Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1732 of 13 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China

(258) The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of between 16,7 % and 43,2 % by a significant portion of the imports from the country concerned on the Union market.

(259) In addition to price undercutting, there was also significant price suppression within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. Due to the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports from the Chinese exporting producers, the Union industry was unable to raise its sales prices throughout the investigation period in line with the development of costs of production and in order to achieve a reasonable level of profit, as set out in Table 9 below. The significant price suppression is further confirmed by the price underselling found on the basis of the data provided by the sampled exporting producers.

(260) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(261) As mentioned in section 1.5.1, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry.

(262) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in questionnaire reply of the complainant relating to all Union producers, which was cross-checked where necessary with the questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. As the sample of Union producers consisted of two Union producers and in order to ensure confidentiality, the microeconomic indicators are provided in ranges. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(263) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(264) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(266) During the period considered, the Union industry’s production volume experienced a consistent and significant decline with an overall decrease of 29 %. From 2021 to 2022, production decreased by 8 %. This downward trend accelerated in 2023, with production falling by 23 % compared to 2021. The decline continued during the investigation period, at which time production had decreased by 29 % when compared to the production volume in 2021.

(267) During the period considered, the Union industry’s production capacity experienced an overall reduction of 13 %. While the capacity remained stable from 2021 to 2022, it experienced a significant decline from 2022 to 2023 and in the investigation period. Given the decrease in the production volume in the period considered, capacity utilization dropped from 55 % in 2021 to 45 % in the investigation period.

(269) Throughout the period considered the total Union industry’s sales volume experienced a consistent and significant decline with an overall decrease of 24 %.

(270) Within light of the decrease of sales volume, the Union industry’s market share was reduced by 7 % overall over the period considered, with an invariable declining trend that decreased the presence of Union industry in the market from 80 % of market share in 2021 to 73 % in the investigation period.

(271) In the context of a contracting market and declining Union consumption, the data indicate that the Union industry suffered significant losses in production, sales volume, and market share – declines that outpaced the overall market contraction (-6 %). The Union industry’s performance deteriorated more sharply than the market, highlighting the industry’s particularly vulnerable position during the period considered.

(273) The Union industry experienced a decline in employment of 11 % over the period considered, with the total number of employees falling from 10 831 in 2021 to 9 597 during the investigation period.

(274) Despite a reduction in employment, the productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured in tonnes produced per employee per year, declined by 20 % over the period considered, due to a significant decrease in production. Although the Union industry made efforts to adapt its workforce, the drop in production outpaced these adjustments, resulting in a decline in overall productivity.

(275) All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

(276) The product concerned was subject to an anti-dumping investigation in the past. Following an initial investigation, definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed on the product concerned in 2009 (98). These measures were repealed following an expiry review investigation in 2015 (99). Since these measures were no longer in force during the period considered, the earlier evidence of dumping and the associated duties were no longer relevant for the injury assessment in the context of the current investigation.

(278) Sales prices on the Union market to unrelated parties fluctuated over the period considered, ultimately showing an overall increase of 24 %. In 2022, prices rose sharply by 30 %, primarily due to rising input costs. This peak level was maintained throughout 2023. Although the average price declined during the investigation period, it remained 24 % higher than in 2021.

(279) Over the same period, the unit cost of production of sampled Union producers increased by 42 %. From 2021 to 2022, there was a significant increase of 23 %. This trend continued in 2023 with a further 25 % increase, before decreasing in the investigation period. Overall, the cost of production experienced an increase of 42 % during the period considered. This rise was primarily driven by the development of raw material prices and the companies’ inability to take full advantage of economies of scale due to a reduction in sales and production.

(281) The average labour costs per employee increased by 19 % over the period considered. While labour costs remained relatively stable between 2021 and 2022, they experienced a significant increase in 2023 and during the investigation period, primarily due to inflation.

(283) In absolute terms, the stocks of the sampled Union producers increased consistently and significantly, rising by 197 % over the period considered. When adjusted for production levels, the closing stock as a percentage of production rose by 123 % during the period considered.

(284) The increase observed from 2023 to the investigation period should be interpreted with caution, as the candle sector is highly seasonal, with a large portion of sales occurring in the final months of the year. Since the investigation period concluded in October, the stock increase may be overstated compared to previous periods. Nonetheless, even accounting for potential seasonal distortions, the rise in stock levels remained significant.

(285) This overall increase in stocks highlights a significant imbalance between production and sales. The trend suggests that despite efforts to align production with demand, the accumulation of unsold inventory reflects serious challenges in accessing the market.

(287) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The profitability of the sampled Union producers declined significantly over the period considered, falling from 9 % – 11 % in 2021 to approximately 3 % – 4 % during the investigation period. A detailed analysis revealed a temporary increase in profitability to 16 % – 18 % in 2022, followed by a sharp decrease to 4 % – 5 % in 2023 which continued to deteriorate during the investigation period.

(288) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. Over the period considered, net cash flow declined by 53 %. It increased from 2021 to 2022, driven by improved profitability, but then fell sharply in 2023 and during the investigation period, mirroring the deterioration in financial performance.

(289) The level of yearly investments decreased over the period considered by 44 %. It notably increased between 2021 and 2022 by 41 %, to later decrease in the following period until the investigation period. The increase in investments was primarily aimed at reallocating existing capacities and replacing essential production assets. The investment continued despite severe competition, loss of market share and a financially difficult situation.

(290) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It developed negatively over the period considered falling from 150 % – 160 % in 2021 to 2 % – 8 % in the investigation period. The negative development shows that, although investments have continued in order to maintain competitiveness, the returns on those investments have fallen substantially over the period considered

(291) In a context of a substantial decrease of the Union consumption (- 16 %), imports from China increased noticeably during the period considered (+ 40 %), at prices which significantly undercut those of the Union industry. This allowed Chinese exporting producers to reach a market share of 22 % in the investigation period (up from 13 % in 2021).

(292) In these circumstances, the economic situation of the Union industry worsened as is shown by all major macroeconomic indicators presenting a negative trend: production (- 29 %), EU sales (- 24 %) and a significant reduction of its market share (from 80 % to 73 %) in the period considered.

(293) In reaction to the pressure of low-priced Chinese imports, the Union industry tried to reduce costs and adjustments in employment (- 11 %) were undertaken. However, as a result of the pressure exerted by dumped Chinese imports in terms of increased volumes and low prices, EU sales, productivity and return on investments dropped rapidly in the period considered, at a rate outpacing the observed drop in consumption.

(294) The cost of production of the Union industry went up significantly during the period considered (+ 42 %), mainly because of a strong increase in the raw material prices.

(295) The Union industry’s cost increased more than sales prices, consequently, profitability collapsed in the period considered, from 9 % – 11 % in 2021 to an injured scenario (+ 3 % to + 4 %) in the investigation period. Chinese imports consistently undercut Union prices, exerting strong downward pressure on market prices which led to price suppression.

(296) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(297) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry and Union consumption.

(298) The deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry coincided with a significant and increasing market penetration of increased imports from China, which consistently undercut the Union industry’s prices and, in any event, led to price suppression. In this respect, the evolution of import volumes and prices, as reflected in Tables 4 and 5, suppressed price levels of the Union industry, establishing a causal nexus between the two.

(299) Imports from China increased by 40 % during the period considered, from 97 764 tonnes in 2021, representing a market share of 13 %, to 136 548 tonnes in the investigation period, representing a market share of 22 %. These increasing imports were made at prices lower than those of the Union industry throughout the period considered and in any event at a price level leading to price suppression, considering that the Union industry could not increase its prices in line with the increase in the cost of production. Similarly, the decline in market share and sales volume, which in turn resulted in a decrease in production output, had a detrimental effect on the industry’s unit production costs due to reduced economies of scale.

(300) This had a strong negative impact on the Union industry. In a situation of increasing costs and the price pressure exerted by the Chinese dumped imports, the Union industry was precluded from setting prices and production volumes at sustainable levels, which resulted in a very strong drop in profitability from 9 % to 11 % in 2021 to 3 % to 4 % in the investigation period, and the consequent deterioration of its financial indicators.

(301) It was, therefore, provisionally concluded that dumped imports from China caused material injury to the Union industry in terms of price and volume.

(303) Compared to China, other countries maintained a limited presence in the Union market. Although import volumes fluctuated during the period considered, the combined market share of imports from all third countries excluding China remained stable at approximately 4 %. Similarly, throughout the period considered, import prices from these third countries were consistently higher than those of both Chinese exporters and Union producers.

(304) This indicates that, excluding China, all third countries maintained only a marginal presence in the Union market at noticeably higher prices than those of Chinese and Union producers. Therefore, they were not a contributing factor to the deterioration of the Union industry.

(305) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of imports from other countries does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(307) Export volumes from the sampled Union producers declined by 49 % during the period considered, falling by more than 6 000 tonnes, from 12 000 – 14 000 tonnes in 2021 to 6 000 – 7 000 tonnes during the investigation period. Average prices of exports increased by 36 % during the period considered.

(308) The investigation established (100) that the decline in the export performance of the Union producers can be explained by the pressure exerted by Chinese producers on third-country markets, which in turn has caused a decrease in exports by Union producers. The loss of export sales volume in absolute terms is significantly lower than the loss of sales in the Union. Moreover, the average export price for sales to third countries was higher by 4 % than for EU sales in 2023 and the investigation period.

(309) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the impact of export performance does not attenuate the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(310) Union consumption fell by 16 % during the period considered, while Union sales declined by 24 %. Notably, in 2022, consumption increased by 2 % compared to 2021, yet the Union industry experienced a 4 % decreased in sales over the same period. This indicates a lack of correlation between consumption trends and the industry’s sales performance.

(311) Similarly, the Union industry reduced its production volumes by 29 %, leaving capacity utilisation at 45 %, which is higher than would be expected from the 16 % decline in consumption.

(312) On that basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the decrease in union consumption does not break the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by Union producers.

(313) In light of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China. As a result of the significant increase of dumped imports from China, the Union industry was precluded from setting prices and production volumes at sustainable levels, which resulted in a strong deterioration of its economic situation.

(314) The economic decline of the Union industry coincided with a sharp rise in low-priced dumped imports from China. These imports consistently undercut Union prices, exerting strong downward pressure on market prices. As a result, the Union industry was unable to increase prices in line with rising production costs. This led to falling sales, a reduced output, and a significant drop in profitability. The timing and scale of these developments establish a clear causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(315) The Commission examined alternative factors that could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry. These included imports from other third countries, the export performance of the Union industry and the evolution of Union consumption. However, none of these were found to weaken the causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(316) Based on the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(317) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(318) In the present case, the complainant claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of sampled exporting producers would be higher than their injury margin.

(319) The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic regulation.

(320) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for the purpose of establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(321) As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. The basic profit was established based on the historical profitability of the Union industry from 2019 to 2020, prior to the period considered and possible disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Such profit margin was established at 12 %.

(322) The EU Industry provided evidence that its level of investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. The Commission verified the company’s internal records related to investment plans, management decisions and financial statements and found the claims warranted. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R&D and innovation (‘IRI’) expenses under normal conditions of competition as provided by the Union industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such difference, expressed as a percentage of turnover, was between 0,33 % and 0,36 % for each of the sampled companies.

(323) Such percentage was added to the basic profit of 12 % mentioned in the recital 308, leading to a target profit of 12,33 % to 12,36 %.

(324) In accordance with article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available, the Commission established an additional cost ranging from EUR 62 782 and 900 299 per tonne for each of the sampled companies. From this, it deducted the actual cost of compliance with the relevant conventions during the IP which ranged from EUR 21 922 to EUR 865 022 per tonne for each of the sampled companies This resulted in a net difference of EUR 0,66 to EUR 2,05 per tonne for each of the sampled companies. This difference was added to the non-injurious price.

(325) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(326) The Commission then determined the underselling margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in China, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(328) As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in the country concerned regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

(329) The complainant has provided sufficient evidence in the complaint that there are raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in China with regard to the product concerned. According to the evidence in the complaint, paraffin wax, accounting for more than 20 % of the cost of production of the product concerned, is subject to an export restriction in the form of no refund of the export VAT in China.

(330) Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined the alleged distortion, and any other distortions covered by Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in China.

(331) The Commission first identified the main raw materials used in the production of the product concerned by each of the sampled exporting producers. As main raw materials were considered those raw materials which are likely to represent at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned.

(332) The Commission established that all sampled exporting producers used paraffin wax, which in all cases accounted for more than 17 % of their costs of production.

(333) The Commission then examined whether any of the main raw materials used in the production of the product concerned is distorted by one of the measures listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation: dual pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on exports, licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refund reduction or withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic market obligation, captive mining.

(334) The Commission established that there was no refund of VAT when exporting paraffin wax, which created an incentive not to export paraffin wax, which in turn distorted the domestic market price-setting mechanisms.

(335) Next the Commission compared the price of paraffin wax paid by the sampled exporting producers to prices in the representative international market(s). In this regard, it was found that the unit price of paraffin wax in the PRC, as reported by the sampled exporting producers, was between 25 % and 60 % lower than the unit price in Türkiye (101), which was considered an appropriate representative country. Such difference was also confirmed when comparing the price paid by the sampled exporting producers with the information contained in the complaint to support the claim of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Considering the extent of such difference, domestic prices were considered to be significantly lower than prices in representative international markets.

(336) Finally, the Commission examined if the paraffine wax accounted individually for at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned. For the purpose of this calculation, an undistorted price of the raw material as established in Table 1 was used. The Commission established that paraffin wax accounted for at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product under investigation.

(337) The Commission concluded that paraffin wax is subject to a distortion within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(338) In accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all pertinent information to this investigation, including the spare capacities in the exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies.

(339) The complaint indicates that China has significant spare capacity in the production of candles, which appears to be structural in nature. This overcapacity is largely driven by China’s position as the world’s largest candle producer, responsible for an estimated 50 % of global output. Industry reports (102) estimate China’s annual production at a minimum of 16 million tonnes, with capacity continuing to expand.

(340) In contrast to its extensive production capabilities, the complaint indicates China’s domestic candle market is estimated to be relatively small. As a result, the Chinese candle industry is structurally export-oriented and heavily reliant on foreign markets to absorb its excess production. The Union market is highly attractive due to its size and consistently high demand for candles. This is reflected in the fact that the majority of leading Chinese candle producers export between 70 % and 90 % of their output, and China alone accounts for 24 % of global candle exports (103).

(341) In light of these factors, the Commission considers that China’s substantial spare capacity, combined with its limited domestic demand and export-oriented production model, poses a significant risk to the Union industry.

(342) In China, access to raw materials used in candle production, particularly paraffin wax, is significantly influenced by domestic pricing policies and export-related distortions. Chinese candle producers benefit from access to paraffin wax at prices below international market levels, giving them a substantial cost advantage (104).

(343) In contrast, Union producers purchase paraffin wax on the open market, where prices are subject to global supply and demand dynamics, energy costs, and geopolitical factors. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Union producers do not benefit from domestic subsidies, preferential pricing, or export restrictions that could protect them from price volatility. As a result, they face higher and more unpredictable costs, which directly impact their competitiveness.

(344) Moreover, the export-related distortions in China, further exacerbate the situation. These distortive raw material measures allow Chinese producers to access abundant and cheaper raw materials, while limiting availability and raising prices for non-Chinese producers. This artificially lowers production costs for Chinese candle manufacturers and creates an uneven playing field. The resulting cost asymmetry undermines the economic sustainability of the Union candle industry.

(345) The imposition of anti-dumping duties on Chinese candle imports into the Union is expected to have a limited impact on the supply chain. The Union industry has sufficient production capacity to meet domestic demand, ensuring a stable supply even if imports from China are reduced. Furthermore, other third countries can still export to the Union at fair, undistorted prices.

(346) The ability of the Union industry to meet the demand is based on its existing production capacities, which are currently underutilised due to the effects of dumped imports. Union producers are currently operating at 45 % of their production capacity and are able to increase their output to fill any potential supply gaps. This ensures that the imposition of duties will not result in shortages or disruption for consumers.

(347) While anti-dumping duties may lead to a moderate increase in candle prices, this impact, as per the complainant, is expected to be absorbed by large retailers, who act as the primary price setters in the consumer market.

(348) The lack of cooperation of the retailers suggests that they do not anticipate substantial disruptions resulting from the imposition of duties.

(349) In light of these factors, applying anti-dumping duties at the full level, without applying the lesser duty rule, is justified and proportionate. This will help to restore fair competition, support the viability of the Union candle industry and ensure a stable and resilient supply chain, while minimising the impact on downstream retailers and consumers.

(350) Having assessed all pertinent information to this investigation, the Commission concluded that it is in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(352) The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, retailers, users and consumers.

(353) The Union industry comprises more than 80 companies, geographically distributed across Europe, employing approximately 9 597 workers directly. A big part of these Union producers expressed support for the complaint, and none opposed the initiation of the investigation.

(354) Current levels of profitability are unsustainable. The imposition of measures is expected to allow the Union industry to recover parts of the lost market share, and to set prices at levels that allow to reach a sustainable level of profitability.

(355) The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price suppression and a further reduction of sales, thus translating into losses and likely closure of production facilities, dismissals and ultimately, the shutdown of entire businesses.

(356) The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of provisional measures is in the interest of the Union industry.

(357) No unrelated importers or users participated in the sampling process or submitted responses to the questionnaire. As such, no data concerning importers or users were provided and no specific concerns were raised that could suggest significant adverse effects from the possible imposition of measures.

(358) In the absence of cooperation, the likely effect of measures on users was assessed on the basis of reasonable assumptions. Candles generally represent a small cost item within the decorative segment of traders and retailers, who typically manage a wide range of products. For consumers, candles are also considered a minor consumable expense. As such, any potential price increase resulting from the imposition of anti-dumping duties is unlikely to have a significant impact on the operational costs of businesses. The relatively low unit cost of candles, compared to the overall product portfolio of traders and retailers, suggests that such increase would have a negligible effect on their economic activities. Similarly, for consumers, the cost increase is not expected to alter purchasing behaviour significantly.

(359) In view of the above, the imposition of measures is not expected to harm users, trader or consumers. It is therefore concluded that the imposition of anti-dumping measures is not contrary to the interest of importers, retailers, users and consumers.

(360) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of product concerned originating in country concerned at this stage of the investigation.

(361) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(362) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China, in accordance Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission concluded in section 6.4 that the appropriate level to remove injury should be the dumping margin.

(364) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(365) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’.

(366) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(367) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, a percentage may be introduced, depending on the case, although not advisable such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(368) As mentioned in recital 3, the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

(369) In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should be discontinued

(370) No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken/can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

(371) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(372) Comments were received from Qingdao Kingking and Ningbo Kwung’s Wisdom Art & Design Co. The comments mainly concerned other issues than the accuracy of the calculations, such as sources of benchmarks, profit margins, SG&A and injury margin calculation and will be therefore considered in the definitive stage of the investigation.

(373) Ningbo Kwung’s Wisdom Art & Design Co. submitted in addition two comments concerning the accuracy of the calculations It identified an error in the packing expenses reported in the export sales listing and an incorrect conversion factor applied to the paper carton price. Both errors were corrected, and the dumping margin for the company was adjusted accordingly.

(374) Company 5 reported an error in its IRI calculations. The Commission verified the calculation and confirmed that this error does not have an impact on the level of the injury margin of the company.

(375) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(376) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 August 2025.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C, C/2024/7459, 19.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7459/oj).

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/511 of 20 March 2025 making imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/511, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/511/oj).

(4) AD726 Candles_Note to the file_Provisional sample_EU producers of 19/12/2024; t24.011572

AD726 Note for the file - definitive sample of EU producers of 17/01/2025; 25.001025.

(5) AD726 Note for the file - Change definitive sample of EU producer of 24/02/2025; t25.002394.

(6) TRON t25.000237 of 6 January 2025.

(7) TRON t25.000574 of 10 January 2025.

(8) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2771.

(9) Company 1 and Company 5 are part of the complainant, who submitted the request under the condition that each producer be granted anonymous treatment, citing a genuine risk of commercial retaliation from their Union customers, who are also customers of the Chinese exporting producers. The Commission considered the request for anonymity to be duly warranted and granted it accordingly.

(10) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024, SWD(2024) 91 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en.

(11) Such as the 14th FYP for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 (‘14th FYP’), available at: t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN (accessed on 3 June 2025).

(12) Xinhua News Agency, ‘SASAC: The State-owned economy should maintain absolute control over seven industries’, available at: https://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-12/18/content_472256.htm (accessed on 6 June 2025).

(13) Usha C. V. Haley and George T. Haley, ‘Through the Looking Glass: Subsidies to China’s Glass Industry’ in Subsidies to Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy, (OUP, 23 May 2013), available at: https://academic.oup.com/book/11363/chapter/160011767 (accessed on 3 June 2025).

(14) List of China’s WTO notifications, available at: https://notifications.wto.org/en/status-by-member/china (accessed on 3 June 2025).

(15) Report – Chapter 2, p. 8.

(16) Report – Chapter 2, p. 7.

(17) See at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm (accessed on 3 June 2025).

(18) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

(19) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20.

(20) Report – Chapter 4, p. 75.

(21) Report – Chapter 4. p. 99.

(22) Report – Chapter 18, p. 538.

(23) Report – Chapter 8, p. 242.

(24) Report – Chapter 12, p. 328.

(25) See at: http://www.kwungs.com/ (accessed on 26 May 2025).

(26) See at: http://www.kwungshome.com/ (accessed on 26 May 2025).

(27) See at: https://www.chinakingking.com/ (accessed on 26 May 2025).

(28) See at: https://m.chinabgao.com/top/brand/88643.html#:~:text=%E8%BF%99%E4%BA%9B%E5%93%81%E7%89%8C%E5%9C%A8%E7%9F%B3%E8%9C%A1%E7%9A%84,%E6%B4%8B%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E3%80%81%E7%9B%9B%E4%BA%9ASASIA%E3%80%82 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(29) See at: https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/index.shtml (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(30) See at: http://www.sinopec.com/listco/en/ (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(31) See at: http://www.syhg.chemchina.com/ (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(32) See at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588045/n27271785/n27271792/c14159097/content.html (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(33) See at: https://www.chinalco.com.cn/xwzx/ (accessed on 4 June 2025).

(34) Art. 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law or General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era (see below for full reference).

(35) See Art. 5 of the Law on Promoting the Private Sector, available at: https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7022018.htm (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(36) See Art. 3 of the CPCIF Articles of Association, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(37) Ibid.

(38) See Art. 36 of the CPCIF Articles of Association, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(39) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/list/40288043661dc14701661ddbe0980010 (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(40) See at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/sy (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(41) See Art.2 of the CHCIA Articles of Association, available at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/fh (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(42) See Art. 3 of the CHCIA Articles of Association, available at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/xhzc (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(43) See Art.36 of the CHCIA Articles of Association, available at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/xhzc (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(44) See at: https://www.chcia.org.cn/lsh (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(45) See at: https://www.cnfa.net.cn/index.aspx (accessed on 4 June 2025).

(46) See at: https://www.cnfa.net.cn/about/1546.aspx (accessed on 4 June 2025).

(47) Ibid.

(48) See at: http://www.cnagi.org.cn/djgz (accessed on 4 June 2025).

(49) See at: http://www.cnagi.org.cn/newsinfo/8098191.html (accessed on 4 June 2025).

(50) Ibid.

(51) Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-104.

(52) Report – Chapter 5, p. 126.

(53) See for example: Blanchette, J. – Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10-19.

(54) Report – Chapter 2, p. 19-26.

(55) See at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(56) General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era, available at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(57) Financial Times (2020) - Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(58) See at: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B1%9F%E6%98%8E%E5%AD%98/62615366#reference-1 (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(59) See at: https://www.chinakingking.com/party_building/detail/1.html (accessed on 27 May 2025.).

(60) See at: http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/000/000/041/41878.shtml (accessed on 27 May 2025).

(61) See at: https://www.chinalco.com.cn/dqjs/dqjs_djdt/202404/t20240422_126423.html (accessed on 5 June 2025).

(62) Report – Chapters 6, pp. 134-138.

(63) Report – Chapter 8, p. 243.

(64) See Art.16 of the Law on Promoting the Private Sector.

(65) 14th FYP on raw materials, available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(66) Ibid.

(67) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(68) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202308/content_6900274.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(69) See at: https://www.ln.gov.cn/web/qmzx/lnsqmzxxtpsnxd/lnzxd/bm/2024061709101833774/index.shtml (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(70) Ibid.

(71) See at: https://www.sohu.com/a/494828794_433256 (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(72) See at: https://www.ningjin.gov.cn/xxgk/content/26103.html (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(73) Report – Chapter 14, p. 315.

(74) Report – Chapter 8, p. 242.

(75) Report – Chapter 9, p. 260.

(76) Report – Chapter 9, p. 262.

(77) Report – Chapter 13, p. 361.

(78) Report – Chapter 13, p. 332.

(79) Report – Chapter 13, p. 370-373.

(80) Report – Chapter 5, p. 107.

(81) Report – Chapter 5, p. 126.

(82) Report – Chapter 6, p. 149.

(83) Report – Chapter 10, p. 272.

(84) See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022), available at: http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 28 May 2025). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management.’

(85) See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(86) See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan Yu, Longmei Zhang, October 2016, WP/16/203.

(87) Report – Chapter 10, p. 272.

(88) OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, available at:

https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(89) http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/20/content_5504241.htm (accessed on 28 May 2025).

(90) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(91) https://connect.spglobal.com/

(92) https://www.macmap.org/

(93) (https://app.bot.or.th/BTWS_STAT/statistics/BOTWEBSTAT.aspx?reportID=636&language=ENG)

(94) https://www.mea.or.th/en/our-services/mea-service/e-service/electric-monthly-calculate/type4.

(95) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(96) (https://app.bot.or.th/BTWS_STAT/statistics/BOTWEBSTAT.aspx?reportID=636&language=ENG)

(97) https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=utility_costs and https://www.mea.or.th/en/our-services/tariff-calculation/latestft.

(98) Council Regulation (EC) No 393/2009 of 11 May 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 119, 14.5.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/393/oj).

(99) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1361 of 6 August 2015 repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of certain candles, tapers and the like originating in the People's Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 210, 7.8.2015, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2015/1361/oj).

(100) Chinese exports to the rest of the world are substantial in volume and at prices lower than those to the Union (source: Global Trade Atlas).

(101) The Commission also searched for an international benchmark, but no such benchmark was readily available. Furthermore, the Commission observed that world prices are influenced by imports from China and its pricing. As the major exporter of paraffin wax, China impacts the import prices of the rest of the world. In addition, in all other potential representative countries analysed, the share of Chinese imports and their impact on the average price was significant. The only exception, in addition to Türkiye, was the Philippines which had 33 % share of imports from China. The price of the non-Chinese imports was even higher than in Türkiye, that is 18 CNY/kg.

(102) https://uniway-sourcing.com/china/candle-manufacturers-suppliers-in-china/

(103) https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/candles.

(104) This is supported by evidence comparing the prices paid by the Complainant for paraffin imported from China (Annex 5.8 of the Complaint) with the prevailing market prices within China (Annex 5.7 of the Complaint), which clearly show a disparity in favour of Chinese producers.