Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2333 of 19 November 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of hardwood plywood originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (110) The Commission found the claim of Jiangshan Wood unsubstantiated. The HS code 4408 90 used to determine the benchmark is a basket of other types of plywood and the range that was applied was used only as a proxy to identify imports of eucalyptus veneer within this basket code more specifically. The Commission considered that this method was reasonable and that, given the available information and despite that it could not distinguish between the qualities of the veneer, it reflected in the most accurate way the price of the eucalyptus veneer.

• (111) Furthermore, the Commission found that the request of Jiangshan Wood to disclose the confidential invoices as unsubstantiated. The invoices themselves were not used to determine the benchmarks. It was only used as a proxy to determine a price range for eucalyptus veneers, and that is why the Commission did not consider that disclosing the confidential invoices would allow Jiangshan Wood to substantiate its claim in more detailed way. In addition, the Commission provided a very detailed explanation of its method in the General Disclosure Document in recitals (67) and (72), and it provided additional summary information containing all the details on the nature of the eucalyptus veneer, and the relevant prices, at the request of Jiangshan Wood, by email of 15 October 2025.

• (112) Finally, the Commission found the claim of Jiangshan Wood that it used only low-quality eucalyptus core veneer in their production as unsubstantiated. To the contrary, the company’s purchase invoices for eucalyptus veneer indicated a quality ‘grade 1’ or ‘first grade’ which suggested that the purchased veneer was of a superior quality. Also, the reference did not allow to determine if the purchased veneer was core and face veneer, despite that the company claimed that all the face veneers were self-produced. The Commission could not thus ascertain the claim that Jiangshan Wood only purchased low quality core veneer.

• (113) The Commission thus rejected the argument that only the lower priced eucalyptus veneer should be used. Also, the Commission did not consider that by not disclosing additional information on the confidential invoices, rights of defence of Jiangshan Wood were breached. The Commission thus rejected the claim.

Flour

• (114) Following provisional disclosure, Jiangshan Wood resubmitted that the Turkish flour market and thus the flour prices were overall distorted and inflated because of the various measures adopted by the Turkish Grain Office affecting the import/export of flour of wheat. It argued that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation provided for establishing costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmark, and the Commission as well assessed an existence of market distortions when establishing the benchmark. In its view, an undistorted benchmark could be the average import price of flour into the other upper middle-income countries, which is 3,9 CNY/kg without import tariffs or 4,45 CNY/kg with applicable customs tariffs.

• (115) The complainant submitted that the comments of Jiangshan Wood related to wheat grain but not to wheat flour. It also argued that the licencing and inspection requirement were standard requirements for health safety reasons requires for all agricultural products.

• (116) The Commission confirmed that the said restrictions indeed related to imports of flour grains and not to the wheat flour itself. As mentioned in recital (213) of the provisional Regulation, the quantity of flour imported into Türkiye was significant and there was a demand for flour at prices that included the duties. Therefore, it maintained that the prices were representative of a market price.

3.2.4.2.   Labour

• (117) In the absence of comments regarding labour, the Commission confirmed recital (223) of the provisional Regulation.

3.2.4.3.   Electricity

• (118) In the absence of comments regarding electricity, the Commission confirmed recital (224) of the provisional Regulation.

3.2.4.4.   Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A profits and depreciation

• (119) As explained in in recital (228) of the provisional Regulation, when establishing the benchmarks for SG&A and profit, the Commission used the Turkish government’s data of the average operating expenses and operating profit of the companies published by the Central Bank of Türkiye on the financial results of the 3 121 companies with activities in the sector of wood products, cork, straw and plaiting materials manufacturing (NACE – C-162).

• (120) Following provisional disclosure, the complainant submitted that the data was not appropriate, since it covered a too broad sector and that it did not reflect the real operating expenses and profitability of plywood industry in Türkiye. It argued that the NACE code C162 included production of other wood-based products such as carpentry and joinery, wood flooring, wood containers, plaiting materials etc., and that the relevant subcategory C162-1 Manufacture of veneer sheet sand wood-based panels was not available. It argued that the plywood segment within the category only represented 2 %, and that it was dominated by the wood-based panels industry such as producers of particleboards and MDF. It submitted that plywood products were the most sophisticated and premium products among all wood-based products and that since the aggregated NACE code comprised mostly other productions, it was not appropriate to determine the SG&A and profit of the plywood sector. It also argued that the database included almost exclusively data of micro or small companies, but that plywood is produced by medium-sized companies. It further submitted that more than 3 000 companies that were considered were loss making which made the use of the macroeconomic data not applicable. The complainant further submitted that the used data related to the period of 2022 and that thus did not reflect the situation of the companies in the IP.

• (121) The complainant submitted financial data of 2024 of a company Pelit Arslan Kontrplak Fabrikasi Anonim Sirketi (‘Pelit Arslan’), available from Dun&Bradstreet Finance Analytics database [^ntr75-L_202502333EN.000101-E0075]. According to the financial report, SG&A expenses in 2024 were 21,6 % of the costs of the good sold, and the profit before tax was 23,6 %. In its view, these indicators were conservative since the company demonstrated even higher level of SG&A and profit in the previous years. In its view, the proposed level of SG&A remained largely in line with the SG&A identified by the Commission whereas the higher profit was clearly more representative of the plywood sector since it was a premium wood-based product compared to other wood panels. On this basis the complainant requested the Commission to revise the approach and to use the data of Pelit Arslan as a benchmark for SG&A and profit.

• (122) Jiangshan Wood submitted that it did not object the use of the Turkish government’s data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye, proposed by the Commission. It submitted that the report from the data indicated that the SG&A contained distribution expenses which should be excluded from the construction of normal value. It therefore argued that the Commission should exclude the distribution expenses based on a reasonable ratio, based on either data of Union producers or based on financial information submitted by the unrelated trader Pizhou Ouyme Import and Export Trade Co. Ltd (‘Pizhou Ouyme’) which showed that the direct selling expenses in its total SG&A represented 62 % of the total SG&A.

• (123) As a rebuttal to the arguments submitted by Jiangshan Wood, the complainant argued that it was not clear what types of expenses were included in this category, and that the general ‘distribution expenses’ category could also (or exclusively) refer to costs associated with making a product or service available to the customers, such as packaging, marketing, sales, storage and warehousing, orders management, customer services, etc. It also argued that the financial data of the Union producers did not include any breakdown of the SG&A expenses into individual categories, thus, not allowing to make adjustments and that likewise, the share of individual cost items within the ‘distribution expenses’ category of the Chinese trader was equally not applicable nor reliable due to distortions found by the Commission in China for this product and industry. Finally, it argued such an adjustment was not done by the Commission in previous investigations.

• (124) As a rebuttal to the complainant’s comments, Jiangshan Wood requested the Commission to disregard the financial data of Pelit Arslan since it argued that without having access to the data, it could not check the accuracy of the calculations nor assess the reliability of the data for the construction of the normal value and that this would not be rectified with a meaningful summary of the data (for example in ranges) since the SG&A and profit must be accurate percentages. It pointed out that the financial data submitted in the context of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation to be ‘readily available’, and copy-right free. It gave example of cases where data was rejected from being used due to the fact that it could not be placed on the open file for copyright infringement reasons.

• (125) The Commission recalled that at provisional stage, recent data of any Turkish company was not available, and therefore, the database that was used constituted the best available proxy to establish a reasonable SG&A and profit. Data of a company producing the hardwood plywood, as submitted by the complainant, was however a more reasonable basis to determine SG&A and profit, than a database that gathers data of a much broader sector. Also, based on the detailed financial reports of this company submitted by the complainant, the Commission could verify that the percentages of SG&A and profit were accurately established. The reports were directly available, against a small fee, on a public website (https://www.informa.es/en). The Commission thus concluded that the data of Pelit Arslan could be used to establish a reasonable SG&A and profit and, hence, were in compliance with Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

Claims on the use of data of Pelit Arslan after the final disclosure

• (126) After the final disclosure, Jiangshan Wood considered that the Commission must revert to using the financial data at the sectorial level and must not include selling expenses when constructing the normal value. It found it unacceptable that the amount for SG&A and profit that was initially deemed reasonable were replaced by in its view non-readily available financial data of Pelit Arslan. It submitted that it was not possible to obtain the report through the website nor was it possible through the general website of Dun&Bradstreet. It further argued that since the Commission obtained the report through the complainant, it could not be ascertained that it was accurate. Jiangshan Wood further argued that the summary provided by the Commission did not allow to assess individual items in the financial statements that were used to calculate the SG&A and the profit. It considered that the Commission’s failure to provide a meaningful summary violated its rights of defence, and it also referred to an investigation concerning certain polyvinyl alcohols and the linked Court case where the Court stated that parties should be ‘in a position during the administrative procedure in which they could effectively make known their views on the correctness and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the evidence presented by the Commission in support of its allegation concerning the existence of dumping and the resultant injury’ [^ntr76-L_202502333EN.000101-E0076].

• (127) As a rebuttal, the complainant submitted that the allegations of Jiangshan Wood that the financial statements could not be obtained were misleading and unfounded. It pointed out that it could be verified through a quick online search that according to the website, the web portal Informa.es provided online access to the Dun&Bradsheet. Data cloud which gathers Financial and Marketing information from more than 600 million companies online all over the world [^ntr77-L_202502333EN.000101-E0077]. To further prove that the financial report is and remained readily available, the complainants re-purchased it again through Informa.es on 9 October 2025 and it submitted the data to the Commission.

• (128) The complainant moreover considered that the reference to the case law by Jiangshan Wood was misleading. In the investigation on polyvinyl alcohols from China, the Commission stated that ‘[A]ccording to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the data does not have to be “publicly available” but “readily available”, and that “publicly available”meant available to the public at large whereas “readily available” meant available to everybody, provided that certain conditions, like a payment of a fee, have been fulfilled’ [^ntr78-L_202502333EN.000101-E0078]. It further pointed out that this finding was ultimately upheld by a final ruling of the General Court in Case T-763/20, and that the General Court also confirmed in that judgment that the Commission was entitled to accept confidential data, provided that a non-confidential summary was submitted [^ntr79-L_202502333EN.000101-E0079]. The complainant pointed out that a non-confidential summary of the financial statement was duly provided and placed in the public file.

• (129) PTIA submitted that it was not able to obtain the financial reports from the website https://www.informa.es/en but that it was able to obtain it from other sources. It indicated that based on the statements from other sources, the pre-tax profit was 17 % and not 23,6 % as indicated by the Commission.

• (130) Saintland Wood submitted that it had a difficulty to access the data of Pelit Arslan due to what appeared a technical flaw in the website’s login process, which prevented it from registering, and therefore, from preparing and submitting an effective and timely submission. It requested the Commission to provide clear, step-by-step instructions or an alternative method to access the data.

• (131) The Commission referred to recital (52) of the General Disclosure Document which mentioned that detailed financial statements of Pelit Arslan were available from Dun&Bradstreet Finance Analytics database. In the recital, the Commission further pointed to the webpage informa.es, a provider of international reports of Dun&Bradstreet [^ntr80-L_202502333EN.000101-E0080] in Spain. The Commission confirmed that the financial information related the company Pelit Arslan was readily available and easily accessible through the Dun&Bradstreet webpage which provides data through its international partners. The financial reports of Pelit Arslan could be directly bought, without a registration, against a fee [^ntr81-L_202502333EN.000101-E0081]. Since the data was readily available through the above webpages, the Commission did not consider it necessary to provide any ‘step by step’ indication as requested by Saintland Wood.

• (132) The Commission furthermore pointed out that a non-confidential summary of the data was provided at the final disclosure. Although the non-confidential summary did not allow parties to identify detailed confidential information, the summary was in the Commission’s view sufficient to provide the parties with the information on which data was used. Since the detailed report was readily available, the Commission as well did not consider that the rights of defence of any party were breached - any party including Jiangshan Wood could obtain and verify the detailed data against a reasonable fee, as did PTIA. Moreover, the claim of Jiangshan Wood that it could not identify the individual items such as selling costs to be deducted was unsubstantiated – as concluded below the claim that the selling expenses had to be deducted from the benchmark was rejected, as detailed below in next section.

• (133) With regard the claim of PTIA that the profit was 17 %, the Commission confirmed that its calculation of the benchmark for the profit margin of the representative company Pelit Arslan, was correctly calculated as the amount of profit before taxes expressed as a share in the value of cost of goods sold by the company, as explained in Section 3.2.4.4 of this Regulation, and that the profit before tax was 23,6 %.

Claims on selling expenses after the final disclosure

• (134) Jiangshan Wood further argued that the Commission must distinguish and separate the selling expenses from the other general and administrative expenses since Jiangshan Wood did not incur any such expenses and had not reported them to the Commission. This was in its view essential since the inclusion of selling and distribution costs (i.e. transport, handling and packaging) within the SG&A costs would lead to the constructed normal value not being ex works.

• (135) To rebut the argument by Jiangshan Wood, the complainant referred to a ruling of the General Court in Case T-263/22, which mentions that ‘although the practice of making adjustments may prove to be necessary, under Article 2(10) of the basic regulation, to take account of differences between the export price and the normal value which affect their comparability, such deductions cannot be made with respect to a value which has been constructed [under Article 2(6a)] and which is not, therefore, genuine. That value is not generally affected by factors which might damage its comparability, because it has been artificially established’ [^ntr82-L_202502333EN.000101-E0082].

• (136) The complainant thus argued that the normal value was constructed in view of the structural distortions in the wood-processing segment in China, making the normal value not ‘genuine’ and thus not prone to factors that would affect its comparability with the export price. It pointed out that according to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, ‘[t]he constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’, and that this provision clearly and unequivocally required considering selling costs when constructing the normal value under said provision. The fact that Jiangshan Wood ‘does not incur any selling expenses’ in no way changes the fact that the constructed normal value should include the selling expenses. To do otherwise, the Commission would deflate (underestimate) the constructed normal value, in clear breach of the basic Regulation.

• (137) The Commission found the claim of Jiangshan Wood unsubstantiated. Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation refers to a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profit, since these are the costs normally borne by each company, including companies like Jiangshan Wood selling through traders. Furthermore, making deductions from the undistorted amount of SG&A costs from a producer based in a representative country to reflect actual costs of Jiangshan Wood would go against the purpose to establish the undistorted costs of a company. Finally, the fact that Jiangshan Wood itself did not report any selling expenses to the Commission did not constitute evidence that there were not any - in general, the accounting system of the company did not allow to identify costs in a detailed way. At the verification visit of the company, the Commission services visited a sales department and met a sales manager which in itself was an indication that the company incurred selling costs. The Commission thus rejected the claim.

Claims on the relevance of using data of Pelit Arslan to establish a benchmark for SG&A costs and profit after the final disclosure

• (138) PTIA furthermore considered that the sectorial data was a more appropriate benchmark to establish the SG&A and profit because it reflected the fact that the Chinese plywood industry was composed of SMEs and was highly fragmented. It further argued that should the Commission use the sectorial data, the financial indicators to be taken into account should reflect the fact that the financing costs for the extraordinary inflation and borrowing costs which are abnormally high in Türkiye, with an interest rate of 45 % in the investigation period, and that it should also deduct distribution costs in case Jiangshan Wood did not incur these costs. PTIA resubmitted similar claims in its submission of 16 October 2025. It argued that contrary to the complainants’ claims, the sectorial data was available not only for 2022 but also for 2024, and that some plywood could be cheaper than better quality MDF or floor products.

• (139) PTIA further considered that 45,2 % of the SG&A and profit was not reasonable as being excessively high and distorted by hyperinflation, currency devaluation and high borrowing costs in Türkiye, and it requested the Commission to revise it downwards. PTIA requested the Commission to use other countries’ financing cost ratio as a proxy and it proposed a proxy of 6 %.

• (140) PTIA as well submitted that according to a statement on its website [^ntr83-L_202502333EN.000101-E0083], Pelit Arslan also produces other types of products, and that therefore, the financial statements of this company necessarily included data from other business units. It also referred to two other websites related to companies within the same group mentioning other products [^ntr84-L_202502333EN.000101-E0084]. PTIA as well argued that the company was using Russian and Vietnamese plywood.

• (141) PTIA also argued that the data of this company was rejected in an investigation on multilayered wood flooring where it was considered to be excessively high and therefore not representative [^ntr85-L_202502333EN.000101-E0085].

• (142) To rebut the arguments of PTIA, the complainant submitted that Pelit Arslan was indeed part of the larger Turanlar Group but that Pelit Arslan is a producer of plywood within the group. The products mentioned by PTIA were not produced by Pelit Arslan but by other related companies within the group such as PeliParke (wood flooring, wall panels, skirtings, etc.) [^ntr86-L_202502333EN.000101-E0086] or Vezirköprü Orman Ürünleri Ve Kağit San. A.Ş. (MDF, laminate flooring, other light and wall panels, paper products, etc.) [^ntr87-L_202502333EN.000101-E0087]. It argued that the financial report of Pelit Arslan was company specific and not a consolidated one representing data of the group, and the fact that the financial results related to the plywood business was specified on the report itself.

• (143) The complainant furthermore submitted that using the data of Pelit Arslan was a more reasonable and more reliable benchmark and that it better reflected the conditions of the product concerned in the representative country, instead of consolidated data of a much broader sector. It argued that the established level of SG&A was largely in line with the SG&A ratio of 16,1 % based on Turkish government’s data for the wood processing industry which is in fact a representative level for wider industries and not only the plywood segment. Concerning the profit ratio of 23,6 % the complainant pointed out that it must be considered reasonable on account of the premium nature of hardwood plywood panels compared to other wood-based panels such us MDF or OSB, as well as other wood products.

• (144) First, the Commission rejected the claim that it should revert to sectorial data. Even if the data was available for 2022, the Commission concluded that it contained data of companies of a larger sector. It was explained in detail in recital (84) of the General Disclosure Document that this data was initially used because of an absence of a more accurate information. Financial data of a company producing the product concerned constituted in its view a better proxy to establish the benchmark. The Commission found the claim that the financial data of the company Pelit Arslan should be rejected in the current investigation since it was not deemed appropriate in the investigation on multilayered wood flooring to be unfounded – the investigation on multilayered wood flooring related to data for financial year of 2023, and therefore, not to data of 2024, which was considered in the present investigation.

• (145) Second, the Commission found the claim of PTIA that Pelit Arslan produced different products unsubstantiated. As indicated by the complainant, the websites that PTIA mentioned in its submission related to the activities of the group to which Pelit Arslan belongs and to other companies in the group. The fact that the financial reports relate to the production of plywood is also mentioned in the financial statements provided by Dun&Bradstreet database.

• (146) The Commission also found PTIA’s claim on the level of profit and SG&A unsubstantiated. As indicated by the complainant, it was largely in line with the sectorial data which included the production of in general lower value products. The fact that some plywood could be cheaper than other wood products was a general claim, and it did not evidence in itself that the indicated benchmarks were excessively high. The claim was thus rejected.

• (147) With regard to the claim on the high financial costs in Türkiye, the Commission pointed out that any such costs were not considered. The claim was thus rejected.

Conclusion

• (148) The Commission thus maintained that the financial data of Pelit Arslan constituted an appropriate benchmark to establish the level of SG&A and profit.

3.2.4.5.   Calculation

• (149) Following the provisional disclosure, Jiangshan Wood submitted that the Commission double counted the transport costs, since when establishing the benchmark for factors of production, the costs such as the domestic freight in the exporting countries as well as ocean freight and insurance were included, and that the Commission also added transport costs in the recalculated costs of manufacturing.

• (150) Jiangshan Wood also argued that, should the Commission add the transport costs, it should add the actual reported transport costs, instead of increasing the values by the ratio of the transport costs on the actual purchase value of the input reported by Jiangshan Wood. It argued that these costs were deemed reliable by the Commission since the Commission as well used data of a Chinese trader Pizhou Ouyme to establish the CIF value. It considered that the provisional Regulation did not demonstrate that transport costs in China were significantly distorted within the meaning of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, and thus, if the Commission would add the transport costs on top of the cost of the benchmark, it should use the actual transport costs.

• (151) The Commission clarified that the transport costs that were added to the benchmark price were the transport costs at CIF or FOB level, hence included costs of the delivery to the border of a representative country. However, these costs did not include inland freight. Since, under the methodology applied under Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, the normal value should reflect the undistorted price of the raw materials in the representative country, in this case Türkiye, it should therefore reflect the price that a producer would pay in Türkiye for a raw material delivered at the factory gate. Therefore, the Commission added the inland transport costs of the raw material to the benchmark value. Therefore, the transport costs were not double counted; the benchmark comprised transport costs to the border of the representative country and the transport costs added when constructing the normal value were inland costs.

• (152) The Commission further clarified that the transport cost, as reported by Jiangshan wood, were used as the percentage of the transport costs of the actual purchase value of the input reported by Jiangshan Wood, as explained in recital (222) of the provisional Regulation. The investigation already established the existence of significant distortions in China and their systemic nature. The Commission considered that distortions equally affected transport costs. Accordingly, the ratio between the exporting producer’s raw material and the reported transport costs could be reasonably used as an indication to estimate the undistorted transport costs of raw materials when delivered to the company’s factory. The Commission thus rejected the claim that it should use the actual transport costs.

• (153) In the absence of other comments regarding calculation issues, the Commission confirmed recital (224) of the provisional Regulation.

3.3.   Export price

• (154) In the absence of other comments regarding the calculation of the export price, the Commission confirmed recital (235) of the provisional Regulation.

3.4.   Comparison

• (155) As explained in recitals (236) to (237) of the provisional Regulation, the CIF value established to be used as a denominator for the dumping calculations was based on the ex-works price of Jiangshan Wood to which the Commission added sea freight costs, as well as the SG&A and profit of an unrelated trader. As explained in the provisional Regulation (recital (237)), to establish these adjustments to arrive from the ex-works price to the CIF value, the Commission relied on publicly available information (Drewry World Container Index) in case of sea freight, and on the financial report of one of the unrelated traders provided by Jiangshan Wood.

• (156) The Commission invited the unrelated traders of Jiangshan Wood to cooperate to provide their actual data on sea freight costs, the SG&A and profit. Data was provided by the following five traders: Jiangsu Sainty Land-up Pro-trading Co., Ltd, Lianyungang Yuantai International Co., Ltd., Pizhou Ouyme Import & Export Trade Co., Ltd., Sumec International Technology Co., Ltd. and Shanghai Fanhong Commerce Co., Ltd. The analysis of the information provided by the traders corresponded to the costs established by the Commission at provisional stage. The Commission therefore confirmed the CIF values, as determined in the provisional disclosure.

• (157) Following the provisional disclosure, Jianghan Wood submitted that a more appropriate benchmark to establish the CIF values would be to calculate a markup amount for the traders’ involvement based on their data. It argued that this was because it was not clear under which incoterms the traders and more specifically Pizhou Oyeme sold the product concerned to the Union.

• (158) The Commission clarified that the costs of the traders involved between the ex-works price of Jianghan Wood were established based on information by the traders covering almost 90 % of the sales volume and value of Jiangshan Wood to the Union, and that it took into account the different incoterms. This methodology was thus considered accurate and reliable. The claim was thus rejected.

• (159) In the absence of other comments, the Commission confirmed recitals (236) to (237) of the provisional Regulation.

3.5.   Dumping margins

3.5.1.   Individual dumping margin for Jiangshan Wood

• (160) Following claims from interested parties as detailed in Section 3, the Commission revised the individual dumping margin for Jiangshan Wood. The definitive dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, is as follows:

Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
Pizhou Jiangshan Wood Co., Ltd	43,3

3.5.2.   Dumping margin for all other imports

3.5.2.1.   Method to calculate the dumping margin for all other imports

• (161) As mentioned in Section 1.7, the association of exporting producers, CEP and CNFPIA contested the decision to abandon the sampling and the fact that the Commission established consequently only one margin for all imports, with the exception of Jiangshan Wood that received an individual dumping margin. These parties requested the Commission to recalculate the residual duty rate based solely on the dumping margin of Jiangshan Wood. CNFPIA submitted in particular that it was unfair and unreasonable that non-sampled exporting producers, which timely filed sampling forms have the same duty as non-cooperating companies. In its view, the non-sampled exporting producers, which timely filed sampling forms should have got the same anti-dumping duty of Jiangshan Wood. It resubmitted the same claim after the final disclosure. CNFPIA also requested the Commission to disclose the list of non-sampled exporting producers, which timely filed sampling forms, and to disclose the detailed calculation of duty for ‘All other imports’ so that it could comment. After final disclosure, the PTIA also submitted that any company that completed the sampling form should be mentioned in a separate annex otherwise its rights of defence to challenge the Commission’s findings before the EU courts are negatively affected.

• (162) The Commission recalled that the objective of not establishing the residual duty based on the dumping margin of the only cooperating party of the initially sampled parties was not to penalise the cooperating non-sampled companies, but rather to establish a duty based on the best available data, given the lack of cooperation from the initially sampled companies. The Commission disagreed that the duty rate for the non-sampled cooperating producers should have been established based on duty rate for Jiangshan Wood. Establishing the dumping margin for all the imports solely on data of one company may not have resulted in a representative dumping margin, since in this specific case, Jiangshan Wood’s exports to the Union only amounted to some 5 % of all the exports to the Union. This is different from a situation where dumping margin for cooperating non-sampled companies is based on a sample which is sufficiently representative. In this case the sampling was abandoned, and hence no sampled average duty for cooperating non-sampled companies could be calculated.

• (163) The Commission further recalled that, as regards the export price, the residual duty was already based on the data of all exporting producers as export prices were based on Eurostat statistics. As regards the normal value, data of Jiangshan was used. Therefore, the Commission considered this as a reasonable and accurate method to calculate the residual duty rate and thus rejected the claim.

• (164) With regard the request to disclose the list of non-sampled cooperating companies, the Commission recalled that sampling replies of the companies could be consulted in the open file. The list of the companies would only be part of a Regulation in case these companies obtain an individual TARIC code and duty rate, which was not the case. Furthermore, the fact that the companies were not listed in a separate annex did not affect the right of the companies to challenge the Commission’s findings in the Union Courts. The Commission thus disagreed that it should do a specific disclosure of a list of non-sampled cooperating producers.

• (165) With regard to the calculations, the Commission considered these could not be disclosed, since the calculations were based on the normal value of Jiangshan Wood. Disclosure would therefore reveal confidential data of the company. The Commission however stressed that the method as to how the duty level for all other imports was established was sufficiently detailed in Section 3.5 of the provisional Regulation, which allowed the parties to make comments. The Commission thus rejected the claim that a detailed calculation of duty for all other imports should have been disclosed.

• (166) Following the final disclosure, Saintland Wood submitted that it was not reasonable to establish two levels of the anti-dumping duty, one for Jiangshan Wood, and a second one for all other companies, and that the Commission should rather consider that the non-cooperating companies behaved as Jiangshan Wood. It mentioned that despite some companies were not unwilling to cooperate, they became subject to punitive measures.

• (167) The Commission first recalled that the residual duty was not set to have an unfair effect. In case of non-cooperation, the Commission had no other choice than to base its findings on ‘facts available’ and that in this particular case, the duty reflected the export price of all non-cooperating producers, and therefore, the method more accurately reflected the behaviour on the non-cooperating producers than if the duty was based solely on data of Jiangshan Wood. The Commission recalled that this was explained in detail above in Section 1.6.2. The claim was thus rejected.

3.5.2.2.   Comments on the level of the dumping margin and export price determination

• (168) The complainant claimed that both the dumping margin of Jiangshan Wood, as well as for the other producers in China, was very low, considering the market distortions found in China in the plywood industry, and the very low pricing levels widely available for the Chinese imports in the Union. It argued that the dumping margins were also much lower compared to the injury elimination levels found by the Commission. Therefore, the levels of the provisional duties were not sufficient to level the playing field and allow the Union producers to recover from the material injury. The complainant also argued that, in view of the very low level of cooperation by the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission should apply the wide margin of discretion it enjoys in trade defence cases and apply the highest possible anti-dumping duty for all other non-cooperating Chinese producers.

• (169) The complainant also argued that, based on the information in the open file (such as sampling form or notes on factors of production), Jiangshan Wood exports predominantly poplar, which was the cheapest hardwood plywood by far compared to other types of plywood. It pointed out to the fact that the export price was mainly determined based on all imports to the Union including cheaper poplar plywood but also more expensive, eucalyptus and birch plywood. The complainant submitted the price differences based on Eurostat data demonstrating the price difference. It therefore requested the Commission to change the approach by adjusting the export price and by using solely the export price for poplar plywood, since it considered that this method would better reflect the dumping behaviour of the non-cooperating exporters.

• (170) Contrary to the complainant’s allegations, Jiangshan Wood exported to the Union not only poplar but also other more expensive types of plywood such as eucalyptus and birch. It was thus not justified to base the export price solely on the exports of poplar plywood, since other more expensive types of plywood represented a sufficient share within the exports of Jiangshan Wood. These shares of poplar wood and other more expensive types exported by Jiangshan Wood were comparable to shares in the overall imports of hardwood plywood into the Union from the PRC, which confirmed that the use of Eurostat statistics to establish the export price in this case was reasonable and accurate. The Commission thus maintained that the method it used to establish the dumping margin for all other imports did not lead to any asymmetry and was accurate and reasonable. The Commission thus rejected the claim.

3.5.2.3.   Definitive dumping margin for all other imports

• (171) Following the revision of the normal value of Jiangshan Wood as detailed in Section 3.2, the definitive dumping margin for all other imports, expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, is as follows:

	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
All other imports	86,8

4. INJURY

• (172) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA pointed out that the Commission relied on data from a macro questionnaire by the European Panel Federation (‘EPF’) in recital (247) of the provisional Regulation without mentioning the sources of the data.

• (173) The Commission referred the PTIA to the public version of the macro questionnaire reply [^ntr88-L_202502333EN.000101-E0088] which itself refers to confidential information from EPF. The questionnaire reply of the EPF was verified and the report was available in the public file [^ntr89-L_202502333EN.000101-E0089].

• (174) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA requested the Commission to clearly indicate which companies were included under the term ‘Complainant’.

• (175) The Commission defined the term ‘Complainant’ in recital (2) of the provisional Regulation.

• (176) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that the injury analysis was flawed because it did not contain an analysis per hardwood species.

• (177) The claim was rejected on the grounds that in view of the definition of the product concerned, see recitals (45) and (46) of the provisional Regulation, a separate injury analysis for each different species was not warranted. Furthermore, the main species, i.e. poplar, birch and eucalyptus, were examined, both in the injury and the dumping analysis.

• (178) After the final disclosure, the PTIA reiterated that it had been prevented from a thorough and meaningful analysis of the complaint due to excessive and unjustified confidential treatment. The aggregation of injury indicators for the nine complainants was unjustified, allowing the PTIA to see the trends but preventing verification of data in individual years or checking injury indicators for consistency. The PTIA submitted that the objective legal standard for confidential treatment of injury indicators was not met.

• (179) The Commission confirmed its findings in recital (13). The complaint included sufficient evidence on injury factors, as was reasonably available. The disclosure of this data in the open file in an aggregated format struck an adequate balance between the right of the complainant for confidential treatment of information and the right of defence of interested parties. The data allowed for an analysis of the trends in injury indicators providing sufficient evidence for a prima facie determination of injury at initiation. The Commission noted that its positive prima facie determination of the existence of injury at initiation was confirmed at both provisional and definitive stage of the investigation.

• (180) After the final disclosure, the PTIA submitted that in case the Commission continued to consider that the product definition was correct and consistent with the birch plywood from Russia case, a segmented injury analysis should be conducted.

• (181) The Commission rejected the argument because the PTIA did not define the precise segments that were meant to be analysed separately, nor did it supply evidence of their existence and the clear dividing lines between them. In this respect, a reference to the ruling of the Court in the birch plywood from Russia case that distinguished poplar, birch and beech as wood species used for the face veneer was not considered sufficient or precise enough. In addition, the Commission found in recital (53), (64), (74) and (242) that birch and eucalyptus plywood, as well as eucalyptus and beech plywood were interchangeable and, therefore, there was competition between these adjoining products. These specific findings were not challenged by interested parties. In view of the above, the claim was rejected.

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry

• (182) In the absence of any comments regarding the definition of the Union industry, recitals (246) to (247) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.2.   Union consumption

• (183) In the absence of any comments regarding Union consumption recitals (248) to (250) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.3.   Imports from the country concerned

4.3.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned

• (184) Following the provisional disclosure, CEP, an ad hoc association of Chinese producers, argued that the decline in Chinese import prices in 2023 and the IP should have resulted in significantly increased imports. Instead, the volume of imports from China declined in 2023 compared to 2022, the previous year, and only increased marginally in the IP.

• (185) The argument was rejected, because the volume of imports was affected by several other factors than only prices. In 2022, such factors were the removal of Russian and Belarusian plywood from the Union market by sanctions and the expectation of economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic whereby orders increased significantly. These factors pushed up the quantity of imports from China in 2022. The effect of those factors, however, was less pronounced in the following years, so that imports first decreased in 2023 before increasing again in the IP.

4.3.2.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

• (186) In the absence of any comments regarding prices of imports from the country concerned, recitals (258) to (260) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (187) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA challenged the representativity of the undercutting and underselling calculation arguing that imported film-faced eucalyptus plywood could not be compared with Union industry production and should be rejected from the product scope as explained and addressed in Section 2.1.2. Should the product scope rejection be denied, PTIA requested the Commission to ensure fair comparison by taking price difference between structural vs non-structural characteristics in the calculations.

• (188) The Commission found that the overwhelming majority of imported PRC film faced hardwood plywood was poplar and eucalyptus, while the sampled complaining Union producers produced film faced hardwood plywood using mostly birch. There was a price difference in the resulting product due to the variance in the price of the raw material used. The Commission, therefore, performed a quality adjustment, based on the price difference between the average purchase price paid during the IP of poplar and birch logs in the EU, in order to meaningfully compare matching types of film faced hardwood plywood produced by the Union industry and imported from the PRC. The result of the adjustment was a decrease of the undercutting margin from 46,3 % to 32,3 % and of the underselling margin from 144,37 % to 93,16 % for Jiangshan Wood and a corresponding decrease from 192,7 % to 185,9 % for all other PRC imports.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

• (189) In the absence of any comments regarding general remarks, recitals (264) to (268) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (190) Following the provisional disclosure, CEP argued that production capacity remained stable and that a production decline of 11 % during the period considered was normal.

• (191) The argument was rejected, as a decline of 11 % in production volume of the Union industry from 2021 to the IP, especially in view of the market gap created by the sanctions against Russia and Belarus, was detrimental to the Union industry.

• (192) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that capacity utilisation of the Union industry has been stable.

• (193) The Commission rejected the claim because capacity utilisation declined by 9 % from 2021 to the IP.

• (194) Following provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that it was erroneous for the Commission to consider in recital (270) of the provisional Regulation that the Union industry could have increased its production capacity to fill in some of the gap in the market created by the banning of Russian and Belarusian hardwood plywood in 2022.

• (195) After the imposition of the ban on Russian and Belarusian hardwood plywood, the Union plywood industry having a large spare production capacity had a justified expectation that the demand for hardwood plywood could shift to its own products. Instead, at least partly, that demand was supplied by dumped and injurious Chinese imports. The availability of raw material for such an increase, disputed by the PTIA, does not take into account the harvesting of reserve plantations and the trade in logs and veneer.

• (196) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA noted that a capacity utilisation of 66 % was realistic for the Union industry. Furthermore, CEP claimed that the capacity utilisation was already low at the beginning of the period considered, in 2021. Therefore, its subsequent decline could not be attributed to imports from China but to a general lack of business know-how of the Union industry.

• (197) The Commission rejected these arguments, these were not backed by any evidence.

4.4.2.2.   Sales quantity and market share

• (198) In the absence of any comments regarding sales quantity, recitals (273) to (275) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (199) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA noted that the market share of the Union industry had increased. They argued that the explanation provided in recital (276) of the provisional Regulation whereby the exclusion of Russian and Belarusian hardwood plywood products from the Union market led to a decrease in consumption was illogical as illegal Russian plywood continued to enter the Union market as evidenced by the conclusions of the anti-circumvention investigation of birch hardwood plywood from Kazakhstan and Türkiye [^ntr90-L_202502333EN.000101-E0090] (‘the anti-circumvention investigation’). PTIA added that the decrease in consumption was rather linked to a normalisation of the demand following the post-Covid economic rebound.

• (200) The claim was rejected because in the anti-circumvention investigation, evidence was found that 130 900 m³ of Russian hardwood plywood were imported through Kazakhstan and Türkiye in July 2022–June 2023, which was less than 10 % of the amount imported from Russia and Belarus in 2021, i.e. the last year before the introduction of the sanctions. Hence, if there was a displacement of the imports from Russia and Belarus to consignments from Kazakhstan and Türkiye, it was only limited.

• (201) In any case, the sales of the Union industry decreased by 12 % or more than 165 000 m³ between 2021 and the investigation period, whereas imports from the PRC increased by 16 % and over 100 000 m³ in the same period. The market share of the Union industry increased by 25 % between 2021 and the investigation period but that of the Chinese imports increased by 67 % in the same period. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

4.4.2.3.   Growth

• (202) In the absence of any comments regarding growth, recital (278) of the provisional Regulation was confirmed.

4.4.2.4.   Employment and productivity

• (203) Following the provisional disclosure, CEP argued that the level of employment of the Union industry was stable and that its productivity showed a positive development.

• (204) The arguments were rejected, because the 2 % decline in employment, 11 % fall in production volume and 9 % decrease in productivity showed a deterioration of the situation of the Union industry rather than signalling stability or improvement as argued by CEP. The Commission also recalled that its injury analysis was not simply static, only comparing end-points, but also dynamic, analyzing the trend in between end-points, too. In the case at hand, the dynamic analysis of the employment, production volume and productivity data confirmed the existence of material injury.

4.4.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (205) In the absence of any comments regarding the magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping, recitals (283) to (284) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (206) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA highlighted that the significant increase in Union sales prices between 2021 and 2023 demonstrated that there was no injury to the Union industry.

• (207) The Commission rejected the argument because the increase in the sales price was offset by the significant increase of production costs. The price depression by imports lead to the loss of profitability by the Union industry, indicating material injury. Furthermore, the Commission also considered that conclusions on the overall situation of the Union industry should not be based on certain injury indicators taken in isolation, but rather on an assessment of the evolution of the whole set of injury indicators during the period considered.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

• (208) In the absence of any comments regarding labour costs, recitals (289) and (290) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

• (209) Following the provisional disclosure, PTIA submitted that the stock level increase should be considered immaterial as, when expressed as a percentage of production, it increased only from 1,74 % in 2021 to 2,43 % in the IP.

• (210) The Commission noted that PTIA did not dispute that there was an increase in stocks both in relative and absolute terms, as assessed by the Commission. The 2,43 % of unsold hardwood plywood stocks in the IP, labelled ‘immaterial’ by PTIA, in real terms accounted for 44 504 m³ of the product under investigation, i.e. more than the amount of birch plywood from Russia that was found to be circumvented through Türkiye in the anti-circumvention investigation. Moreover, any increase in stocks represents a cost for its holder that needs to be financed. The Commission rejected the argument.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (211) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA expressed concerns regarding the representativeness of the profitability of the sampled companies. It identified certain birch plywood producers that reported good results in the period considered. PTIA argued that it was not able to comment on which wood species will be affected more by the measures because the Commission had not performed an analysis per segment.

• (212) The Commission rejected the argument because the profitability of the Union industry was assessed by examining a duly selected representative sample of Union producers of the product under investigation. Its representativity was not disputed by interested parties at sampling stage. Furthermore, Union producers, including those referenced by the PTIA, did not manufacture the product under investigation only, whereby the scope of the investigation was narrower than their published financial results. The Commission determined in recital (55) of the provisional Regulation that the basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics of plywood made from all hardwood species were the same and they formed a single product category, thereby making an analysis per segment unnecessary. The determination regarding basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics of hardwood plywood from different species has been challenged by the PTIA based on the findings and the Court ruling in the Russia birch plywood case but was rejected in recitals (55) and (56) of the provisional Regulation and recital (52), above. On this basis, the claim was rejected.

• (213) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that Union prices were not depressed and that the profitability issues resulted from cost of production increases. The PTIA claimed that Union industry’s sales prices increased in the IP according to market reality leading to a loss of profitability, and that the Union sales volume followed the general decline in consumption. PTIA argued that the Commission erred by attributing the decline in consumption to the Russian and Belarusian plywood ban because the anti-circumvention investigation demonstrated that Russian birch plywood continued entering the Union market.

• (214) In the absence of any new evidence, the Commission sustained its findings in recitals (285)–(288) of the provisional Regulation. The argument relating to the decline in consumption was addressed in recital (200).

• (215) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that there is no investment benchmark demonstrating the health of an industry, the hardwood plywood industry is not capital intensive and noted that investments between 2023 and the IP increased by 8 %.

• (216) The Commission sustained its finding in recital (296) of the provisional Regulation that investment by the Union industry decreased by 31 % during the period considered. The existence of a benchmark and the capital intensity of the hardwood plywood industry were irrelevant because these injury indicators were not analysed separately but as a part of a larger analysis of material injury indicators, meaning that even without a benchmark or an assessment of the capital intensity of the industry, the trend of the decrease in investment supported rather than negated the existence of material injury.

4.5.   Conclusion on injury

• (217) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that for reasons discussed above, injury indicators did not support the provisional conclusion of the Commission that the Union industry suffered injury.

• (218) The Commission addressed the claims by the PTA with regard to a number of injury indicators above, see recitals (172) to (177), (187) to (188), (192) to (196), (199) and (200), (206) to (207), and (209) to (210). With exception of the comment on undercutting, the claims of the PTIA were rejected. The recalculated undercutting margins remained, however, high, see recital (188).

• (219) The Commission, therefore, maintained the conclusion that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (220) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA claimed that the Commission did not properly assess the impact of the increase of the volume of imports and that there was no significant increase of import volume of Chinese origin in relation to consumption or production quantity in 2023 and the IP. Imports peaked in 2022 with an increase of 32 % but, in 2023 and the IP, imports were only 11 % and 16 % higher than in 2021, respectively. The PTIA took issue with the statement in recital (324) of the provisional Regulation that Chinese manufacturers were ‘continuously increasing their import volumes at significantly lower prices’.

• (221) The Commission when assessing the volume of imports and their impact on prices found that a significant increase in the volume of imports in 2022, was followed by a more moderate increase in 2023 and the IP as compared to 2021, at sharply declining prices. These trends, however, continued to point to the existence of a causal link between imports from China and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Import of hardwood plywood from China in relation to Union consumption rose from 18 % in 2021, to 26 % in 2022, and 29 % in 2023, increasing again to 31 % in the IP. In relation to Union production, the percentage of Chinese imports was 37 % in 2021 that grew to 49 %, 44 % and 48 % in 2022, 2023 and the IP, respectively. The argument was, therefore, rejected.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

• (222) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA submitted that the more significant increase of the production costs of the Union industry in relation to its sales price was the result of extraordinary events like the increase in the cost of raw materials, the war in Ukraine and the resulting energy crisis.

• (223) The Commission found that the Union industry was able to increase prices above its production costs in 2022. However, following this increase, sales prices declined and remained below the level of production costs. The latter were constant in 2023 and the IP. The element impacting Union industry prices showing change was the increasing volume and decreasing price of Chinese imports. On this basis, the Commission maintained its conclusion that Chinese imports were causing injury to the Union industry.

• (224) Following the provisional disclosure, CEP argued that the sales prices of the Union industry were not affected by the decline in import prices because when import prices dropped significantly in 2023, while the Union industry was able to increase prices.

• (225) As already set out in recitals (306) and (307) of the provisional Regulation, the drop in the prices of Chinese imports prevented the Union industry from raising its prices above its production costs. The Commission found that the claim of CEP rather than showing a lack of causality demonstrated that in a situation of increasing production costs and decreasing import prices, the Union industry attempted but did not succeed raising its prices to sustainable levels, precisely because of the low-priced imports.

• (226) Following the provisional disclosure, to demonstrate the alleged lack of causal link, the PTIA referred to production cost data from the birch plywood from Russia case [^ntr91-L_202502333EN.000101-E0091], where Paged, one of the sampled Union producers in this case was also part of the sample.

• (227) The reference was deemed irrelevant because it concerned a case with a different investigation period and product scope.

• (228) After the final disclosure, the PTIA submitted that the increase of production costs of the Union industry was so sharp that it could not be passed on to customers in full in the form of price increases. It was the pace of the increase of costs rather than the presence of low-priced Chinese imports that prevented the Union industry from raising prices to a profitable level.

• (229) The Commission rejected the argument because the radical increase in production costs of the Union industry in 2022 compared to the year 2021, was matched by a corresponding price increase, showing that the former could be passed on to consumers. The further, a much smaller increase in production costs in 2023 and the investigation period could not be passed on leading to a situation where the profitability of the Union industry turned negative, as stated in recital (288) of the provisional Regulation.

5.3.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (230) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA and CEP attributed the injury suffered by the Union industry to the decline of its export performance.

• (231) The Commission found that more than 80 % of the sales of the Union industry were made in the Union and that exports were profitable throughout the period considered. Given the share of the export sales, their decline was not considered to attenuate the causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped Chinese imports.

5.4.   Conclusion on causation

• (232) The Commission assessed the impact of all known factors, taking into account the comments of interested parties, and concluded that those factors did not attenuate the causal link. The Commission, therefore, confirmed the conclusions in recitals (332) to (334) of the provisional Regulation that there was a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

• (233) In the present case, the complainant claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of the sampled exporting producers would be higher than their injury margin.

6.1.   Injury margin

• (234) Based on data from the Surveillance 2 database, import volumes from China during the four weeks period before pre-disclosure were 82 % lower than the average import volumes in the investigation period on a four-week basis. On that basis, the Commission concluded that there had not been a substantial rise in imports subject to the investigation during the period of pre-disclosure.

• (235) The Commission, therefore, did not adjust the injury elimination level in this regard.

• (236) As described in recital (188), the Commission revised the injury margins. Therefore, the final injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

Country	Company	Definitive injury margin (%)
The People’s Republic of China	Pizhou Jiangshan Wood Co., Ltd	93,1
The People’s Republic of China	All other imports originating in the PRC	185,9

6.2.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

• (237) In recital (347) of the provisional Regulation, it was established that the margins adequate to remove injury were higher than the dumping margins.

• (238) After the revision of the injury elimination levels at definitive stage, the margins adequate to remove injury remained higher than the dumping margins. The Commission thus maintained that it was appropriate to determine the amount of definitive duties in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.

7. CONCLUSION ON THE LEVEL OF MEASURES

• (239) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Company	Definitive injury margin (%)	Definitive dumping margin (%)	Definitive duty level (%)
Pizhou Jiangshan Wood Co., Ltd	93,1	43,3	43,3
All other imports originating in the PRC	185,9	86,8	86,8

8. UNION INTEREST

8.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (240) Following the provisional disclosure, the PTIA argued that it is not in the interest of the Union industry to impose measures on Chinese film-faced plywood for formwork, because, in view of the limitations of formwork plywood production in the EU, it is not economically viable for the Union industry to produce it.

• (241) The Commission noted that Chinese film-faced plywood can have different grades of durability, some can be used up to ten times for formwork. The Union industry produced high and lower durability film-faced plywood using different hardwood species. Restoring fair pricing in this part of the film-faced plywood market is clearly in the interest of the Union industry.

• (242) As far as low-reusability film faced plywood, mainly used by construction firms for formwork was concerned, during the verification of the questionnaire reply of one of the sampled Union producers, the claim was made that in case of fair pricing the company is capable and willing to produce it The Commission has no reason to doubt this specific statement especially in the light of the fact that beech plywood produced in the Union may be a viable alternative for low-reusability film-faced Chinese imports, as explained in recital (73). The argument was, therefore, rejected.

8.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

• (243) Following the provisional disclosure, ISB, a sampled unrelated Union importer, argued in its questionnaire reply that the measures would cause a shortage in product supply and an increase in their price for the end consumer. Altripan, another sampled unrelated Union importer, argued in its questionnaire reply that importers and traders relying on Chinese-origin products would face increased costs, leading to reduced margins or higher prices for downstream buyers. Altripan supported the imposition of anti-dumping duties on birch plywood, but as a member of the PTIA, argued for the exclusion of poplar and eucalyptus plywood, addressed in Section 2.1.1 and Section 2.5 of the provisional Regulation. The PTIA submitted support letters from importers and users opposing the imposition of the measures [^ntr92-L_202502333EN.000101-E0092]. These letters were based on common templates and were unsupported by additional evidence.

• (244) The Commission considered that when birch hardwood plywood from Russia and Belarus was banned by sanctions in 2022 supply was substituted by eucalyptus hardwood plywood, mainly from the PRC. In case the measures imposed on hardwood plywood from the PRC in this investigation would cause temporary disturbances in the Union market, importers will be able to rely on sources of supply in Southeast Asia, Africa or Latin America to supply hardwood plywood to substitute current imports from the PRC, should importers and/or users wish to rely on an alternative source of supply.

• (245) Following the provisional disclosure, ISB argued that the limited supply of logs in certain production centres, especially the Union, and the lack of their worldwide trade would make it impossible to find alternative sources to the volume of hardwood plywood currently supplied by China. PTIA highlighted that this is especially true for eucalyptus plywood where the Union industry does not have the capacity to supply the Union market with eucalyptus hardwood plywood panels due to the lack of eucalyptus logs.