Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/114 of 15 January 2026 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (134) Reckel, Abranova, PRE, DFFI, and the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC argued that the increase in the Union industry’s production costs, in particular due to higher electricity prices, inflation and the rising cost of imported raw materials, breaks or at least considerably attenuates the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

• (135) The Commission had already examined this claim in the provisional Regulation and concluded that the increases in energy and raw material does not explain the deterioration observed. In particular, the investigation showed that in 2022, when energy prices were at their highest, the Union industry remained profitable. This was possible because part of the increased energy costs could be passed on to the users. What allowed the Union industry to pass on the energy cost increase in 2022 was the exceptional price increase of imports from China (by 44 % from 2021, see Table 4 of the provisional Regulation), which substantially alleviated the supportive force of these imports. However, in 2023 the prices of imports from China sharply decreased to close to 2021 levels, significantly increasing the suppressive pressure on the prices of the Union industry. In those circumstances the Union industry was no longer capable of passing on the energy costs, even though these costs went down when compared to 2022. The Commission noted that in 2023 and in the investigation period, when energy prices had declined, the Union industry was no longer able to adjust its prices accordingly due to price suppression from low priced imports from the PRC, which resulted in the collapse of the profitability. Similarly, no systematic disadvantage in respect of raw materials prices was identified.

• (136) Since no new evidence was submitted at the definitive stage that would warrant a different conclusion, the Commission confirms its assessment set out in recitals (254) to (259) of the provisional Regulation that increased production costs cannot break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.5.   Cumulative effect of other factors

• (137) PRE and DFFI argued that all factors contributing to the injury should be assessed cumulatively, including the decline in Union consumption, poor Union export performance, rising energy and raw material costs, and imports from China and other third countries. They claimed that, both individually and collectively, these factors attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury allegedly suffered by the Union industry.

• (138) As explained in recital (132) above, the Commission recalled that the existence of other factors affecting the Union industry does not break the causal link where dumped imports, taken in isolation, are found to have caused material injury. The investigation established that, irrespective of other factors, considered individually or cumulatively, imports from China entered the Union in significant volumes, gained market share, and were consistently priced below the Union industry’s sales prices and cost of production. The Commission further confirmed that, notwithstanding rising production costs, the Union industry was unable to adjust its prices accordingly, resulting in price suppression and a deterioration of profitability. This demonstrates that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was causally linked to the dumped imports.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (139) In the absence of any other comments with respect to the causation, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (267) to (270) of the provisional Regulation.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Injury margin

• (140) As explained in recitals (88) to (90), the Commission confirmed that the injury analysis is representative and reflects actual market competition. In the absence of further comments, recital (280) of the provisional Regulation is confirmed. Therefore, the final injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

Country	Company	Definitive injury margin (%)
PRC	Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.	233,9
PRC	Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.	116,9
PRC	Other cooperating companies	178,4
PRC	All other imports originating in the PRC	259

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (141) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Country	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
PRC	Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.	99,8
PRC	Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.	88,7
PRC	Other cooperating companies	94,5
PRC	All other imports originating in the PRC	110,6

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (142) As explained in recitals (285) to (288) of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry is composed of nine producers located across various Member States, employing approximately 962 workers. A majority of these producers supported the complaint with no opposition to the initiation of the investigation.

• (143) The Union industry is currently operating under conditions that are economically unsustainable leading to an untenable level of profitability. The dumping margins, as established in Section 3.5, are exceptionally high. These dumped imports have inflicted substantial injury on the Union industry, as per Section 4.6, threatening its viability and capacity to operate under normal market conditions..

• (144) The absence of measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry in terms of further price suppression and a further reduction of sales, thus translating into more losses and likely closure of production facilities, dismissals and ultimately, the shutdown of entire businesses.

• (145) Such outcomes could disrupt the continuity of European fused alumina production and pose long term risks to the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic autonomy. Fused alumina is an essential input in the production of a wide range of downstream goods, including refractory materials, abrasives and advanced ceramics, which are in turn indispensable for critical sectors such as the production of steel, other metals, glass, and related materials. It is considered as a sensitive product due to its strategic importance, including military and dual-use applications [^ntr9-L_202600114EN.000101-E0009]. Owing to its unique properties, including its exceptional hardness and thermal stability, few materials can substitute fused alumina. The strategic importance and sensitivity of this product highlights the necessity of maintaining a stable and secure supply chain in the Union. Disruptions could directly affect the Union’s economic security by impacting critical industrial, energy and defence infrastructure that relies on fused alumina-based components and by threatening the resilience of supply chains against external shocks, coercion, or other risks.

• (146) The Commission therefore concluded that it is in the Union’s interest to impose measures that enable the Union industry to recover part of its lost market shares and restore fair competition.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and traders

• (147) The importer Traxys claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would result in a significant reduction of competition in the Union market. Traxys further argued that increased costs cannot be passed on to refractory producers and that the imposition of measures would lead to plant closures of refractory operators, loss of skilled employment, and greater reliance on imports of finished refractory products. It was also claimed that measures on brown fused alumina, in particular, would have severe and disproportionate effects on the European steel industry.

• (148) The Commission observed that Traxys’ arguments concerned a general assessment of the market, including the impact on users and the steel industry, but did not provide additional information on the interests of unrelated imports and traders beyond what was already provided and addressed in recitals (290) to (294) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission noted that the arguments concerning increased costs for users, including refractory producers, are addressed in Section 7.3 below. Additionally, the Commission addresses the arguments regarding market concentration in Section 7.4 below.

• (149) In the absence of any further comments regarding this section, the conclusions set out in recitals (289) to (294) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.3.   Interest of users, consumers or suppliers

• (150) Following the provisional Regulation, several users submitted information highlighting the negative effects that they were already experiencing after the imposition of provisional measures, particularly the inability to transfer the increase in prices to customers. These concerns had also been raised and explained at provisional stage, where users argued that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would significantly raise their costs, which would be difficult to pass on to customers. Users claimed that this could threaten their profitability and competitiveness. Some users further warned that the cost increases linked to the duties could jeopardize their operational sustainability, putting at risk the continued viability of certain production activities within the Union. Potential consequences cited included downsizing, relocation outside the Union, and business closures.

• (151) The Commission noted that the information collected during the investigation was widely documented, as detailed in recital (295) of the provisional Regulation. Around 50 users and user associations came forward and actively participated in the proceedings. Many of these users provided complete responses to the questionnaire, enabling the Commission to conduct a thorough and representative assessment of the situation. Industry associations in the abrasives and refractory sectors were particularly active, submitting substantial and detailed information. These associations represent a wide spectrum of operators, including a considerable number of small and medium sized enterprises, as well as larger users. This ensures that the data reflects the diversity and scale of the Union’s downstream industries.

• (152) From a socio-economic perspective, based on information from industry associations, it is estimated that the refractory industry employs around 20 000 people across the Union and generates an annual turnover of around EUR 4 billion. As for the abrasives industry, it accounts for around 8 400 jobs in Germany and Italy alone, generating a combined annual turnover of approximately EUR 2,3 billion in these two Member States. Based on the information provided by user associations in both sectors, the Union refractory and abrasive industries together account for approximately EUR 6,6 billion in annual turnover and 39 000 direct jobs within the Union, of which more than 22 600 would be significantly and immediately at risk.

• (153) Thus, these sectors contribute significantly in economic terms and employment in the countries in which they are based. In addition, the abrasive and refractory industries play a critical role in the producing steel, metals and glass as well as cutting, grinding, polishing and finishing tools, tools that are critical for manufacturing processes in sectors such as automotive, aerospace and construction.

• (154) The Commission noted that, according to responses to the users' questionnaire, around 50 % of the fused alumina used in the abrasives sector and around 65 % of that used in the refractory sector originates from China. This data reflects the significant dependency of downstream industries on fused alumina of Chinese origin. While a substantial proportion of the supply is sourced from alternative origins, which could mitigate the overall cost impact of the duties for some companies, the Commission also observed that reliance on low-priced, dumped imports from China remains significant. For users who heavily rely on Chinese material, any price increase resulting from the imposition of duties would impact production costs.

• (155) When evaluating the potential impact on production costs, the Commission, as explained in recital (300) of the provisional Regulation, estimated that the imposition of duties could result in cost increases for user industries ranging between 10 % and 30 %, depending on the specific company and sector, assuming 100 % of fused alumina was sourced from China. More specifically, the refractory industry could face cost increases of 10 % to 30 %, while the abrasives industry could experience increases in the range of 10 % to 23 %. Thus, the Commission concluded that users exhibit a high degree of exposure in their production cost to fluctuations in the price of fused alumina.

• (156) The Commission, therefore, acknowledged the economic vulnerability of user industries. User industries are highly fragmented, comprising a wide range of operators with varying capacities to absorb cost increases. For some users, the cost increases resulting from anti-dumping duties could jeopardise their operational sustainability. This could lead to downsizing, relocation of operations outside the EU, or business closures.

• (157) Given the composition of user industries, which includes both large global companies and numerous small and medium-sized enterprises, smaller or more cost-sensitive operators could be particularly severely impacted. The Commission acknowledged that smaller companies may be unable to absorb the additional costs and could be forced to shut down. Larger companies, on the other hand, would be more likely to shift their production to existing facilities outside the Union.

• (158) Based on the above the Commission recognised a high risk of deindustrialisation in the downstream sectors. Many companies in the refractories and abrasives sectors are already operating at a loss, and their financial fragility poses a direct threat to the sustainability of industrial activity in areas that are of strategic interest to the Union.

7.4.   Other factors: Availability of supply and market concentration

• (159) Some parties within the refractories industry claimed that substituting imports from China would compromise the security of supply for the Union refractory industry, given the limited production capacity of the Union industry in the product types most relevant to this sector, in particular refractory-grade and brown fused alumina. It was claimed that the Union industry has traditionally been oriented towards the production of abrasive-grade fused alumina, which represents a larger share of overall demand, is traded at higher prices, and benefits from economies of scale allowing for more efficient cost rationalisation. In addition, it was claimed that imports from third countries could not constitute a viable alternative source of supply, as their market share remains limited.

• (160) VDS further argued that it is insufficient to assess production capacities in aggregate terms, as there is a lack of capacity for producing specific qualities, treatments, and grain sizes of fused alumina. Additionally, VDS submitted that, even in third countries, it is often not possible to obtain products of the same quality as those originating in China.

• (161) The Commission found that the Union industry is capable of supplying the Union market in the required quantities, including for different types, qualities, treatments and grain sizes of the product concerned. Although the Union industry’s production volumes substantially decreased over the period considered due to dumped imports from China, the Commission observed that the Union industry significantly underutilised its production capacity during this period, as set out in recitals (206) to (208) and (308) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission confirmed that the available additional capacity includes the production of refractory-grade fused alumina and brown fused alumina. In particular, the Commission further confirmed that a substantial proportion of the available additional capacity relates to the production of brown fused alumina, which is either immediately available or can be made operational within a very short period of time.

• (162) Additionally, the Commission reiterated that, beyond the production of the Union industry, imports from third countries continue to represent a reliable source of fused alumina, as set out in recitals (304) and (305) of the provisional Regulation. While third countries had a limited presence in the Union market compared to China during the IP, the Commission noted that, following the imposition of the provisional measures, a moderate increase in imports from third countries has already been observed on the basis of the most recent available data. This development confirms that the adjustment process is unfolding as expected and, given its progressive nature, further increases in imports from third countries can reasonably be anticipated as operators expand or establish their presence in the Union market. Furthermore, the Commission did not find evidence supporting the claim that products from third countries are of inferior quality compared to those originating in China. Information available to the Commission indicates that producers in third countries are capable of supplying fused alumina of comparable specifications and performance characteristics.

• (163) Additionally, some parties argued that Chinese exports to the Union of fused alumina have been essential for maintaining competition in the Union market, particularly in view of the limited alternative sources. The parties argued that while the Commission’s intention is not to exclude Chinese producers, the proposed anti-dumping duties would effectively do so by raising their prices above Union levels, leading to market concentration, reduced competition, and potential harm to downstream users.

• (164) The Commission recalled that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to restore fair trading conditions distorted by dumped imports, not to exclude Chinese exporting producers from the Union market. As set out in recital (311) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission confirmed that no substantiated evidence was provided demonstrating that the imposition of measures would result in severe adverse effects on market structure, including anti-competitive conduct by the Union industry, that would negatively affect downstream operators.

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (165) The investigation revealed that the confirmation of the provisional measures as designed would create a high risk of deindustrialisation in downstream sectors. Many companies in the refractories and abrasives sectors are already operating at a loss, and their financial fragility poses a direct threat to the sustainability of industrial activity in areas that are of Union’s strategic interests.

• (166) At the same time, the non-imposition of measures would have negative and irreversible consequences for the Union industry since continued price suppression and declining sales would accelerate financial losses and lead to the closure of production facilities. This could jeopardise the continuity of European fused alumina production, which is an essential material for strategic sectors such as steel and defence, as well as for other sensitive applications. This would undermine the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic autonomy.

• (167) Therefore and to avoid the disappearance of the Union industry or of the downstream industry, the Commission deemed it appropriate to adjust the form of the measures as discussed in Section 8.

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

• (168) The Commission, following the publication of the provisional measures, continued gathering information and engaged in an extensive consultation process. This process was marked by a high level of interaction with interested parties, including hearings, written submissions, presentations, and detailed exchanges of information with both Union producers and users.

• (169) A proposal was submitted by Saint-Gobain to extend the anti-dumping duties to the product concerned integrated in downstream products. Saint Gobain argued that this proposal would level the playing field and ensure fair competition in the downstream markets as it would prevent third-country producers using unfairly priced Chinese fused alumina from gaining a competitive advantage over Union producers operating in those markets.

• (170) The Commission considered that such approach would be impossible withing the scope of the current investigation. The Commission noted that the anti-dumping investigation on imports of fused alumina was initiated with a limited scope, covering only the product concerned. Accordingly, the findings concerning dumping and injury cannot legally be applied to downstream products without a separate investigation. The Commission further found that implementing such a proposal would pose substantial practical difficulties, as verifying the content of fused alumina in downstream finished products would be extremely complex. The proposal was therefore rejected.

8.2.   Form and level of measures

• (171) Considering the interests involved, described in Section 7 above, the Commission considers that a duty-free tariff-rate quota is the best form of measure to balance the various interests at stake, namely protecting the position of Union producers, while, on the users’ side, avoiding cost shocks, mitigating cost impact, ensuring sufficient time for adaptation, and reducing dependencies on China.

• (172) In light of the need to protect Union producers suffering injury from dumped imports, while mitigating costs for users and reducing dependencies on China, the definitive anti-dumping measure should take the form of a duty-free tariff-rate quota. Imports of the product concerned within the limits of this quota shall be exempted from the anti-dumping duty. However, imports exceeding the quota volume shall be subject to the full anti-dumping duty, as established in this Regulation.

• (173) The Commission proceeded to determine the appropriate level for such a quota. The starting point was to assess what Union producers require to remain viable. This involved identifying the volume of sales necessary to maintain a stable market presence, based on historical data from periods when the industry was both competitive and profitable.

• (174) The next step was to consider how imports from third countries might evolve. Finally, the Union market size was taken into account. Based on the Union supply and projected third-country imports, the remaining volume was set as the level to be covered by the duty-free quota.

• (175) Following this assessment, the Commission set a duty-free tariff-rate quota with an initial volume of 60 000 tonnes for 2026. This quota is designed to decrease gradually by 7 500 tonnes per year over a five-year period, reaching 30 000 tonnes by 2030, the end of the period.

• (176) The duty-free tariff-rate quota operates on a first-come, first-served basis. To ensure broad and equitable access, the quota was divided (1) by product, with separate allocations for brown fused alumina and white fused alumina; (2) by granularity, to ensure balanced distribution across various applications; and (3) by time, with quarterly distributions to maintain availability throughout the year. This structure ensures that the measure supports proportional access across sectors and is responsive to industry-specific needs.

• (177) In terms of how the volume of the duty-free tariff-rate quota was expected to affect interested parties, the Commission noted the following:

• (178) For the Union industry, the duty-free volume was based on a reference point when the industry was already achieving reasonable profit margins. It was designed to maintain this level of profitability while boosting sales, market share, and production. By reducing the volume of unfairly priced Chinese imports, the Union industry was expected to operate in a more stable environment, enabling better price management and sustained profitability.

• (179) Specifically, Union industry sales were projected to increase by 84 % in 2026, reaching a 95 % rise by 2031, nearly doubling the sales recorded during the IP. Capacity utilisation was expected to grow from 43 % during the investigation period to 67 % in 2026, peaking at 71 % by 2031, representing a 65 % improvement. Market share was projected to increase from 32 % during the investigation period to 59 % in 2026, reaching 63 % by 2031 an increase of 96 %, nearly doubling the level observed during the IP. Concerning prices, due to limited data, precise forecasts was uncertain. Several factors such as consumption trends, international price comparisons, the Chinese product mix, and changes in production costs could influence future price levels.

• (180) Given these projected improvements in sales, capacity utilisation, and market share, the duty-free tariff-rate quota was designed to ensure the continued viability of the Union industry. By providing a predictable framework for imports, the measure allows producers to benefit from the anticipated growth, adapt their production and investment plans, and maintain their position in the market.

• (181) For the user industries, it was challenging to assess the precise impact of the proposed measure, given the wide variety of companies involved. However, the duty-free tariff-rate quota approach offers a transitional period to mitigate the initial cost impact, giving users time to adapt by identifying alternative suppliers, securing necessary product certifications, and aligning with client requirements. Furthermore, the measure continues to offer a substantial duty-free volume and introduces a predictable and transparent framework that is designed to supports strategic planning and facilitates a less disruptive transition.

• (182) Specifically, taking the IP as a reference, the measure would allow 37 % of the Chinese imports to enter the Union duty-free in the first year, 2026. The duty-free quota was designed to be progressively reduced, reaching 19 % by 2030. Access to these volumes free of duty was mean to provide an immediate and substantial reduction in cost impact for companies, depending on their product mix and supply sources, compared to the standard imposition of duties.

• (183) Following the final disclosure and the additional final disclosure, a number of parties challenged the volumes established in the duty-free quota. On one side, parties representing the Union industry claimed that they were operating under economically unsustainable conditions, with their viability directly threatened by price suppression. In their view, measures were therefore essential to restore fair competition and recover lost market share. They further maintained that, in designing the duty-free quota volume, the capacity utilisation of Union industry should be increased and, accordingly, that either no duty-free quota should be allowed or that such quotas should be substantially reduced. Additionally, they argued that a three-year instead of five-year duration for the duty-free quota would be more appropriate, as it provides adequate time for users to reduce reliance and diversify their suppliers.

• (184) On the other side, user industries argued that quotas at current levels were insufficient to address the concerns of the downstream operators and called for further reductions in duties together with significant increases in quota volumes. They contested the Commission’s methodology for assessing capacity utilisation and argued that quota reductions were too steep. Additionally, they argued that a higher initial volume of free quota is needed to give user industries adequate opportunity to adjust their operations and diversify their supply sources, and that the progressive reduction of the duty-free quota should be removed for the first three years.

• (185) The Commission confirmed its methodology to be sound, grounded in historical data and in factual evidence collected during the investigation, including information on costs, capacity utilisation, sales volumes, dependence on Chinese imports, and overall import levels. Similarly, the Commission noted that its methodology takes into account what Union producers require to remain viable. This involved identifying the volume of sales necessary to maintain a stable market presence. At the same time, the Commission also considered the interests of users in the design of the duty-free quota, the measure continues to provide a substantial duty-free volume and facilitate a less disruptive transition. In particular, the measure allows more than 37 % of Chinese imports registered during the investigation period to enter the Union duty-free in the first year (2026). The quota is then progressively reduced, reaching 19 % by 2030. This design significantly mitigates the impact on user’s costs, offers a transitional period to mitigate the initial effects, and provides time to adapt by identifying alternative suppliers and securing the necessary product certifications. The claims were therefore rejected.

• (186) Following the final disclosure, a number of parties challenged the Commission’s reliance on third-country imports. a number of users argued that these countries could not realistically fill the supply gap and that the Commission’s assumptions were overly optimistic. On this basis, they claimed that the duty-free quota volumes should be increased. In particular, they pointed out that Brazil had withdrawn from the Union market due to United States’ tariffs, that Ukraine’s production was disrupted by the ongoing war, and that India itself depended on imports from China. By contrast, the Union industry claimed that there were strong reasons to foresee that third-country imports would enter the Union market more rapidly once anti-dumping duties were in place. Accordingly, they argued that the duty-free quota volumes should be substantially decreased. They referred in particular to Ukraine, which has increased its production capacities and publicly offered to expand exports to the Union.

• (187) The Commission noted that its estimation of increased third-country imports was based on historical import data. On the one hand, this methodology took into account that any increase would not occur suddenly, but rather progressively to reach the maximum level of imports observed in 2021. On the other hand, the Commission also considered the actual import flows from third countries following the imposition of the provisional measures. These data showed that imports were increasing, contrary to the claims of users, but neither rising sharply as alleged by the Union industry. In view of the opposing and contradictory arguments presented by the different parties, the Commission noted that its methodology relied both on established historical import data and on the observed import activities of third countries in the months following the imposition of the provisional measures. The Commission therefore considered its approach to be sound, robust, and grounded in factual evidence. The claims were accordingly rejected.

8.3.   Administration of the quotas

• (188) As explained in the above section, the duty-free tariff-rate quota should operate on a first-come, first-served basis.

• (189) In order to ensure broad and equitable access, the quota is fragmented as follows: by product, with separate allocations for brown fused alumina and white fused alumina; and by granularity, to ensure balanced access for the main user sectors. Furthermore, the quota should be distributed on a quarterly basis to ensure availability throughout the year.

• (190) This structure is intended to guarantee that the duty-free tariff-rate quota is fairly distributed and responsive to the specific needs of the different industries.

8.3.1.   Product type quotas

• (191) For the separation among product types, the Commission focused on the main distinctive categories: brown fused alumina and white fused alumina, taking into account the feasibility of existing nomenclature and TARIC code differentiation.

• (192) The Commission assessed, based on historical import data, information gathered through questionnaires, as well as submissions from interested parties, the consumption levels of brown fused alumina and white fused alumina within the Union, the sales and production of the Union industry, its production capacity, and the degree of user dependency on imports from China. The assessment also considered the feasibility of sourcing from alternative suppliers, whether Union-based or from third countries, at cost levels that would not cause disruptive price shocks for users.

• (193) Based on the above, the Commission allocated 70 % of the duty-free quota to brown fused alumina and 30 % to white fused alumina. Given sol gel’s price specificity, including it within the volume allocated to white fused alumina would lead to inappropriate use of the quota. A separate quota for sol gel corundum is established.

8.3.2.   Granularity requirements by users

• (194) To ensure a balanced distribution of volumes among the main user industries, namely, abrasives and refractories, the Commission allocated the quota in a way designed to allow both sectors to secure access to appropriate shares of the duty-free quota.

• (195) To this end, the Commission assessed, based on the information gathered during the investigation, including historical import data and market consumption proportions for both sectors, the relative needs and supply dependencies of each industry.

• (196) Based on the above, the Commission allocated 60 % of the quota to the abrasive sector and 40 % to the refractory sector.

• (197) Specific TARIC codes, based on the granularity and technical description of the product are created. While overlap exists, these codes effectively distinguish between applications in the abrasive and refractory sectors, while the classification remains grounded in the physical characteristics of the product.

8.3.3.   Distribution of the duty-free quota over time

• (198) The duty-free is to be divided quarterly in order to ensure that imports are evenly distributed over the year and to prevent that significant imports of products are stockpiled at the beginning of the period in order to avoid possible duties. Unused quarterly tariff-rate quota is to be automatically transferred to the next period.

8.3.4.   Duration and evolution of the duty-free quota

• (199) The volume of the duty-free tariff-rate quota are to be progressively reduced. The reduction takes place annually following entry into force of this Regulation, starting with 60 000 tonnes and decreasing by 7 500 tonnes per year, reaching 30 000 tonnes.

• (200) This annual reduction in the volume quota was expected to gradually limit the injury suffered by the Union industry, allowing Union producers to recover and regain viability over time.

• (201) For users, this approach is designed to support cost management by avoiding sudden price impacts on critical inputs. It is meant to allow time to reduce dependency on China, diversify suppliers, and meet certification and client standard requirements. The proposed timeline ensured predictability, enabling users to plan and adjust operations accordingly.

8.3.5.   Comments after final disclosure

• (202) Following the final disclosure, a number of interested parties argued that the duty-free tariff rate quota system, particularly its operation on a first-come, first-served basis, was inappropriate. They claimed that such a system disproportionately benefits large purchasers, disadvantages small and medium-sized enterprises, and encourages speculative behaviour and stockpiling. According to these parties, SMEs would be harmed, as unlike large traders they cannot stockpile or clear customs rapidly, leaving them dependent on intermediaries. To ensure fair access, they called for protective allocation methods, such as daily import limits and SME specific quotas.

• (203) The Commission noted that the duty-free tariff-rate quota system has been designed to ensure broad and equitable access. It establishes distinctions by product, differentiating between BFA and WFA, by time, through quarterly distribution, and by granularity, thereby de facto creating differences by type of users. This fragmentation of the quota is intended to prevent concentration and to allow a wide range of operators to benefit. Regarding the proposal for daily import limits per company, the Commission observed that such a mechanism would be difficult to implement and would create disproportionate administrative burdens at national customs level. Moreover, the Commission noted that SMEs could benefit from the system on their own and through established importers, who, as confirmed during the investigation, act as the transmission channel between Chinese exporters and SMEs. Since SMEs in many instances do not import directly, the role of established importers is essential in ensuring their access to the material. Introducing daily limits per company would risk blocking this channel and, in practice, undermine the access that SMEs require. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (204) Following the final disclosure, a number of interested parties argued that the Commission’s distinction between abrasive and refractory grades was artificial and technically unsound. They claimed that the two categories are physically and chemically interchangeable and that customs authorities lack the means to enforce such differentiation. These parties further argued that, without stricter controls, part of the quota could be consumed by industries other than the intended users. To address these concerns, they called for the introduction of end-user certification.

• (205) The Commission noted that while the product under investigation is the same, specific TARIC codes have been established on the basis of granularity and the technical description of the product. Although some overlap exists, these codes effectively distinguish, to a large extent, consumption between applications in the abrasive and refractory sectors. The classification is therefore firmly grounded in the physical characteristics of the product, ensuring that differentiation is both technically sound and enforceable. The Commission further noted that the introduction of an end-use exemption would be difficult to implement and would create disproportionate administrative burdens given the large number of potential users. In addition, such an exemption would risk disrupting the role of traditional importers, who act as the de facto transmission mechanism between Chinese exporters and SMEs. As SMEs in many cases do not import directly, they rely on established importers to secure access to the material. The introduction of end-user certification could block this channel and undermine SME access rather than protect it. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (206) Following the final disclosure, certain parties challenged the duty-free quota volumes under product categories. a number of interested parties claimed that refractory-grade fused alumina should be exempted from the measures or that a specific end-use exemption should be introduced for fused alumina imported for the manufacture of refractory products intended for the steel industry. Other parties argued that certain product forms, such as sol-gel and lumps, should be excluded from the scope of the tariff rate quota or that the volumes of certain product types, such as brown fused alumina, should be increased. Additionally, a number of interested parties representing the refractories industry contested the allocation between the refractories and abrasives, arguing that the decisive criterion for the allocation between the user industries should be dependency and not consumption.

• (207) The Commission noted that, when defining the quota volumes, it took into account the entire product scope and applied a consistent methodology to all products falling within that scope. Specifically, the Commission established a total quota volume of 60 000 tonnes, as explained in recitals (173) to (175). Of this amount, 70 % was allocated to brown fused alumina and 30 % to white fused alumina, also as set out in Section 8.3.1. The volumes were then proportionally distributed across the relevant TARIC codes of these categories, based on the share of imports recorded during the investigation period.

• (208) The Commission considered this methodology to be sound, balanced, and proportionate, treating the product concerned as a whole rather than favouring or excluding any particular typology. As already established in Section 222, all forms are regarded as part of the same product concerned. Additionally, the Commission noted that the methodology used to determine the allocation between user industries was sound, taking into consideration both user dependencies and consumption levels. Accordingly, the claims were rejected.

• (209) Following the final disclosure, a number of interested parties argued that a review clause should be included to address possible changes in circumstances, including developments in Union production, imports from third countries and the Union market size, which would warrant an adjustment of the duty-free quota.

• (210) The Commission noted that, in accordance with the basic Regulation, it may initiate a review where changes in circumstances occur, including changes in overall Union production, Union consumption of fused alumina, and imports from third countries. Accordingly, the Commission considered that the inclusion of a separate review clause is not warranted.

• (211) Following the definitive, disclosure the exporting producers represented by the CCCMC claimed that exporting producers who cooperated during the investigation should be given priority in the quota allocation.

• (212) The Commission noted that the duty-free tariff-rate quota was established, based on the Union interest, to mitigate the impact of the measures on user industries and balance the interests of all parties, not to provide preferential treatment to individual exporting producers. For this reason, the claim that cooperating producers should be given priority in the quota allocation was rejected.

• (213) Following the final disclosure, a number of parties claimed that the inclusion of TARIC code 2818 10 91 20, destined to blue sol-gel, under brown fused alumina was inaccurate. They argued that, for purposes of distinguishing product types in line with their TARIC classification, blue sol-gel should not be regarded as a specialty type of brown fused alumina. They claimed that blue sol-gel has an aluminium oxide content below 98,5 %, which is why it falls under CN code 2818 10 91 , yet it has limited interchangeability with standard brown fused alumina products. They further argued that sol-gel uses boehmite as its main raw material, which is a special type of alumina, whereas alumina is also the main raw material for white fused alumina products, while brown fused alumina relies on bauxite. In addition, they claimed that a higher level of interchangeability exists between blue sol-gel and white sol-gel, classified under TARIC codes 2818 10 11 10 and 2818 10 11 20, rather than with standard brown fused alumina grades. Similarly, they argued that the inclusion of blue sol-gel under BFA would disproportionately allocate volumes to a niche product type, creating the risk that disproportionate levels of blue sol-gel could enter the Union under the duty-free quota. On this basis, the parties requested that blue sol-gel be excluded from the brown fused alumina category and treated separately under the duty-free tariff-rate quota framework.

• (214) The Commission carefully assessed this request and, following the arguments presented, concluded that although all product types within the scope of the investigation constitute the same product concerned and share key physical, chemical, and technical characteristics, for purposes of distinguishing product types in line with their TARIC classification, blue sol-gel should not be regarded as a specialty type of brown fused alumina. It should instead be included in the white fused alumina category. This conclusion was technically justified but also based on the consideration that the inclusion of blue sol-gel under brown fused alumina would disproportionately allocate volumes to a niche product type, creating the risk that disproportionate levels of blue sol-gel could enter the Union under the duty-free quota.

• (215) In addition, the Commission noted that the intention of the duty-free quota and the larger allowance of 70 % for brown fused alumina was to mitigate the impact on the substantial volumes of consumption of brown fused alumina by the majority of users. Covering blue sol-gel within this category, however, would not materially alter the overall availability of volumes for users given its small consumption, but could, on the other hand, significantly harm the Union industry.

• (216) Therefore, the Commission decided to include TARIC code 2818 10 91 20 under white fused alumina for the purposes of the repartition of volumes.

• (217) Additionally, a number of interested parties claimed that certain modifications in the TARIC descriptions for sol-gel were required for the purposes of technical accuracy and to avoid potential misclassification of imported sol-gel products. These modifications included the clarification that both sintered and pre-sintered sol-gel is included in TARIC codes 2818 10 11 10 and 2818 10 91 20. Additionally, some parties claimed that an adjustment was required in TARIC code 2818 10 91 20 to avoid the import of certain sol-gel products with less than 98,5 % aluminium oxide under the TARIC code 2818 10 91 99.

• (218) The Commission carefully assessed this request, and following the arguments presented, concluded that the modifications are warranted for the purposes of technical accuracy and to avoid potential misclassification of imported sol-gel products. In addition, the Commission noted that the intention of the duty-free quota was to mitigate the impact on the substantial dependency volumes of consumption by the users. Modifying the TARIC codes pertaining to a variety of the product would not materially alter the overall availability of volumes for users given its small consumption and could avoid misclassification that could significantly harm the Union industry.

• (219) Following the additional final disclosure, Imerys pointed to a technical inaccuracy in the description of one of the newly created TARIC codes for sol-gel products and requested its revision.

• (220) The Commission noted that the observation was accurate and adjusted the description of the relevant TARIC codes accordingly.

8.4.   Level of measures

• (221) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country	Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
PRC	Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.	99,8	233,9	99,8
PRC	Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.	88,7	116,9	88,7
PRC	Other cooperating companies	94,5	178,4	94,5
PRC	All other imports originating in the PRC	110,6	259	110,6

• (222) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

• (223) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission [^ntr10-L_202600114EN.000101-E0010]. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (224) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

• (225) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (226) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

• (227) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

• (228) Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

8.5.   Definitive collection of the provisional duties

• (229) Following the final disclosure, certain parties argued that the collection of provisional duties at the level of the dumping margins was unwarranted. They claimed that such collection would impose an undue burden on users and, given that the form of the definitive measures was modulated, the provisional duties should not be collected in their current form.

• (230) The Commission noted that the definitive measures establish a duty-free tariff rate quota covering part of the import volume from China. Based on imports from China during the investigation period, 62,6 % of the total import volume would not benefit from the duty-free quota and would therefore be subject to anti-dumping duties. In order to reflect the actual share of imports subject to duties and to prevent over-collection beyond what was imposed under the definitive measures, the Commission considered that, for the period between the imposition of the provisional measures and the entry into force of the definitive measures, the duties collected should correspond to the same proportion of imports not falling within the tariff-rate quota, taking the investigation period import volumes as reference, namely 62,6 % of the definitive duty level. This approach ensures imports are treated consistently, duties are applied proportionately, and no excess is collected beyond the definitive measures.

• (231) In view of the dumping margins established and the level of injury suffered by the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed under the provisional Regulation should be definitively collected at 62,6 % of the duty levels established in the present Regulation.

• (232) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected at 62,6 % of the duty levels established under the present Regulation.

8.6.   Retroactive collection

• (233) As mentioned in Section 1.2, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

• (234) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

• (235) The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission compared import volumes between (i) the period from the first full month following initiation up to the last full month before registration and the period from the first full month following initiation up to the last full month before the adoption of provisional measures on one hand and the corresponding calendar months of the investigation period on the other, to account for seasonality; and (ii) the monthly average for these periods with the monthly average over the full investigation period.

• (236) The outcome of this analysis indicated a decline in import volumes. Specifically, the data showed a 9 % decrease in the monthly average volume of imports when comparing the seven-month period from the initiation of the investigation to the publication of the provisional measures with the monthly average during the investigation period. A similar comparison over the two-month period from initiation to registration of imports revealed an 8 % decrease in monthly average import volumes. The Commission also compared the import volumes during the seven months following initiation with the same calendar months during the investigation period. This comparison showed a 10 % decrease in import volumes. Furthermore, when comparing the two months following initiation until the registration of imports with the same months during the investigation period, a decrease of 3,2 % in import volumes was observed.

• (237) In light of the above, the evidence did not support the existence of a substantial rise in imports following initiation. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the conditions for imposing measures with retroactive effect were not met.

9. FINAL PROVISION

• (238) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr11-L_202600114EN.000101-E0011], when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (239) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion on the measures provided for in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Country of origin	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)	TARIC additional code
PRC	Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.	99,8	89RI
PRC	Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.	88,7	89RJ
PRC	Other cooperating companies listed in Annex I	94,5	See Annex I
PRC	All other imports originating in PRC	110,6	8999

Article 2

Article 3

Country of origin	Company	Provisional anti-dumping duty (%)	TARIC additional code
PRC	Chongqing Saite Corundum Co., Ltd.	62,4	89RI
PRC	Luoyang Runbao Abrasives Co., Ltd.	55,5	89RJ
PRC	Other cooperating companies listed in Annex I	59,1	See Annex I
PRC	All other imports originating in PRC	69,2	8999

Article 4

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

• (a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024);

• (b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

• (c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 5

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 January 2026.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

[^ntr1-L_202600114EN.000101-E0001]: OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

[^ntr2-L_202600114EN.000101-E0002]: OJ C, C/2024/7049, 21.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7049/oj.

[^ntr3-L_202600114EN.000101-E0003]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/260 of 10 February 2025 making imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/260, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/260/oj).

[^ntr4-L_202600114EN.000101-E0004]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1456 of 17 July 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fused alumina originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2025/1456, 18.7.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1456/oj).

[^ntr5-L_202600114EN.000101-E0005]: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1173 of 4 June 2020 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union as regards the duration of the period of pre-disclosure (OJ L 259, 10.8.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/1173/oj).

[^ntr8-L_202600114EN.000101-E0008]: In the absence of available financial statements for a fused alumina producer in any of the potential representative countries with similar level of economic development as the PRC, the Commission relied on the financial statements of companies producing fused alumina in other countries to assess whether the SG & A costs of Bozel were representative of the sector concerned. This includes the information from an Indian producer, Carborundum Universal Limited (https://www.cumi-murugappa.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/CUMI-Annual-Report-2025.pdf), a Japanese producer, Resonac Holdings Corporation (https://www.resonac.com/sites/default/files/2025-02/e_tanshin2024q4.pdf), and data collected and verified from the sampled Union producers.

[^ntr9-L_202600114EN.000101-E0009]: Fused alumina is produced from alumina and bauxite, which are both listed as strategic inputs under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (2024/1252). Additionally, its strategic importance and relevance for the iron and steel, aerospace and defence industries are confirmed by Singh et al. (2023) Applications and Developments of Thermal Spray Coatings for the Iron and Steel Industry and Grigaitienė et al. (2025) Effect of TiO2 Content on the Corrosion and Thermal Resistance of Plasma-Sprayed Al2O3-TiO2 Coatings.

[^ntr10-L_202600114EN.000101-E0010]: Email: TRADE-TDI-NAME-CHANGE-REQUESTS@ec.europa.eu, European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 170, 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË.

[^ntr11-L_202600114EN.000101-E0011]: Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

ANNEX I

PRC cooperating exporting producers not sampled

Country	Name	TARIC additional code
PRC	Art Abrasives (Guizhou) Co., Ltd.	89RK
PRC	Bedrock Corundum Co., Ltd.	89RL
PRC	Binzhou Qinai New Material Co., Ltd.	89RM
PRC	Guizhou Guxin New Materials Co., Ltd.	89RN
PRC	Guizhou Kaicheng Fused Minerals Co., Ltd.	89RO
PRC	Henan Ant Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.	89RP
PRC	Henan Haochen Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.	89RQ
PRC	Henan Hengxin Industrial & Mineral Products Co., Ltd	89SI
PRC	Henan Jinfeng New Material Technology Co., Ltd.	89RR
PRC	Imerys Fused Minerals (Guizhou) Co., Ltd.	89RS
PRC	Qinai (Shandong) New Material Co., Ltd.	89RT
PRC	Qingdao Reckel Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.	89RU
PRC	Qingdao Sisa Abrasives Co., Ltd.	89RV
PRC	Saint-Gobain Ceramic Materials (Zhengzhou) Co Ltd	89RW
PRC	Shandong Imerys Mount Tai Co., Ltd.	89RX
PRC	Shanxi Lvliangshan Mineral Co., Ltd.	89RY
PRC	Yichuan Kingsino Refractories Co., Ltd	89RZ
PRC	Zhengzhou Sinabuddy Mineral Co., Ltd.	89SA
PRC	Zhengzhou Yufa High-Tech Material Co., Ltd.	89SB
PRC	Zibo Jin Chun Tai Abrasives Co., Ltd.	89SD
PRC	Zibo Jinjiyuan Abrasives Co., Ltd.	89SC

ANNEX II