetcorn producers respond to the retailer’s request with volume offers and corresponding prices. Third, the retailer and Union sweetcorn producers or EU importers enter into negotiations, typically focusing on the price of sweetcorn. For own brand sweetcorn, retailers generally negotiate on the price, and not on the volume. Fourth, the retailer decides on the volume allocation among different sweetcorn producers and suppliers, and the parties finalize the sales agreement for the upcoming year. Fifth, once the negotiations are completed, Union and non-Union sweetcorn producers supply the agreed volume throughout the September-August period at negotiated prices.

(296) Chinese imports impact the tender negotiations as they hinder the ability to negotiate fair prices and reduced the number of won tenders. As a result, production volumes of Union producers had to be reduced, the industry is subject to high fixed costs that remained unchanged and therefore the fixed costs per unit increased. The Chinese imports impacted also indirectly the sales of own brand product, considering that consumers tend to be price sensitive and prefer to buy the cheaper retailer brand product if the price gap to own brand products is significant. The information submitted by the Union producer confirmed also a significant decrease of the ratio of tenders won by the latter.

(297) Given the nature of tenders and of the sweetcorn production and sales cycle, a delayed effect of the imports also needs to be taken into consideration. Taking into account that tenders are negotiated for the following year, starting as from September, the effect on volumes and sales prices will take effect only in the following year. Therefore, the effect of the price pressure exerted by the Chinese prices during the investigation period are still not fully visible as they will continue to develop after the period considered. As described in recital 289, stock levels increased significantly at the expense of sales volumes.

(298) The deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry took place in a market of slightly decreasing demand. Over the period considered, consumption decreased by 9 %, but the Union industry market share dropped of a larger extent, from 95 % in 2021 to 83 % during the period considered. This was linked to the price pressure generated by Chinese imports, with significant price undercutting and, in any event, with price suppression considering that the Chinese imports remained constantly below the average unit costs of the costs of goods sold. Such price suppression prevented the Union industry to adjust their sales prices fully in line with the price increases related to raw materials, resulting in a decreasing profit that remained constantly below target profit over the period considered, coupled with a significant decrease in sales volume.

(299) Even though the development in sales prices showed a positive trend during the period considered with an increase of 42 %, this was linked to the significantly increased prices of the main raw materials. However, the sales price increases did not allow to fully cover the raw materials price increases that were reflected in the increase of 44% of the average unit cost of the costs of goods sold and resulted in the drop of the sales quantities of 21 %.

(300) Most indicators showed a negative trend, with a decreased profit of 21 % and decreased cash flow of -104 %. Sales and production volumes, as well as capacity utilisation decreased significantly during the investigation period, indicating volume injury. Closing stocks of finished goods were impacted by the Chinese imports and increased significantly which also had a negative impact on cash flow and substantially increased fixed costs. Prices of Chinese imports remained constantly below the level of the Union industry’s average sales prices and average unit costs of the costs of goods sold. The development of Chinese import prices in light of the increasing quantities and negative injury indicators clearly demonstrated price pressure.

(301) During the period considered the Union industry managed to carry out investments to expand production capacities. While the decisions to carry out those investments were taken before the rise of Chinese imports, future investments might be at risk in case no measures will be imposed.

(302) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(303) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by known factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These known factors are: imports from third countries, export performance, reduction in consumption and other factors, including the bad sweetcorn harvest in 2022 in the EU, floods in Thailand, and the impact of the Ukraine war on raw material and energy costs.

(304) As shown in Table 3, the volume of dumped imports from China increased significantly from around 6 480 tonnes in 2021 to 40 050 tonnes in the investigation period. In terms of market share, the dumped imports from China increased from 2 % in 2021 to 15 % in the investigation period.

(305) The average price of Chinese imports was always significantly below the average price and average unit cost of the cost of goods sold of the Union industry. Between 2022 and the investigation period, the Chinese average import prices decreased significantly by 33 %, while undercutting was confirmed in recital 253.

(306) These observations coincided with a 12 % decrease in market share of the Union industry over the period considered from 95 % in 2021 to 83 %. This drop exceeded the drop in consumption of 9 % over the period considered.

(307) The Chinese imports showed a considerable negative effect on the sales volumes of the Union industry, which dropped significantly in 2023, and the investigation period as described in recital 266. The production volume decreased by 9 percentage points during the investigation period. At the same time, the Union industry’s ratio of successful tenders significantly declined, while the stocks (in absolute terms, and also both in terms of production and sales) substantially increased. Such trends, in particular those on sales volumes and market shares, can be linked to a volume injury caused by the Chinese imports.

(308) As explained in recital 255, imports from China caused price suppression to the Union industry in 2023. Such price suppression meant that, while the unit cost of the Union producers increased by more than 30 % in 2022 and an additional 13 % in 2023 due to increased raw material and energy costs, Union producers were unable to adjust their sales prices fully in line with the price increase related to raw materials. As a result of this price suppression, the profitability decreased over the period considered. Although the profit remained positive, it remained below the target profit over the period considered. The coincidence in time between the deterioration in the economic situation of the Union industry and the significant presence of dumped imports from China, undercutting the Union industry’s prices, and supressing Union market price levels, confirms a causal link between the two.

(309) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from China caused material injury to the Union industry.

(311) Imports from Thailand are subject to anti-dumping measures as mentioned in recital 276. Over the period considered, the level of imports decreased slightly from 4 345 tonnes in 2021 to 3 640 tonnes in the investigation period. Consequently, the market share decreased from 1,4 % to 1,3 % and remained at an overall low level. Although the price levels of imports from Thailand were below the Union industry prices, no additional market share could be gained by Thai imports. Therefore, the impact was considered to be limited, if not negligible, and the Commission therefore concluded that they did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(312) The Commission considered that imports from other third countries were at very low levels throughout the period considered. Over the period considered, the market share for all other third countries decreased from 2,4 % in 2021 to 2,2 % in the investigation period. The average price level remained below the price level of the Union industry, although they increased by 24 % over the period considered. While the Commission could not exclude that those imports contributed to the injury of the Union industry, given their low and stable volume, the impact was considered to be limited, and the Commission therefore concluded that they did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(313) In their comments to the investigation, the CFNA and the unrelated importer Otto Frank considered that the low crop yield of EU sweetcorn in 2022 caused by droughts contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(314) Otto Frank considered that the low crop yield of EU sweetcorn in 2022 that was caused by widespread droughts represented the main factor that contributed to the injury of the Union industry. As a result of this bad harvest, the importer explained that the EU maize production, including sweetcorn, decreased by 28,9 % in 2022 compared to the previous year and 24,3 % below the five-year average (112). Consequently, raw material prices were subject to sharp price increases (113). Otto Frank considered that following increased price estimates and risks of insufficient supplies from the Union industry, some EU retailers decided to change their procurement strategy by purchasing sweetcorn from China rather than from Union producers. The importer claimed that a low crop year will impact also the following year of production, as producers have to serve contracts from the previous season without any surplus left. As a result, retailers hesitated to change back to the supply from Union producers when contracts for the 2023 and 2024 were closed due to uncertainty about the 2023 crop yield, continued high raw material prices and previous supply from China that prevented shortage of supply. However, after a reduction in raw material prices towards the end of 2023 and a recovery of the crop yield in 2023 and 2024, the importer considered that customers purchased again sweetcorn produced in the EU and the increase in Chinese imports was considered by the importer as a temporary shift.

(315) The CFNA claimed that the abrupt change of imports from China in 2022 was due to a large order placed by Lidl, representing about 60 % of China’s total exports.

(316) The Commission noted that the CFNA did not further specify this claim or provide any supporting evidence. Therefore, it was rejected.

(317) The analysis of the production volume in recital 262 showed a drop in the production volume of the sampled Union producers for 2022. However, in the following year, the production volume recovered to a normal level, while Chinese imports continued to enter the Union at dumped prices. While it cannot be excluded that the low sweetcorn yield contributed to the injury of the Union industry, considering that it was limited to only one year of the period considered, it was considered that it did not attenuate the causal link to the extent of making it not genuine or not substantial.

(318) The CFNA claimed that a shortage of supply caused by floods in Thailand represented another cause of injury.

(319) The Commission noted that the CFNA did not further specify this claim or provide any additional supporting evidence.

(320) While indeed Thailand experienced serious floods in 2022 with a negative impact on the agricultural sector and the production of rice in particular (114), the import statistics described in Table 12 with the level of sweetcorn imports originating in third countries, showed that the level of sweetcorn imports from Thailand was not negatively impacted. To the contrary, the imports from Thailand increased between 2021 and 2022 from 4 345 tonnes to 4 863 tonnes, representing an increase of 12 %. The Commission therefore did not consider the floods in Thailand as a cause of injury to the Union industry.

(321) As described in recital 243, the Union consumption increased by 3 % between 2021 and 2022, followed by a significant drop of 9 % in the investigation period compared to 2021. At the same time, Chinese imports increased significantly from 6 % in 2022 to 16 % in 2023, while the Union industry market share dropped from 91 % to 82 %.

(322) Although the decline in consumption could have contributed to a reduction in production and sales due to the decreased demand, the Commission observed that the decrease in market share of the Union industry coincided with the market share gained by the Chinese exports. Hence, in the Commission’s view, the decrease in consumption did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped Chinese imports and the material injury to the extent of making it not genuine or not substantial.

(323) CFNA considered that the war in the Ukraine may have provided challenges to Union producers in the form of increased energy costs and challenges in security of supply.

(324) As mentioned in recital 280, the average unit cost of cost of goods sold increased by more than 30 % in 2022 and an additional 5 % in 2023, driven mainly by price increases of the main raw materials such as energy, cans, and sweetcorn. However, due to the price pressure of the Chinese imports, the Union industry was not able to increase its prices in line with the increase in its costs and to remain viable.

(325) While it could not be excluded that the increases in raw material prices contributed to the injury of the Union industry, the Commission considered that it did not attenuate the causal link to the extent of making it not genuine or not substantial.

(327) The export volume of the Union industry decreased by 31 % over the period considered. The sales prices of these exports increased by 39 % over the same period.

(328) Bearing in mind that the export volumes represent only around 10 % of Union sales and that the trend of sales volumes and prices was similar to the trend observed for Union industry sales in the Union, it is evident that the export performance of the Union industry is not a key element in the overall assessment in the economic situation of the Union industry.

(329) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the export performance of the Union industry did not cause material injury to the Union industry or was able to attenuate the causal link with respect to Chinese imports.

(330) The Commission established a causal link between the material injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China. The increase of the Chinese imports in 2023 and the investigation period coincided with the deterioration of the Union industry’s situation. The sharp increase in Chinese market share resulted in a significant drop of sales by Union producers in 2023 and the investigation period, and a decline in production volumes in the investigation period. At the same time, stock levels increased dramatically, and the ratio of successful tenders decreased. The trend of these volume indicators showed a clear volume injury. Chinese imports were made at prices significantly undercutting the Union industry’s sales prices. While the profitability remained positive, it remained below the target profit.

(331) Other factors examined were imports from other third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, floods in Thailand, decreased Union consumption, and a bad sweetcorn harvest in 2022.

(332) Therefore, the Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. None of the factors, collectively or separately, were found to have a bearing on the situation of the Union industry sufficient to call into question the conclusion that the Chinese imports were causing material injury.

(333) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. The injury consists mainly of lost volumes related to sales and production volumes, capacity utilisation, and increased stock levels. At the same time, the Union industry suffered from low import prices that were undercutting the Union sales prices and reducing the level of profitability, which remained consistently below target profit.

(334) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(335) In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. At this stage of the investigation, the Commission has not taken any decision regarding the raw material distortions which will be taken at the definitive stage of the investigation.

(336) The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(337) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(338) As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. This basic profit was established based on the profitability of the Union industry that was considered to be achieved in the absence of the dumped Chinese imports. Such profit margin was established at 14 %. This level of profitability was already confirmed in the previous anti-dumping investigation considering imports from Thailand (115).

(339) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period.

(340) The Commission then determined the underselling margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in the country concerned, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(341) The adjustments made to the export price as described at section 3.4.2 above also apply to the CIF prices used in the underselling calculations.

(343) As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant has provided sufficient evidence in the complaint that there are raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in the country concerned with regard to the product concerned. According to the evidence in the complaint, steel cans, accounting for at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned, is subject to export VAT in the country concerned.

(344) The Commission will continue to investigate the alleged distortions to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation at the definitive stage of the investigation. Therefore, the Commission concluded to, at this stage, determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.

(345) With regards to the Sunflower Group, the provisional anti-dumping duty is therefore set at the level of the underselling margin.

(346) With regards to the Tongfa Group, the provisional anti-dumping duty is therefore set at the level of the dumping margin.

(348) Having decided to apply Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation at this stage, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, wholesalers, retailers, users, consumers, and farmers.

(349) The Union industry is composed of 11 producers or groups of producers, employing about 3 460 people (FTE). The producers are spread throughout the Union with several producers located in Hungary and France.

(350) Given the findings of the material injury to the Union industry, imposing measures would allow the Union industry to increase its sales prices and improve its profitability in line with the cost increases and maintain a competitive level in their market. The Union industry would be also able to regain lost market share by increasing production and sales quantities on the Union market. Due to the increased Chinese imports, Union producers were not able to sell their production volume and acquired a high level of stocks in 2023 and the investigation period. Imposing measures would allow the Union industry to sell of their existing stock levels to decrease the fixed costs.

(351) The absence of measures is likely to have further significant negative effects on the Union industry in terms of lower sales and production volumes, as well as further increasing stock levels. Further price suppression leading to further financial deterioration of its economic situation in terms of profitability and future investment, jeopardizing its future and employment.

(352) It is therefore concluded that provisional measures are in the interest of the Union industry.

(353) On the date of initiation, 20 unrelated importers, traders, and retailers were contacted. As described in recital 32, six unrelated importers and traders provided the requested information. A sample of two unrelated importers was selected out of which one unrelated importer provided a questionnaire reply that was verified. The cooperating importer represented about [17 - 27] % of the sweetcorn imports during the investigation period. A hearing took place with the importer associations FRUCOM and Waren-Verein.

(354) The cooperating importer considered that sweetcorn retail products from the PRC will disappear from the market in case measures will be imposed. The importer argued that in short term, importers will lose competitiveness related to sales of non-EU sweetcorn and due to the lack of alternative sources of supply from other third country markets. As a result, turnover and profits will be reduced with a potential impact on the level of employment.

(355) Considering that sweetcorn represented a relatively small share of the cooperating importer’s turnover and taking into account that the number of FTEs directly related to sweetcorn is relatively small, it is considered that importers would not be disproportionately affected by the imposition of measures. Moreover, the Commission considered that for future sales contracts, the importer will be able to pass on at least partially the price increases to their customers.

(356) The coopering importer stressed the potentially existential threat of the retroactive collection of antidumping duties.

(357) As described in recital 387, no decision of the retroactive collection of duties can be taken at this stage of the investigation.

(358) In case no measures will be imposed, importers will continue their business of importing sweetcorn from the PRC and sell it to retailers, the catering industry or other users.

(359) On the date of the investigation, the Commission contacted several retailers of sweetcorn. No cooperation was obtained. Given the specification of the sweetcorn market, private consumers and other users of sweetcorn, such as catering firms are also impacted by the measures.

(360) In case measures will be imposed, retailers and other users will face higher purchasing costs of sweetcorn due to the measures.

(361) The cooperating importer criticised that the average purchase prices charged by retailers will lead to price increases of private consumers. The importer further considered that the catering sector will also be negatively affected by price increases due to the price pressure caused by increased costs and food prices and the lower willingness of customers to spend for out-of-home food. Considering that catering size canned sweetcorn is produced only in small volumes in the EU, the main supply will remain from the PRC at increased prices.

(362) In case no measures will be imposed, retailers, private consumers and other users will likely benefit from lower prices.

(363) The Commission considered that sweetcorn represented a very small share of the consumer shopping basket. Any impact from the imposition of anti-dumping duties on the financial situation of an average consumer is likely to be negligible.

(364) In light of the non-cooperation of retailers and other users and considered that sweetcorn represents only a marginal percentage of their sales and limited shelf space in retail stores, it is provisionally concluded that they will not be substantially affected by the proposed measures.

(365) As mentioned in recital 280, the main raw materials of sweetcorn are the raw sweetcorn and cans. Following the initiation of the investigation, one can producer association came forward. In addition, the complaint was supported by farmer associations.

(366) In case measures will be imposed, sweetcorn suppliers will be able to maintain their business.

(367) In the absence of measures, suppliers are likely to be impacted in case Union sweetcorn producers will have to reduce their production volume. Considering that farmers and can producers are closely linked to the sweetcorn business, a reduced sweetcorn production in the Union is very likely to affect also the business of the suppliers.

(368) The cooperating importer criticised that in case measures will be imposed, there will be no guarantee that especially the main market players will forward their additional profit.

(369) The Commission considered that suppliers will be more significantly impacted in case no measures will be imposed, as they would lose a certain share of their business. The claim was therefore rejected.

(370) Considering the above, it is provisionally concluded that the imposition of measures will unlikely affect suppliers in a negative way.

(371) The cooperating importer Otto Frank criticised in its questionnaire reply the limited competition in case measures will be imposed due to the low number of EU producers, warning of an oligopoly market situation. The importer warned also that in case of future low crop yields, the availability of sweetcorn in the Union cannot be guaranteed.

(372) The cooperating importer considered further that besides China, no other third country is able to meet the quality standard and price competitiveness that is required by the European market.

(373) The Commission considered that the imposition of measures will not prevent access into the Union for imports on which measures were imposed, but rather the purpose of the measures is to eliminate the impact of distorted market conditions arising from the presence of dumped imports.

(374) During the investigation period, the Union industry consisted of 11 producers or groups of producers. As shown in recital 262, the Union industry operated during the investigation period well below full capacity. It is therefore considered that the Union industry will be able to increase its production volume before reaching any capacity constraints. Furthermore, Union producers acquired a substantial level of sweetcorn stocks due to the imports from China that are also available for sale.

(375) The cooperating importer considered that besides China, no other third country is able to meet the quality standard and price competitiveness that is required by the European market.

(376) Given the above considerations, market shares and number of independent suppliers of the product concerned, the above claims concerning the issues on competition are rejected.

(377) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of sweetcorn originating in the PRC at this stage of the investigation.

(378) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(379) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of sweetcorn originating in China, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins in recital 342 above. The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.

(381) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(382) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’.

(383) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(384) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(385) As mentioned in recital 3, the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

(386) In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should be discontinued.

(387) No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

(388) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE’s website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(389) Both the Sunflower group and the Tongfa group provided comments. Following comments from the Sunflower group regarding the accuracy of calculations for consumables and domestic transport costs for the determination of normal value, the Commission revised its dumping calculations for both groups. Other comments from both groups concerned the methodology used for the dumping calculations and will therefore be addressed, where appropriate, in the definitive stage of the investigation.

(390) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(391) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 August 2025.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels, originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C, C/2024/7407, 9.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7407/oj).

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/309 of 14 February 2025 making imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/309, 17.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/309/oj).

(4) Commission Decision 2012/343/EU of 27 June 2012 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain concentrated soy protein products originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 168, 28.6.2012, p. 38, recitals 161-167, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2012/343/oj).

(5) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2762.

(6) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024, SWD(2024)91 final.

(7) Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology, ‘Translation: Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035,’ 13 May 2021.

(8) China Canned Food Industry Association, ‘Outline of FYP14 for the Development of China’s Canned Food Industry’.

(9) GOC, ‘Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Comprehensively Promoting Key Works of Rural Revitalization in 2023,’ 13 February 2023.

(10) China Canned Food Industry Association, ‘Three-Year Special Action Plan (2021-2023),’ 7 September 2021.

(11) GOC, ‘Guangdong Province Agricultural Products Processing Industry Development Plan (2018-2025),’ Yue Nong [2018] No. 195, 30 August 2018.

(12) GOC, ‘General Office of the People’s Government of Heilongjiang Province on the issuance of Heilongjiang Province to speed up the promotion of high quality of agricultural products processing industry Notice of Three-Year Action Plan for Development (2023-2025)’.

(13) GOC, ‘Notice from the General Office of the People’s Government of Heilongjiang Province on the issuance of the three-year action plan (2023-2025) for accelerating the high-quality development of the agricultural product processing industry in Heilongjiang Province,’ Regulation [2023] No. 3, 25 June 2023.

(14) GOC, ‘Notice from the General Office of the People’s Government of Heilongjiang Province on the issuance of several policies and measures to support the high-quality development of the intensive processing industry of agricultural products in Heilongjiang Province,’ Government Regulations [2023] No. 4, 25 June 2023.

(15) GOC, ‘Implementation Opinions of the Suihua Municipal People’s Government Office on Accelerating the High-Quality Development of the Agricultural Products Processing Industry (2023-2025),’ Suizheng Banfa [2023] No. 24, 31 August 2023.

(16) Report – Chapter 3, p. 55.

(17) 36 Krypton, ‘Reviewing Zong Qinghou’s ten major life nodes,’ 25 February 2024.

(18) Huanlejia, ‘Annual Report 2022,’ April 2023, p. 8.

(19) Hebei Yaxiong Modern Agriculture Co. Ltd., ‘Public Transfer Instructions (draft declaration),’ June 2017, pp. 30, 43.

(20) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/802 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil, recital 75, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/802/oj; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 of 11 January 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel refillable kegs originating in the People’s Republic of China, rec. 58, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/100/oj.

(21) Report – Chapter 2, p. 7.

(22) Report – Chapter 2, p. 7-8.

(23) Report – Chapter 2, p. 10, 18.

(24) See at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.html (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(25) Report – Chapter 2, p. 29-30.

(26) Report – Chapter 4, p. 57, 92.

(27) Report – Chapter 6, p. 149-150.

(28) Report – Chapter 6, p. 153 -171.

(29) Report – Chapter 7, p. 204-205.

(30) Report – Chapter 8, p. 207-208, 242-243.

(31) Report – Chapter 2, p. 19-24, Chapter 4, p. 69, p. 99-100, Chapter 5, p. 130-131.

(32) See at: http://en.tyhsp.cn/ (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(33) See at: http://www.tfacan.com/page-10500.html (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(34) See at: http://www.jsrunfeng.cn/ (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(35) See at: https://www.wahaha.com.cn/#/Introduce (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(36) See at: http://www.21jingji.com/article/20240718/herald/8041aff7549aaa03487bacb1128aa14f.html (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(37) See Art. 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See Report – Chapter 3, p. 47-50.

(38) See at: http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/cwgk_1/nybt/202206/t20220610_6402146.htm, paragraph 20 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(39) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/11/content_5673082.htm, section II.6, Box 2 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(40) Report – Chapter 2, p. 24-27.

(41) See at: http://www.cnlic.org.cn/index.html (accessed on 11 June 2025).

(42) See at: http://www.cnlic.org.cn/footers/footer-zc.html (accessed on 11 June 2025).

(43) Ibid.

(44) See at: http://www.cnlic.org.cn/LingDaoHuoDong/202206/t20220630_64680.html (accessed on 11 June 2025).

(45) See at: http://www.topcanchina.com (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(46) See at: http://www.cnlic.org.cn/LingDaoHuoDong/202206/t20220630_64680.html (accessed on 11 June 2025).

(47) See at: http://www.topcanchina.com/xhjj/4095 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(48) Ibid.

(49) Ibid.

(50) See at: http://www.topcanchina.com/myxrhqy/16113 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(51) See at: http://www.topcanchina.com/myxrhqy/16123 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(52) See at: http://www.topcanchina.com/xhhydw/11568 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(53) Report – Chapter 3, p. 40.

(54) See for example: Blanchette, J. – Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10-19.

(55) Report – Chapter 3, p. 41.

(56) See at: https://merics.org/en/comment/who-ccp-chinas-communist-party-infographics (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(57) General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era, see at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(58) Financial Times (2020) - Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise, see at: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(59) See: https://njna.nanjing.gov.cn/jd/pcjd/jdgk/201807/t20180724_502337.html (accessed on 19 June 2025).

(60) See at: http://js.news.cn/20250108/60bd844f35d747b3917cfe5131c0a677/c.html (accessed on 11 June 2025).

(61) See Art. 5 of the Private Economy Law, available at: https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7022018.htm (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(62) Report – Chapter 14, Sections 14.1 to 14.3.

(63) Report – Chapter 4, p. 56-57, 99-100.

(64) See Art. 5 and 6 of the Private Economy Law.

(65) See at: http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/cwgk_1/nybt/202206/t20220610_6402146.htm, paragraphs 6 and 15 (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(66) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/11/content_5673082.htm (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(67) Ibid., Section II.1.

(68) See at: http://www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/ZZYGLS/202201/t20220113_6386808.htm (accessed on 18 October 2024).

(69) Ibid., Section III.1.3.

(70) See at: https://dsynews.com.cn/shipin/2023/03/31/17765.shtml (accessed on 10 June 2025).

(71) Ibid.

(72) Ibid.

(73) See at: https://gxt.fujian.gov.cn/jdhy/zxzcfg/sjzcfg/202107/t20210707_5641856.htm (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(74) See Section III.2, available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/dffzgh/202106/P020210628416237004949.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(75) See Heilongjiang Development Plan for the corn processing Industry (2021-2025), released June 2021.

(76) Ibid., Section III.1.

(77) See at: https://www.sohu.com/a/756699103_121769698 (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(78) See at: http://jilin.chinatax.gov.cn/art/2023/11/6/art_334_710476.html (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(79) Report – Chapter 6, p. 171-179.

(80) Report – Chapter 9, p. 260-261.

(81) Report – Chapter 9, p. 257-260.

(82) Report – Chapter 9, p. 252-254.

(83) Report – Chapter 13, p. 360-361, 364-370.

(84) Report – Chapter 13, p. 366.

(85) Report – Chapter 13, p. 370-373.

(86) Report – Chapter 6, p. 137-140.

(87) Report – Chapter 6, p. 146-149.

(88) Report – Chapter 6, p. 149.

(89) See the Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022) issued by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (‘CBIRC’) on 28 August 2020; available at: http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 21 October 2024). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management’.

(90) See the Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method issued by the CBIRC on 15 December 2020, available at: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(91) See at: http://www.gzjrw.com.cn/Item/396372.aspx (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(92) Report – Chapter 6, p. 157-158.

(93) Report – Chapter 6, p. 150-152, 156-160, 165-171.

(94) OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, see at:

https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(95) See at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/20/content_5504241.htm (accessed on 12 June 2025).

(96) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(97) http://www.dosm.gov.my/uploads/release-content/file_20241108110530.pdf.

(98) https://www.rippling.com/country-hiring/malaysia-employees.

(99) https://www.mida.gov.my/setting-up-content/human-resources-development-fund/

(100) https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1.

(101) https://www.st.gov.my/

(102) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(103) http://www.dosm.gov.my/uploads/release-content/file_20241108110530.pdf.

(104) https://www.rippling.com/country-hiring/malaysia-employees.

(105) https://www.mida.gov.my/setting-up-content/human-resources-development-fund/

(106) https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1.

(107) https://www.st.gov.my/

(108) Source - www.chinamoney.com.cn/.

(109) Council Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 of 18 June 2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain prepared and preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand (OJ L 159, 20.6.2007, p. 14–25, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/682/oj).

(110) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 875/2013 of 2 September 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 244, 13.9.2013, p. 1–18, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2013/875/oj).

(111) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1996 of 28 November 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in the Kingdom of Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (OJ L 310, 2.12.2019, p. 6–28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1996/oj).

(112) https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/cmo-16-3-2023-summary_en.pdf.

(113) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:F4_Developments_of_output_price_indices_for_cereals_(2015_%3D_100,_EU,_2015-2023).png.

(114) https://www.world-grain.com/articles/17685-thailands-rice-crop-hurt-by-flooding.

(115) Council Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 of 18 June 2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand (OJ L 159, 20.6.2007, p. 14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/682/oj).