Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1981 of 7 October 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) By Regulation (EU) No 1072/2012 (2), the Eurpean Commission (‘the Commission’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘the PRC’).

(2) By Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 (3), the Council imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, originating in the PRC (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(3) By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1932 (4), the Commission amended the product scope as defined in the original measures, leading to the exclusion of imports of ceramic condiment or spice mills and their ceramic grinding parts, ceramic coffee mills, ceramic knife sharpeners, ceramic sharpeners, ceramic kitchen tools to be used for cutting, grinding, grating, slicing, scraping and peeling, and cordierite ceramic pizza-stones of a kind used for baking pizza or bread following a partial interim review of the product scope.

(4) By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 (5), the Commission re-imposed the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review (the ‘previous expiry review’).

(5) By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 (6), the Commission amended the existing measures pursuant to an anti-circumvention investigation, extending the residual duty rate of 36,1 % to imports declared by 33 companies previously benefiting from reduced duty rates, and repealing their TARIC additional codes.

(6) The individual anti-dumping duty rates currently in force range from 13,1 % to 18,3 %. All non-sampled cooperating exporting producers in the investigation leading to the original measures (‘the original investigation’) received a duty rate of 17,9 % and all other companies are subject to the residual duty rate of 36,1 % (‘the original measures’).

(7) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry (7), the Commission received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(8) The request for review was submitted on 14 April 2024 by Cerame Unie / The European Federation of Ceramic Table and Ornamentalware (‘FEPF’) and an individual Czech company (‘the applicants’) on behalf of the Union industry of ceramic tableware and kitchenware in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(9) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 12 July 2024 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (8) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(10) On 19 December 2024, the Commission initiated a partial interim review concerning imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, originating in the People’s Republic of China, pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation. That partial interim review was requested by Cerame-Unie/The European Federation of Ceramic Table and Ornamentalware (‘FEPF’) and it is limited in scope to the examination of dumping.

(11) The China Chamber of Commerce for Exports and Imports of Light Industrial Products and Art Crafts (‘CCCLA’) submitted comments upon initiation of the expiry review investigation. CCCLA drew attention to the length of time that the initial measures had been in place, since they were first imposed back in 2012. Consequently, in CCCLA’s view, the Union industry had already been benefiting from market protection for almost 12 years, and, should the present expiry review lead to an extension of the measures for another 5-five year period, it would result in nearly 18 years of continuous protection of the Union market from imports of Chinese ceramic tableware and kitchenware. CCCLA made reference to Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’), which states that anti-dumping measures should be terminated after five years unless there is evidence to suggest that they should be continued. CCCLA claimed that an extension of the measures against imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware from China would serve merely a protectionist purpose and would be unwarranted, unlawful and harmful to Union market as a whole.

(12) CCCLA further argued that the Union industry is in a sound state, as confirmed by the Regulation imposing provisional measures, the Regulation extending the measures and the present request for an expiry review investigation, demonstrating that the Union industry has, except for 2010 followed by full-scale economic crisis in the EU, been profitable at a rate of between 2 % and 5 % since 2008. Therefore, there is no injury that needs to be counteracted.

(13) This claim had to be dismissed. The Commission recalls that Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’) and Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation allow for an exception of the five-year expiry rule if it is determined in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.

(14) As regards the situation of the Union industry, the Commission noted that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition by having a positive effect on the state of the Union industry. Even if the Union industry had not suffered material injury in the period considered by the request, one would need to assess whether resulting from the Chinese imports injury may recur if measures would be allowed to lapse. In addition, the Notice of Initiation stated in point 4.2 that the applicants alleged the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury from the PRC. In this respect, the applicants have provided sufficient evidence that, should measures be allowed to lapse, the current import level of the product under review from the country concerned to the Union would likely increase significantly and cause further injury to the Union industry. Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

(16) Finally, the CCCLA pointed to WTO jurisprudence (11) (12) stablishing that investigating authorities must use the product costs actually incurred by producers or exporters for the calculation of constructed normal values. It also argued that WTO jurisprudence supports its claim that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation appears to be inconsistent with Article 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the WTO ADA.

(17) The Commission recalled that its Report constitutes a body of evidence placed on the file of the investigation that the Commission can rely upon to find existence of significant distortions, as provided by Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation. The Report has been published on 21 December 2017 and updated on 10 April 2024, after providing the opportunity for everybody (that is, not only the parties to a particular anti-dumping investigation) to submit comments, rebut, and supplement the evidence contained in the Report. To date, the Commission has received no contribution on the Report questioning the objectivity thereof. Moreover, the CCCLA itself did not provide any specific elements rebutting the evidence or the legal conclusions contained in the Report. Accordingly, it has not been shown why the Report would lack objectivity and the claim that the Report could not be relied on in this investigation was rejected.

(18) The claim that Five-Year Plans are merely guiding documents is already demerited in the ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations’, mentioned above.

(19) The report foresees this argument and considers that ‘However, the fact that the FYPs (or the overarching strategies) do not have a precisely defined status within the Chinese legal order does not […] put in question their binding nature which transpires from other pieces of legislation, such as the Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the PRC. This law unequivocally obliges said authorities to implement the FYPs […].In view of the above, it is apparent that the implementation and reference to higher level plans is resolutely addressed across plans at every level, often in the introductory part or the final chapters of the respective FYPs and other planning documents. This cannot be dismissed as simply aspirational language since the implementation of plans is mandated by law, including by the Constitution. In addition, the implementation and fulfilment of targets set by various plans are regularly monitored and evaluated […]’ (13) .

(20) With regard to point (c) and to the further claims related to the compliance of the normal value construction with WTO jurisprudence, the Commission noted that, in the case at hand, the Commission had applied the relevant rules contained in Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission considered that the provision of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation is fully consistent with the European Union’s WTO obligations and the jurisprudence. Indeed, the existence of significant distortions renders costs and prices in the exporting country inappropriate for the construction of normal value. In these circumstances, Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation envisages the construction of costs of production and sale on the basis of undistorted prices or benchmarks, including those in an appropriate representative country with a similar level of development as the exporting country. As explicitly clarified by the Appellate Body in DS473 (14), WTO law permits the use of data from a third country, duly adjusted when such adjustment is necessary and substantiated. The Commission recalled in this connection that once it is determined that due to the existence of significant distortions in the exporting country in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country, the normal value is constructed by reference to undistorted prices or benchmarks in an appropriate representative country for each exporting producer according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. The same provision of the basic Regulation also allows the use of domestic costs if they are positively established not to be distorted. In that context, the exporting producers had the possibility to provide evidence that their individual costs were undistorted. However, no positive evidence as to the factors of production of individual exporting producers being undistorted was submitted.

(21) On the construction of the Normal Value proposed in the expiry review request, CCCLA argued that by disclosing cost structure and prices in ranges, the applicants were infringing CCCLA’s right of defence and not complying with WTO practice. Additionally, the CCCLA claimed that the level of SG & A costs and profit found by the applicants proved that the constructed normal value (‘CNV’) established in the expiry review request cannot be compared to the price of sales by Chinese producers/exporters.

(23) Therefore, the CCCLA qualified the applicants’ approach as unacceptable, and argues that the data used in the dumping margin assessment section of the review request should not have been accepted by the Commission.

(24) Regarding the CCCLA’s right to defence, the Commission considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided under confidential cover to let the interested parties exercise their right of defence throughout the proceeding. These summaries were therefore sufficiently detailed to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence pursuant to Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation.

(25) It is further recalled that Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation and Article 6(5) of the WTO ADA allow for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person has acquired the information. The information provided under confidential cover falls under these categories. Therefore, the bracketing of relevant numerical data was considered appropriate and sufficient to ensure the right to defence of interested parties. Consequently, this claim was rejected.

(26) As regards the level of SG & A costs and profit employed in the construction of the Normal value in the expiry review request, the CCCLA provided no explanation as to why this would render the comparison of the CNV and the export price of the product concerned from China unrepresentative. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(27) Finally, concerning the claims that the use of a single product type for the construction of the normal value of the product concerned in the complaint was intolerable and should have not been accepted by the Commission, it is recalled that, according to Article 5(3) of the basic Regulation, the Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the complaint, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. In this context, the Commission reminded the CCCLA that complainants are not subject to the same standard of proof as the Commission is during an investigation. Moreover, the applicants cannot be required to use information that is not available to them. In this case, the Commission analysed the expiry review request thoroughly and confirmed that sufficient evidence of a likelihood of dumping and injury existed to justify the initiation of an expiry review. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(28) The investigation of a continuation of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation of recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2020 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(29) CCCLA criticised the selection of both the period considered and the RIP as it would not meet the legal standard prescribed by Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation and strongly distorts potential findings by pushing them towards positive determinations on dumping and injury recurrence due to two main factors.

(30) Firstly, setting the RIP from the first to the fourth quarter of 2023 would be unacceptably distant, given that the request for a review investigation was lodged on 27 May 2024, and proceedings were initiated on 12 July. Furthermore, using 2020 as a benchmark for analysing import trends and the current state of the Union industry would produce a distorted picture due to the heavy impact of the administrative measures adopted in response to the pandemic in 2020, and would impede an objective examination of this case based on positive evidence. The CCCLA concluded that the applicants should have been invited to resubmit the request based on a non-distorted period considered, i.e. as of 1 January 2019, excluding the year 2020, with the end date as close as possible to the initiation date.

(31) In determining the investigation period, the Commission’s general approach aligns with Article 6(1), second subparagraph of the basic Regulation (applicable to reviews pursuant to Article 11(5), first subparagraph of the basic Regulation), which states that the ‘investigation period shall be selected which in the case of dumping shall, normally, cover a period of no less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of proceedings’. In the present review, by contrast to a normal case, exceptional circumstances had to be taken into account in view of the Union industry’s composition, which is high fragmented, with a very high proportion of SMEs. In order to ensure access to this trade defence instrument for such a diverse and fragmented industry, the Commission used the last full calendar year preceding the year in which the investigation was initiated. It is common practice for small and medium-sized enterprises to have a financial year that corresponds to the calendar year. By letting the review investigation period coincide with the calendar year, and consequently with the financial year, as set out in Article 6(9), last sentence of the basic Regulation, the Commission sought to reduce the burden on SMEs in providing information in the investigation. CCCLA’s claim was therefore rejected.

(32) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to participate in the investigation. In particular, it advised the following parties of the initiation of the expiry review: the applicants, the known producers in the Union and their relevant associations, the known exporting producers in the PRC, the known unrelated importers in the Union and the authorities of the PRC.

(33) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(34) The Commission received, together with the request for review dated 14 April 2024, a request for anonymity from six Union producers supporting the expiry review request. All those who requested anonymity brought forward their reasoning for not revealing their identity. The companies claimed concerns of retaliation from their customers in China, as well as indirectly from Chinese competitors through the customers and distributors they have in common in the European Union and in other parts of the world. To avoid risk of retaliation from private Chinese actors, which could potentially have a severe negative impact on their business activities, the companies requested the Commission to keep their identity confidential.

(35) The Commission assessed these requests, and the supporting evidence provided. The Commission concluded that indeed the alleged risk of retaliation exists and, on this basis, granted confidential treatment to the identity of the companies in question (15).

(36) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.