Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1724 of 8 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium carbonate originating in the People`s Republic of China and India

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	2025/1724	11.8.2025

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union [^ntr1-L_202501724EN.000101-E0001] (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 7 thereof,

After consulting the Member States,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

• (1) On 20 December 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of barium carbonate originating in the People`s Republic of China and India (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

• (2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 5 November 2024 by Kandelium Group GmbH (‘the complainant’ or ‘Kandelium’). The complaint was made by the Union industry of barium carbonate in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2.   Registration

• (3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/482 [^ntr2-L_202501724EN.000101-E0002] (‘the registration Regulation’).

1.3.   Interested parties

• (4) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, the known exporting producers and the Chinese and Indian authorities, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

• (5) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

1.4.   Comments on initiation

• (6) No comments were received on initiation.

1.5.   Sampling

• (7) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

Sampling of Union producers

• (8) Since there is only one known Union producer, Kandelium Group GmbH, representing 100 % of the Union production, no sampling was necessary.

Sampling of unrelated importers

• (9) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

• (10) Seven companies provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample, however, three of these companies were not unrelated importers but users of the product under investigation and one of them was both an importer and a user. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of three unrelated importers on the basis of the volume of imports during the investigation period and the resale on the Union market. However, one of the three sampled importers did not provide a reply to the importers’ questionnaire, within the established deadlines.

Sampling of exporting producers in the People`s Republic of China

• (11) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in People`s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘PRC’) to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

• (12) Three exporting producers in China provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned and the Mission of the People’s Republic of China were consulted on the selection of the sample. No comments were received on the sample.

Sampling of exporting producers in India

• (13) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in India to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of India to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

• (14) There was only one exporting producer in India known to the Commission at the initiation of the investigation. The exporting producer provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. No further exporting producers came forward. Therefore, the Commission deemed it was not necessary to select a sample and proposed the sole exporting producer to be investigated. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the known exporting producer concerned, and the authorities of the country concerned, were consulted on this decision. No comments were received.

1.6.   Questionnaire replies and verification visits

• (15) The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’).

• (16) Furthermore, the complainant provided in the complaint sufficient evidence that there may be raw material distortions in the People’s Republic of China regarding the product under investigation. According to the evidence in the complaint one of the raw materials for the production of product under investigation, carbon dioxide, accounting for at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product under investigation, is subject to export VAT. Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, the investigation covered also raw material distortions to determine whether to apply the provisions of Articles 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation with regard to China. For this reason, the Commission sent additional questionnaires in this regard to the GOC.

• (17) The questionnaires for exporting producers, Union producer, unrelated importers, and users were made available online [^ntr3-L_202501724EN.000101-E0003] on the day of initiation of the investigation.

• (18) The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Union producer

• — Kandelium Group GmbH, Bad Hönningen, Germany

Importers

• — L’Aprochimide SRL, Muggiò, Italy

• — Kimpe SAS, Toulouse, France

Users

• — Kimpe SAS, Toulouse, France

• — Esmalglass S.A., Villareal, Spain

• — Younexa S.A, Vall d’Alba, Spain

• — Fritta S.A., Onda, Spain

Exporting producers in China

• — Guizhou Redstar Developing CO., LTD., Anshun City, China (‘Redstar’) and

• — Guizhou Redstar Developing Import & Export Co., Ltd., Guiyang City, China

• — Hubei Jingshan Chutian Barium Salts Co., Ltd., Jingshan, China (‘Chutian’)

Exporting producer in India

• — Vishnu Barium Private Limited, Hyderabad, India

1.7.   Investigation period and period considered

• (19) The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

2. PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product under investigation

• (20) The product under investigation is barium carbonate with a strontium content of more than 0,07 % by weight and a sulphur content of more than 0,0015 % by weight, whether in powder, pressed granular or calcined granular form, currently falling under CN code ex 2836 60 00 (TARIC code 2836 60 00 10) (‘the product under investigation’).

• (21) Barium carbonate is an inorganic compound with a chemical formula BaCO3 used in a wide range of applications, for example in the glass and ceramic industry. In the glass production process, barium carbonate improves the glass optical property, making it more brilliant. In the ceramic industry, barium carbonate leads to smoother and more consistent glaze surfaces.

2.2.   Product concerned

• (22) The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in China and India currently falling under CN code ex 2836 60 00 (TARIC code 2836 60 00 10) (‘the product concerned’).

2.3.   Like product

• (23) The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

• — the product concerned when exported to the Union;

• — the product under investigation produced and sold on the domestic market of China and India; and

• — the product under investigation produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

• (24) The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

2.4.   Claims regarding product scope

• (25) No comments were received on the product scope.

3. DUMPING

3.1.   China

3.1.1.   Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation

• (26) In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation pointing to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with regard to the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation with regard to the exporting producers from this country having regard to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

• (27) Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in the PRC to provide information regarding the inputs used for producing barium carbonate. Two exporting producers submitted the relevant information.

• (28) In order to obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC.

• (29) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks, referring to Türkiye as a possible appropriate representative third country.

• (30) On 11 April 2025, the Commission informed by a note (‘the First Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of the product concerned. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified possible representative countries, namely Türkiye and Mexico. The Commission received comments on the First Note from the exporting producers Redstar and Chutian and from the complainant. These comments have been duly addressed in the Second Note

• (31) On 15 May 2025, the Commission informed by a second note (‘the Second Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Türkiye as the representative country. It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs ('SG&A') and profits based on available information for the companies Türkiye şişe ve cam fabrikalari A.Ş (‘Sisecam’) and Alkim Alkali Kimya A.Ş. (‘Alkim’), producers in Türkiye.

• (32) The Commission received comments on the Second Note from the exporting producers Redstar and Chutian and from the complainant. These comments have been addressed under respective heading under Section 3.1.4 below.

• (33) After having analysed the comments and information received, the Commission concluded that Türkiye was an appropriate representative country from which undistorted prices and costs would be sourced for the determination of the normal value. The underlying reasons for that choice are further described in detail in Section 3.1.3 below.

3.1.2.   Normal value

• (34) According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

• (35) However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined … that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred to hereinafter as ‘SG&A’).

• (36) As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

3.1.2.1.   Existence of significant distortions

• (37) In recent investigations concerning the chemical sector in the PRC [^ntr4-L_202501724EN.000101-E0004], the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present.

• (38) In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles [^ntr5-L_202501724EN.000101-E0005]. In particular, the Commission concluded that in the chemical sector not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation [^ntr6-L_202501724EN.000101-E0006], but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation [^ntr7-L_202501724EN.000101-E0007]. The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces [^ntr8-L_202501724EN.000101-E0008]. Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC [^ntr9-L_202501724EN.000101-E0009]. In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the chemical sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation [^ntr10-L_202501724EN.000101-E0010], as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC [^ntr11-L_202501724EN.000101-E0011].

• (39) Like in previous investigations concerning the chemical sector in the PRC, the Commission examined in the present investigation whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the complaint, and in the Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations [^ntr12-L_202501724EN.000101-E0012] (‘Report’), which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under investigation. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC as also found by its previous investigations in this respect.

• (40) The complaint alleged that significant distortions exist in the Chinese barium carbonate sector. It referred to the Report and in particular to the PRC’s economic system being a ‘socialist market economy’ and the active role of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) in both the public and private sectors in the PRC.

• (41) More specifically, the complaint pointed out that:

• — The Chinese chemicals market, including the barium carbonate sector, is subject to significant interference by the GOC [^ntr13-L_202501724EN.000101-E0013].

• — The Chinese chemicals market, including the barium carbonate sector, is being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the GOC. For example, the biggest producer of barium carbonate in China accounting for approximately 44 % of total production of Chinese barium carbonate, Redstar, is State-owned. Also, in the context of the previous anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of barium carbonate from China [^ntr14-L_202501724EN.000101-E0014], the Commission found that State-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) producing barium carbonate had Boards of Directors entirely or predominantly consisting of Directors nominated by the GOC [^ntr15-L_202501724EN.000101-E0015].

• — The GOC and the Chinese CCP maintain structures that ensure their continued influence and control over enterprises, in particular SOEs. Generally, the GOC actively formulates and oversees the implementation of general economic policies by individual companies as well as participates in operational decision-making through presence of Party members in SOEs executive bodies and of Party cells in companies, as well as by shaping the corporate structure of the SOE sector. The particular status of SOEs within the Chinese economy comes with a number of economic benefits, in particular the shielding from competition and the preferential access to relevant inputs, including financing. Additionally, with the high level of government intervention in the chemicals industry and a high share of SOEs relative to overall production, even privately owned barium carbonate producers are prevented from operating under market conditions. As such, both public and privately owned companies in the chemicals sector are likely subject to policy supervision and guidance by the GOC [^ntr16-L_202501724EN.000101-E0016].

• — Through State presence in chemicals producers in China, the GOC is able to interfere with prices and costs of those companies. The complaint referred to Chapter 5 of the Report and argued that since these findings apply to the Chinese economy more generally, these would be relevant for the barium carbonate sector in China as well as their suppliers of inputs [^ntr17-L_202501724EN.000101-E0017].

• — There are public policies or measures applicable to the Chinese barium carbonate industry that discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influence free market forces. Specifically, the chemical industry, including the production of barium carbonate, is regarded as a key industry by the GOC, as explained in the 14th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development (‘14th FYP’). Other plans or measures providing support to the Chinese barium carbonate industry include, among others, the Guiding Opinion on Promoting the High-Quality Development of the Petrochemical and Chemical Industry During The 14th FYP [^ntr18-L_202501724EN.000101-E0018].

• — There is a lack of, a discriminatory application of or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws in China resulting in distortions by maintaining insolvent firms afloat and by not providing land at market conditions. In this regard, the complaint referred to Chapter 9 of the Report and argued that since these findings apply to the Chinese economy more generally, these would be relevant for the chemicals industry, including the production of barium carbonate, in China [^ntr19-L_202501724EN.000101-E0019].

• — Wage costs are distorted in China as workers and employers are impeded in their rights to collective organisation. China has not ratified a number of essential conventions of the International Labour Organisation, in particular those on the freedom of association and collective bargaining. The complaint referred to Chapter 13 of the Report and argued that that the chemicals sector, including the barium carbonate industry, is affected by the distortions of wage costs both directly and indirectly [^ntr20-L_202501724EN.000101-E0020].

• — Access to capital for corporate actors in China is subject to various distortions. The Chinese financial system is characterised by the strong position of SOE banks, which take into consideration criteria other than economic viability of the project when granting access to finance. Bonds and credit ratings are often distorted and borrowing costs are kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth. The complaint argued that, despite the steps that have been taken to liberalize the market, the corporate credit system in China is affected by significant systemic issues and distortions resulting from the continuing pervasive role of the state in the capital markets. These distortions affect market conditions in China generally, including in the chemicals sector and thus also the production of barium carbonate [^ntr21-L_202501724EN.000101-E0021].

• (42) In conclusion, the complaint took the position that prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. On that basis, according to the complaint, it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case.

• (43) The Commission examined whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in China, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in China’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product concerned.

• (44) In this regard, the Commission first assessed whether the barium carbonate sector in the PRC is being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the Chinese authorities, within the meaning of the first indent of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. The sector of the product concerned is served by both private companies, such as Guizhou Hongtai Barium Industry Co., Ltd. [^ntr22-L_202501724EN.000101-E0022], Hubei Jingshan Chutian Barium Salt Co., Ltd. [^ntr23-L_202501724EN.000101-E0023] or Zaozhuang Yongli Chemical Co., Ltd. [^ntr24-L_202501724EN.000101-E0024], and by SOEs such as Sinochem Group [^ntr25-L_202501724EN.000101-E0025]. The exact ratio of private versus State-owned producers in the barium carbonate market could not be determined. However, the Commission found that at least one producer is directly controlled by the State, namely Redstar [^ntr26-L_202501724EN.000101-E0026], which is effectively controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Qingdao Municipal People’s Government [^ntr27-L_202501724EN.000101-E0027] through the State-owned holding company Qingdao Redstar Chemical Group Co., Ltd. [^ntr28-L_202501724EN.000101-E0028]. Furthermore, Sinochem Group [^ntr29-L_202501724EN.000101-E0029] is a central enterprise controlled by the State Council’s State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (‘SASAC’) [^ntr30-L_202501724EN.000101-E0030] and acts as a trader in barium carbonate [^ntr31-L_202501724EN.000101-E0031].

• (45) Moreover, CCP interventions into operational decision-making have become the norm, not only in SOEs but also in private companies [^ntr32-L_202501724EN.000101-E0032], with the CCP claiming leadership over virtually every aspect of the country’s economy. Indeed, the State’s influence by means of CCP structures within companies effectively results in economic operators being under the government’s control and policy supervision, given how far the State and Party structures have grown together in China.

• (46) Furthermore, the Law on Promoting the Private Sector mandates that ‘private economic organizations and their operators shall support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, adhere to the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, and actively participate in the construction of a socialist modern power’ [^ntr33-L_202501724EN.000101-E0033].

• (47) The investigation found that the industry national association covering the chemical sector is the China Petrochemical and Chemical Industry Federation (‘CPCIF’). The CPCIF adheres to the overall leadership of the CCP, carries out Party activities, and provides necessary conditions for the activities of Party organizations [^ntr34-L_202501724EN.000101-E0034]. Moreover, the ‘registration and management authority of the Association is the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ [^ntr35-L_202501724EN.000101-E0035] and the conditions to be eligible as a representative of the CPCIF include to ‘adhere to the leadership of the CCP, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the Party’s line, principles, and policies, and possess good political qualities’ [^ntr36-L_202501724EN.000101-E0036].

• (48) Sinochem Group is a member of CPCIF [^ntr37-L_202501724EN.000101-E0037].

• (49) More specifically, the national industry association representing the producers of barium carbonate is the China Inorganic Salts Industry Association (‘CISIA’) [^ntr38-L_202501724EN.000101-E0038]. Article 3 of CISIA’s Articles of Association sets out the following: ‘The Association adheres to the overall leadership of the Communist Party of China’ [^ntr39-L_202501724EN.000101-E0039]. Moreover, it mandates that ‘the Association accepts the business guidance and supervision and management of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and industry management departments’ [^ntr40-L_202501724EN.000101-E0040]. Also, Article 36 sets out the conditions to be eligible as a ‘president, vice president and secretary general of [CISIA]’ which include to ‘adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the party's line, principles, and policies, and possess good political qualities’ [^ntr41-L_202501724EN.000101-E0041].

• (50) Qingdao Redstar Chemical Group Co., Ltd. occupies the position of Managing Director of CISIA [^ntr42-L_202501724EN.000101-E0042].

• (51) Both public and privately owned enterprises in the chemical sector are subject to policy supervision and guidance. The latest Chinese policy documents concerning the chemical and petrochemical sector confirm the continued importance which the GOC attributes to the sector, including the intention to intervene in the sector to shape it in line with the government policies. This is exemplified by the 14^th FYP and 2035 Perspectives, according to which the GOC intends to ‘accelerate the transformation and upgrading of key industries such as chemicals’ [^ntr43-L_202501724EN.000101-E0043] .

• (52) To this end, the GOC intends to ‘support private economic organizations to participate in major national strategies and major projects. Support private economic organizations to invest and start businesses in strategic emerging industries, future industries and other fields, encourage the technological transformation and transformation and upgrading of traditional industries’ [^ntr44-L_202501724EN.000101-E0044].

• (53) More specifically, the Guiding Opinion on Promoting the High-Quality Development of the Petrochemical and Chemical Industries during the 14^th FYP [^ntr45-L_202501724EN.000101-E0045] (‘the Guiding Opinion’) also stipulates that the GOC will ‘accelerate the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, vigorously develop new chemical materials and fine chemicals, […]and foster China’s transition from a large petrochemical and chemical country into a strong petrochemical and chemical power. […] By 2025, […] the production concentration of bulk chemical products will be further improved, and the capacity utilization rate will reach more than 80 %; the supply security of ethylene equivalent will be greatly improved, and the supply security of new chemical materials will reach more than 75 %’ [^ntr46-L_202501724EN.000101-E0046] . In addition, the GOC shall ‘promote industrial structure adjustment: strengthen specific measures and scientifically regulate the scale of the industry’ [^ntr47-L_202501724EN.000101-E0047] .

• (54) Also, the barium carbonate industry is mentioned among the ‘restricted industries’ in the Guidance Catalogue for industry structural adjustment [^ntr48-L_202501724EN.000101-E0048] and ‘production units with a single-line capacity of […] less than 20 000 tons/year of ordinary grade barium carbonate’ are listed among the ‘obsolete industries’ [^ntr49-L_202501724EN.000101-E0049] to be eliminated.

• (55) Furthermore, some Chinese policy documents also cover inputs used to produce barium carbonate, including coal. For example, the 14^th FYP on the Development of the Raw Materials Industry stipulates that China shall ‘promote the clean and efficient use of coal, [and] short-process coal-to-chemicals’ [^ntr50-L_202501724EN.000101-E0050].

• (56) Similar examples of the intention of the Chinese authorities to supervise and guide the developments of the barium carbonate sector can be found at the provincial level, such as in the Shandong 14th FYP on the Development of the Chemical Industry seeking to ‘comprehensively promote the upgrading of industrial foundation and modernization of industrial chain, accelerate the withdrawal of backward and inefficient production capacity, and promote the development of chemical products in the direction of functionalization, refinement and differentiation. Guide enterprises to merge and reorganize, optimize resource allocation and industrial chain structure, and improve production efficiency and profitability’ [^ntr51-L_202501724EN.000101-E0051] and, more specifically to ‘control the increase and optimize the stock, and lay out and build modern coal chemical industry clusters in southern Shandong in Zaozhuang […]. Give full play to the advantages of the basic coal chemical industry, reduce the production capacity of traditional coal chemical industry, […] and accelerate the development and production of downstream coal-based fine chemical products’ [^ntr52-L_202501724EN.000101-E0052]. Zaozhuang Yongli Chemical Co., Ltd. is located in Zaozhuang [^ntr53-L_202501724EN.000101-E0053].

• (57) Similarly, the Guizhou 14th FYP on the Economic and Social Development and 2035 Perspectives sets out that the province seeks to ‘actively research and develop new processes and technologies for barium chemical industry, focus on developing electronic grade, reagent grade, pharmaceutical grade and other barium salt products, and increase the comprehensive utilization of barium salt waste resources’ [^ntr54-L_202501724EN.000101-E0054].

• (58) In the same vein, the Guizhou 14^th FYP on Developing Strategic and Emerging Industries Clusters mandates ‘to strive to build a characteristic new materials industry cluster focusing on […] barium salt chemical materials […] and accelerate the improvement of industry quality and efficiency’ [^ntr55-L_202501724EN.000101-E0055] .

• (59) Redstar and Guizhou Hongtai Barium Industry Co., Ltd. are both located in Guizhou.

• (60) As to the GOC being in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation, the Commission found that the Chairman of Redstar also serves as the Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of Qingdao Redstar Chemical Group Co., Ltd. [^ntr56-L_202501724EN.000101-E0056].

• (61) Moreover, the investigation found that Guizhou Hongtai Barium Industry Co., Ltd. ensures that Party classes are given to its personnel by the Deputy Secretary of the Party working committee of the County Non-Social Organization [^ntr57-L_202501724EN.000101-E0057]. Moreover, the company is located in the Tianzhu County Industrial Park [^ntr58-L_202501724EN.000101-E0058] and the Chairman of the State-owned County Industrial Investment Company managing the Tianzhu County Industrial Park also serves as the Secretary of the Party Branch [^ntr59-L_202501724EN.000101-E0059].

• (62) Furthermore, Sinochem Group’s Chairman of the Board of Directors serves as the Secretary of the Party committee and several members of the Board of Directors serve as Deputy Secretaries of the Party committee [^ntr60-L_202501724EN.000101-E0060]. Also, Sinochem Group presents itself as a company that ‘adheres to the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, effectively strengthens the Party's overall leadership over the enterprise, deepens Party building, [and] gives full play to the role of Party organizations at all levels’ [^ntr61-L_202501724EN.000101-E0061].

• (63) It was not possible to systematically establish the existence of personal connections between all of the Chinese barium carbonate producers and the CCP. However, given that the product under investigation represents a subsector of the chemical sector, the Commission considered that the information established in the recent investigations concerning the chemical sector, as indicated in recital (38), is relevant also to the product under investigation.

• (64) Further, policies discriminating in favour of domestic producers or otherwise influencing the market in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation, are in place in the barium carbonate sector. The Commission identified several documents demonstrating that the barium carbonate industry benefits from the governmental guidance and intervention into the chemical sector, given that barium carbonate represents a subsector of the chemical sector.

• (65) The chemical industry is consistently regarded as a key industry by the GOC [^ntr62-L_202501724EN.000101-E0062]. This is confirmed in the numerous plans, directives and other documents focused on chemicals, which are issued at national, regional, and municipal level. Under the 14^th FYP, the GOC earmarked the chemical industry for optimization and upgrade [^ntr63-L_202501724EN.000101-E0063].

• (66) Similarly, the 14^th FYP on the Development the Raw Materials Industry stipulates that the GOC will ‘Optimize the organizational structure: Make leading enterprises bigger and stronger. […] Support enterprises to accelerate cross-regional and cross-ownership mergers and reorganizations, increase industrial concentration, and conduct international operations. In the chemical, petrochemical, steel, non-ferrous metals, building materials and other industries, cultivate a group of leading enterprises in the industrial chain with ecological dominance and core competitiveness’ [^ntr64-L_202501724EN.000101-E0064] .

• (67) Furthermore, according to the Notice on Promoting the Healthy Development of Modern Coal Chemical Industry, the GOC intends to ‘further strengthen planning guidance, optimize industrial layout, and promote the accelerated implementation of advanced technology and equipment transformation and upgrading of existing modern coal chemical projects’ [^ntr65-L_202501724EN.000101-E0065].

• (68) More specifically, the investigation also found evidence of the GOC’s guidance and intervention at local level, like in Guizhou where ‘in recent years, Tianzhu County has closely focused on the goal of building an important national barium salt fine chemical base and an [RMB]10 billion-level barium salt industrial cluster, deeply implemented the barium salt industry doubling plan, and focused on building an intensive, high-end, green and intelligent modern barium salt chemical industry system, and fully promoted the high-quality development of Tianzhu’s new industrialization. (…) Based on the barite resource endowment, Tianzhu County (…) adheres to the leadership of Party building, strives to create a provincial chemical park and a provincial economic development zone, and actively plans the development of the park’ [^ntr66-L_202501724EN.000101-E0066] .

• (69) Furthermore, ‘in 2022, Tianzhu Industrial Park compiled a list of 20 investment projects, focusing on the barium salt leading industry, (…) focusing on the upstream and downstream industrial chains of barium salts. At present, the park has gathered more than 90 key enterprises such as Guizhou Hongtai Barium Industry Co., Ltd.(…)’ [^ntr67-L_202501724EN.000101-E0067].

• (70) The GOC also intervenes upstream in the industry chain, organising the supply of barite, a key input to produce barium carbonate: ‘According to the principle of “integrate some companies, upgrade some companies, and withdraw some companies”, since October last year [in 2023], Tianzhu County has integrated 17 enterprises into 7, Tianzhu Chemical Mining is one of them’ [^ntr68-L_202501724EN.000101-E0068]. Tianzhu Chemical Mining is a key supplier to Guizhou Hongtai Barium Industry Co., Ltd. [^ntr69-L_202501724EN.000101-E0069].

• (71) Similarly, in Hubei, the Jingshan Municipality has listed Hubei Jingshan Chutian Barium Salt Co., Ltd. as a ‘little giant’ company [^ntr70-L_202501724EN.000101-E0070]. The GOC defines ‘little giant’ companies as ‘the novel elites of China’s small and medium-sized enterprises that are engaged in manufacturing, specialize in a niche market and boast cutting-edge technologies’ and intends to ‘scale up support for “little giants” during the 2024-2026 period, with a focus on key industrial chains, strategic emerging industries and other sectors. These funds will be used to encourage these firms to tackle technological challenges, develop new products, build up the supporting capacities of the industrial chain, and support local governments in nurturing “little giants” ’ [^ntr71-L_202501724EN.000101-E0071] .

• (72) In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of the product under investigation. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely.

• (73) The present investigation has not revealed any evidence that the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the chemical sector, according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, would not affect the manufacturers of the product under investigation.

• (74) Further, the product under investigation is also affected by the distortions of wage costs in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, as referred to above in recital (38). Those distortions affect the sector both directly (when producing the product under investigation or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC) [^ntr72-L_202501724EN.000101-E0072].

• (75) Moreover, no evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the barium carbonate sector is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation. The abovementioned Guiding Opinion requiring to ‘improve supporting policies, strengthen the coordination between fiscal, financial, regional, investment, import and export (…) policies with the industry policies to give full play to the national cooperation platform between industry and finance and to foster the connection between enterprises and banks’ [^ntr73-L_202501724EN.000101-E0073] also exemplifies this type of government intervention very well. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

• (76) Finally, the Commission recalls that in order to produce the product under investigation, a number of inputs is needed. When the producers of the product under investigation purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors.

• (77) As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product under investigation are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth.

• (78) In sum, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under investigation, including the costs of raw materials, land, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein.

3.1.2.2.   Arguments raised by interested parties

• (79) The GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file, including the Report and the additional evidence provided by the complainant, on the existence of significant distortions and/or appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand.

• (80) The Commission received comments concerning the significant distortions affecting the barium carbonate industry in the PRC from Redstar in its response to the exporting producer questionnaire and its comments to the Commission’s First note on the sources of the normal value.

• (81) The company argued that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation should not be applied in the present investigation because the Chinese barium carbonate industry operates under market-oriented conditions. Further, Redstar requested that the Commission accepts the domestic prices and costs as reported by the company, which is a public-listed company. According to Redstar, the prices and costs of raw materials and energy reported for the production of the product under investigation are market-based and undistorted. It stressed that the Commission is entitled to use the domestic costs of the company to establish normal value pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation ‘to the extent that they are positively established not to be distorted, on the basis of accurate and appropriate evidence’. Finally, the company argued that, in case the Commission finds the existence of significant distortions, an assessment is done individually for Guizhou Redstar, as indicated in Article 2(6a), third paragraph of the basic Regulation.

• (82) As analysed in detail in Section 3.1.2.1 above, the Commission found in the context of the investigation actual evidence of the existence of significant distortions affecting the barium carbonate industry in China. For this reason, the use of the methodology prescribed by Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation to establish the normal value is justified. None of this evidence was effectively refuted by Redstar. The Commission therefore rejected the company’s claim that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would not apply in the present investigation.

• (83) As regards the company’s claim that the assessment on significant distortions should be done individually for each sampled exporting producer, the Commission recalled that once it is determined that due to the existence of significant distortions in the exporting country in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country, the normal value is constructed for each exporting producer by reference to undistorted prices or benchmarks in an appropriate representative country according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. While it is correct that Article 2(6a)(a) allows the use of domestic costs if they are positively established not to be distorted, in the present investigation, no costs of production and sale of the product under investigation were positively established as undistorted by the exporting producers in question or any other interested party. The company’s claim was therefore rejected.

3.1.2.3.   Conclusion

• (84) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, as described in the following section.

3.1.3.   Representative country

3.1.3.1.   General remarks

• (85) The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

• — A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank [^ntr74-L_202501724EN.000101-E0074];

• — Production of the product under investigation in that country;

• — Existence of relevant readily available data in the representative country.

• — Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference was given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection.

• (86) As explained in recitals (30)-(31), the Commission issued two notes for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value (the ‘Notes’). These notes described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria, and also addressed the comments received by the parties on these elements and on the relevant sources. In the Second Note on production factors, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to consider Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

3.1.3.2.   A level of economic development similar to the PRC

• (87) In the First Note on production factors, the Commission explained that the product under investigation appears to be produced only in countries none of which is a country with a level of economic development similar to the PRC in accordance with the criteria mentioned in recital (85).

• (88) As all countries where there is production of the product under investigation have a different level of economic development than the PRC, the Commission considered the production of a product in the same general category and sector of the product under investigation.

• (89) Subsequently, the Commission identified Türkiye and Mexico as countries (i) where production of a product in the same general category (inorganic salts and strontium carbonate respectively) and sector (chemical) was known to take place; and (ii) which have a similar level of economic development as the PRC according to the World Bank, i.e. they are all classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ countries on a gross national income basis,

• (90) Following the First Note, Kandelium submitted that both countries are an appropriate choice, Chutian did not express its views on the selection, while Redstar argued that Türkiye’s data demonstrates better availability and reliability than the data for Mexico.

3.1.3.3.   Existence of relevant readily available data in the representative country

• (91) For the two countries considered (Mexico and Türkiye), the Commission further verified the readily available data, including the data on imports of factors of production as well as of financial data from the relevant producers in these potential representative countries.

• (92) The Commission analysis showed that for Türkiye data on representative undistorted volumes of the principal input for production of BC (raw, unprocessed baryte ore) was available, as opposed to Mexico. Furthermore, for Türkiye, a company data (for two companies) showing a reasonable amounts for profit and for SG&A costs for substantial part of the investigation period were available. Moreover, Turkish imports of baryte ore were not materially affected by imports from the PRC or any of the countries listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr75-L_202501724EN.000101-E0075].

• (93) The Commission therefore indicated it would use Türkiye and production of inorganic salts (sulphates), a similar product to the product under investigation, to establish an appropriate representative country for the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

• (94) Regarding the producers in Türkiye and the availability of their data, the Commission identified two sulphate producers, Sisecam and Alkim, for which financial results showing reasonable amount for profit and for SG&A costs were available for 2024, thus period overlapping by three quarters with the investigation period.

• (95) In light of the above considerations, the Commission informed the interested parties with the Second Note that it intends to use Türkiye as an appropriate representative country and Sisecam (for chemical segment) and Alkim SG&A costs and profit data from 2024, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to source undistorted prices or benchmarks for the calculation of normal value.

3.1.3.4.   Level of social and environmental protection

• (96) Having established that Türkiye was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

3.1.3.5.   Conclusion

• (97) In view of the above analysis, Türkiye met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

3.1.4.   Sources used to establish undistorted costs

• (98) In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under investigation by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that Note.

• (99) Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use GTA import data for Türkiye to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials baryte ore and anthracite.

• (100) Furthermore, for the bituminous thermal coal, the Commission set out in the Second Note that the average IMF prices in the investigation period will be used. With respect to the liquified CO2, in the absence of reliable and representative import data from Türkiye, the Commission stated that it would resort to GTA import prices of liquid CO2 from India (major exporter) in all countries worldwide as a benchmark.

• (101) In addition, the Commission stated that it would use the Turkish Statistical Institute [^ntr76-L_202501724EN.000101-E0076] and Energy Market Regulatory Authority [^ntr77-L_202501724EN.000101-E0077] data for establishing undistorted costs of labour and energy respectively.

• (102) In the Second Note, the Commission also informed the interested parties that due to the large number of factors of production of the sampled exporting producers that provided complete information and the negligible weight of some of the raw materials in the total cost of production, these negligible items were grouped under ‘consumables’. The Commission calculated the percentage of the consumables on the total cost of raw materials (3-5 %) and applied this percentage to the recalculated cost of raw materials when using the established undistorted benchmarks in Türkiye.

• (103) Following the Second Note, Kandelium argued that international benchmarks do not accurately reflect the actual costs incurred by producers in Türkiye, and that the data used should resemble the costs actually incurred by producers in the representative country. In this context, Kandelium submitted that prices for bituminous thermal coal (for which IMF benchmark was used) should reflect CIF prices, including costs for transport and insurance, rather than FOB prices. According to Kandelium, only the CIF price provides an appropriate benchmark for prices incurred in the representative country.

• (104) As set out in the Notes, it is indeed the Commission’s practice to first identify the corresponding cost in an appropriate representative country. Should a representative benchmark for a particular factor of production (such as bituminous thermal coal in this case) not be available in national or import statistics of the representative country, the Commission may use undistorted international prices, costs, or benchmarks. This is explicitly provided for in the second indent of the second sub-paragraph of Article 2(6a)(a). In the event these other benchmarks are used, the Commission is however no longer determining the price of that input as incurred in the representative country by domestic producers (in this case Türkiye) and hence is not bound to establish CIF price for that benchmark. Considering the above, Kandelium’s argument was rejected.

3.1.4.1.   Factors of production

• (105) Considering all the information submitted by the interested parties and collected during the verification visits, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production of barium carbonate

Factor of Production	HS Commodity code / Other nomenclature codes used in country concerned	Undistorted value in CNY	Unit of measurement
Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials
Raw Baryte Ore	2511 10/251110000011	0,941	kg
Anthracite Coal	2701 11/270111000011	1,105	kg
Liquid CO2	2811 21/2811210000, 28112100090	1,331	kg
Bituminous Coal	2701 12/270112000010	897,11	MT
Labour	Labour	Labour	Labour
Labour	[N/A]	[47,68 -62,75 ]	FTE
Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy
Bituminous Coal	2701 12/270112000010	897,11	MT
Electricity	[N/A]	0,75	kWh
By-products	By-products	By-products	By-products
Sulphur	2503 00/25030010, 25030090013, 25030090018	0,73	kg

Raw materials

• (106) To establish the undistorted price of raw materials (other than bituminous coal, for which IMF benchmark is used) as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties and transport costs were added.

• (107) An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 [^ntr78-L_202501724EN.000101-E0078].

• (108) The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in recital (84) that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices.

• (109) The Commission expressed the transport cost incurred by the cooperating exporting producers for the supply of raw materials as a percentage of the actual cost of such raw materials and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw materials to obtain the undistorted transport cost. The Commission considered that, in the context of this investigation, the ratio between the exporting producer’s raw materials and the reported transport costs could be reasonably used as an indication to estimate the undistorted transport costs of raw materials when delivered to the company’s factory.

• (110) Chutian submitted following the Second Note that the use of GTA Turkish import data to value the raw baryte ore is inappropriate and that export prices of Indian baryte ore should be used instead. More specifically, Chutian submitted that the Turkish import prices are not representative of normal baryte ore prices, as they mainly consist of expensive high-grade baryte ore that are meant to satisfy the needs of the gas and oil industries, rather than general consumption. In Chutian’s view, India, on the other hand, does not produce high-grade baryte ore and India's exports consist of low- and medium-grade baryte ore, which are the same grade as the one used by Chutian in its production.

• (111) It is not disputed that majority of the demand for baryte ore in Türkiye (as well as in many other countries with drilling operations) comes from oil and drilling industries and that part of this demand is satisfied by imports from third countries. However, based on GTA, also overwhelming majority of Indian exports are directed towards oil and gas producing countries in the Middle East and the U.S. and the domestic Indian baryte market equally serves predominantly the oil and gas industry. This implies that the product mix of Indian baryte ore is not materially different from baryte ore imported to Türkiye. Therefore, the argument that Indian prices and baryte ore types are more representative of the baryte ore used by the Chinese producers than the ore imported into Türkiye cannot be accepted as valid. Moreover, Chutian did not provide any substantive evidence in support of its claims and in any event, the Turkish import prices of baryte ore are consistent with the market information on Indian prices [^ntr79-L_202501724EN.000101-E0079]. Chutian’s argument is therefore rejected.

• (112) Furthermore, Redstar suggested that the appropriate benchmark price for baryte ore should instead be based on import prices of Indian baryte. According to Redstar, the Indian prices would be more representative, because India remains one of the top baryte exporters worldwide and using Indian import prices captures the true market-determined level of trade in a high-volume, price-competitive context. In Redstar’s view, opting for Indian import prices of baryte ore would also be consistent with the use of Indian CO2 price statistics in this case, to address the discrepancies between the factors of production used by the Chinese producers and the materials in Türkiye whose price would be used as the benchmark. In this context Redstar argued that in terms of geology and grades, Chinese barytes are more comparable to Indian barytes rather than to Turkish baryte deposits or mix of deposit types and qualities covered by the Turkish GTA imports.

• (113) Redstar’s claim had to be rejected for the following reasons. First, Morocco, which according to Redstar alone is also one of the top exporters worldwide accounts for the largest share of Turkish imports of baryte ore with representative import quantities (almost 80 000 tonnes). According to the metric suggested by Redstar, the choice of Turkish GTA import prices is therefore no less representative than the choice of Indian prices. It was further recalled that Türkiye was selected as a representative country for the purposes of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the construction of normal value in this case. As GTA data on import prices of baryte ore in Türkiye are readily available, the above condition is fulfilled. The Commission would seek to identify other suitable benchmarks only in the absence of appropriate Turkish benchmark. Unlike in case of CO2, for which no appropriate and representative benchmark could be found in Türkiye, for baryte ore import statistics with high level of granularity of data (allowing the Commission to isolate data for ore in a raw, unprocessed form, as used by the exporting producers), undistorted nature and representative quantities and price levels could be identified. Regarding the comparison based on geology and grades, Turkish deposit types are irrelevant for establishing the baryte ore benchmark as the data is exclusively sourced from GTA for imports and therefore does not reflect the prices of Turkish domestic production but rather prices shaped by competition of such domestic production with international imports. Furthermore, while the import data may cover different qualities and grades, sufficient representative undistorted quantities of baryte ore were imported into Türkiye to ensure that the final average mitigates the impact of any outliers. As long as the import quantities of the baryte ore are representative and there are no other specific circumstances rendering them unsuitable (which is not the case here), there is no objective reason to exclude these statistics from use. In any event, the Turkish import prices of baryte ore are consistent with the market information on Indian prices [^ntr80-L_202501724EN.000101-E0080]. Therefore, Redstar’s arguments could not be accepted.

• (114) Chutian claimed in response to the Second Note that while it is using industrial grade CO2, the CO2 statistics used by the Commission seem to blend the prices of industrial grade and food grade CO2. Chutian further argued that proposed CO2 costs are exaggerated due to the inclusion of high transportation costs associated with steel cylinders (while Chutian buys CO2 in trucks). Chutian consequently requested that the Commission adjust the CO2 prices to eliminate these extra costs and distortions. It is noted that in line with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, in the absence of a reliable benchmark in Türkiye, the Commission used the GTA import data for Indian CO2 (major exporter of CO2, in other, liquified form), which are readily available. The Commission sought to ensure that the statistics cover CO2 in the form used by the exporting producers and duly verified that there are sufficient representative undistorted quantities of the CO2 imported so that the resulting final average automatically reduces the impact of any potential abnormal prices at the lower and higher end of the range, thereby reflecting also potentially different modes of transport. As a result, there is no objective reason to exclude the GTA statistics used for CO2. Furthermore, Chutian failed to demonstrate that the benchmark established for CO2 includes (and to what degree) different grades and means of transportation (cylinders or trucks) and to what extent the prices of the two grades would be different. Chutian’s argument is therefore rejecteds.

• (115) Further to the CO2 benchmark, Kandelium argued that the average global import price of Indian liquid CO2 is not representative of the costs that would be incurred by Turkish producers (separated from India by a long distance), due to short land-based transportation routes to the biggest importers (which are mostly neighbouring countries). Subsequently, Kandelium suggested basing the CO2 price on countries where liquid CO2 needs to be shipped, such as Thailand or the US. It is recalled that in this case, the Commission applied objective and transparent criteria in establishing the benchmark costs for liquified CO2 by using the imports of Indian liquefied CO2 worldwide. In the absence of representative prices for liquefied CO2 in Türkiye, the Commission resorted to an alternative appropriate benchmark in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. The alternative benchmark used is however not linked to Türkiye or Turkish producers in any material way that would merit factoring in the distance between India and Türkiye. The fact that the biggest importers of CO2 are countries neighbouring India merely confirms the Commission’s conclusions drawn in the First Note that the production and consumption of liquefied CO2 is more regionalised (due to, among others, a specialised equipment required and safety systems applied) that the global CO2 trade is therefore limited. It was therefore reasonable to use Indian prices to identify costs representative of the CO2 costs of the Chinese producers.

• (116) Kandelium also noted further to the Second Note that no reference was made to natural gas as a factor of production and submitted that the Commission should include an appropriate price for natural gas in its calculation of the normal value, as it is an important energy source and therefore part of the production cost. It was observed that the Commission duly considered and reflected in constructing the normal value all factors of production used by the exporting producers (classified as raw materials or energy sources), aside of consumables. Furthermore, the data on factors of production was duly reported by the sampled exporting producers, checked and verified accordingly during on-site verifications and the natural gas was not reported as a factor of production nor energy source by the exporting producers.

Labour