Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/65 of 6 January 2026 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Image omitted; see official source	Official Journal of the European Union	EN L series
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	2026/65	7.1.2026

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union [^ntr1-L_202600065EN.000101-E0001] (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1.   Previous investigations and measures in force

• (1) By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688 [^ntr2-L_202600065EN.000101-E0002], the European Commission (‘the Commission’) imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago (hereafter also: ‘TT’) and the United States of America (hereafter also: ‘the US’ or ‘USA’) (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

• (2) In May 2021, Copa-Cogeca, an association of users of the product concerned, requested for the suspension of the anti-dumping duties in force, in accordance with Article 14(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. By Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2070 [^ntr3-L_202600065EN.000101-E0003], the Commission decided not to suspend the anti-dumping duties on imports of mixture of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688.

• (3) The anti-dumping duties currently in force range between 27,77 EUR/tonne and 42,47 EUR/tonne on imports from Russia and amount to 22,24 EUR/tonne on imports from Trinidad and Tobago and to 29,48 EUR/tonne on imports from the United States of America.

1.2.   Request for an expiry review

• (4) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry [^ntr4-L_202600065EN.000101-E0004] the Commission received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

• (5) The request for review was submitted on 28 June 2024 by Fertilizers Europe (‘the applicant’) on behalf of the Union industry of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The grounds of the request for review were that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation and/or recurrence of dumping and continuation or recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

1.3.   Initiation of an expiry review

• (6) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 8 October 2024 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union [^ntr5-L_202600065EN.000101-E0005] (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

1.4.   Review investigation period and period considered

• (7) The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 (‘review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

1.5.   Comments on initiation by interested parties

• (8) In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, other known Union producers, the known producers in the countries concerned and the authorities of Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of America, known importers and associations representing the interests of users known to be concerned about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate.

• (9) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

• (10) The Russian authorities argued that the initiation of the investigation was WTO-inconsistent to the extent that the Panel Report in EU – Cost Adjustment Methodologies II (Russia) [^ntr6-L_202600065EN.000101-E0006] found the cost adjustment methodology used by the Commission in the original investigation to be inconsistent with Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Commission noted that the Panel Report in question is still under appeal. In any event, the facts examined by that panel are different from the facts of this case. In particular, the expiry review request submitted by Fertilizers Europe contains dumping calculations based on actual domestic prices in Russia. This claim was thus dismissed.

• (11) On 14 November 2024, the Russian authorities alleged the absence of a duly substantiated request within the meaning of Article 11.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement since the request lacked sufficient evidence of the likelihood of recurrence or continuation of dumping and injury. The Russian authorities referred to dumping calculations under the so-called standard methodology, which the Russian authorities alleged were not duly summarised. The Russian authorities stated that the request deprived Russian parties of the opportunity to verify data, to understand and verify the calculations and to comment on them because the request lacked due summarisation of confidential information, including data provided by external experts to the applicant, or lacked a statement of reasons explaining why summarisation was not possible. In this context, the Russian authorities referred to Article 6.5.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and several WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Decisions, including EC – Fasteners (China) [^ntr7-L_202600065EN.000101-E0007].

• (12) In addition, with regard to the constructed normal value outlined by the applicant in the request, the Russian authorities claimed that adjustments of the natural gas costs based on Waidhaus or Baumgarten prices are inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. To this end, the Russian authorities referred to the WTO Panel Report on Cost Adjustment Methodologies [^ntr8-L_202600065EN.000101-E0008].

• (13) By submission of 16 November 2024 [^ntr9-L_202600065EN.000101-E0009], Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited (‘MHTL’), an exporting producer located in Trinidad and Tobago, alleged that the request did not meet legal standards as regards the allegation that the expiry of the measures in respect of imports from Trinidad and Tobago would be likely to result in a recurrence of dumping. MHTL specified that the request showed negative dumping margins with regard to the Trinidad and Tobago exports of UAN to the Union.

• (14) By submission of 18 November 2024 [^ntr10-L_202600065EN.000101-E0010], CF Industries Holdings, Inc. (‘CFI’), an exporting producer located in the United States of America, echoed the Russian authorities as regards the impossibility for interested parties to verify certain data, assessments and sources in the request. CFI also cast doubts on the legitimacy of some of the applicant’s claims due to discrepancies between the figures in the request and in Eurostat regarding imports from the US in 2020 and 2021.

• (15) By submission of 18 November 2024 [^ntr11-L_202600065EN.000101-E0011], JSC Nevinnomyssky Azot (Eurochem) and JSC Novomoskovsk Azot (NAK Azot) (jointly referred to as ‘Eurochem’) argued that the version of the request for an expiry review that was lodged on 28 June 2024 by Fertilizers Europe (‘original request’) did not provide sufficient evidence of the likelihood of continuation of dumping or injury by means of UAN imports from Russia. Eurochem also reiterated that such lack of sufficient evidence in the original request could not be rectified by additional information submitted by the applicant during the three-month period preceding the expiry of the original measures. It referred in this regard to the open version of the request for an expiry review dated 9 September 2024 that was made available to interested parties in the case file. Eurochem therefore requested that the Commission provide Eurochem with the original request.

• (16) Further, Eurochem claimed that the original request did not contain sufficient evidence that the expiry of the measures would likely result in a continuation of dumping. It argued that the export price as determined by the applicant was manifestly inaccurate because it was based on a wrongful methodology and was not supported by evidence. Specifically, Eurochem alleged that the request incorrectly used an average annual import price for Russia, but should have relied on average monthly import prices as there was a major fluctuation in UAN prices in 2023. Also, in the request, the average import price of Russian UAN imports in 2023 were based on Eurostat and adjusted for transportation costs within Russia and between Russia to France (Rouen). According to Eurochem, such adjustments incorrectly assumed that all Russian imports require transportation costs for shipment within Russia, as Acron, a major Russian exporter, used its own UAN terminal in Estonia, and that all Russian imports entered the EU through France whereas, according to Eurochem, one third of Russian UAN imports was imported through other Member States.

• (17) In addition, Eurochem claimed that the request provided no evidence for several assumptions regarding the determination of the export price of Russian-origin UAN, such as that Acron had sales of UAN from Russia to the EU, transportation of UAN within Russia and from Russia to France as well as related costs for such transportation. In this regard, the request referred to several confidential annexes without providing good cause for such confidential treatment. Eurochem argued that the non-confidential version of these annexes which contained certain ranges are meaningless and insufficient for interested parties to gain a reasonable understanding of the information submitted.

• (18) Further, Eurochem claimed that the determination of the normal value was also based on a wrongful methodology and not supported by evidence. Eurochem specified that, contrary to Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, the request compared the export prices of a plant in Russia that had no domestic sales (JSC Acron) with domestic sales prices of a plant in Russia that had both, domestic and export sales (NAK or Nevinka). According to Eurochem, the request should have either taken domestic and export prices of the same plant or average Russian export and domestic sales prices. Instead, the request erroneously relied upon prices of legal entities that were not comparable.

• (19) Eurochem additionally claimed that the applicant had not used three known sources of monthly UAN prices in the Russian market, namely Argus, Chemcourier and SPIMEX and instead relied on unsupported speculations by an unnamed expert or consultant. Also, since UAN prices significantly fluctuated in the course of 2023, the request should have determined the normal value based on monthly home market prices, rather than annual average prices.

• (20) Furthermore, Eurochem echoed the comments made by the Russian authorities, as concerns the absence of due summarisation of confidential information of normal value data.

• (21) Furthermore, Eurochem alleged that the request failed to provide evidence of a particular market situation within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation, and that the cost adjustment methodology whereby the actual cost of gas in Russia is replaced by a benchmark price based on gas prices at Waidhaus and Baumgarten was inconsistent with applicable WTO rules. Eurochem also argued that constructing a normal value that was based on selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) costs and profit stemming from UAN producers in the USA would likewise be in conflict with EU and WTO rules.

• (22) Additionally, Eurochem argued that the request did not provide sufficient evidence that the expiry of the measures would result in a continuation of injury by means of imports from Russia and it failed to analyse the effect of various other factors that caused injury to the Union industry, such as imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, the evolution of consumption, the price of urea, increased costs of production of Union producers and purchases of UAN by Union producers.

• (23) The Commission carried out an examination of the request in accordance with Articles 11(2) and 5 of the basic Regulation and concluded that the requirements for initiation of an expiry review investigation were met. The Commission considered that the prima facie evidence presented in the request pointed to a situation whereby the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in the continuation and/or recurrence of dumping and continuation or recurrence of injury to the Union industry injury which merited the initiation of an investigation according to the law. In other words, the request was found to be sufficiently substantiated and therefore deserved further investigation. Such assessment was made before the three-month period preceding the expiry of the original measures. The version of the request dated 9 September 2025 that was made available to interested parties in the case file at initiation of the investigation constituted a consolidation of the request and certain corroborating evidence that was submitted by the applicant, which did not constitute any new evidence or arguments when compared to the original version of the request. Specifically as regards Eurochem’s request to receive the original version of the request, the Commission shared this with Eurochem on 15 January 2025. In this respect, the Court notes that, in accordance wih the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-554/23 P, C-568/23 P, Fertilizers Europe and Commission v Nevinnomysskiy Azot and NAK “Azot” [^ntr12-L_202600065EN.000101-E0012], Article 11(2) of the basic AD Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the Commission is entitled to take into account evidence that was produced, at its request, by Union producers in the three-month period preceding the expiry of anti-dumping measures, in order to decide whether it is appropriate to carry out a review of those anti-dumping measures.

• (24) The claims made by the four parties in relation to the lawfulness of initiation and the sufficiency of evidence presented in the request were thus dismissed. In this regard, the Commission emphasised that a review request must contain sufficient prima facie evidence. In particular, according to settled case-law, the quantity and quality of the evidence necessary to meet the criteria of the sufficiency of the evidence for the purpose of initiating an expiry review is different from that which is necessary for the purpose of a preliminary or final determination of the existence of recurrence or continuation of dumping and injury [^ntr13-L_202600065EN.000101-E0013].

• (25) The request lodged by the applicant included detailed calculations showing the continuation of dumping in Russia based on evidence reasonably available to the applicant. The Commission considered the quantity and the quality of evidence submitted by the applicant to be sufficient to lead to the initiation of the expiry review. In this respect, contrarily to what Eurochem submitted, there is no obligation under Article 11 of the basic Regulation for an expiry review request to faithfully reflect, in the dumping margin calculations, all different distribution channels of the product concerned in the countries considered and in the Union. Similarly, there is no legal requirement for the request to cover the entirety of domestic or export sales or present detailed adjustments in the calculations. Moreover, the average yearly calculations submitted by the applicant were sufficient to establish a prima facie dumping margin. There is no obligation for an applicant lodging an expiry review request to carry out monthly dumping margin calculations prior to the initiation stage.

• (26) In the same vein, the Commission considered that none of the comments lodged by Eurochem in relation to injury and causation, as summarised in recital (22) above, could plausibly put into question the sufficiency of the detailed relevant evidence submitted as part of the request.

• (27) The Commission therefore considered that the quantity and quality of evidence demanded in particular by Eurochem clearly goes beyond the prima facie standard. Eurochem’s claims were dismissed accordingly.

• (28) The claim made by the Russian authorities on the methodology to assess the normal value for Russia is further addressed in the respective section covering the dumping assessment, notably under recitals (56), (60) and (61) below.

• (29) As regards the claim by MHTL concerning the missing evidence on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping, the Comission agreed on the fact that the request showed negative dumping margins with regard to TT. Where dumping has ceased to exist following the imposition of measures, any expiry review analysis has indeed to focus on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping. The Commission noted that the applicant had provided sufficient evidence, based on data reasonably available, showing the likelihood of recurrence of dumping from TT under several plausible scenarios and in line with the relevant legal standard. The Commission considered the arguments submitted by MHTL as incapable as putting into question the sufficiency of evidence included in the request.

• (30) The Commission considered that the request was submitted with a sufficiently clear and detailed non-confidential version. The non-confidential version provided interested parties with a meaningful understanding of the legal and factual grounds underpinning the request, thereby allowing them to submit thorough comments at initiation stage. The Commission further noted that, in the course of the proceedings, the applicant engaged in an additional disclosure of information and annexes to the request which were initially kept confidential. The applicants’ document was placed on the open file of the investigation and made available to interested parties. Accordingly, the Commission dismissed the claims raised by interested parties in this respect.

1.6.   Sampling

• (31) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

1.6.1.   Sampling of Union producers

• (32) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of representativity in terms of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024. The geographical spread was also considered. This sample consisted of three Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for approximately 64 % of the estimated total volume of production of the like product in the Union at initiation stage and 75 % of the sales into the Union of the producers that replied to the standing exercise. The sample was representative of the Union industry.

• (33) In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. The exporting producer CFI alleged that the proposed sample overrepresented Eastern European producers, failed to meet the established standards of representativity and requested an additional (Dutch) producer to be added to the sample of Union producers. The Commission dismissed CFI’s claim on the grounds that the sample was representative of the Union industry both in terms of production and sales and, given the locations of Union producers, also in terms of geographical spread as it contained companies from different parts of the Union (Germany, Poland and Lithuania).

1.6.2.   Sampling of importers

• (34) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

• (35) Two unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In view of the low number of replies, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary.

1.6.3.   Sampling of exporting producers in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America

• (36) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

• (37) Initially, the two Russian exporting producers JSC Nevinnomyssky Azot (Eurochem) and JSC Novomoskovsk Azot (NAK Azot) (which are jointly referred to as ‘Eurochem’, see recital (15)) provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In view of the low number, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary and invited the two exporting producers to submit a complete questionnaire response.

• (38) One exporting producer in Trinidad and Tobago and one exporting producer in the United States of America provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In view of the low number for each country, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary and invited the two exporting producers to submit a complete questionnaire response.

1.7.   Replies to the questionnaire

• (39) The Commission invited the three sampled Union producers, the two unrelated importers which had made themselves known and the four exporting producers in the countries concerned which made themselves known to complete the questionnaires, which were made available on its website [^ntr14-L_202600065EN.000101-E0014] on the day of initiation. The Commission sent a questionnaire to the applicant with a view to collect data on macro-indicators.

• (40) Questionnaire replies were received from the three sampled Union producers, the applicant, two unrelated importers in the Union, and from each of the exporting producers in Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America.

• (41) The two Russian exporting producers did not submit any questionnaire response by the deadline set by the Commission.

1.8.   Application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation

• (42) By letter dated 12 December 2024, the Commission informed the two Russian exporting producers that it considered them as non-cooperating parties and informed them of its intention to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation and make use of facts available to determine its findings in the investigation. The Commission also informed the authorities of Russia of its intention to apply facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

• (43) By letter dated 19 December 2024, the two Russian exporting producers disagreed with the intended application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation. However, the two Russian exporting producers did not submit the outstanding questionnaire response but they rather questioned the lawfulness of the initiation of the ongoing review investigation. In particular, they alleged that the Commission had not provided a copy of the expiry review request by Fertilizers Europe even though it was under an obligation to provide it on 8 October 2024, the day of initiation of the present review. On this basis, the two Russian exporting producers concluded that the Commission impeded their cooperation with the expiry review. This matter is further addressed under recital (23) above.

1.9.   Verification

• (44) The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Union producers and their association:

• — AB Achema, Jonava, Lithuania

• — Grupa Azoty Zakłady Azotowe Puławy S. A., Puławy, Poland

• — SKW Stickstoffwerke Piesteritz GmbH, Lutherstadt Wittenberg, Germany

• — Fertilizers Europe, Brussels, Belgium

Exporting producers in Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America:

• — Methanol Holdings (Trinidad) Limited, Point Lisas, Trinidad and Tobago

• — CF Industries Holdings, Inc., Northbrook, United States of America

Related importer:

• — Helm AG, Hamburg, Germany

(a) Subsequent procedure

• (45) On 20 November 2025, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to maintain the anti-dumping duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

• (46) The comments made by interested parties were considered by the Commission and taken into account, where appropriate. The parties who so requested were granted a hearing.

2. PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product under review

• (47) The product under review is the same as in in the original investigation namely mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution (‘UAN’), currently falling under CN code 3102 80 00 (‘the product under review’).

• (48) UAN is a liquid nitrogen fertiliser typically used in some arable crops.

• (49) The nitrogen content is the most significant feature of the product under review. It can vary between 28 % and 32 % of UAN, depending on the water content of the solution. In general, imported solutions are UAN 32 % since more concentrated UAN is cheaper to ship. However, whatever their nitrogen content, all solutions of urea and ammonium nitrate are considered to have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and therefore constitute a single product.

2.2.   Product concerned

• (50) The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America, currently falling under CN code 3102 80 00 .

2.3.   Like product

• (51) As established in the original investigation, this expiry review investigation confirmed that the following products have the same basic physical and chemical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

• — the product concerned when exported to the Union,

• — the product under review produced and sold on the domestic market of the countries concerned,

• — the product under review produced and sold by the exporting producers to the rest of the world, and

• — the product under review produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

• (52) These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

3. DUMPING

3.1.   Russia

3.1.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (53) During the review investigation period, imports of UAN from Russia continued albeit at lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation (i.e. from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018). According to Eurostat, imports of UAN from Russia accounted for 12,4 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 13,4 % market share during the original investigation. In relative terms, the volume of Russian UAN exports to the EU fell by 47 %, and in absolute terms, the decrease amounted to 289 952 tonnes.

3.1.2.   Application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation

• (54) As mentioned in recital (42), none of the exporting producers from Russia cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of Russia that due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission intended to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings with regard to Russia. Eurochem replied to the Commission’s information on 19 December 2024 and reiterated its intention not to cooperate in the investigation in the light of the alleged errors made at initiation stage as addressed in Section 1.5 above. The Commission did not receive any further comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard.

• (55) Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular on data provided by the applicants in the request and import statistics retrieved from Eurostat.

3.1.3.   Normal value

• (56) As mentioned in recital (55) above, in the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers in Russia, the Commission used facts available to establish the normal value. To this end, the Commission used data provided by the applicant in the request. These data were based on market intelligence the applicant had access to. The estimated normal value consisted of an ex works domestic price, of EUR 165 per tonne in the year 2023.

3.1.4.   Export price

• (57) In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers in Russia, the Commission used facts available to establish the export price.

• (58) The export price was determined based on market intelligence data provided in the request. The thus resulting ex works export price for the year 2023 was EUR 135 per tonne.

3.1.5.   Comparison

• (59) As mentioned in above recitals, the Commission used normal value and export price data adjusted to ex works levels to perform the comparison under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

3.1.6.   Dumping margins

• (60) The above comparison showed that the export prices to the Union, expressed as a percentage of the CIF value, were 16,7 % lower than the established normal value. In any event, the Commission found that if it relied on a constructed normal value based on adjusted natural gas prices [^ntr15-L_202600065EN.000101-E0015], this would result in an even higher difference between the export prices and the established normal value: that is 44 %.

• (61) Since dumping was found with respect to Russia under any plausible scenario, the Commission considered Eurochem’s claims aimed at disqualifying the use of a constructed normal value methodology, as summarised in recital (21) above, to be moot.

• (62) The Commissoin therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

3.2.   Trinidad and Tobago

3.2.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (63) The only known producer of UAN in Trinidad and Tobago during the period considered was MHTL.

• (64) During the review investigation period, in absolute terms, imports of UAN from Trinidad and Tobago continued at almost the same levels as during the investigation period of the original investigation. Based on Eurostat figures, imports of UAN from Trinidad and Tobago accounted for about 9,8 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 8,1 % market share during the original investigation. The relative increase in market share is explained by the significantly lower level of Union consumption during the review investigation period as compared with the original investigation period.

3.2.2.   Normal value

• (65) The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales of MHTL was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation.

• (66) As there were no sales of the like product on the domestic market and it was not possible to find domestic prices (absent any domestic consumption), the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and 2(6)(b) of the basic Regulation.

• (67) The normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of the cooperating exporting producer during the review investigation period:

• (a) the actual amounts of SG&A expenses incurred by MHTL on the production and sales of the same general category of products in the domestic market, in the ordinary course of trade, during the review investigation period; and

• (b) the actual amount of profit realised by MHTL on the production and sales of the same general category of products in the domestic market, in the ordinary course of trade, during the review investigation period.

3.2.3.   Export price

• (68) During the review investigation period, MHTL exported to the Union only via related companies acting as importers. All sales to the Union were carried out via a related importer in Germany. This related importer sold the product concerned to independent customers in Germany or to related companies in France and Spain, which in turn sold the product concerned to independent customers on their respective national markets.

• (69) Therefore, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses and dilution and mixing costs; and for a reasonable profit.

• (70) With regard to the dilution and mixing costs, specific for this case, MHTL exported only UAN with a nitrogen content of 32 % during the investigation period. The related importers, however, sold to the independent customers UAN with a nitrogen content of either 32 % or less. Therefore, in case where the product concerned was diluted with water or mixed with sulphur to achieve lower nitrogen content, the adjustments mentioned in recital (69) also included the additional costs of dilution and mixing incurred by the related importer.

3.2.4.   Comparison

• (71) The Commission compared, per product type, the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(3) and 2(6)(b) of the basic Regulation and the export price of the cooperating exporting producer on an ex-works basis as established above.

• (72) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for freight and insurance costs, customs duties, handling, loading and ancillary expenses and storage costs, and for additional costs of dilution and mixing incurred by the related importer.

3.2.5.   Dumping margins

• (73) For MHTL, the cooperating exporting producer, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product under review, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

• (74) Using the methodology described under recital (70) above, the dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was 35,1 % for MHTL. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

• (75) Following disclosure, DAKOFO [^ntr16-L_202600065EN.000101-E0016] alleged that imports of UAN originating in Trinidad and Tobago into the Union were not made at dumped prices. For the sake of assessing an export price into the Union, DAKOFO relied on UAN import price quotations at the Fredericia terminal, according to DAKOFO the largest terminal in the Baltic Sea region handling UAN shipments. As to the normal value, DAKOFO considered that there are no sales of UAN on the domestic market of Trinidad and Tobago. It therefore used a constructed normal value that was based on published New Orleans (NOLA) CIF quotations.

• (76) The Commission rejected DAKOFO’s claim. As outlined in recitals (65) to (74), the Commission based its dumping calculation on the verified data of the sole co-operating and, according to the information on file, the sole existing producer of UAN in Trinidad and Tobago. These data were verified by the Commission on-the-spot. As this calculation resulted in the existence of dumping, the Commission’s conclusion of a continuation of dumping for Trinidad and Tobago is confirmed.

3.3.   United States of America

3.3.1.   Preliminary remarks

• (77) During the review investigation period, imports of UAN from the US continued albeit at lower levels than in the investigation period of the original investigation. Based on Eurostat figures, imports of UAN from the US accounted for about 20,6 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 16,2 % market share during the original investigation.

3.3.2.   Normal value

• (78) The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for the sole cooperating exporting producer, CFI, was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represented at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product under review to the Union during the review investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by the cooperating exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

• (79) The Commission subsequently identified for the cooperating exporting producer the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union.

• (80) The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by the cooperating exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the review investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of the only product type that the cooperating exporting producer sold for export to the Union were representative.

• (81) The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the review investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

• (82) The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

• (a) the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

• (b) the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

• (83) In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the review investigation period.

• (84) The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the review investigation period, if:

• (a) the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type; or

• (b) the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

• (85) The analysis of domestic sales showed that [95-100] % of all domestic sales were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the review investigation period.

3.3.3.   Export price

• (86) The cooperating exporting producer exported to the Union directly to independent customers. Therefore, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product under review when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

3.3.4.   Comparison

• (87) The Commission compared, per product type, the normal value and the export price of the cooperating exporting producer on an ex-works basis as established above.

• (88) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for discounts, rebates and differences in quantities; transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs and credit costs.

3.3.5.   Dumping margins

• (89) For the cooperating exporting producer, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product under review, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

• (90) On this basis, the weighted average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was 52,2 % for the cooperating producer. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

• (91) Following disclosure, DAKOFO alleged that imports of UAN originating in the US into the Union were not made at dumped prices. For the sake of assessing an export price into the Union, DAKOFO relied on UAN import price quotations at the Fredericia terminal, similarly as DAKOFO claimed for imports from Trinidad and Tobago (see recital (75) above). As to the normal value, DAKOFO used published ‘New Orleans (NOLA) CIF quotations’, considering that these quoations represent the domestic prices payable in the US.

• (92) The Commission rejected DAKOFO’s claim. As outlined in recitals (78) to (90), the Commission based its dumping calculation on the verified data of the sole co-operating producer of UAN in the US. These data were verified by the Commission on-the-spot. As this calculation resulted in the existence of dumping, the Commission’s conclusion of a continuation of dumping for the US is confirmed.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF DUMPING

4.1.   Russia

• (93) Further to the finding indicating the existence of dumping during the review investigation period with regard to Russia, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures lapse. The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia and the attractiveness of the Union market.

4.1.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in Russia

• (94) The investigation established that the total production capacity and spare capacity in Russia were significant during the period considered. According to data supplied by the applicant, the aggregated production capacity of all known Russian producers exceeded 3 500 000 tonnes per year, and spare capacities were on average about 30 % in any year of the period considered.

4.1.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (95) The Commission examined whether it was likely that Russian exporting producers would increase their export sales at dumped prices on the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse.

• (96) The existence of anti-dumping measures did not diminish the attractiveness of the Union market. Throughout the period considered, yearly import volumes reached more than 300 000 tonnes per year, which is almost half of the volume of imports found in the original investigation period, and more than half the yearly average observed in the period considered of the original investigation, which lasted from 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2018. It is also recalled that these sales into the Union, even with anti-dumping measures in place, were made at dumped prices. Therefore, should the measures lapse, volumes of dumped imports are likely to increase.

4.1.3.   Conclusion

• (97) The applicable anti-dumping measures have not prevented Russian producers from continuing to sell significant volumes of UAN into the Union at dumped prices. Should measures be allowed to lapse, these producers are likely to sell even greater volumes at dumped prices into the Union, because they have the spare capacity to be able to do so (see recital (94)).

4.2.   Trinidad and Tobago

• (98) Further to the finding indicating the existence of dumping during the review investigation period (see recital (74)), the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures lapse. The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in Trinidad and Tobago and the attractiveness of the Union market.

4.2.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in Trinidad and Tobago

• (99) The investigation established that the total production capacity and spare capacity in Trinidad and Tobago were significant during the period considered. On average, the yearly spare capacity was over 400 000 tonnes in the period considered, and it reached more than 700 000 tonnes in 2023.

4.2.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (100) The existence of anti-dumping measures did not diminish the attractiveness of the Union market during the period considered. Yearly import volumes from Trinidad and Tobago during the period considered reached more than 400 000 tonnes per year, which is more than in the original investigation period and close to the yearly average observed in the period considered of the original investigation, which lasted from 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2018. It is also recalled that these sales into the Union, even with anti-dumping measures in place, were made at dumped prices. Thus, it is likely that, should the measures lapse, dumped imports would continue increasing.

4.2.3.   Conclusion

• (101) The applicable anti-dumping measures have not prevented MHTL from continuing to sell significant volumes of UAN into the Union. Should the measures lapse, MHTL is likely to sell even greater volumes at dumped prices into the Union, because MHTL has the spare capacity to be able to do so.

4.3.   United States of America

• (102) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission analysed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures lapse. In this regard, the Commission analysed the production capacity and spare capacity in the US and the attractiveness of the Union market.

4.3.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the US

• (103) Both in the original investigation period and in the review investigation period, the only cooperating exporting producer from the US was CFI. The request indicated the existence of other UAN producers in the US. These producers did not cooperate with the present expiry review nor the original investigation. Their production capacity is deemed unlikely to be available for exports to the Union. Following a conservative approach, the Commission has therefore considered only the spare capacity of CFI as available for export to the Union. That spare capacity amounted to more than 200 000 tonnes yearly throughout the period considered. CFI’s total capacity was in a range of [6 000 000 to 6 500 000] tonnes yearly in the review investigation period.

4.3.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (104) The existence of anti-dumping measures did not diminish the attractiveness for US exporting producers of UAN of the Union market during the period considered. Except for the year 2021, yearly volumes exported from the US to the Union exceeded 550 000 tonnes per year, which is significant and just about 150 000 tonnes less than in the original investigation period. It is also recalled these sales into the Union, even with anti-dumping measures in place, were made at dumped prices. Thus, it is likely that, should the measures lapse, dumped imports would continue increasing.

4.3.3.   Conclusion

• (105) The applicable anti-dumping measures have not prevented CFI from continuing to sell significant volumes of UAN into the Union. Should measures lapse, CFI is likely to sell at least about the same volume it sold in the review investigation period at dumped prices into the Union or even increase its volumes sold into the Union as CFI has the spare capacity to be able to do so (see recital (103)). Although UAN may be sold at higher prices in the domestic market when compared to the Union market, there are no indications that the US UAN market will grow any further, and therefore it is unlikely to absorb any spare capacities. In addition, CFI is keen to make best use of their production capacity and to sell any output from otherwise idle spare capacities to export markets, including the Union market.

• (106) Following disclosure, CFI claimed that the Commission failed to conduct the forward-looking assessment required by Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. CFI added that the review investigation period was characterised by extraordinary, non-representative circumstances, including supply shortages which drew marginal exporters into the Union. In addition, CFI claimed that the Commission did not assess if CFI had any incentive to sell at the same prices in the future and if gas prices, which CFI expected to drop after 2024, would impact price relationships, if the Union producers’ recovery would affect the future demand for US-produced UAN, and if US domestic demand trends would limit export availability. Finally, CFI invoked that US exports were driven by temporary Union shortages, not by structural incentives to dump.

• (107) As to the general allegation of an absent forward-looking assessment, the Commission drew CFI’s attention to the assessment made under recitals (102) to (105).

• (108) As to any non-representative character of the review investigation period, the Commission pointed out that import volumes from the US, which held a share of more than 20 % of the total Union market (see Table 2 below), can by no means be considered marginal. The Commission understood that CFI did not mean ‘marginal exporters’ but ‘marginal exports’.

• (109) Contrary to CFI’s claim, the Commission did assess whether CFI would have a clear incentive to continue selling UAN at dumped prices into the Union (see recital (105)). Moreover, the Commission found that not only in the review investigation period but also in the years 2022 and 2023, the gross domestic prices of CFI exceeded the gross export prices invoiced by CFI to the Union, which is a clear indication of consistent dumping practices in the entire period considered. CFI has been found to have a strong position in the US domestic market to which it has been selling at least 95 % of its output throughout the period considered. There is no obvious reason why CFI would lower their domestic prices (to the level of export prices) and thus give away their main source of profits. In turn, CFI is unlikely to sell UAN into the Union market at prices at the high level of the US domestic market, in view of the more competitive structure of the Union market.

• (110) The Commission further clarified that there was no need to assess any effect of gas prices on future price relations. As pointed out under recitals (102) and (118), it was not deemed necessary to analyse price relationships in the present likelihood of continuation of dumping assessment. For the same reasons, it was not considered necessary to analyse if the Union producers’ recovery would affect the future demand for US-produced UAN. This notwithstanding, it can be expected that as long as UAN originating in the US is offered at prices undercutting the prices of Union producers, demand for US-produced UAN will continue.

• (111) As to whether US domestic demand trends could limit export availability, the Commission recalled that it had found that the US domestic market was not likely to grow any further (105). In any event, CFI failed to submit any analysis pointing to the contrary, i.e. which would show that the US domestic market is likely to grow in the future.

• (112) As to CFI’s claim that there were no structural incentives to dump, reference is made to recital (109) above, where the Commission outlined why CFI’s strong position on the US domestic market, allowing it to realise significant profits, in combination with a much more competitive export market in the Union has indeed created a situation of structural dumping, which is likely to continue.

• (113) In addition, CFI argued that the Commission did not analyse whether CFI’s spare capacity of at least 200 000 tonnes yearly was in fact needed to serve its domestic and third-country customers, nor did it examine the opportunity costs of diverting volumes to the Union. It further noted that, on the one hand, concluding that the Union market remained attractive because export volumes by CFI exceeded at least 550 000 tonnes during the review investigation period, and, on the other hand, inferring that dumping is likely to continue in the absence of measures, would present a circular reasoning.

• (114) The Commission disagreed with CFI’s claims. Notwithstanding the assessment under recital (103), the Commission found that even if none of the assessed spare capacity or only a small fraction of it is exported to the Union in the future, at least a yearly volume of more than 550 000 tonnes of UAN [^ntr17-L_202600065EN.000101-E0017], which was the lowest that CFI exported in any 12-month period falling into the period considered, is likely to be exported to the Union in the future as well. Such export volume is significant (20 % market share during the review investigation period, see Table 2 below), when compared to the Union consumption. Moreover, the investigation confirmed that such imports were made into the Union at dumped prices. Considering that dumping practices have continued while anti-dumping measures have been in place, it is likely that such dumping practices will continue in the event that measures would expire. Such reasoning does not present a circular reasoning, but it is rather inferring a consequence or likelihood based on current events.

• (115) CFI further claimed that the surge in US exports in 2022 and 2023 was a response to an exceptional combination of high Union prices, limited Union production, and reduced availabilities of other suppliers. Once Union producers resumed production and Union prices returned to normal levels, US exports had already begun to decline. It claimed that this can be confirmed by the Eurostat data in Table 2 below, showing a drop in US import volumes into the Union from 853 263 tonnes in 2022 to 536 569 tonnes in the review investigation period.

• (116) The Commission disagreed with CFI’s claim. First, the Commission found that the import volume observed in the review investigation period represented above 20 % of market share of the Union consumption (see Table 2). Moreover, these imports were found to be dumped, as the investigation has shown. The Commission likewise recalled that even in a context of no exceptional external factors (such as rapidly increasing gas prices and subsequent supply disruptions, which CFI deemed to be mainly responsible for increased export volumes from the US), UAN exports from the US to the Union reached yearly more than 540 000 tonnes in 2016, 2017 and the investiagtion period of the original investigation, covering the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 (see Table 2 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/576 [^ntr18-L_202600065EN.000101-E0018]). This shows that in all periods investigated by the Commission since 2016, the export volumes of UAN to the Union reached significant levels.

• (117) Finally, CFI noted that according to paragraph 96 of the disclosure document, the Commission intended to analyse ‘the relationship between prices in the Union and the US’ and the ‘relationship between export prices to the Union and third countries and prices in the US’. However, the disclosure document did not contain any such analysis.

• (118) The Commission clarified that the analysis of the noted price relationships was not necessary to conclude that dumping is likely to continue in the absence of measures. The analysis of the production capacity and spare capacity in the US and the attractiveness of the Union market was sufficient to reach this conclusion (see recitals (102) to (105)).

• (119) For the above considerations, the Commission confirmed the conclusion that dumping is likely to continue should measures be allowed to lapse.

5. INJURY

5.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (120) The like product was manufactured by around 20 (groups) of producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

• (121) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at 2 299 135 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, namely data collected by Fertilizers Europe and market intelligence available to the applicant. As indicated in recital (32), three Union producers were selected in the sample. Based on verified data, they represented close to 70 % of the total Union production of the like product.

5.2.   Union consumption

• (122) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market plus imports from all third countries as recorded in Eurostat.

• (123) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Union consumption (tonnes)

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Total Union consumption	3 380 170	3 420 870	2 922 614	2 608 677
Index	100	101	86	77
Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat.	Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat.	Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat.	Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat.	Source: Fertilizers Europe and Eurostat.

• (124) Over the period considered, the Union consumption fell by 23 %. This decrease in the Union consumption can be explained by a number of reasons: a temporary decrease in production of UAN in the Union when gas and energy prices spiked in 2022; a very significant surge in import volumes in the same year; and best practices for the use of nutrients in farming that limit the usage of mineral fertilisers [^ntr19-L_202600065EN.000101-E0019].

5.3.   Imports from the countries concerned

5.3.1.   Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned

• (125) The Commission examined whether imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation.

• (126) That provision stipulates that the imports from more than one country shall be cumulatively assessed only if it is determined that:

• (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in Article 9(3) and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible; and

• (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between imported products and the like Union product.

• (127) At initiation stage, MHTL alleged that imports from Trinidad and Tobago should be assessed separately due to changed circumstances as compared to the initial investigation. Specifically, according to MHTL, a separate assessment of TT imports would have been justified in the light of the fact that the request found no dumping for TT, the exporters from TT were reliable and politically stable partners for the Union and different from the exporters from Russia and the United States of America and TT imports (with higher prices than imports of other origins and significantly less volume-wise than imports from Russia and the United States of America together) could have not caused material injury to the Union industry. The Commission rejected such claims. The decision as to whether or not imports should be assessed cumulatively must be based on the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, which were met in this case as explained in more detail in recitals (129) to (132) below. No other issues raised by MHTL could question the appropriateness of examining imports from Trinidad and Tobago together with imports from the US and Russia [^ntr20-L_202600065EN.000101-E0020].

• (128) The exporting producer CFI requested Russian imports to be assessed separately from the imports from Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America. CFI based its claim on the Hardboard [^ntr21-L_202600065EN.000101-E0021] and Wire Rod [^ntr22-L_202600065EN.000101-E0022] cases (involving countries other than Russia) and referred to (i) the unique cost structures of Russian producers resulting from regulated gas prices domestically; (ii) geopolitical factors (namely the Russian’s war of aggression against Ukraine and consequent Western sanctions on Russia); (iii) a distinct pricing behaviour as Russia was diverting its natural gas supplies into downstream nitrogen products; and (iv) the request showing significant undercutting only for Russia. The Commission noted that the situation in the cases cited by CFI differed from the situation in the present investigation, thus those arguments could not be transposed to this investigation. For instance, in Hardboard, where Brazil imports were assessed separately, the Brazilian imports concerned a product type with a very distinct use. The Commission considers that this is certainly not the case of imported UAN in the present review. In Wire Rod, Turkish imports were not cumulated in particular because their prices were very high and the conditions of competition between Turkish and other operators were not deemed similar, whereas imports from the Republic of Moldova were assessed separately since they did not undercut the prices of the Union industry and the injury margin was below the de minimis injury threshold. In the present investigation, no country concerned has abnormally high prices and undercutting is significant considering the price sensitive nature of a commodity such as UAN. Following disclosure, CFI alleged that the Commission had not performed a substantive analysis in accordance with Article 3(4)(b) of the basic Regulation (i.e. a substantive analysis of the conditions of competion between products from the different origins) and that the nature and source of any dumping from the US, Russia or TT differed, namely as Russian dumping would stem from structural state-induced cost distortions . The Commission disagreed and noted that the conditions of competition between imported products and the like Union product are assessed in detail in recital (131)below and that the nature of dumping is, in the context of such an analysis, irrelevant.

• (129) The margins of dumping established in relation to the imports from each of the three countries concerned were far above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation.

• (130) The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. The market shares in the review investigation period were 12,4 % for imports from Russia, 9,8 % for imports from Trinidad and Tobago and 20,6 % for imports from the United States of America. Although import volumes from Trinidad and Tobago decreased during the period considered, these imports still hold a considerable market share in the Union (9,8 %).

• (131) The conditions of competition between, on the one hand, the dumped imports from Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America and, on the other hand, between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like product of the Union industry, were similar. More specifically, the imported products competed with each other, as well as with the like product produced in the Union. This is because the imported and domestic products are sold through the same sales channels and to similar categories of customers. Often UAN from different origins is mixed in storage tanks. The product under review is an interchangeable homogenous commodity and competition took place largely based on price alone. During the period considered, the sales prices to the Union of both the domestic producers and the countries concerned (consolidated and individually) peaked in 2022 and decreased significantly afterwards. During the review investigation period, whereas import prices from TT were basically the same as in 2021, Russian import prices shrank by 39 %. US prices also fell but to a lower extent. Prices of imports from any of the countries concerned dropped to levels below the Union sale prices of the Union industry during the review investigation period.

• (132) In light of the above, the Commission considered that the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination.

5.3.2.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

• (133) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing the volume of imports with the Union consumption.

• (134) Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 2

Import volume and market share

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Volume of imports from the countries concerned (tonnes)	533 210	1 954 098	1 326 333	1 116 079
Index	100	366	249	209
Market share	15,8  %	57,1  %	45,4  %	42,8  %
Index	100	362	288	271
Volume of imports from the Russian Federation (tonnes)	144 663	427 636	300 523	323 539
Index	100	296	208	224
Market share	4,3  %	12,5  %	10,3  %	12,4  %
Index	100	292	240	290
Volume of imports from Trinidad and Tobago (tonnes)	388 547	673 200	261 201	255 972
Index	100	173	67	66
Market share	11,5  %	19,7  %	8,9  %	9,8  %
Index	100	171	78	85
Volume of imports from the United States of America (tonnes)	0	853 263	764 610	536 569
Index [^ntr1-L_202600065EN.000101-E0023] (basis 2022)*	-	100 -	90 -	63
Market share	-	24,9  %	26,2  %	20,6  %
Index (basis 2022)	-	100	105	82
Source: Eurostat (import volume), cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat (import volume), cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat (import volume), cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat (import volume), cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat (import volume), cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.

• (135) Imports from the countries concerned increased by 109 % over the period considered. The increase in market share was even more pronounced as the market share of the imports concerned increased by 171 %, from 15,8 % in 2021 to 42,8 % in the review investigation period. As Union consumption decreased by 23 % over the same period, the steep increase in market share by the countries concerned was clearly to the detriment of other market participants, namely the Union industry.

5.3.3.   Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting

• (136) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data.

• (137) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/tonne)