Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/157 of 23 January 2026 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (160) The Commission noted that a 12 % target profit was already included in the complaint and was substantiated and cross-verified during the investigation. The additional 0,33 %–0,36 % reflects a justified adjustment for underinvestment in R & D and innovation resulting from market distortions, such as the established dumped imports. This adjustment is consistent with Commission methodology, which aims to ensure that the target profit reflects the level of profit the Union industry could have achieved in the absence of unfair trade practices. Therefore, it does not constitute double counting but a necessary correction to restore fair competition. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (161) As described in Sections 3.2 to 3.5 above, following claims from interested parties, the Commission revised the underselling margins. Therefore, the final underselling margins for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

• (162) Following final disclosure, Ningbo Kwung’s Wisdom reiterated the claimed that no information has been provided on the profitability levels of the Union industry in 2019 and 2020.

• (163) The Commission noted that this information was contained in the complaint, verified by the Commission, and was provided in recital (320) of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

6.2.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

• (164) Following the provisional disclosure, the CHCIA requested the application of the lesser duty rule, arguing that imposing duties based on the dumping margins, when these margins are calculated using external benchmarks, results in unfairly high duty rates. Similarly, Ningbo Kwung’s Wisdom requested the application of the lesser duty rule given their low levels of underselling.

• (165) The Commission noted that, in cases where domestic prices or costs are deemed unreliable due to market distortions, the use of external benchmarks is both legally and methodologically sound. Moreover, as explained in Section 6 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission made a comprehensive analysis of the economic context. This included: raw material distortions, Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, spare production capacities in China, competition for raw materials and impact on supply chains for Union companies. Based on this assessment, the Commission concluded that the decision to not apply the lesser duty rule was legally justified, economically sound, and aligned with the Union’s interests. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

• (166) Following final disclosure, Ningbo Kwung’s Wisdom claimed that the Commission failed to provide sufficient explanation for the modulation of the lesser duty rule.

• (167) The Commission referred to recitals (160) and (161) above, which addressed the modulation of the lesser duty rule. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

• (168) Following the final disclosure, the CHCIA stated that the modulation of the lesser duty rule would lead to a sharp increase in the cost of candle imports from China and undermine competitive dynamics within the Union market.

• (169) The Commission noted that, on the contrary, the setting of duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation aimed to restore a fair competitive environment in the Union market, which had been distorted by unfair dumped Chinese imports. Thus, the claim was rejected.

6.3.   Raw material distortions – on interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation

• (170) In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (338) to (350) of the provisional Regulation that it is in the Union interest to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

6.4.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (171) On the day of publication of the provisional measures, the Commission informed the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Mission of the PRC to the European Union) of its decision and invited it to submit any comments by 29 August 2025. The Government of China submitted a set of comments on 15 September 2025, including on the modulation of the lesser duty rule and the level of the measures.

• (172) Given that the submission was made more than two weeks after the established deadline, the Commission was unable to consider the claims in the context of the provisional disclosure on procedural grounds. Furthermore, the content of the submission did not present any new or substantive arguments, but rather reiterated points already raised by other interested parties.

• (173) In light of the procedural delay the Commission rejected the submission. However, the content of the claims was duly addressed in response to the timely, earlier and correct submissions of other parties.

• (174) Following the final disclosure, importer Bunnik Creations B.V. claimed that the modulation of the lesser duty rule disregards the competitive conditions in the Union market. It argued that such methodology relied only on the sampled Chinese exporting producers, did not consider the full supply chain, contradicted the proportionality principle and harmed EU importers.

• (175) The Commission disagreed and noted that its decision to determine the duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the Basic Regulation was fully explained in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of the provisional Regulation, as well as in the same sections in this Regulation. Specifically, the Commission conducted a thorough analysis of the raw material in question (paraffin wax) and concluded that paraffin wax was subject to distortion within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Furthermore, in Section 6.3.1 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission noted that the determination of Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation was based on a comprehensive evaluation of all the relevant information from the investigation. This included spare capacities in the exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (176) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation:

7. UNION INTEREST

• (177) On the day of publication of the provisional measures, the Commission informed the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Mission of the PRC to the European Union) of its decision and invited it to submit any comments by 29 August 2025. The Government of China submitted a set of comments on 15 September 2025, including on Union interest.

• (178) Given that the submission was made more than two weeks after the established deadline, the Commission was unable to consider the claims in the context of the provisional disclosure on procedural grounds. Furthermore, the content of the submission did not present any new or substantive arguments, but rather reiterated points already raised by other interested parties.

• (179) In light of the procedural delay the Commission rejected the submission. However, the content of the claims was duly addressed in response to the timely, earlier and correct submissions of other parties.

• (180) Following the final disclosure, importer Bunnik Creations B.V. claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would harm importers and distributors.

• (181) The Commission noted that no unrelated importers, users or distributors participated in the sampling process or submitted responses to the questionnaire. Consequently, no data concerning importers or users was provided, preventing the Commission from assessing the impact on importers, users or distributors.

• (182) The Commission also noted that there exist additional sources of supply both in the Union and outside the Union, apart from China. Consequently, importers and distributors have the option to source from these alternative sources. The imposition of measures aimes at restoring a level playing field on the Union market but does not prohibit importers and distributors from continuing to source from China. Furthermore, as per recital (358) of the provisional Regulation, in the absence of cooperation, the likely effect of the measures on users was assessed on the basis of reasonable assumptions. Candles generally represent a minor expense within the decorative range of traders and retailers, who typically manage a wide variety of products. Candles are also considered a minor consumable expense for consumers. Consequently, any potential price increase resulting from the imposition of anti-dumping duties is unlikely to significantly impact the operational costs of businesses. The relatively low unit cost of candles compared to traders’ and retailers’ overall product portfolios suggests that such an increase would have a negligible effect on their economic activities. Similarly, the cost increase is not expected to significantly alter consumer purchasing behaviour.

• (183) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the negative impact of the measures on importers, if any, did not outweigh their positive effect on Union producers.

• (184) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (352) to (360) of the provisional Regulation.

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

7.1.   Definitive measures

• (185) Following the provisional disclosure, the CHCIA claimed that the use of an ad valorem duty is an inappropriate form of measure given the specific nature of candles as a product. In support of this claim, it referred to the Commission Regulation (EC) No 393/2009 [^ntr14-L_202600157EN.000101-E0014] in which the duties were based on fixed amounts on the basis of the fuel content of the candles.

• (186) The Commission noted that the use of ad valorem duties is legally and economically justified since candles are sold in a wide variety of forms, with significant differences in size, weight, material, and presentation. The PCN structure used in the investigation already accounts for fuel type, container material, scent, decoration and wick type. This ensures that comparability and differentiation.

• (187) Furthermore, the reference to a previous investigation, where duties were based on fixed amounts linked to fuel content, is not directly applicable to the current case and should not affect the factual findings established in the present investigation. The form of duty applied must reflect the characteristics of the product and the outcome of dumping and injury analysis. In this case, the Commission found that ad valorem duties are effective in addressing the dumping and injury, transparent and administratively feasible, and appropriately aligned with the diversity of the product range. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (188) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

• (189) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

• (190) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

• (191) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission [^ntr15-L_202600157EN.000101-E0015]. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (192) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

• (193) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (194) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

• (195) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

• (196) Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

7.2.   Definitive collection of the provisional duties

• (197) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation.

7.3.   Retroactive collection

• (198) As mentioned in Section 1.2 above, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

• (199) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

• (200) The Commission in particular analysed whether there was any substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. For this analysis, the Commission compared the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures. The outcome of this comparison indicated a decline in the monthly average volume of imports. Specifically, the data show that the average monthly import volume during the period between the initiation of the investigation and the publication of the provisional measures was lower than the monthly average observed during the investigation period.

• (201) The Commission also compared the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures against the corresponding calendar months during the investigation period. The results of this comparison indicated an increase in import volumes during the period following initiation, relative to the same months in the investigation period. While the market is subject to a certain degree of seasonality, the observed increase in import volumes during the relevant period was accompanied by a rise in average import prices. This development suggests that the increase in volumes may be attributed to broader market dynamics. In light of the above, the evidence available does not support a clear finding of stockpiling or a surge in imports that is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty and would justify the application of retroactive measures under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the conditions for imposing measures with retroactive effect are not met.

8. FINAL PROVISION

• (202) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr16-L_202600157EN.000101-E0016], when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (203) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1732 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of candles, tapers and the like shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the country concerned and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

• (a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1.10.2023 to 30.9.2024);

• (b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

• (c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 23 January 2026.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

[^ntr1-L_202600157EN.000101-E0001]: OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

[^ntr2-L_202600157EN.000101-E0002]: Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C, C/2024/7459, 19.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7459/oj).

[^ntr3-L_202600157EN.000101-E0003]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/511 of 20 March 2025 making imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/511, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/511/oj).

[^ntr4-L_202600157EN.000101-E0004]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1732 of 13 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2025/1732, 14.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1732/oj).

[^ntr5-L_202600157EN.000101-E0005]: In TRON (t24.013249), some 66 members of CHCIA have provided their explicit power of attorney to CHCIA to represent them in the proceeding at hand. In its turn, CHCIA has given a power of attorney to a law firm to represent them.

[^ntr7-L_202600157EN.000101-E0007]: Please see: AD726 Candles_Note to the file_Provisional sample_EU producers of 19 December 2024 (t24.011572); Note for the file – definitive sample of EU producers of 17 January 2025 (t25.001025); Note for the file – Change definitive sample of EU producers of 24 February 2025(t25.002394).

[^ntr9-L_202600157EN.000101-E0009]: See recital (149) of the provisional Regulation, where the Commission provided the regulatory requirements for finding a representative country at the same level of economic development as the PRC, i.e. an Upper Middle Income country as per World Bank classification.

[^ntr10-L_202600157EN.000101-E0010]: Available for parties in TRON under t25.005556.

[^ntr11-L_202600157EN.000101-E0011]: NACE – Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne – is the the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Union.

[^ntr12-L_202600157EN.000101-E0012]: Rather than NACE Category 3299 used for collection of data for candle producers, the two Thai producers that the Union industry suggested to add fell into NACE categories 2042 (Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations) and 4520 (Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles) respectively.

[^ntr13-L_202600157EN.000101-E0013]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2015/2447/oj).

[^ntr14-L_202600157EN.000101-E0014]: Commission Regulation (EC) No 393/2009 of 11 May 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain candles, tapers and the like originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 119, 14.5.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/393/oj).

[^ntr15-L_202600157EN.000101-E0015]: Email: TRADE-TDI-NAME-CHANGE-REQUESTS@ec.europa.eu; European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 170, 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË.

[^ntr16-L_202600157EN.000101-E0016]: Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

ANNEX

People’s Republic of China’s cooperating exporting producers not sampled:

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/157/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)