Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2337 of 24 November 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1452 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain continuous filament glass fibre products originating in the People’s Republic of China

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2025-11-24
Last updated 2026-04-15
State In force
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 4
Reform history JSON API

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2025/2337 of 24 November 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1452 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain continuous filament glass fibre products originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) By Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 248/2011 (2), the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain continuous filament glass fibre products (‘GFR’) originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’ or ‘China’, or ‘the country concerned’). The duty, based on the injury elimination level, ranged from 7,3 % to 13,8 %.

(2) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1379/2014 (3), following an anti-subsidy investigation and a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures, the Commission amended the original anti-dumping duty to values ranging from 0 % to 19,9 % and imposed an additional countervailing duty ranging from 4,9 % to 10,3 %. The resulting combined countervailing and anti-dumping measures ranged from 4,9 % to 30,2 %.

(3) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/724 (4), following an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures, the Commission maintained these measures as established in Implementing Regulation (EU) 1379/2014.

(4) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/328 (5), following an expiry review of the countervailing measures, the Commission decided to maintain these measures as established in Implementing Regulation (EU) 1379/2014.

(5) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1452 (6), following an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures, the Commission decided to maintain these measures as established in Implementing Regulation (EU) 1379/2014.

(6) The resulting combined countervailing and anti-dumping measures therefore range from 4,9 % to 30,2 %.

(7) Measures are also in force on imports of GFR originating in Egypt, imposed by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/870 (7) following an anti-subsidy investigation. The duty on imports of certain continuous filament glass fibre products originating in Egypt, based on the level of subsidisation is 13,1 %.

(8) On 30 August 2024, the Commission initiated a partial interim review, limited to injury, of the anti-subsidy measures applicable to imports of GFR originating in the People's Republic of China. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (8).

(9) On 17 February 2025, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of GFR originating in Bahrain, Egypt and Thailand. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (9).

(10) On 30 August 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of GFR originating in the People’s Republic of China on the basis of Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation. The Commission published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (10) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(11) The Commission initiated this review following a request lodged on 3 June 2024 by Glass Fibre Europe (‘the applicant’). The review request was made on behalf of the Union industry of GFR within the meaning of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The review request contained evidence of changes of lasting nature in the structure of Chinese and Union GFR industries, as well as dumping and resulting material injury, that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(12) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers in the PRC as well as the authorities of the PRC, known importers, users as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

(13) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the review investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(14) The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of GFR originating in the PRC. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure. Comments submitted by Glass Fibre Europe, PROXIM, Jiangsu Changhai Composite Materials Holding Co., Ltd. and the Jushi Group Co., Ltd. after the disclosure were addressed in the relevant section below.

(15) Parties who so requested were also granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with Glass Fibre Europe, Jiangsu Changhai Composite Materials Holding Co., Ltd. and the Jushi Group Co., Ltd.

(16) Following the disclosure referred to in recital (14), the Commission subsequently made an additional final disclosure to all interested parties. This additional disclosure contained updated findings and considerations. Parties were given the opportunity to comment on this additional disclosure, and the comments received were addressed in the relevant section below.

(17) No comments on initiation were received.

(18) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(19) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the largest volume of production and sales during the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 reported by the Union producers in the context of the pre-initiation standing assessment analysis. The sample consisted of three Union producers accounting for more than 60 % of the estimated total volume of production and more than 69 % of the estimated total volume of sales of the like product in the Union. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received. The sample was considered representative of the Union industry.

(20) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(21) No unrelated importer replied to the sampling form. Consequently, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary.

(22) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(23) Four exporting producers/groups in the PRC provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample composed of two exporting producers/groups on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned, and the authorities of the PRC were consulted on the selection of the sample. The initial sample consisted of the Jushi Group and Jiangsu Changhai Composite Materials Holding Co., Ltd (‘Jiangsu Changhai’). The Taishan Fiberglass Group, a group of exporting producers initially not included in the sample, submitted comments on its relationship to one of the initially sampled companies, the Jushi Group, through the China National Building Materials Group (also referred to as ‘CNBM’ or ‘CNBM Group’).

(24) On 20 September 2024, the Commission notified all interested parties that provisional sample had changed, and that the Taishan Fiberglass Group and the Jushi Group would be treated as related companies within the meaning of Article 127 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 (11), and be considered as part of the same group, the CNBM Group. The final sample thus consisted of the CNBM Group and Jiangsu Changhai, representing 98 % of the volume of exports from the PRC to the Union. No comments were received on the definitive sample.

(25) No companies came forward requesting individual examination.

(26) The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’).

(27) The Commission published online (12) the questionnaires for the exporting producers, users, unrelated importers and Union producers.

(28) Questionnaire replies were received from all three Union producers selected in the sample of Union producers, two users and the sampled Chinese exporting producers and their related traders in the Union.

(30) The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 (‘the review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(31) The product subject to this review is chopped glass fibre strands, of a length of not more than 50 mm; glass fibre rovings, excluding glass fibre rovings which are impregnated and coated and have a loss on ignition of more than 3 % (as determined by the ISO Standard 1887); and mats made of glass fibre filaments excluding mats of glass wool (‘the product under review’), currently falling under CN codes 7019 11 00 , ex 7019 12 00 , 7019 14 00 and 7019 15 00 (TARIC codes 7019 12 00 22, 7019 12 00 25, 7019 12 00 26, 7019 12 00 39). The CN and TARIC codes are given for information only without prejudice to a subsequent change in the tariff classification.

(32) The product under review is the raw material most often used to reinforce thermoplastic and thermoset resins in the composites industry. The resulting composite materials (filament glass fibre reinforced plastics) are used in a large number of industries: the automotive industry, electric/electronics, windmill blades, building/construction, tanks/pipes, consumer goods, aerospace/military, etc.

(33) The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the product concerned’).

(35) The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(36) Following disclosure, Glass Fibre Europe submitted comments concerning the product scope of the measures.

(37) These comments were received after the deadline set for submitting comments on the final disclosure. In addition, the interim review was limited to examination of dumping and injury.

(38) As the submissions were received outside the prescribed time limit, the Commission did not take them into account and rejected the request.

(39) In accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation, the Commission analysed whether the change in circumstances with regard to dumping and injury could reasonably be said to be of a lasting nature.

(40) In the request, the applicants submitted that that the lasting changes concerning dumping related to a significant change in the structure of the Chinese GFR industry, increase of production volume, production capacity and spare production capacity of the product under review in the PRC, and the resulting massive overcapacity and downward pressure on export prices.

(41) The Commission noted that in every expiry review since Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/724, the data on excess GFR capacity in China confirmed a significant increase in overcapacity, from 150 000 tonnes in 2015 (13), up to 1,1 million tonnes in 2021 (14).

(42) In light of the data supporting the argument of lasting increase in the production capacity of the GFR industry in the PRC, the evolution of the capacity of the cooperating exporting producers was investigated and verified. All sampled cooperating exporting producers reported increases in production capacity, going from 1,5 million tonnes in 2016 up to 4,1 million tonnes during the RIP. Between 2020 and 2021, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, Chinese GFR producers were able to increase their production output by more than 1 million tonnes in one year alone.

(43) It is recalled that GOC did not cooperate in this review. Therefore, the Commission relied on the information contained in the review request to establish Chinese domestic demand for GFR. On this basis, Chinese domestic demand for GFR amounted to approximately 3,1 million tonnes between 2023 and 2024, translating in overcapacities of at least 1 million tonnes if compared with the verified data submitted by the sampled Chinese exporting producers alone. When taking into account other Chinese exporting producers, such as Chongqing Polycomp International Corp. (15), Shandong Fiberglass Group Corp. Ltd (16) and Chongqing Sanlei Fiberglass Co. Ltd. (17), and their announced capacity increases, Chinese overcapacities could be above 2 million tonnes.

(44) In addition, all sampled exporting producers reported recent investments in new furnaces and production lines, with the CNBM Group opening two new manufacturing plants in Taiyuan (18) and Huai’an (19), increasing manufacturing capacity by over 800 000 tonnes per year.

(45) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission indicated that the lasting changes concerning injury related to significant changes in the structure of the Union industry due to the increasing aggressive pressure of Chinese imports in terms of quantities and prices caused by the Chinese GFR overcapacities.

(46) The investigation confirmed that the persistent overcapacity in China, coupled with aggressive pricing, has significantly hindered the growth of the GFR Union industry. Union producers have only managed limited capacity increases by optimising existing facilities. Following the implementation of additional trade measures in 2014, Chinese exports continued to exert pressure on the Union market, causing several producers to exit the market. In 2009, during the investigation period of the original investigation, there were eleven producers of GFR in the Union. By 2021, the beginning of the period considered, this number had declined to ten. Notably, P-D Glasseiden ceased production in Germany in 2019. More recently, Krosglass discontinued the production of GFR in July 2023 to focus on downstream activities. In addition, NEG NL declared bankruptcy (20) mainly due to escalating energy costs and a decline in demand from the automotive sector, which was the main end-market for its optical-fibre glass products. This additional closure thus brought the number of producers down to only eight. In parallel, Electric Glass Fiber UK has ceased production of GFR (21) in 2025. Whereas the United Kingdom is no longer part of the European Union since 1 January 2021, this development does not change the number of Union producers, though it reduces available regional supply and forms part of the lasting changes affecting the Union market.

(47) Looking at the evolution of production capacity, whereas capacity in the Union market was assessed only for the sampled producers in the original investigation and cannot be used as a point of reference in this regard, Union production capacity was estimated at 725 960 tonnes in 2015 in the 2017 expiry review of the anti-dumping measures (22). By contrast, in the current investigation, capacity declined from 711 692 tonnes in 2021 to 651 196 tonnes in the RIP (– 9 %), i.e. about 10 % below the 2015 level found during the original investigation. Even when not taking into account the UK producer in the post-Brexit indicators, the downward trend relating to production capacity was confirmed.

(48) When comparing the data available from the original investigation, Union industry’s sales fell from 737 818 tonnes in 2006 to 520 064 tonnes in the investigation period, with market share decreasing from 75,1 % to 69,5 % over the same period. By contrast, in the current investigation the Union industry’s sales declined down to 337 898 tonnes in the RIP with market share dropping to 40 % in the RIP. This shows that Union sales have now reached levels well below that of the mid-2000s and, more importantly, that market share has contracted by roughly 30 percentage points, signalling a lasting erosion of the Union industry’s position.

(49) The situation on the Union market has also been affected by the establishment of Chinese owned companies producing GFR in third countries such as Egypt and Bahrain (23). After the establishment of the companies in Egypt, the Commission imposed countervailing duties on imports of GFR from Egypt (24) aiming at restoring a level playing field in view of the subsidised imports injuring the Union industry. Furthermore, there have been additional capacity increases in production of GFR in Egypt (25) and Bahrain (26). Despite the measures taken against GFR imports from the PRC, the Union industry remained under persistent pressure from recurring inflows of unfairly traded GFR coming from a growing number of third countries, including Chinese-controlled facilities in Bahrain and Egypt, which increased their market share on the Union market significantly. On 17 February 2025, the Commission initiated an anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of GFR originating in Bahrain, Egypt, and Thailand (27).

(50) The Commission also established that structural changes have occurred in Union energy markets. Although energy costs had fallen from their 2022 peak by the end of the RIP, they remained above the levels prevailing at the beginning of the period considered. The Commission considered that it is unlikely that gas prices will return to or firmly stabilise at the levels observed until mid-2021. Since that year, most Member States that previously relied on pipeline imports of natural gas from Russia have progressively reduced such dependence. Following Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, the Union and its Member States reinforced and accelerated measures to diversify energy supplies and to eliminate reliance on Russian gas. In this context, at least 17 new LNG terminals have been planned or are under construction (28). Given the scale of investment required for LNG infrastructure and the Union’s clear commitment to ending dependence on Russian pipeline gas (29), the Commission concluded that the Union is highly unlikely to return to sourcing Russian gas in the volumes and at the prices that prevailed prior to 2021. Accordingly, it must be expected that gas prices will remain durably higher than those seen until the first half of 2021.

(51) The Commission noted that the Union industry operates in a context of increasingly stringent environmental and energy-related obligations. In its 2023 position paper, the applicant warned that Union GFR producers face rising operating costs linked to environmental and energy compliance (30). In this regard, a recent life-cycle assessment covering around 95 % of Union production of glass-fibre fabrics demonstrated that the manufacture of one kilogram of fabric entails an average environmental footprint of 2,2 kg CO2 emissions and 39 MJ of primary energy consumption (31). Between 2015 and 2021, industry-wide energy consumption decreased by 8 % and greenhouse gas emissions by 3 %. These figures indicate that, while some progress has been achieved, further reductions will require substantial additional investments. Furthermore, the Commission observed that Union legislation in the field of environmental protection, including the Industrial Emissions Directive (Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (32) as amended by Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council (33)), as well as other climate and circular economy measures forming part of the European Green Deal, is expected to bring additional compliance costs for Union producers. Taken together, these findings confirm that environmental costs for the Union industry are expected to rise in the coming years. This constitutes a lasting change in the cost structure of the Union industry.

(52) The Commission recalls that the product concerned is mainly used as reinforcement material in the production of composites. More than 95 % of glass-fibre demand in the Union is linked to such reinforcement applications. In recent years, however, the Union market for composites has contracted. Production volumes of glass-fibre-reinforced plastics in Europe fell by 9 % in 2022 and by an additional 8 % in 2023 (34), bringing total output down to 2,4 million tonnes in 2024, a level not seen since 2012. At the same time, global composites production expanded by approximately 6 % in 2023, underlining the decrease of Union’s market share. This contraction has a direct impact on demand for the basic forms of glass fibre covered by the current review. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the decline in Union composites demand, coupled with increased world wide production and increased imports from third countries, represented a lasting change in market circumstances.

(53) In light of the above, the Commission concluded that since the original investigation there were changes in circumstances of a lasting nature, both with regard to the structure of the Chinese GFR industry and market and the structure of the Union industry and market, which is considered a relevant change in circumstances within the meaning of Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation.

(54) In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation pointing to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with regard to the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation with regard to the exporting producers from this country having regard to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(55) Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in the PRC to provide information regarding the inputs used for producing GFR. Two sampled companies/groups submitted the relevant information.

(56) In order to obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(57) No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC.

(58) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks.

(59) On 23 January 2025, the Commission informed by a first note (‘the First Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production (‘FOP’) such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of GFR. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified possible representative countries, namely Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Türkiye.

(60) On 10 July 2025, the Commission addressed the comments received from interested parties on the First Note and informed interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Türkiye as the representative country by a second note (‘the Second Note’). It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A’) and profit based on available information for the company Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş, a producer in the representative country.

(61) The Commission received comments on the Second Note from the Jushi Group, part of the CNBM Group, Glass Fibre Europe, Jiangsu Changhai and one user, PROXIM. These comments have been addressed under respective heading under Section 4.2.2 below.

(62) After having analysed the comments and information received within the deadlines, the Commission concluded that Türkiye was an appropriate representative country from which undistorted prices and costs would be sourced for the determination of the normal value, with the exception of pyrophyllite. The underlying reasons for that choice are further described in detail in Section 4.2.2 below.

(63) According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(64) However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined … that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is refereed hereinafter as ‘SG&A’).

(65) As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(66) In recent investigations concerning the glass fibre sector in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) (35), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present.

(67) In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (36). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the glass fibre sector not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the Government of China (‘GOC’) persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (37), but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (38). The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (39). Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC (40). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the chemical sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (41), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC (42).

(68) Like in its previous investigations concerning the glass fibre sector in the PRC, the Commission examined in the present investigation whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the request, and in the Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations (43) (‘Report’), which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under investigation. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC as also found by its previous investigations in this respect.

(69) The applicant alleged that significant distortions exist in the Chinese Glass Fibre Reinforcement sector. It referred to the Report and in particular to the PRC’s economic system being a ‘socialist market economy’ and the active role of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) in both the public and private sectors in the PRC.

(71) In conclusion, the request took the position that prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. On that basis, according to the request, it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case.

(72) The GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file and on the existence of significant distortions and/or appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand. The Commission examined whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in China, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in China’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product concerned.

(73) In the glass fibre sector, a substantial degree of ownership and control by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation. The investigation confirmed that the three largest producers in the GFR sector, namely Jushi (50) , Taishan Glassfiber (51) and CPIC (52), are either fully state-owned or the State holds a controlling stake. These three producers represent around 70 % of Chinese glass fibre production capacity (53).

(74) Moreover, CCP interventions into operational decision-making have become the norm, not only in SOEs but also in private companies (54), with the CCP claiming leadership over virtually every aspect of the country’s economy. Indeed, the State’s influence by means of CCP structures within companies effectively results in economic operators being under the government’s control and policy supervision, given how far the State and Party structures have grown together in China.

(75) The investigation found that the industry national association covering the glass fibre sector is the China Fiber Glass Industry Association (‘CFGIA’) (55). The CFGIA ‘adheres to the overall leadership of the CCP, […] carries out Party activities, and provides necessary conditions for the activities of Party organizations’ (56). Moreover, the ‘registration and management authority of the Association is the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ (57) and the conditions to be eligible as a representative of the CFGIA include to ‘adhere to the leadership of the CCP, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the Party’s line, principles, and policies, and possess good political qualities’ (58).

(76) Jushi, Taishan Glassfiber and CPIC are members of CFGIA (59).

(77) Both public and privately owned enterprises in the glass fibre sector are subject to policy supervision and guidance. The latest Chinese policy documents concerning the glass fibre sector confirm the continued importance which the GOC attributes to the sector, including the intention to intervene in the sector to shape it in line with the government policies. This is exemplified by the 14th FYP on Developing the Raw Material Industry (60) which lists the sector, in particular special-purposes glass fibres, among materials for which technological innovation will be supported by policies under the Plan. Glass fibres are also listed among the encouraged sectors under the 2024 edition of the Guiding Catalogue for Industry Structural Adjustment (61), as well as in the 2024 Guiding Catalogue of Key New Materials eligible to first use/demonstration schemes (62).

(78) Similar examples of the intention by the Chinese authorities to supervise and guide the development of the sector can be seen at the provincial level, such as in Shandong which, with respect to specifically the glass fibre and composite material industry, plans to ‘actively cultivate leading and backbone enterprises with strong brand influence and market appeal, strong integration capabilities and driving effects on industrial chains and industrial clusters, and support cross-industry, cross-regional, and cross-ownership mergers and reorganization of enterprises’ and to ‘develop high-performance glass fibers and products [and to e]ncourage the development of ultra-fine, high-strength, high-modulus, alkali-resistant, low-dielectric, low-expansion, high-silica, degradable, special-shaped cross-section and other high-performance glass fiber and glass fiber products. Focusing on the needs of electronic information, aerospace, new energy, large-scale breeding farms, agricultural greenhouses and other fields, research and develop and promote glass fiber reinforced thermoplastic and thermosetting composite products, and glass fiber composite grilles for infrastructure projects’ (63).

(79) Similarly, the Chongqing Municipality, where CPIC is located, released its 14th FYP on Developing Strategic and Emerging Industries (64) which foresees ‘expanding the scale of high-performance fiber and composite materials industry’ as well as ‘accelerating the construction of projects such as the […] high-performance glass fiber production line with an annual output of 150 000 tons, and the production base of ultra-fine glass fiber and composite materials, so as to increase the production capacity of high-performance glass fiber and composite materials’.

(80) Additionally, emphasis on glass fibres can be seen in planning documents also in other provinces, such as Guangxi (65), Hubei (66) or Zhejiang (67).

(81) As to the GOC being in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation, the Commission found that many producers of GFR explicitly emphasise Party building activities on their websites or have Party members in the company management and underline their affiliation to the CCP.

(82) For instance, Jushi Group’s Chairman of the Board serves at the same time as the Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee (68). Moreover, Jushi mentions on its website that ‘[u]nder the correct leadership of the Party Committee of China National Building Materials Group, […] Jushi Party Committee resolutely implements the decisions of the Party Central Committee […] and always adheres to the leading role of the Party Committee of the company in “setting the direction, managing the overall situation, and ensuring the implementation”’ (69) .

(83) Moreover, Article 195 of Jushi’s Articles of Association explicitly provide for direct Party oversight over essential corporate affairs, according to which ‘the Party committee of the enterprise shall discuss and decide the major matters of the enterprise in accordance with the regulations’, with the Party committee’s main responsibilities entailing the tasks to ‘study and discuss major business management issues of the company, and support the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the management to exercise their powers according to law’, as well as to ‘strengthen the leadership and control of the selection and employment of the enterprise, and do a good job in the construction of the enterprise leadership team, cadre team and talent team’ (70).

(84) As regards Taishan Fiberglass, the Chairman also occupies the position of the Secretary of the Party Committee (71). Also, the company’s General Manager also serves as the Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee (72) and claims that ‘it is necessary to further give full play to the leading role of party building, unite the work of Party members, cadres and workers at all levels, and promote the company's reform and development and production and operation to a new level’ (73).

(85) In the case of CPIC, the Chairman of the Board of Directors holds at the same time the position of the Secretary of the Party Committee (74).

(86) Furthermore, policies discriminating in favour of domestic producers or otherwise influencing the market in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation are in place in the GFR sector. While industrial policies typically relate to numerous sectors rather than exclusively to the GFR sector, it is subject to numerous plans, guidelines, directives and other policy documents issued at national, regional and municipal level (see also recitals (77) to (80) above). Those policies are at times squarely at odds with market forces.

(87) For example, the Guangxi Three-Year Action Plan on Strategic and Emerging Industries administratively sets future target output volumes and growth rates: ‘by 2023, the output value of the new material industry will reach 133 billion yuan, and the added value will reach 44 billion yuan’ (75).

(88) Similarly, the Chongqing Action Plan for the High Quality Development of Fiber and Composite Materials Industry Clusters (2023-2027) also sets quantitative targets : ‘by 2027, the total scale of the city's fiber and composite materials industry will exceed RMB 50 billion, the production and sales of glass fiber and composite materials will account for more than 20 % of the national total, 1-2 world-class fiber and composite materials companies and brands will be created, a number of high-quality companies will be introduced, the modernization level of the industrial chain and supply chain will be significantly improved, the innovation ability and quality and efficiency will be significantly improved, the construction of an important national glass fiber and composite materials industry base will be accelerated, and a fiber and composite materials industry cluster with international influence will be created’ (76). To do so, the Chongqing Municipality seeks to ‘accelerate the construction of an important national glass fiber and composite materials industry base and create a fiber and composite materials industry cluster with international influence’ (77) .

(89) In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of GFR. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely.

(90) The present investigation has not revealed any evidence that the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the chemical sector, according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation would not affect the manufacturers of the product under investigation.

(91) Further, the product under investigation is also affected by the distortions of wage costs in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, as referred to above in recital (67). Those distortions affect the sector both directly (when producing the product under investigation or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC) (78).

(92) Moreover, no evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the GFR sector is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation. The abovementioned Guiding Opinion requiring to ‘improve supporting policies, strengthen the coordination between fiscal, financial, regional, investment, import and export (…) policies with the industry policies [to] give full play to the national cooperation platform between industry and finance and [to] foster the connection between enterprises and banks’ (79) also exemplifies this type of government intervention very well. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

(93) Finally, the Commission recalls that in order to produce the product under investigation, a number of inputs is needed. When the producers of the product under investigation purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors.

(94) As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product under investigation are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth.

(95) In sum, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under investigation, including the costs of raw materials, land, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein.

(97) As explained in recitals (59) and (60), the Commission issued two notes for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value: the First Note on production factors of 23 January 2025 and the Second Note on the production factors of 10 July 2025.

(98) These notes described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria, and also addressed the comments received by the parties on these elements and on the relevant sources.

(99) In the Second Note, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to consider Türkiye as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

(100) In the First Note, the Commission identified Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, and Türkiye as countries with a similar level of economic development as the PRC according to the World Bank, i.e. they are all classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ countries on a gross national income basis where production of the product under investigation was known to take place.

(101) Following the First Note, Jushi Group and Jiangsu Changhai submitted that Türkiye would be an inappropriate third country for the construction of the normal value, due to its high inflation rate, depreciating currency, and an unstable regulatory environment.

(102) The Commission rejected the claims based on the fact that the submitting parties did not demonstrate how the depreciation of the Turkish Lira and high inflation would actually have affected the prices of inputs sourced in Türkiye, and if so what the real impact on the normal value, that is calculated in CNY, would be.

(103) In its comments on the First Note, Jiangsu Changhai submitted that Malaysia – a country not identified in the First Note – should be considered a representative country, as financial data was available for glass producer Xinyi Energy Smart (M) Sdn Bhd (81). The choice of Malaysia was also uphold by the Jushi Group, given the presence in the country of another producer of the product concerned via company Nippon Electric Glass (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd.

(104) The Commission rejected Malaysia as a possible representative country. Xinyi Energy Smart (M) Sdn Bhd. is a subsidiary of a major Chinese glass manufacturer (Xinyi Glass Holdings Ltd). The evidence provided by the Jushi Group concerned information only at the level of consolidated accounts for the Japanese group. In any event, the level of imports in Malaysia from China for the main raw materials ranged from 40 % to 79 %.

(105) Following the Second Note, PROXIM submitted that Türkiye was not a suitable representative country, due to Şişecam Elyaf Sanayii A.Ş.’s production structure of GFR, as well as production scale. The company also submitted that imports into Türkiye from Russia and Belarus affected the market conditions of the factors of production, together with the country’s high inflation, outdated labour statistics and non-transparent data on industrial utility consumption. In light of this, the company added that Thailand or Malaysia would be more suitable alternative representative countries.

(106) The Commission highlighted that PROXIM’s comments were general and unsubstantiated. In any event, the same comments on imports from Russia and Belarus (recital (116)), on inflation (recital (102)), labour statistics (recital (111)), and Thailand and Malaysia as possible representative countries (recitals (104), (116) and (119)) were already addressed by the Commission in their replies to other parties’ comments. On the claim concerning non-transparent data on industrial utilities, the Commission made available to all parties the sources and methodology used to calculated utilities. Therefore, these claims were rejected.

(107) For the countries considered and mentioned above in recital (100), the Commission further verified the readily available data, including the data on imports of factors of production as well as of financial data from the producers of the product under investigation in these potential representative countries.

(108) Concerning the First Note, Glass Fibre Europe submitted that the Commission should have included spare parts in the list of production factors. The Commission rejected this claim, on the ground that it was general and unsubstantiated. The same claim was reiterated in reaction to the Second Note, without adding any new piece of information and was therefore rejected.

(109) After disclosure, GFE reiterated that spare parts should have been included in the factors of production, as they are part of direct production costs and amount between 1-5 % of manufacturing costs. The Commission highlighted that spare parts were included in the manufacturing overheads in the construction of the normal value. The claim was therefore dismissed.

(110) Following the First Note, the Jushi Group submitted that Türkiye would be an inappropriate third country due to outdated cost data for labour cost, arguing that adjusting this data using the Consumer Price Index would be inappropriate as Turkish wages have not risen in line with the inflation rate.

(111) The company claimed erroneously that the Commission used the Consumer Index price which is not the case since it used the Labour Input Indices, which is more accurate. Furthermore, no substantial changes in hourly rate were obtained after the adjustment. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(112) In their comments to the First Note, the Jushi Group added that the SG&A and profit data of Türkiye Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş should not be deemed appropriate sources at consolidated level, because the actual producer of glass fibre products is its subsidiary, Şişecam Elyaf Sanayii A.Ş. In particular, according to Jaingsu Changhai, the SG&A and profit recalculated by the company based on 2023 and 2024 data would show that Türkiye Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş was not profitable during the review investigation period.

(113) The Commission rejected the Jushi Group’s claim based on the fact that the industrial glass segment of Türkiye Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş included Şişecam Elyaf and encompassed similar industrial products with comparable cost structures.

(114) On the claim submitted by Jiangsu Changhai, the Commission highlighted that the methodology used for the calculation of profitability of Türkiye Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş presented significant limitations with regard to consistency in accounting policies between 2023 and 2024, and the fact that the methodology proposed did not include year-end financial adjustments such as depreciation, provisions, and tax settings that may not be captured by mid-year reports. Hence, the Commission rejected Jiangsu Changhai’s claim that Türkiye Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş was not profitable during the review investigation period.

(115) Both in the comments on the First and Second Note, the Jushi Group submitted that Thailand would be a more appropriate representative country. The company argued that there is production of the product under investigation and SG&A costs and profit data is available for two producers (82), and there are neither imports of the FOPs from Russia and Belarus, nor export restrictions on the FOPs from Thailand. Additionally, Thailand would not require adjustments for inflation based on the consumer price index.

(116) The Commission highlighted that Thai import statistics of glass fibre rely significantly on inputs imported from China, especially for main raw materials such as kaolin, epoxy resin, pyrophyllite and white chrysanthemum ore, ranging from 30 % up to 71 %, exposing them to cost distortions. Therefore, the Commission rejected this claim. The claim that the data from the two Thai producers was more suitable than the audited consolidated data of Şişecam was deemed unsubstantiated by the Commission. Regarding the claim on imports from Russia and Belarus, the Commission did not establish that they distorted the prices of inputs either in Thailand or in Türkiye. The claim on export restrictions was general and unsubstantiated. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claims.

(117) Furthermore, the data for electricity and natural gas in Türkiye reflected actual figures concerning the review investigation period and did not require any adjustments. Therefore, the Commission found the claim that Thai data on utilities are more accurate than the data obtained for Türkiye to be unwarranted.

(118) In the Second Note, the Jushi Group contested that Thailand’s exposure to imports from China could not be a criterion in the selection of a representative third country, suggesting that the inputs with a high percentage of imports from China could be substituted with import data from Türkiye or other upper middle income countries.

(119) Jushi Group added that all Thai companies, including private ones, are required to submit their audited financial statements to the Thai authorities, which makes them available online (83). The Jushi Group argued that this, coupled with the fact that both companies cover the entirety of the product concerned and the same general category of products (biaxial fabrics, woven rovings, linter pulp and synthetic fibre mats) made Thailand a more suitable representative country compared to Türkiye.

(120) The Commission reiterated that, first, Thailand showed a higher degree of reliance of imports from China. Indeed, in Türkiye the most sourced four factors of production from China, accounting for more than 40 % of the total import volumes, represented only around 1 % of the total cost of production. On the other hand, Thailand sourced significantly more raw materials from China, accounting also for more than 40 % of the total import volumes, represented more than 20 % of the total cost of production. All the raw materials traded in high quantities from China and imported into Thailand, with the exception of light-burned magnesium powder and silane coupling agents, were imported at lower quantities or not imported at all into Türkiye.

(121) Second, in comparing market data, China was the biggest producer and exporter of glass fibre worldwide. Türkiye (84) represented a bigger glass fibre export market compared to Thailand (85), with a higher level of exports of the product concerned. Furthermore, the two Thai producers identified by the Jushi group had a reported annual production capacity of glass fibre much smaller than the Turkish company. Wanda New Material (Thailand) Co. Ltd and Thai United Glass Fibre Co. Ltd’s annual production capacity was 20 000 tons (86) and 2 500 tons of glass fibre (87), respectively. In contrast, in 2022, the Şişecam group reported an installed capacity of 70 000 tons of glass fibre (88). Given Türkiye’s lower dependence on China and bigger market in terms of exports, the Commission rejected the claim that Thailand would be a more representative country.

(122) Following the Second Note, the Jushi Group submitted that Şişecam Elyaf Sanayii A.Ş., the glass fibre producer within the Türkiye Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş group, was unprofitable during 2024, and argued that the Commission should use the segment data to which Şişecam Elyaf Sanayii A.Ş. belongs to, i.e. the industrial segment, for the calculation of SG&A costs and profit. Jiangsu Changhai requested the Commission to utilise the updated financial statements of 2024, which included adjustments for inflation for both 2024 and 2023. Jiangsu Changhai submitted that, in the consolidated statements of Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş group, the general administrative and marketing expenses included transportation and commission costs, as well as packaging expenses, and the Commission should therefore exclude such expenses from the calculation of the normal value.

(123) The Commission accepted the claim of the Jushi Group and revised the SG&A costs and profit calculations based on the industrial segment instead of the consolidated level. The Commission highlighted that the claim submitted by Jiangsu Changhai concerned adjustments at the level of the consolidated group, and no breakdown of general administrative and marketing expenses was available at industrial glass segment level.

(124) In the comments on the First Note, Jiangsu Changhai highlighted that the HS code for pyrophyllite was too broad and encompassed various other products under the subheading 2530 90 unrelated to GFR production. Given the considerable price differences based on aluminium content of pyrophyllite, which the HS code did not reflect, Jiangsu Changhai proposed an alternative benchmark based on a market report (89) that differentiated between the types of pyrophyllite grades and aluminium content.

(125) The applicant submitted that, based on the information contained in the report, the prices of low alumina pyrophyllite offered by the Indonesian company PT. Gunung Bale and Kaolin (Malaysia) Sdn would be the most suitable alternative benchmark for establishing the price of pyrophyllite in China.

(126) The Commission accepted to revise the benchmark of pyrophyllite and used the prices of PT. Gunung Bale as benchmark, given Indonesia’s lower reliance on imports of pyrophyllite from China as compared to Malaysia (less than 5 % and around 80 %, respectively).

(127) Following the Second Note, the Jushi Group submitted that the Commission should have used the average price at which one of their suppliers purchased low-grade pyrophyllite from PT. Gunung Bale. Alternatively, the Commission should not add the average cost of transport to the benchmark of 0,60 CNY/kg, as the invoice submitted as evidence indicated that transport was already included in the cost.

(128) The Commission highlighted that one unverified commercial invoice, together with a certificate of authorisation containing mistakes in the spelling of the name of the input supplier did not constitute information that could enable the Commission to arrive at a reasonably accurate finding, and verifiable information that could have enabled such finding was not submitted. Therefore, the Commission decided to disregard the information submitted by the Jushi Group and rejected the claim.

(129) The same claim was reiterated following final disclosure, arguing that the invoice submitted covered most of the volume purchased from PT. Gunung Bale during the investigation period, and that the data to which the invoice pertained (i.e. the purchase volumes of pyrophyllite) had been verified by the Commission.

(130) The Commission highlighted that the assessment carried out in recital (128) stood still, and that albeit the purchase volumes had been verified in the framework of the pyrophyllite consumption data, the commercial invoice submitted could not be verified by the Commission. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(131) In the comments on the Second Note, Jiangsu Changhai submitted that the prices from Türkiye of dolomite and calcium oxide were unrepresentative due to the low import volumes, and that prices in Türkiye of these two raw materials were not reflective of the type used in the production of GFR. In support of their claim, Jiangsu Changhai submitted two reports from Multimarket Insights (90) containing information about different grades and applications of dolomite and calcium oxide.

(132) The Commission rejected the proposed benchmarks on dolomite and calcium oxide provided by Jiangsu Changhai, on the grounds that it did not have sufficient verifiable evidence to establish whether the benchmarks proposed were sound and reasonable and could be thus considered as a suitable alternative benchmark. Furthermore, the reports submitted by the exporting producer did not provide sufficient information about the sources used to establish the different price ranges for different types of dolomite and calcium oxide. Concerning dolomite and calcium oxide, the company submitted in their comments to the Second Note test reports that were not verifiable by the Commission, and the market reports submitted by Jiangsu Changhai did not provide any source as to how the values for different grades of dolomite and calcium oxide were calculated.

(133) By contrast, the benchmarks from Multimarket Insights for pyrophyllite, (recitals (124)-(126)) were accepted by the Commission, as the benchmark prices are readily available as part of non-confidential case file and it could be verified during the verification visit with the exporting producers which type of pyrophyllite was used in the production process of GFR and the mineral content thereof, and that it could be ascertained that the benchmark from Türkiye did not reflect these specificities. Furthermore, the Commission also received comments from the complainant that prices of pyrophyllite contained in the report were reasonable and reflecting the reality of the different grades of pyrophyllite used in the production of GFR.

(134) Following final disclosure, Jiangsu Changhai reiterated that the Turkish import benchmarks for dolomite and calcium oxide were unsuitable due to the low import volumes of these raw materials into Türkiye, especially vis-à-vis the company’s consumption of each of these two raw materials. In this respect, Jiangsu Changhai invited the Commission to review the Union industry data for these two raw materials and compare their costs against the Turkish benchmark. In the alternative, the Commission should treat these two raw materials as consumables.

(135) The Commission found Jiangsu Changhai’s argument to be unsubstantiated and unwarranted. Firstly, the Jiangsu Changhai has failed to establish an any correlation between import quantities and pricing in the sense that the volume of those imports would made per se the prices unfit for the purpose of finding an undistorted price. Secondly, the suggestion that lower import quantities necessarily result in atypical pricing ignores the economic realities of how prices are established. Exporting producers set prices based on a plethora of factors, rather than relying on the overall import volumes of any single country. Therefore, even if import quantities are low, this does not inherently mean that prices are skewed or unrepresentative, or that they are not market prices. Moreover, Jiangsu Changhai’s comment misrepresents the Commission’s previous practice which in any case is not binding as each case is assessed on its own merits. Its reference to one previous investigation (91) is incomplete and selective as it omits to mention that in that investigation the Commission discarded the use of certain benchmarks based on other considerations than quantity alone such as customs nomenclature not allowing to identify imports that would reflect the prices of the actual input used by exporting producers. No such claim was made by Jiangsu Changhai in this review, nor did they claim that the Turkish import benchmarks for dolomite and calcium oxide were not representative for any other reason. Therefore, these claims were rejected.

(136) In the comments on the First Note, Jiangsu Changhai submitted that all raw materials, except of pyrophyllite, should have been categorised as consumables given their low impact on the cost of manufacturing.

(137) The Commission rejected the claim, based on the fact that the remaining raw materials cumulatively accounted for [20-30] % of cost of manufacturing, and that benchmarks for those raw materials were available.

(138) Following the Second Note, Jiangsu Changhai submitted that calcium oxide, dolomite, and packing materials should be treated as consumables due to their low impact on the cost of production, arguing that in previous investigations (92), the Commission classified materials, including packing materials, under consumables when their aggregate cost accounted for around 4–7 % of the cost of manufacturing.

(139) The Commission highlighted that calcium oxide and dolomite together constitute already more than 4 % of the cost of manufacturing, and the packaging materials alone almost 7 % of the cost of production. In the previous investigations the factors of production that were grouped under consumables had a negligible weight in the total cost of production, and it was not possible to find accurate benchmarks for those, contrary to this investigation. Given the impact of the factors of production highlighted by Jiangsu Changhai, and the fact that benchmarks for those factors of production could be used to establish the normal value, the Commission rejected their claims.

(140) Following final disclosure, Jiangsu Changhai reiterated that some raw materials should have been grouped under consumables, proposing that, for the raw materials sourced internationally or via related suppliers included under consumables, the Commission include also those sourced domestically. The company also added that all packing materials be grouped under consumables.

(141) The Commission reiterated its stance that the packaging materials alone are almost 7 % of the cost of production, without considering the materials that have already been included under consumables. Given the existence of reasonable benchmarks for these factors of production, the claim was rejected.

(142) Jiangsu Changhai added that, since the calculation of the normal value incorporates the cost of packaging, to ensure a fair comparison in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, the Commission should have not deducted the allowances for packaging from the export price.

(143) The Commission accepted this claim and revised the calculation of the margin for Jiangsu Changhai.

(144) Following disclosure, the Jushi Group highlighted some clerical errors in the calculation of freight and handling, loading and ancillary expenses at the premises in exporting country in the aggregate dumping margin calculation.

(145) The Commission accepted the claim and revised the Jushi Group’s dumping margin calculations accordingly.

(146) Following the Second Note, the Jushi Group submitted several comments on specific factors of production and alternative benchmarks that could be used. First, the company submitted that the Commission should have extracted the import data of limestone powder at 6-digit level from the UN COMTRADE database, instead of 4-digit, requesting the Commission to use the unit price calculated by the company of 2,01 CNY/kg instead of 2,5 CNY/kg.

(147) The Commission highlighted that the extraction provided by the company from the UN COMTRADE database included data covering August 2024, a period outside of the review investigation period, and excluded any data for August 2023. The extraction at 6-digit level covering the review investigation period confirmed that the correct benchmark is 2,5 CNY/kg.

(148) Second, the company submitted that some specific codes from Global Trade Atlas (GTA) for kaolin should be used for different entities, to reflect the different companies’ specific production processes, which involved different types of kaolin, either in its powdered form or in its ore form.

(149) The Commission accepted this claim and revised the calculations for the Jushi group accordingly.

(150) Thirdly, the Jushi Group submitted that the Commission should have used GTA code 251990300019-Other Completely Burnt (Sintered) Magnesia, as it was the only relevant code for their production process.

(151) The Commission highlighted that the Jushi Group’s request was general and unsubstantiated, as it did not provide any specific information about what other types of burnt magnesia were included in the GTA code, and how this code was more relevant in their production process vis-à-vis other codes. Therefore, the Commission rejected this claim.

(152) Fourthly, for wollastonite powder, the Jushi Group submitted that import data based on the HS code 2530 90 was too broad and proposed to use pyrophyllite powder as a benchmark and increase it by reflecting the cost differential that Jushi incurs for the wollastonite powder in comparison to the pyrophyllite. The Jushi group added that the same methodology could be applied to other factors of production grouped under HS code 2530 90 .

(153) The Commission highlighted that this methodology lacked any factual ground on the reasons why the Commission should use pyrophyllite as a benchmark for wollastonite and other raw materials, and why this would be the most accurate methodology. Hence, the Commission rejected this claim.

(154) Lastly, the Jushi Group requested the Commission not to include waste fibre under consumables, on the grounds that this factor of production was reported in their cost of manufacturing tables with an available benchmark, and that the company also provided information about their resale value.

(155) The claim was rejected on the grounds that waste fibre had a negligible impact on the cost of production. In addition, when compared to the company’s average value for by-products, the GTA codes suggested by the Jushi Group as benchmark could not reasonably reflect the type of fibres generated by the Jushi Group’s production process.

(156) Following disclosure, the Jushi Group submitted comments covering light-burned magnesium, wollastonite, waste fibre and limestone powder.

(157) Concerning recitals (150) and (151), following final disclosure, the Jushi Group reiterated those claims, providing additional evidence that HS code 2519 90 30 was the one used in their production process. The Commission used the weighted average price of the benchmarks of the GTA codes at 8-digit level ending in ‘30’.

(158) With regards to wollastonite (recitals (152) and (153)), the Jushi Group reiterated that the import price was not accurate enough to reflect the differences in prices between not only between wollastonite powder and pyrophyllite powder, but also concerning spodumene powder and lepidolite powder. The Jushi Group proposed to calculate the benchmarks for the three powders based on the group’s price differences between wollastonite, spodumene, and lepidolite powder against the pyrophyllite benchmark. In the alternative, the Jushi Group submitted that the Commission should use GTA codes 2530 90 40 for spodumene and lepidolite, and code 2530 90 50 for wollastonite, based on Turkish imports of wollastonite from the US (93).

(159) The Commission highlighted that it could not accept a calculation based on the company’s own costing data, as, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, it was established in recital (95) it is not appropriate to use domestic costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions. The Commission accepted the claim and extrapolated the prices for spodumene, lepidolite, and wollastonite at 8-digit level from GTA.

(160) On waste fiber, the Jushi Group submitted that waste and scrap fibre appeared to be imported into Türkiye under the HS code 7019 62 10  (94) (instead of HS code 7019 90 ), and the Commission should use the average import prices from Türkiye to establish a waste fibre benchmark. In the alternative, the Commission should use the EU import or export price. If the Commission does not apply a benchmark to waste fibre, the raw materials representing an even lower cost of production should also be grouped under consumables.

(161) At the outset, the Commission highlighted that, in the consumption tables, for two of its entities, the Jushi Group had submitted that the applicable waste fibre HS code was 7019 90 , and for one entity no HS code was reported at all, highlighting the difficulty of finding an applicable code for this specific factor of production. Second, the Commission looked into code 7019 62 10 and noticed that Türkiye only imported either HS code 7019 62 (Other Mechanically Bonded Closed Fabrics Made Of Glass Rovings) (95) or HS code 7019 62 90 (Other Mechanically Bonded Closed Fabrics Made Of Glass Rovings), and no information was available for HS code 7019 62 10 . Third, even when looking at data from the other possible representative countries identified in the First Note and Second Note, import volumes from China constituted 90 % or more of total imports of this factor of production for most countries. Overall, for both HS code 7019 90 (recital (155)) and for code 7019 62 it was not possible to establish what would fall under these codes, and for code 7019 62 10 it was not possible to find a benchmark for it. Therefore, the Commission rejected this claim.

(162) Following disclosure, the Jushi Group argued that the import prices from Türkiye of limestone powder and calcium oxide/calcinated limestone powder seemed unreasonably high due to the low import volumes, submitting that the Commission should revise the benchmarks (a) taking Türkiye’s export price and mark it up for appropriate import duties; or (b) use the average GTA international import price; (c) use the import price into Brazil; or (d) use the EU import prices (or export prices).

(163) Concerning calcium oxide and limestone powder, the Commission already addressed a similar comment on the correlation between import quantities and prices in recital (135).

(164) After disclosure, GFE submitted that using a weighted average price of a mix of kaolin ore and ground kaolin is inappropriate, as such a mixture does not exist in actual batch formulations. At the same time, kaolin ore cannot be used directly in GFR production, as it needs to go through intermediary steps such as grinding and milling. GFE argued that the Commission should only use the ground kaolin customs code (250700200012) as raw material for the construction of the normal value. The Commission clarified that it used the corresponding cost of either kaolin ore or kaolin powder depending on the companies’ specific production processes. The costs of processing kaolin ore into kaolin powder were accounted in the energy and labour cost through a carry-over exercise. The claim was therefore rejected.

(165) Having established that Türkiye was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(166) In view of the above analysis, Türkiye met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

(167) In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under investigation by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note.

(168) Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use GTA to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. For pyrophyllite, as covered in recital (126), the Commission used the prices of the Indonesian company Pt. Gunung Bale (96). In addition, the Commission used Turkstat and Eurostat for establishing undistorted costs of labour (97), energy (98) and natural gas (99). For water, the Commission used the data published by the Investment and Finance Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye (100).

(169) In the Second Note, the Commission also informed the interested parties that due to the large number of factors of production of the sampled exporting producers that provided complete information and the negligible weight of some of the raw materials in the total cost of production, these negligible items were grouped under ‘consumables’. Further, the Commission informed that it would calculate the percentage of the consumables on the total cost of raw materials and apply this percentage to the recalculated cost of raw materials when using the established undistorted benchmarks in the appropriate representative country.

(171) The Commission included a value for manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. To establish this amount, the Commission relied on data from the sampled exporting producers.

(172) In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA. An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (106). The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices.

(173) For pyrophyllite, as explained in recital (124), Jiangsu Changhai submitted that the HS code for pyrophyllite was too broad and did not reflect the difference based on the aluminium content. The company thus submitted a market report providing data about pyrophyllite, based on application, region, and also providing prices for specific companies and specific types of pyrophyllite. The applicant submitted that the prices of low-alumina pyrophyllite – i.e. the type used in the production process of GFR – from Indonesian company PT. Gunung Bale and Kaolin (Malaysia) Sdn would be the most suitable alternative benchmark. The Commission accepted this claim and used the prices of pyrophyllite supplier PT. Gunung Bale, due to Indonesia’s lower reliance of imports of pyrophyllite from China.

(174) Following disclosure, GFE submitted that, although the costs of rhodium and platinum were reflected in the depreciation, these costs are incomplete, as the precious metals can be held as assets or leased, proposing different calculation methodologies based on whether the bushings containing platinum and rhodium were owned or leased. The Commission highlighted that the platinum/rhodium consumption and the leakage plate were factored in the construction of the normal value under manufacturing overheads.

(175) Following final disclosure, GFE added that based on the findings of recital (42), i.e. that the Chinese industry increased their capacities from 1,5 million tonnes in 2016 to 4,1 million tonnes in the review investigation period, the Commission should have constructed the normal value taking into account the greenfield GFR plant costs and the resulting annual depreciation costs. The Commission clarified that these costs were already captured in the depreciation costs. The claim is dismissed as moot.

(176) For a number of factors of production the actual costs incurred by the cooperating exporting producers represented a negligible share of total raw material costs in the review investigation period. As the value used for these had no appreciable impact on the dumping margin calculations, regardless of the source used, the Commission decided to include those costs into consumables. This was the case for compressed air, oxygen, and steam.

(177) The Commission expressed the transport cost incurred by the cooperating exporting producers for the supply of raw materials as a percentage of the actual cost of such raw materials and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw materials in order to obtain the undistorted transport cost. The Commission considered that, in the context of this investigation, the ratio between the exporting producer’s raw material and the reported transport costs could be reasonably used as an indication to estimate the undistorted transport costs of raw materials when delivered to the company’s factory.

(178) Following disclosure, the Jushi Group argued that the Commission should have only added the actual reported transport costs to the undistorted raw material costs, and not applied a ratio, as in the case for glass fibre fabrics (107).

(179) The Commission highlighted that the methodology used reflects the costs structure of the exporting producer, since the ratio between transport cost and the cost of raw material is maintained and is further applied to the undistorted benchmark. The Commission highlighted that it could not accept a calculation based on the company’s own costing data, as, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, it was established in recital (95) it is not appropriate to use domestic costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions. Moreover, the example referenced by the Jushi Group did not necessarily imply that what was used was the actual cost, as the ‘domestic transport costs for all raw materials were estimated based on the verified data provided by the cooperating exporting producers’. In any event, the Jushi Group failed to demonstrate why the approach used by the Commission should have been unreasonable. Therefore, this claim was deemed unwarranted.

(180) TurkStat, Structure of Earnings Statistics, 2023 (108) publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Türkiye. The Commission used the latest available statistics covering 2023, for the economic activity according to NACE Rev.2 classification. The monthly value reported for the end of 2023 was duly adjusted for inflation using the Hourly labour cost index adjustment as published by the TurkStat, Labour cost indices, 2009-2024 [2021=100] (109).

(181) The price of electricity for companies (industrial users) in Türkiye is published by Eurostat: Electricity prices for non-household consumers – bi-annual data (from 2007 onwards) (nrg_pc_205) (110) in its regular press releases. The Commission used the data on the industrial electricity prices in the corresponding consumption band in kWh covering the review investigation period.

(182) Following disclosure, Jiangsu Changhai submitted that the Commission should have used the electricity’s consumption band that would reflect the company’s electricity use. Similarly, for natural gas, the company submitted that, based on their usage, the Commission should apply the specific consumption band based on usage, rather than the average of all consumption bands.

(183) The Commission accepted these claims and carried out adjustments to the electricity and natural gas benchmark reflecting actual consumption profiles of the sampled Chinese exporting producers.

(184) The price of natural gas for industrial users in Türkiye is published by Eurostat - Gas prices for non-household consumers – bi-annual data (111). The Commission used the data of the industrial gas prices in the corresponding consumption band in kWh covering the investigation period.

(185) The cost of water for industrial use is published by the Investment and Finance Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye (112). The Commission used an average industry price in Istanbul region related to the Organized Industrial Zones (OIZs): Eskişehir OIZ; Balıkesir OIZ; Ankara Başkent OIZ and İzmir Aliağa OIZ.

(186) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(187) The manufacturing overheads incurred by the cooperating exporting producers were expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

(188) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A costs and profit, the Commission relied on the financial data for 2023 for Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş as extracted from the company annual reports (113).

(189) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(190) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the sampled exporting producers. These consumption rates were verified during the verification. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country.

(191) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost were established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, SG&A costs, and profit as noted in recitals (186) to (188). They were determined on the basis of the financial statements of Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş as explained in recital (188).

(192) Then the Commission added manufacturing overheads, as explained in recitals (186) and (187) to the undistorted cost of manufacturing in order to arrive at the undistorted costs of production.

(193) To the costs of production established as described in the previous recital, the Commission applied SG&A costs and profit of Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş. SG&A costs expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 22,7 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 8,8 %.

(194) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(195) Following final disclosure, GFE submitted that the use of Şişecam’s industrial glass business data for the determination of reasonable amounts for of SG&A costs and for profit was not warranted, since (a) the Commission should have excluded other operating income and financial income from Şişecam’s glass business; (b) the SG&A costs did not reflect the economic reality of GFR producers; (c) a the profit found of 8,8 % was insufficient for capital-intensive industries like GFR and thus unreasonable, arguing that the Commission should use the SG&A costs and profit of the entire group.

(196) Following final disclosure, Jiangsu Changhai argued that the industrial glass segment of Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş. was actually unprofitable in 2023, as the Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation is only the result of income and profit made from investment activities, purchase of tangible and intangible assets and right of use assets, not the main operating activities. Jiangsu Changhai requested to use the 2023 inflation-adjusted data contained in the 2024 annual reports of Şişe Ve Cam Fabrikalari A.Ş., and to deduct transportation, commissions and packaging expenses. In the alternative, should the Commission still use the segment-specific data, a proportional share of the consolidated-level SG&A expenses should be allocated to the industrial segment.

(197) Concerning the establishment of reasonable amounts for SG&A costs, the Commission accepted Jiangsu Changhai’s claim to exclude the transportation costs, packaging expenses and commission expenses of the whole group and allocate them using turnover as an allocation key. The Commission revised its calculation of the profit for the industrial segment and confirmed that the recalculated profit, before tax for the industrial segment was negative in 2023.

(198) The consolidated financial statements of the Şişecam group provided the profit of Şişecam Elyaf and the SG&A costs of the industrial glass segment. In respect of Şişecam Elyaf, the company that produces glass fiber, the publicly available financial statements for 2023 provided the net sales and the profit but did not include the information about the cost of goods sold (‘COGS’) nor the SG&A. The COGS were available at the level of the industrial glass segment of the Şişecam group. Hence, to calculate the percentage of profit of Şişecam Elyaf, the Commission allocated the COGS of the industrial segment, to which Şişecam Elyaf belongs to, using turnover as an allocation key.

(199) In the light of the above, the Commission concluded that it would be appropriate to establish the reasonable amount for SGA costs based on recalculated SG&A costs for the industrial segment using the 2023 inflation-adjusted data included in the latest annual statement of the Turkish group. The Commission allocated the net financial expenses of the Şişecam group to the segment using turnover as allocation key, and obtained SG&A costs expressed as a percentage of the COGS of 11,24 %.

(200) To calculate the profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS, the Commission divided the profit of Şişecam Elyaf by the COGS of the industrial segment allocated to Şişecam Elyaf using turnover as allocation key, as explained in recital (198). This amounted to 21,58 %.

(201) Following the additional final disclosure, GFE submitted that the Commission should not have accepted Jiangsu Changhai’s claim on transportation costs, packaging expenses and commission and, in any event, it should not have applied the adjustment to all exporting producers. Similarly, any other claims with regard to exporters other than the specific one making a particular claim should have not been applied to all sampled exporting producers.

(202) The Commission highlighted that the findings on SG&A costs and profit from the representative company concern the ‘reasonable amounts’ to be used in the construction of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation and apply to all sampled exporting producers. The Commission cannot apply different SG&A costs solely to the company that submitted a claim on SG&A costs adjustments. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(203) Following the additional final disclosure, GFE also submitted that there was no evidence that the entirety of the transportation costs apply only to outbound transactions, and that, assuming they related to both inbound and outbound transactions costs, the Commission’s adjustment was excessive, as some of the sampled Chinese exporting producers reported much lower transportation costs in their annual reports and the Commission should thus have adjusted these costs accordingly. Lastly, GFE argued that the industrial segment in Şişecam’s financial statements is comprised of products in several different industries, and reasoned that transportation and packaging costs for the automotive industry must be higher than for the GFR industry.

(204) The Commission rejected these claims because the normal value had to be established at ex-works level, so these costs had to be deducted in order to establish reasonable amounts for SG&A and profit in the representative country. Moreover, the fact that transportation and packaging costs for the automotive industry might be higher than for the GFR industry has no bearing in this case, as the transportation and packaging costs were taken for the whole group and applied proportionally based on the turnover of the industrial segment, and no breakdown was available for transportation costs specific to the industrial glass segment.

(205) Following the additional final disclosure, Jiangsu Changhai contested the calculation of the profit of Şişecam Elyaf, arguing that the SG&A costs rate applied does not reflect the cost structure that generated the reported profit, proposing to recalculate Şişecam Elyaf’s profit by incorporating the SG&A costs ratio over COGS or by determining a combined figure for SG&A costs and profit based on Şişecam Elyaf’s turnover minus the recalculated COGS.

(206) The Commission highlighted that the approach followed for the calculation of profit was focused on Şişecam Elyaf as standalone company, thus reflecting more closely the profit of GFR-producers in Türkiye. Moreover, the allocation of COGS over the GFR producer’s profit followed the same exact logic and allocation that Jiangsu Changhai had proposed for the calculation of commissions, packing expenses and transportation costs, transfered from the overall group to the industrial segment. The same methodology has also already been previously applied, by using the same group, industrial segment and GFR producer, over the same year (i.e. 2023), for the calculation of SG&A costs and profit of one of GFR’s downstream products (114). Therefore, the Commission rejected this claim.

(207) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies.

(208) For the exporting producers that exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(209) For indirect sales, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. Established case-law clarifies that adjustments pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation include costs incurred by an entity located outside the European Union, provided that such an entity appears to be associated with the importer or exporter and that the costs in question would normally be borne by an importer (115). In this context, case-law equates these costs with those related to sales activities performed by subsidiaries as they reduce the amount received by the exporting producer, in as much as they are typically borne by the importer (116). As noted by the Court of Justice, this approach is in line with the objective of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. According to the Court, that objective would not be achieved if an exporting producer could simply structure its sales in such a way as to ensure the involvement, prior to the importation of the product concerned into the European Union, of an intermediary associated with it which would assume responsibility for the costs normally borne by an importer, so as to increase the export price actually paid by the importer (117).

(210) The Commission noted that the trader related to the exporting producers located in Hong Kong was incurring costs normally born by an importer, including those related to invoicing unrelated customers located in the Union. Therefore, an adjustment under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation for these costs (SG&A costs) and a nominal profit was warranted.

(211) For the exporting producers that exported the product concerned to the Union through related companies acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing.

(212) In the absence of cooperation of unrelated importers in the present case, a reasonable profit established at 5 % in the original glass fibre fabrics (‘GFF’) (118) investigation for a downstream glass fibre product was used to establish a reliable export price at the Union frontier level.

Reading this document does not replace reading the official text published in the Official Journal of the European Union. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies arising from the conversion of the original to this format.

This text is published under EUR-Lex's own terms of reuse, not a Legalize or public-domain licence. EUR-Lex
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu — Source: EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the European Union). Reused under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. Only EU legislation published in the printed Official Journal of the European Union is deemed authentic; consolidated texts are reproduced here for documentation purposes and have been reformatted to Markdown.