Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1919 of 25 September 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Egypt, Japan and Vietnam, and terminating the investigation on imports thereof originating in India

Image omitted; see official source	Official Journal of the European Union	EN L series
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	2025/1919	26.9.2025

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union ¹ (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

• (1) On 8 August 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel, originating in Egypt, India, Japan and Vietnam (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. The Commission published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union ² (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

• (2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 24 June 2024 by the European Steel Association (‘EUROFER’ or ‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2.   Registration

• (3) The Commission made imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Egypt, India, Japan and Vietnam subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2719 (‘the registration Regulation’) ³.

1.3.   Provisional measures

• (4) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 14 March 2025, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details of the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days. The Commission did not receive comments relating to the accuracy of the calculations.

• (5) On 7 April 2025, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Egypt, Japan and Vietnam by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/670 ⁴ (‘the provisional Regulation’).

1.4.   Subsequent procedure

• (6) Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), the complainants, the following exporting producers: Daido Steel Co., Ltd. (‘Daido’), Formosa Ha Tinh Steel Corporation (‘FHS’), Al Ezz Dekheila Steel Company S.A.E (‘Ezz Steel’), Nippon Steel Corporation (‘Nippon Steel’) and JFE Steel Corporation (‘JFE’), Hoa Phat Group, as well as the Government of Egypt (‘GOE’) and the Government of Japan (‘GOJ’) made written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation.

• (7) The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with Ezz Steel, the GOE, Nippon Steel and the GOJ.

• (8) The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate.

• (9) The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products originating in Egypt, Japan and Vietnam (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure.

• (10) Parties who so requested were also granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with the GOE, Ezz Steel (EZDK and EFS), GOJ and Nippon Steel.

• (11) Following the final disclosure, the Commission received comments from Daido, FHS, Hoa Phat Group, Nippon Steel, JFE, GOJ and EUROFER.

• (12) Certain comments submitted by Nippon Steel were accepted, which affected the level of the injury margin for this exporting producer and for the Japanese non-sampled cooperating exporting producers. The new margins were re-disclosed in an additional final disclosure on 7 August 2025 to all parties, which were given the opportunity to provide comments. No comments were received.

• (13) Following final disclosure, the Commission found that the non-captive sales to related parties by the Union industry had been double counted in consumption and sales figures reported in Tables 1, 3 and 4 of the general disclosure document. The market shares of imports from the countries concerned and other third countries calculated in Tables 2 and 6 were revised accordingly. This change does not affect the relevant trends and thereby the findings disclosed in the final disclosure. However, considering that some of the values were slightly different to the ones disclosed in the final disclosure, an additional final disclosure was made informing interested parties of these revisions on 18 August 2025. The interested parties were given an opportunity to comment within 2 days in line with the last sentence of Article 20(5) of the basic Regulation, given the timeframe of the investigation. No comments were received.

1.5.   Claims on initiation

1.5.1.   Claim regarding procedure

• (14) Formosa Ha Tinh Steel Corporation (‘FHS’) argued that the Commission did not properly address its procedural claims on the ground that these claims went beyond the sufficient evidence requirement under Articles 5(3) and 5(7) of the Basic Regulation and Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. FHS considered these three elements: (i) the absence of core economic indicators in the Complaint; (ii) the deficient non-confidential version; and (iii) the Commission’s failure to examine the Union industry’s own structural weaknesses, mounting decarbonisation costs and record high electricity prices in their entirety. FHS was of the opinion that a number of factors identified by the Commission in the chapter on ‘causation’ confirmed its claims that the standard for initiation in the complaint was not met by the complainant. FHS claimed that the Commission breached its obligation to conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence by considering procedural allegations in isolation and labelling the evidence presented by the complainants as ‘insufficient’ without properly addressing the issues raised. The claims made at initiation by this exporting producer concerning the lack of positive evidence justifying the initiation of the proceeding within the meaning of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement were addressed in detail in recitals 12 to 18 of the provisional regulation. The Commission noted that the aspects which, according to this exporting producer, were incomplete or presented in a way to misrepresent the actual state of the Union industry have been duly documented in the provisional regulation. These factors and indices concerned the following points of the State of the Union industry:

• — a breakdown of import volumes per each targeted country,

• — import volumes and value of non-targeted countries,

• — sale prices of the Complainant and Union Industry,

• — a breakdown of employment data for administrative staff and labour directly involved in the manufacturing,

• — wages to personnel,

• — cash flow.

• (15) As mentioned in recital (16) of the provisional Regulation, it was considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided under confidential cover in order for interested parties to exercise their right of defence throughout the proceeding. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (16) After final disclosure, FHS reiterated that its concrete examples such as ‘missing PCN tables; copyright-blanked market studies; illegible capacity worksheets)’ and the absence of a reasoned explanation of why those items could remain concealed violated Article 6 WTO ADA and Article 19(2) of the Basic Regulation but did not submit additional arguments. In the absence of new elements and as mentioned in recital (15), the claim was rejected.

1.6.   Sampling

• (17) In the absence of comments concerning sampling, recitals (27) to (35) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

1.7.   Individual examination

• (18) In the absence of comments concerning this section, recital (36) of the provisional Regulation was confirmed.

1.8.   Questionnaire replies and verification visits

• (19) An additional verification visit was carried out at the premises of EUROFER, in Brussels, Belgium.

1.9.   Investigation period and period considered

• (20) FHS argued that by recognising in recital (45) of the provisional Regulation that the year 2021 had been ‘an exceptionally low point’ for capacity utilisation, and also acknowledging the existence of a post-COVID-19 price spike in the same period, the Commission should not have used this ‘abnormal year’ as the benchmark. By choosing 2021 as the index base year, the Commission created a bias affecting the trend line.

• (21) The Commission addressed this claim in recital (42) of the provisional Regulation, where it stated that the period considered should not be extended to the year 2020 since the market and the performance of the Union industry were severely influenced by exceptional circumstances triggered by the COVID-19 crisis. Such extension would not have added value, in particular since in 2020, the industry faced significant losses, primarily attributable to the impact of COVID-19. The market situation started to go back to normal in terms of supply and demand, which explains the improvement of the economic situation of the Union Industry, however, at the same time the Union Industry found itself under renewed pressure from imports from the countries concerned, which eroded market share and profits which became even more acute in 2023 and in the IP. Moreover, the length of the period considered was consistent with standard investigation practices.

• (22) After final disclosure, FHS claimed that the Commission ignored its proposal to start the investigation period in 2019 instead of 2021, which resulted in a breach of the Commission’s obligation of objective-examination standard under Article 3.1 of the ADA. Further comments received from exporting producers after final disclosure linked to both the start of the period considered and the injury analysis are addressed in the Section 4.

• (23) In the absence of any other comments concerning the investigation period (‘IP’) and the period considered, recitals (40) to (45) of the provisional Regulation was confirmed.

2. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Claims regarding the product scope

• (24) One exporting producer, Daido, requested the exclusion of all its types of hot-rolled flat steel products on the basis that they are known in the industry as tool steel and high-speed steel, even though they do not fit the description of tool steel included in the EU Combined Nomenclature (CN).

• (25) The Commission confirmed in the provisional Regulation that tool steel and high-speed steel were not covered in the product scope of the investigation at hand. However, the Commission considered that the claim of Daido to exclude all its types of hot-rolled flat steel products was not specific enough, opening the risk that it could cover also many ordinary hot-rolled flat steel products for other uses than for tools. On these grounds, the Commission dismissed Daido’s claim to reject all its products but confirmed the exclusion of tool steel as provided in Section 2.1 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission also considered that the use of the appropriate CN codes was of the responsibility of the importers when declaring the goods to the customs authorities.

• (26) Following the imposition of provisional measures, Daido claimed that even if its tool steel fell outside the definition of tool steels and therefore not falling within the dedicated CN codes to tool steel ⁵, their tool steel still competed with them. Therefore, the Commission should recognise ‘Daido’s tool steels’ as having different physical and chemical properties from those of the ‘hot-rolled flat steel products’ covered by this investigation, and exclude them from the product scope.

• (27) Daido considered that it had in its submission established objective and specific criteria to support their exclusion request. Furthermore, Daido was confident that both the end use of tools steels and their physical characteristics were sufficiently specific for preventing the exclusion of non-tool steel products that should not be excluded from the investigation (i.e. to prevent circumvention).

• (28) The Commission concluded that based on the information on the file and in the absence of information to the contrary from Daido, ‘Daido’s Tool Steel’ products are not, as such, different from HRF and could cover many ordinary hot rolled flat steel products for other uses than for tools. Consequently, the Commission did not consider that it was warranted to explicitly exclude ‘Daido’s Tool Steel’ products from the product scope.

• (29) After final disclosure, Daido provided additional technical documents (inspection certificate and chemical specification sheet) to support its exclusion request. Daido also stressed that rejecting ‘Daido’s tool steel’ exclusion request meant that although their tool steel products were defined under DIN standards as tool steels, the Commission was not treating them as tool steels simply because they did not fall under the definition set in the EU’s classification system. This, in Daido’s view, was not a sufficient argument not to consider ‘Daido’s tool steel’ as tool steel. Finally, Daido pointed to the fact that when ‘Daido’s tool steels’ are imported into the EU, it provides an inspection quality certificate to the customs authorities, in which Daido’s company name and Daido’s tool steels’ types are clearly mentioned. This should thus allow customs authorities to distinguish and verify that ‘Daido’s tool steels’ are not HRF.

• (30) However, Daido still failed to provide objective technical characteristics according to the definition of tool steel in the dedicated CN codes, that would confirm that they fall in the definition set in the EU’s classification system of tool steel and thus allow customs authorities to distinguish ‘Daido’s tool steels’ from any other steel product covered by the measures. An alleged market perception is not sufficient to exclude a product. The reference to DIN standards allowing to define tool steel products was rejected on the ground that the description of tool steel, which is included in the EU Combined Nomenclature (CN) provided a very precise composition of the individual elements required in the Additional Note to Chapter 72 of the EU’s Combined Nomenclature Regulation. As noted in recital (24), and confirmed by Daido, ‘Daido’s Tool Steel’ was not an actual tool steel within the meaning of the EU Combined Nomenclature. Indeed, the Commission noted that the additional note 1 to Chapter 72 provides for a clear definition of tools steels. Should the product for which an exclusion is requested not fall in the defined scope for tools steels, they should not be considered as such and would therefore fall under the scope of this investigation.

• (31) The Commission thus rejected the exclusion request of ‘Daido’s tool steels’. As to the impact on the requesting party, the Commission failed to see why the non- exclusion would be ‘catastrophic’, as claimed by the party, given the capacity of Daido to declare its products under the correct CN code to the customs authorities or to request a specific CN code.

2.2.   Conclusion

• (32) In the absence of any other comments with respect to the product scope, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (52) and (53) of the provisional Regulation.

3. DUMPING

3.1.   Egypt

• (33) Following imposition of provisional measures, the Commission received written comments on the provisional dumping findings regarding Egypt from the Egyptian exporting producer Ezz Steel, the GOE and EUROFER. In addition, comments were received after final disclosure from Ezz Steel and the GOE. Those claims are addressed in the relevant sections below.

3.1.1.   Normal value

• (34) The details of the calculation methodology of the normal value were set out in recitals (54) to (65) of the provisional Regulation.

• (35) In the absence of claims related to the calculation of the normal value, those recitals are hereby confirmed.

3.1.2.   Export price

• (36) The details of the calculation of the export price were set out in recital (66) of the provisional Regulation.

• (37) At the provisional disclosure stage, EZZ Steel identified five export sales transactions which were reported by the company in their questionnaire reply but were missing from the dumping calculation. The Commission corrected accordingly.

3.1.3.   Comparison

• (38) Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, Ezz Steel and the GOE submitted that the Commission should have used the invoice date as the date for the exchange rate to convert export sales to the Union in USD into local currency, instead of using the initial sales contract date. Ezz Steel furthermore argued that, if the Commission were to deviate from using the invoice date, it should not use the initial sales contract date, but the date of issuance of the letter of credit for the corresponding export sale, when the contract becomes final. For this, an average time lag between the invoice date and sales contract date of 20 days was proposed by the company based on the few export transactions sampled by the Commission during the verification which would effectively lead to applying an average exchange rate no greater than 30 days following the date at which the sales legal terms become final.

• (39) EZZ Steel argued that the Commission should also use the sales invoice date to the domestic sales as there was also a time lag of between one and two months between the date of the sales contract and the date of the invoice, and that prices varied between those dates.

• (40) Regarding the export sales, the parties did not demonstrate, nor did the sampled sales transactions reveal that there was a structural difference in the agreed terms of sales (for instance in price, volume or quality) in between the initial sales contract date and the date of issuance of the letters of credit other than the existence of a time lag for the small number of 18 export transactions in question, not representative of the population. In addition, the average of 30 days mentioned in recital (38) is irrelevant because the standard deviation of the sample is high. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (41) Concerning the claim at provisional disclosure stage regarding the existence of a similar situation for the domestic terms of sales and that for domestic sales the sales contract date should be used instead of the sales invoice date, the Commission concluded that besides that this claim was not substantiated by any evidence, there was also no reason to deviate from the domestic sales invoice date since these sales were not subject to the exchange rate difficulties as the domestic sales were all made in Egyptian pounds. This claim was thus rejected.

• (42) Following the final disclosure, Ezz Steel and the GOE further elaborated on their claim at provisional stage that the Commission had used the incorrect date to convert export sales from USD to EGP, adding two reasons: the devaluation and the date when the material terms of sale are set.

• (43) According to Ezz steel, the Commission did not explain in the provisional regulation how the exchange rate fluctuations and overall decrease of the EGP against the USD lead to the conclusion that the reference point needed to be the date of the sales contract and not the invoice date.

• (44) The reasons for using the sales contract date instead of the invoice date were however clearly stated in recital (72) of the provisional Regulation. As explained therein, the fact that the company operated in a situation of high devaluation of the EGP against the USD and the Euro in combination with the fact that sales conditions, including the sales price, were set at the moment of the sales contract, a moment where only the exchange rate at that time was known, justified the use of the sales contract date as the correct reference date for the sale and not the invoice date.

• (45) The company further argued that the ‘hybrid’ methodology used by the Commission by considering the exchange rate at the time of the contract date for export sales and the exchange rate at the time of the invoice date for the domestic sales did not allow for a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price. This was because the devaluation of the EGP was taken into account only on the domestic side while on the export side this was negated by using the sales contract date. In support of its argument, the company referred to a report prepared by a consultant which stated in its summary that this approach ‘(…) implies that domestic prices duly reflect the impact of 1-2 months of inflation (from order to invoice), whereas the corresponding appreciation of the EGP vs the USD during the same period is ignored’ ⁶.

• (46) The devaluation of the EGP versus the USD was established, confirmed to exist and thus taken into account. The company failed however to provide substantial evidence for this claim demonstrating a need for a consistent adjustment of domestic prices over time in line with inflation. Also, during the investigation it was established that for domestic sales, the company was not able to link specific sales to specific payments. Clients can pick up the product at Ezz steel warehouses when they have green light from the department which controls the current accounts. However, Ezz steels’ internal control procedures do not provide sufficient and adequate information as regards at which date exactly a specific invoice was paid. Therefore, it was not possible to establish the precise payment date per domestic sales transaction and thus evaluate or quantify the alleged impact of the devaluation of the EGP on domestic prices. In addition, this claim regarding the impact of inflation on the domestic sales refers to inflation in general, not specifying which index was used. It is therefore unknown whether it refers to the general inflation index that includes many items outside the scope of the investigation which are, consequently, irrelevant. Only the evolution of the prices of the like product on the domestic market are important and as regards those, in the financial statements of both EZDK and EFS the statutory auditors did not address any key audit matters related to inflation. There is also no reference in the financial statements of the company to IAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies. This request for an adjustment under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation was therefore rejected as unsubstantiated.

• (47) In addition, Ezz steel reiterated its claim that the terms of the export sales were set only when the contract between the parties was countersigned by the purchaser or the letter of credit had been issued. Using this approach, Ezz steel concluded that, for the selected sample of export sales verified on spot, the average number of days between the sales contract date and the issuance of the letter of credit was about 20 days for the group. As a result, according to the company, the Commission should have relied on the date of issuance of the letter of credit.

• (48) Besides that the letter of credit is irrelevant in this context because, by definition, it must reflect the conditions and terms which are included in the sales agreement, i.e. the contract, the Commission rejected this claim for reasons set out in recital (40) above.

• (49) At provisional and definitive stage, Ezz Steel submitted that the present case should be distinguished from facts and circumstances of the Bulb Flats ⁷ and Ceramic Tiles ⁸ which concerned exports from Türkiye and in which the Commission used the contract date, rather than the invoice date, as the circumstances of these cases do not apply to this case. Since the Commission performed an independent assessment of the facts and figures of this case and no parallels with the cases mentioned above were drawn, this claim was rejected.

• (50) Ezz Steel furthermore submitted that the Commission had used the wrong exchange rates for the transactions during the IP related to sales contracts concluded in the three months preceding the IP, i.e. for the period from January to March 2023. They claimed that the Commission should have used the exchange rates in audited financial report of the company, provided to the Commission during the investigation.

• (51) The Commission assessed and accepted the company’s claim as regards the exchange rate for March 2023. For January and February 2023, however, the Commission found that the use of the official exchange rate was correct since the problem of exchangeability of the Egyptian Pound as regards normal access to USD in the exchange currency market only became an issue for the company from March 2023, as confirmed in the several financial statements of the company itself ⁹. There are no monetary reasons not to use the official exchange rate when the monetary market works normally, which was the case until Feb 2023, included, according to Ezz 2023 financial statements. In addition, the 2023 financial statements do not disclose the specific exchange rates of January and February 2023.

• (52) Following final disclosure, Ezz steel claimed that the above statement in recital (51) regarding the use of the official exchange rate for the months January and February 2023 by the Commission is wrong, supported by the following documents: Deloitte Report on EZDK pricing during April 2023 till March 2024, World Bank’s Egypt Economic Monitor for December 2022, Audit Committee Q4 2023 minutes and report issued on 20 July 2024 by Moore Egypt Public Accountants and Consultants. However, this last report includes the following disclaimer and scope limitation: ‘(…) The procedures do not constitute an audit or a limited review in accordance with Egyptian auditing Standards or Egyptian Accounting Standards, and accordingly, we do not express any assurance or opinion on the underlying financial information. (…) This Report (…) nor should it be relied upon by any other party other than those to whom it is specifically addressed’. The minutes of the Audit’s Committee of Q4 2023 has the same nature of limitations because it is a purely internal document. As regards the Deloitte and World Bank’s reports, they are not specific and detailed as regards Ezz steel transactions subject to exchange rates for the first two months of 2023. The provisional conclusion in recital (51) was therefore confirmed.

• (53) Besides the corrections described above, no other changes in the methodology for comparison as described in recitals (67) to (72) were made. They are thus hereby confirmed.

3.1.4.   Dumping margin

• (54) As described in recitals (36) and (37), following claims from interested parties, the Commission revised the dumping margins.

• (55) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Definitive dumping margin
Ezz Steel Company	11,7 %
All other imports originating in Egypt	11,7 %

3.2.   India

• (56) Following provisional and final disclosure, the Commission received written comments by EUROFER which are addressed in Section 3.2.4.

3.2.1.   Normal value

• (57) In the absence of any comments regarding the normal value, recitals (78) to (90) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.2.2.   Export price

• (58) In the absence of any comments regarding the export price, recitals (91) to (93) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.2.3.   Comparison

• (59) In the absence of any comments regarding the export price, recitals (94) to (100) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.2.4.   Dumping margin

• (60) EUROFER contested the Commission’s conclusion that there was no dumping of Indian hot-rolled flat steel imports, arguing that the finding was distorted and should be reassessed.

• (61) EUROFER submitted that export volumes and prices from India to the Union in Q2 2023 were unusually high, which it believed distorted the dumping calculation. These high volumes were, according to EUROFER, largely the result of quota carryovers under the EU Steel Safeguard mechanism, with 334 000 tonnes carried over from Q4 2022 to Q1 2023 and 422 000 tonnes from Q1 to Q2 2023, resulting in total Q2 exports of 555 000 tonnes – an exceptional surge compared to other quarters. Additionally, Q2 2023 prices reached EUR 740 per tonne, which was unusually high given India’s usual practice of selling excess steel abroad at lower prices after satisfying domestic demand. EUROFER suggests this spike may have been influenced by the removal of a 15 % export duty and other incentive schemes. It argues that calculating dumping over the full period hides this temporary distortion and calls for the use of monthly or quarterly averages instead, a method previously applied by the Commission in other cases involving market volatility.

• (62) EUROFER stated that seasonal factors contributed to the unusual high exports to the Union: while Union demand and prices are typically higher in Q2 before the summer slowdown, Indian domestic demand is usually lower due to the start of the monsoon season, incentivizing exporters to export more to the Union. Since the quota carryover system was discontinued in March 2025, EUROFER emphasized that Q2 2023 represented a one-off distortion that should not be averaged across the entire investigation period.

• (63) EUROFER submitted the Commission wrongly treated iron ore costs when calculating the normal value. EUROFER contended that Indian producers sold iron ore from captive mines at a loss to comply with government directives. However, the Commission treated these transactions as legitimate procurement costs rather than adjusting them to market-based valuations. EUROFER insisted that cost adjustments should reflect prices that would occur in the ordinary course of trade, including a reasonable profit. Using distorted input prices like below-cost iron ore sales results in an underestimated normal value and, consequently, a misleading dumping margin.

• (64) EUROFER therefore requested that, first, the dumping margin for Indian HRF should be recalculated either by removing the influence of Q2 2023 data or by averaging margins on a monthly or quarterly basis. Second, the methodology for determining normal value should be revised to account for fair market-based iron ore prices, including a reasonable profit margin, in line with international trade standards.

• (65) The Commission carefully examined these claims. First, it concluded that that EUROFER did not properly explain why Q3 would be different from the other quarters. The Commission found that the removal of export duties in India occurred already in November of 2022 and those duties were not reimposed. It is unclear why they would have affected only Q3. Finally, the Commission noted that, following the removal of those duties, exporting producers in India had the option of charging lower export prices or increase prices. They decided to increase prices (and their profits). Thus, the Commission cannot consider that the sales data from Q2 2023 did not reflect actual commercial transactions that occurred within the investigation period. Also, the export sales volumes of the two exporting producers during Q2 2003 were not exceptionally high and there were representative sales in all quarters for both exporting producers. Consequently, these data are representative and valid for inclusion in the dumping margin calculation. The claim was thus rejected.

• (66) The Commission also rejected EUROFER’s arguments concerning both seasonality and distorted iron ore input prices. Regarding seasonality, the Commission maintained that the Q2 2023 data – despite EUROFER’s claims of exceptional volume and pricing due to quota carryovers and seasonal market dynamics – reflected actual commercial transactions within the investigation period. As such, it found no legal basis under Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation to deviate from the standard methodology, which considers the full investigation period as representative.

• (67) Regarding EUROFER’s claim on iron ore input prices, the Commission found that there was not sufficient evidence which would allow for the replacement of the reported costs with alternative market-based values. First, EUROFER has not indicated the legal basis for the adjustment it claimed. Second, the Commission notes that the ‘sales’ of iron ore referred to by EUROFER are in fact internal transfers, and not a sale between related companies at a loss. The statement in recital (84) of the provisional Regulation refers to sales of iron ore to unrelated customers in the free market, and not to the intracompany transactions. To reflect the actual cost of manufacturing of the product under investigation, the Commission has allocated the realised loss of iron ore sales as a procurement cost to the cost of manufacturing. Therefore, contrary to EUROFER’s claims, the dumping calculation correctly accounted for losses incurred on sales of iron ore. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (68) In both instances, the Commission upheld its provisional findings and concluded that the methodology used complied with the legal requirements of the basic Regulation.

• (69) In the absence of any accepted claim concerning the dumping margin calculation, recital (102) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed and therefore no dumping of Indian hot-rolled flat steel imports was found.

• (70) After the final disclosure, EUROFER resubmitted comments contesting the Commission’s conclusion that imports of HRF originating in India were not dumped. EUROFER argued that the calculation of the dumping margin was likely distorted due to:

• (a) abnormally high-priced and high-volume exports in Q2 2023; and

• (b) the alleged improper treatment of below-cost iron ore input prices.

• (71) With regard to point (a), EUROFER claimed that Q2 2023 export prices and volumes were unusually high due to a convergence of policy and market-related factors, including safeguard quota carryovers, seasonal demand patterns, the removal of export duties in November 2022, and the extension of export incentive schemes such as RoDTEP. EUROFER submitted that these elements created a temporary distortion that should have been addressed either by excluding Q2 2023 from the dumping calculation or by adopting a quarterly or monthly comparison methodology under Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation.

• (72) The Commission examined these claims and found that they did not warrant a revision of its provisional findings. While the export duty was removed in November 2022, this change applied throughout the investigation period and was not specific to Q2 2023. Regarding the safeguard quota carryover and alleged seasonal demand, the sampled exporting producers had the option of adjusting their commercial strategies accordingly. The Commission found no evidence that the transactions in Q2 2023 did not reflect genuine commercial behaviour.

• (73) Moreover, for the two sampled exporting producers, the Commission confirmed that export volumes in Q2 2023 were not abnormally high and that representative export sales existed in all quarters of the investigation period. The Commission further recalled that the dumping margin calculation is based on verified data from sampled exporters, in line with standard Union practice, and that aggregated public import statistics cited by EUROFER cannot put into questions the findings based on detailed data of the sampled companies.

• (74) Regarding the legal basis for an alternative methodology, the Commission noted that Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation provides that, subject to fair comparison, the existence of dumping should ‘normally’ be established on the basis of a weighted average comparison over the entire investigation period. This does not preclude deviations where justified, but the Commission found no compelling reasons that would justify the use of quarterly or monthly averages in the present case. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (75) With regard to point (b), EUROFER reiterated its view that iron ore input costs used to determine the normal value were not market-based, as Indian producers sourced ore from captive mines at a loss under government direction. EUROFER claimed that these prices should have been replaced with values reflecting transactions in the ordinary course of trade, including a reasonable profit margin.

• (76) The Commission assessed this claim and found that it was not substantiated. The iron ore inputs in question were not shown to be influenced by government mandates in a manner that would justify disregard of the reported costs. In the absence of verifiable evidence demonstrating distortion or non-commercial pricing, the Commission concluded that the reported costs accurately reflected the producers’ actual cost of production and did not require adjustment.

• (77) Consequently, the Commission did not accept EUROFER’s additional comments. The methodology used by the Commission complies with the relevant provisions of basic Regulation, including the fair comparison requirement and Article 2(11). Accordingly, the findings set out in recital (102) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.3.   Japan

• (78) Following the imposition of provisional measures, the Commission received written comments on the provisional dumping findings regarding Japan from GOJ and one sampled exporting producer (Nippon Steel). Other comments received from these parties, or from other companies such as Daido and JFE concerning other aspects of the investigation were treated in the relevant sections (e.g. in Sections 2.1., 4.3.2 and 4.4).

3.3.1.   Related companies

• (79) GOJ and Nippon Steel both claimed that some of the companies, which the Commission at provisional stage considered as related companies, should not be treated as related given the little influence of one of the shareholders and the size of the entity controlled as explained in detail below. This concerned the Japanese companies Marubeni-Itochu Steel Inc. (‘MISI’) and Sumitomo Corporation Global Metals Co., Ltd. (‘SCGM’). In the provisional Regulation both companies were considered as related to Nippon Steel since they each held a shareholding interest in a common third entity. In this regard, the Commission noted the following.

• (80) First, Nippon Steel itself had reported both MISI and SCGM as related entities from the outset of the investigation. Already as early as 16 September 2024, i.e. five weeks after initiation of the investigation and before the deadline for questionnaire replies, Nippon Steel informed the Commission by email of the relationship between the different companies and indicated that these related entities would provide questionnaire replies. Subsequently, questionnaire replies and deficiency replies were submitted and verification visits were undertaken, all based on the premise that these companies were related to each other.

• (81) After final disclosure, Nippon Steel stated that the reason for reporting those companies as related entities was to prevent the Commission from applying Article 18 of the basic Regulation (non-cooperation).

• (82) However, if this were the sole reason for reporting these entities, Nippon Steel had ample opportunity throughout the investigation to claim and prove it was not related to those entities, e.g. at questionnaire, deficiency stage and during the verification visit. Nevertheless, Nippon Steel treated the companies as related companies in all these steps and raised the claim only after the imposition of provisional measures. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (83) Second, the basic Regulation states in Article 2(1) that ‘In order to determine whether two parties are associated, account may be taken of the definition of related parties set out in Article 127 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447’ ¹⁰. Letter (g) of that Article 127 provides that persons shall be deemed to be related if ‘together they control a third person directly or indirectly’.

• (84) Concerning MISI, Nippon Steel and MISI together held almost 100 % of the shares of a third entity ¹¹, where the two companies together appointed almost all directors, including the president. Concerning SCGM, Nippon Steel and SCGM together held (close to) 100 % of two separate entities ¹², either directly or via Nippon Steel’s (undisputed) related entity Nippon Steel Trading Corporation (‘NST’). Nippon Steel and SCGM together appointed (almost) all directors, including the president.

• (85) Nippon Steel claimed that in each case one of the two shareholders had less influence on or control over the third entity than the other shareholder. A mere shared ownership of the third entity by itself, therefore, was, according to the company, not enough to conclude that a relationship existed. However, whether one shareholder had less influence on the day-to-day operations of the third entity than the other shareholder does not diminish the objective reality that Nippon Steel and MISI, respectively SCGM, together, fully controlled that third entity.

• (86) After final disclosure, Nippon Steel referred to a preliminary ruling ¹³, where the Court of Justice had explained that ‘one person is to be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter’. This wording was also reflected in the article referenced in recital (83) as ‘one person is deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise direction over the latter’. According to Nippon Steel, the third entities were solely controlled by MISI or SCGM (and for NST Coil Centre, by NST and NSC).

• (87) However, the referenced Article 127(g) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 does not concern ‘one person’ controlling another, but related entities (in this case two) together controlling another entity. Although the level of control or influence of one of the shareholders (whether MISI, SCGM, Nippon Steel or NST) was allegedly small compared to the other shareholder(s), this does not negate the conclusion of the previous recital that the entities, together, fully controlled that entity.

• (88) In addition, Nippon Steel provided conflicting information as to which of the companies was the main shareholder – Nippon Steel or MISI, respectively SCGM. The shareholding percentages reported in its email of 16 September 2024 were different from those in the company’s submission after provisional disclosure. Moreover, the third entity mentioned in the email of 16 September 2024, owned by Nippon Steel and SCGM together, was no longer mentioned in Nippon Steel’s submission after provisional measures. According to public information, this third entity was fully owned by SCGM and Nippon Steel and/or NST during the investigation period ¹⁴.

• (89) After final disclosure, NSC provided more information on this third entity (NST Coil Centre, as mentioned in footnote 10). NSC claimed a lack of relationship with this entity in the same vein as set out in recitals (84), (85) and (96), with arguments concerning minority shareholding interests in the third entity, the lack of control or decisive influence through its directors and the size of the third entity in relation to NSC’s business.

• (90) Apart from the foregoing, letter (b) of the Article 127 referenced in recital (83) above also states that persons shall be deemed to be related if ‘they are legally recognised partners in business’. The shared ownership of the third entities by Nippon Steel and MISI or SCGM respectively, in and of itself established the existence of a legally recognised business partnership.

• (91) After final disclosure, Nippon Steel also argued that Nippon Steel was not a legally recognised partner in business under Japanese law, as would be the case if, for example, the different entities had entered into an agreement to form a so-called ‘kumiai’ ¹⁵.

• (92) However, the Commission noted that Nippon Steel and MISI or SCGM, respectively, together jointly (directly or indirectly) owned 100 % of the shares of a third entity. Regardless of the legal definition of related companies in Japan under Japanese law, under the referred Article 127 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447, the provision normally applied for establishing relationship in trade defence investigations in the European Union, those parties are considered partners in business as joint owners of a third business and therefore related parties.

• (93) In addition, Nippon Steel noted that in another investigation concerning electric vehicles from China ¹⁶, the Commission had not considered certain Chinese entities as related despite all having joint ventures with a third entity.

• (94) Any determination of a relationship between parties should be based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Commission is not bound by past practice. The electric vehicles case concerned a subsidy investigation, with specific facts that were taken into account in the context of all relevant facts and circumstances of that case, including the specific entities mentioned by Nippon Steel and their contractual arrangements. The current investigation, on the other hand, is an anti-dumping investigation concerning a different country (Japan) and economic reality, a different product/sector, and other facts; i.e. different circumstances than those in the electric vehicles case.

• (95) It should be noted that some of the legal representatives for Nippon Steel in this case were the same as those representing the SAIC group in the anti-subsidy investigation concerning imports of electric vehicles from the People’s Republic of China, referenced in Nippon Steel’s submission. This may explain why detailed information was provided on the SAIC group’s ownership structure in the case at hand, although that information cannot be found in the Implementing Regulations concerning that case as it was submitted as confidential business information in the electric vehicles case. It might also explain why Nippon Steel disregarded the fact that in the same investigation concerning electric vehicles, the Commission did consider certain entities of another group as related due to their involvement in a joint venture ¹⁷. However, such facts cannot be discussed in detail outside the realm of that investigation, as it concerns confidential and proprietary information to which only the relevant parties involved in that investigation and their legal representatives should have access. No permission of the relevant data owners to use that information in the context of the present investigation was provided to the Commission. In any event, what the Commission did or did not do in other cases has no bearing on the current investigation.

• (96) Third, Nippon Steel also claimed that the size of the third entities (in terms of turnover or number of employees) was very small compared to Nippon Steel and that this underlined the limited involvement of Nippon Steel in those entities. However, size could not be accepted as a determining argument showing a relationship or lack thereof.

• (97) Fourth, during the investigation period Nippon Steel had a similar relationship with another entity, Metal One. The two companies together owned 100 % of a third entity, as reported by Nippon Steel in their email of 16 September 2024 ¹⁸. However, although the situation seemed to be identical to that of MISI and SCGM, Nippon Steel did not claim a lack of relationship with Metal One at any time during the investigation.

• (98) Fifth, although the legal representatives of Nippon Steel did mention during the on-spot verification that they did not agree that MISI should be considered a related entity, this was at the time a mere comment. No formal claim was made with respect to this issue, and no argumentation or supporting evidence was provided until after the imposition of provisional measures. It should be noted that it was not the Commission, but Nippon Steel itself who declared MISI and SCGM as related entities from the very beginning of this investigation and who ensured that these entities provided the requested information as related entities. Only after seeing the outcome of the dumping calculations, and, presumably, the impact of the companies’ relationships on those calculations, did Nippon Steel decide to make a claim regarding relationships.

• (99) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that there was a relationship between Nippon Steel on the one hand and MISI, respectively SCGM on the other hand, based on a joint ownership of a third entity which the companies controlled together and which established their legally recognised business partnership. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim that these companies should not be considered as related entities.

3.3.2.   Arm’s length

• (100) Nippon Steel claimed that its export sales to its related companies were conducted on arm’s length terms. To support this claim, Nippon Steel argued that Nippon Steel’s sales to NST, MISI and SCGM had similar framework agreements, that the related entities were free to buy from other suppliers and that sales to these entities were made at similar prices. Furthermore, MISI’s sales to its related company in the Union, Marubeni-Itochu Steel Europe GmbH. (‘MISEA’), were at arm’s length since MISI’s sales to MISEA were allegedly in line with those to unrelated customers in the EU, while MISEA also purchased the product concerned from unrelated entities. In addition, MISEA’s sales to its related Union entity Company A ¹⁹ should be considered as done at arm’s length, since Company A also purchased the product concerned from unrelated entities. To support these claims, Nippon Steel provided evidence that the companies were free to buy from other entities as well as ex-works sales price comparisons on a PCN basis.

• (101) First, the Commission noted this claim concerning the transactions in question being at arm’s length was made by Nippon Steel after the imposition of provisional measures. Certain entities were reported as related companies, and transactions with those companies were accordingly treated as related transactions by the Commission at provisional stage.

• (102) Second, the Commission did not dispute that the different related entities were indeed free to sell and buy from other unrelated companies. It was also true that the framework agreements with related entities that were provided to the Commission were similar in terms of content and conditions. However, the provided framework agreements did not specify how the final prices were set, how commissions (if any) were paid or other details relevant for the determination of arm’s length transactions.

• (103) Moreover, by the company’s own assertions in its submission after provisional measures, the price negotiations involving related traders in practice took place either through the trader or directly with the customer, meaning the trader’s influence in these negotiations was limited to acting as an intermediary or ‘go-between’. The final price was therefore mainly determined by the interaction between Nippon Steel and the final customer. In view of the limited (if any) influence of the related trader on the price setting, the price between related entities was considered unreliable.

• (104) Third, Nippon Steel claimed that the prices paid by Nippon Steel to or via its related entities were in line with prices paid to unrelated customers. To support this claim, Nippon Steel provided tables showing the ‘ex works’ prices to related and unrelated entities for sales by Nippon Steel itself and by its related entities MISI and MISEA. However, it is unclear which prices were used as ‘ex works’ prices by Nippon Steel. When comparing sales prices, a comparison should be made between the invoice prices, minus relevant transport costs (to account for differences in delivery terms) and minus import duties where applicable. Such comparison showed notable price differences between related and unrelated sales transactions, where in most cases ²⁰ the sales price to related traders were lower than to unrelated traders (up to more than 50 % lower prices on a product type basis). It can therefore not be concluded that the transfer prices to related entities were in line with prices to unrelated entities. In any event, Nippon Steel had not provided any argument or evidence showing that the prices between the related entities reflected market prices.

• (105) According to the GOJ in its submission after final disclosure, the application of Article 2.3 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement was not justified by the lower sales prices of the relevant transactions, since that Article addresses the difficulty to calculate dumping margins due to the ‘unreliable’ (unreasonably high)’ export prices.

• (106) However, Article 2.3 does not specify whether prices between related entities should be higher or lower to trigger its application, it merely requires the existence of an association which renders the export price unreliable. In any event, in this particular case, there were significant price differences for sales between Nippon Steel and its related entities and those between Nippon Steel and its unrelated entities and therefore the GOJ’s claim is also factually incorrect.

• (107) In view of the above, the Commission rejected Nippon Steel’s claim and concluded that there was no evidence that prices between related entities were at arm’s length or that they reflected market prices.

3.3.3.   Normal value

• (108) The details of the calculation methodology of the normal value were set out in recitals (104) to (116) of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of any specific claims related to the calculation of the normal value, these recitals are hereby confirmed.

3.3.4.   Export price

• (109) The details of the calculation of the export price were set out in recitals (117) to (119) of the provisional Regulation.

• (110) Following provisional disclosure, Nippon Steel made two claims related to the calculation of the export price. These concerned the deduction of profit for sales via related entities and the exclusion of dividends and other income in the SG&A costs.

• (111) First, the company claimed that the amount for profit of sales through related entities (whether importers in the Union or traders outside the Union) should be deducted only once, in line with previous investigations such as Plain Paper Photocopiers ²¹ and Polyester Staple Fibre ²². In Plain Paper Photocopiers for instance, the definitive Regulation mentioned in recital (70) that a single profit margin of 5 % was applied, irrespective of the number of subsidiaries involved in the sales chain.

• (112) The Commission notes that Nippon Steel’s claim mixed up the adjustment made to the export price under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation when sales were made through related importers and adjustments made for fair comparison under Article 2(10) for sales made through related traders acting as agents in Japan. Those adjustment, however, have different factual and legal basis and therefore cannot be treated together.

• (113) The Commission notes that the approach taken (which refers only to Article 2(9)) reflected the specific circumstances of those cases at that time, in particular the type of product and sales flows. Nippon Steel has not explained why the approach in the referenced cases would be relevant for the case at hand, in particular when its claim covers also an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i). The findings in those cases, therefore, cannot be applied as such in the current investigation.

• (114) For the case at hand, the Commission made an adjustment of 2 % for profit incurred by each Union related entity involved until resale to the first independent Union customer in accordance with Article 2(9). Nippon Steel has not challenged that the adjustment under Article 2(9) was unwarranted but merely that, combined with the adjustment under Article 2(10)(i), it was too high.

• (115) In view of the above, the Commission rejected Nippon Steel’s first claim.

• (116) Following final disclosure, Nippon Steel clarified that it took issue with the fact that the Commission made a double adjustment under Article 2(9) for sales made via MISEA and Company A. According to the company, this would be the exact same situation as mentioned for the two cases referenced in recital (111).

• (117) The Commission disagreed. In those two referenced cases the Commission decided to use one single profit margin regardless of the number of entities involved. In those cases, a profit margin of 5 % was used to reflect the profit made by related importers in case of a complex flow involving multiple entities.

• (118) The situation in the case at hand involved a relatively simple flow of two related importers, for each of which the Commission decided to adjust the export price in view of the role played and functions taken by the two related parties. In this regard, depending on the transaction they were both involved in the importation process and further resale on the Union market.. It should be noted that this approach was in fact to the company’s benefit. If the Commission had chosen to follow the example of the older cases referenced by Nippon Steel and had applied a profit of 5 % regardless of the number of subsidiaries, this would have decreased the export price and thereby increased the dumping margin. The fact that the product was sold to the final unrelated customer only once, as argued by Nippon Steel, does not detract from the fact that the goods were, in some cases, sold twice: once by MISEA to Company A and once by Company A to the independent customer. Both MISEA and Company A would expect to make a profit on these sales, and such profit would therefore have to be deducted twice. This is in line with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation which allows adjustments for, amongst other, ‘profits accruing’.

• (119) Second, Nippon Steel claimed that certain dividends related to the product concerned should be included in the SG&A costs. To support this claim, Nippon Steel explained that the relevant amounts for MISEA, MISI, NST and NSC all related to dividends from related companies involved in steel trading. However, the Commission considered these amounts as the redistribution of profit between related entities and as such, not part of SG&A costs. Following final disclosure, Nippon Steel claimed that since those dividends were a return on investments linked to resales of the product concerned by related parties, they should have been taken into account as part of SG&A costs. However, regardless of whether or not these amounts concerned the product concerned, they were paid out between related entities due to investments in such related entities. These amounts could therefore not be considered as part of SG&A, but only as a redistribution of profit between those related entities. Furthermore, and in any event, Nippon Steel did not demonstrate that the dividends were directly linked to the production and sale of the product concerned. The Commission therefore rejected Nippon Steel’s claim.

3.3.5.   Comparison

• (120) Following the imposition of provisional measures, Nippon Steel made three claims with regard to the comparison between the export price and the normal value.

• (121) First, as stated in recital (111), Nippon Steel claimed that the amount for profit of sales through related entities (whether importers in the Union or traders outside the Union) should be deducted only once. However, as noted in recital (112), the company mixed up adjustments made under different factual and legal basis and therefore the claim was rejected, as explained in recitals (113) to (115).

• (122) Nippon Steel claimed that for sales to the Union via unrelated traders, the Commission should add an amount for SG&A costs and profit of those unrelated traders to the CIF prices they themselves had provided to the Commission during the investigation. According to Nippon Steel, the Court of Justice’s judgment in the Hansol case ²³ implied that competition at the EU border takes place at the point of resale to the first independent customer in the Union, not in Japan or elsewhere.

• (123) The Commission noted that this claim was made for the first time only after provisional disclosure while at provisional stage, the company itself had supplied questionnaire replies including an estimated CIF price for Union sales made via unrelated traders. At no point in time did the company propose or request to include in that CIF price the SG&A and profit of the unrelated traders, while the company had ample time to do so. Only after the imposition of provisional measures did Nippon Steel claim adjustments.

• (124) Nevertheless, in view of the specific circumstances of this case and in particular the fact that Nippon Steel also exported to the Union via related traders for which the relevant CIF prices were verified to include SG&A costs and profit, the Commission exceptionally agreed that it would be reasonable to reflect an amount for SG&A costs and profit for the unrelated traders in the CIF prices pertaining to the export transactions made via the unrelated traders concerned. With their submission, Nippon Steel had supplied the non-consolidated financial statements of four of the five unrelated traders involved in Union sales during the investigation period. However, those costs and profits did not cover all traders, while they did include the operations of those traders related to other business and other products than the product concerned. Moreover, the type of costs included in the SG&A for those unrelated traders was not specific enough to avoid double-counting of e.g. transport or other costs. The Commission therefore did not consider these costs and profits as reasonable.

• (125) As an alternative, Nippon Steel had suggested using as a proxy the verified SG&A and profit as reported by the related traders MISI or NST. The Commission considered that the weighted average of the relevant and verified SG&A costs of the related traders MISI and NST would indeed be a reasonable proxy for the unrelated traders’ SG&A. With regard to profit, however, the profit of the related traders was considered unreliable since that profit was affected by the relationship with Nippon Steel.

• (126) The Commission instead considered using a notional profit margin of 2 %, which would be consistent with the profit margin used under Article 2(9) for Union sales via related companies, as explained in the provisional Regulation in recital (119) and Nippon Steel’s specific disclosure at the time of provisional measures. The Commission considered this a reasonable proxy. On this basis, the Commission recalculated the dumping and injury margins.

• (127) After final disclosure, Nippon Steel claimed that the VAT taxes on invoices for export sales through Japanese unrelated traders should not be deducted. According to Nippon Steel, the VAT paid by the unrelated traders to Nippon Steel following a domestic sale to these unrelated traders can be included in the deduction value in the traders’ tax declaration. However, the facts of this case showed that for these sales, Nippon Steel did not export directly to the unrelated EU customer, but via an unrelated domestic trader. Under these circumstances, the approach taken by the Commission was confirmed as any such rebate would be provided to the unrelated trader and not Nippon Steel. No evidence was provided by Nippon Steel showing that this VAT element affected the price with the unrelated trader and no evidence was provided showing that the relevant VAT payments were indeed refunded, deducted or otherwise offset for the export transactions made by the unrelated traders. The Commission therefore did not accept this claim.

• (128) Third, Nippon Steel claimed that the Commission should not deduct credit costs from the export price for the related selling entities in the Union. The Commission accepted this claim.

3.3.6.   Dumping margin

• (129) As described in recitals (120) to (128), following claims from interested parties, the Commission revised the dumping margins.

• (130) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Definitive dumping margin
Nippon Steel Corporation	42,1 %
Tokyo Steel Co. Ltd.	6,9 %
Other cooperating companies: — Daido Steel Co., Ltd. — JFE Steel Corporation	32,6 %
All other imports originating in Japan	42,1 %

3.4.   Vietnam

3.4.1.   Normal value

• (131) Following provisional and final disclosure, the Commission received written comments by EUROFER and Hoa Phat Group.

• (132) EUROFER resubmitted comments on existence of ‘a particular market situation’ in Vietnam, within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation. It argued that the Government of Vietnam provided domestic steel producers with inputs at distorted, artificially low prices, and that therefore, together with the export restrictions on raw material, these distortions justify adjustment of costs in accordance with Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation. To support these arguments, EUROFER first referred to statements in working documents or legislation in Vietnam mentioning a need for development of steel industry and support to domestic steel producers. Secondly, it referred to the existence of export taxes or restrictions on coal, scrap, and iron ore.

• (133) Hoa Phat Group rebutted the arguments by EUROFER arguing that no particular market situation nor raw material distortions existed in Vietnam and that EUROFER brought no additional evidence compared to the information submitted at a complaint stage and before the provisional regulation.

• (134) As concluded in recitals (286) to (287) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission recalled that existence of distortions of the price of the raw material could not be established. Since in Vietnam, the raw material of the quality needed for the production of the product concerned was inexistant or only existed in minor quantities, the exporting producers imported the raw material from several different suppliers and countries. Therefore, it could not be established that raw material prices would be artificially low since the prices of these raw material were not affected by domestic prices and could not be subject to distortions. The claim was thus rejected.

• (135) After the final disclosure, EUROFER reiterated that despite that the production inputs were partially imported into Vietnam, their prices might still be indirectly distorted due to the broader market structure and state interference, export restrictions and duties. The prices might have been as well distorted because of the low priced HRF imported from China, and by the explicit government strategies aiming at promoting and supporting the domestic steel industry. It argued that all these elements indicated that a particular market situation existed in Vietnam. EUROFER as well considered that even if the existence of the ‘particular market situation’ was not confirmed, based on the information available and provided to the Commission by EUROFER, Vietnamese domestic sales prices could not be relied upon for purposes of calculation of the normal value. It therefore requested the Commission to revisit the assessment.