Regulation (EU) 2026/261 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 January 2026 on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase-out of Russian oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194(2) and Article 207 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1),

After consulting the Committee of the Regions,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (2),

Whereas:

(1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas for markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of State or Government therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully eliminate the dependency on Russian energy. In its REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’ and in its Communication of 18 May 2022 on the REPowerEU Plan the Commission proposed concrete measures to allow for the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process of diversifying gas supplies away from the Russian Federation has been achieved since then. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, in its Communication of 6 May 2025 on the Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports (REPowerEU Roadmap), the Commission announced a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for addressing energy dependencies. In order to ensure energy security and resilience of the Union, it is urgent and strategically needed to address all remaining energy dependencies mentioned in the REPowerEU Roadmap.

(2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, demonstrate that the Russian Federation has systematically exploited existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies as a political weapon to harm the Union’s economy. This has led to serious negative effects on Member States and the Union’s economic security, on the stability of the single market, on the Union’s consumers and on competitiveness in general. The Union can therefore no longer consider the Russian Federation and its energy companies reliable energy trading partners.

(3) In January 2006, the Russian Federation stopped its natural gas supplies to some countries in South East and Central Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, the Russian Federation again fully cut off gas in transit through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States, in particular those in Central and Eastern Europe. This supply disruption led to serious disturbances to gas markets in the region and in the whole of the Union. Some Member States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing sustained shutdowns of heating in schools and factories, which required them to declare a state of emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, seized Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several Member States which had announced that they would supply Ukraine with gas, which in turn led to market disturbances and price increases and harmed economic security. The Russian Federation’s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom was the subject of several Commission investigations for a possible breach of Union competition rules and has subsequently changed its conduct on the market in order to address the Commission’s competition concerns. In several cases, the competition issues at stake concerned so-called ‘territorial restrictions’ in Gazprom’s gas supply contracts, prohibiting the resale of gas outside the destination country, as well as evidence that Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies dependent on political concessions, such as the participation in Russian pipeline projects or acquiring control over Union energy assets.

(4) The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 and subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the obvious potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas market, the Union’s economy and its essential security interests, as well as the potential of direct harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens’ health or life. Evidence shows that the state-controlled company Gazprom intentionally manipulated the Union’s energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at unprecedentedly low levels, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs and fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, which affected short-term markets and aggravated the already tight supply situation after the Russian Federation’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, the Russian Federation systematically halted or reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant disturbances to the Union gas market. This affected in particular supplies to the Union via the Yamal pipeline, supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut down supplies via the pipeline entirely.

(5) The Russian Federation’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to a sudden and sharp increase in energy prices in the Union, causing unprecedented price levels in 2022, up to eight times the average of previous years. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure further contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022.

(6) The exceptionally high gas prices resulted in high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices and volatility, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, leading to risks to social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very serious problems concerning the security of energy supply in the Union and forced 11 Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, the Russian Federation’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from the remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports still accounting for EUR 15 billion in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

(7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preserving market stability and protecting human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, in particular because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from the Russian Federation would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore decrease, rather than increase, its security of energy supply. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by the Russian Federation, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if only temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, in particular in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from the Russian Federation. In view of the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, as well as the fact that the government of the Russian Federation has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy goals rather than trade goals, it is appropriate to take legally binding measures to eliminate all remaining vulnerabilities of the Union resulting from dependence on natural gas imports from the Russian Federation, both via pipelines (‘pipeline gas’) and liquified natural gas (LNG).

(8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The relations between the Union and the Russian Federation have greatly deteriorated in recent years and in particular since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, to not accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods from the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken at the time of the ongoing emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests.

(9) Diversifying LNG imports is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. In order to prevent the risk of long-term reservations of LNG terminal capacity held by Russian companies being used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices, such as practices to book liquification or storage capacities without actually using them or with the purpose of preventing competitors from using the infrastructure, regulatory authorities and competition authorities are to make full use of the robust legal instruments which are available under Union and national energy and competition law, where appropriate. Where customs authorities identify risks to safety or security resulting from Russian gas before entering the customs territory of the Union, they should make use of the provisions concerning risk management in the Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the ‘Union Customs Code’) (4) to avoid such risks.

(10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition on natural gas imports from the Russian Federation. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase-out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 2022, and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase-out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase-out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner and in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the security of the Union’s energy supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPowerEU Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced the Union’s dependencies on supplies from the Russian Federation, for instance by introducing measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as by actively supporting the diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the bargaining power of the Union via joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impacts also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies.

(11) This Regulation is fully compatible with the Union’s strategy to reduce its reliance on fossil fuel imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the REPowerEU Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in a substantial reduction of more than 60 billion cubic metres annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce its dependence on supplies from the Russian Federation. A further reduction of dependence could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand, to increase energy efficiency, or to accelerate the green transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which would significantly increase the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by actively supporting diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the bargaining power of the Union via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, in particular investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 billion cubic metres of natural gas by 2030. These combined efforts will strengthen the Union’s resilience, competitiveness, and open strategic autonomy, support European industries, SMEs and citizens and facilitate the phase-out of gas imports from the Russian Federation.

(12) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from the Russian Federation. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for the security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the world gas market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure. The related measures need to be in line with the current energy framework of the Union.

(13) In some cases, LNG cargoes carry gas produced in different countries and mixed together. The prohibition on natural gas imports from the Russian Federation should therefore also apply to the amounts of gas in such cargoes that are produced in the Russian Federation. Where importers can unambiguously document the relevant shares of LNG produced outside the Russian Federation, it should be possible to import the non-Russian LNG amounts contained in an LNG cargo.

(14) Short-term supply contracts concern smaller volumes than the large long-term supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies and existing short-term supply contracts will in any event be close to expiration by the time this Regulation enters into force. Accordingly, the risk to economic security resulting from existing short-term supply contracts appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term supply contracts from the immediate application of the import prohibition allowing for a transition period until 25 April 2026 for LNG imports, taking into account Article 3ra of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (5), and until 17 June 2026 for pipeline gas.

(15) Importers holding long-term supply contracts will likely need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders because long-term supply contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term supply contracts. A transition period regarding the prohibition on gas imports for existing long-term supply contracts should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term supply contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. While LNG can be sourced world-wide and LNG customers usually face no physical barriers in switching to alternative suppliers on the LNG world-market, diversification for pipeline gas customers, notably in countries without LNG infrastructure, may be more complex. A longer transition period should therefore be granted for gas supplies under existing long-term pipeline supply contracts.

(16) Specific situations have occurred where a country which is currently still being supplied under existing long-term supply contracts for Russian pipeline gas is specifically affected by recent changes of supply routes from the Russian Federation, removing the possibility to import gas via these supply routes, due to limited or no alternative routes for the transport of the contracted gas. In order to remedy the situation, suppliers from other Member States are currently ensuring the delivery of pipeline gas under short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation via uncongested interconnection points. Due to this very specific situation and in order to give them sufficient time to find new suppliers, a longer transition period should also apply to those short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation which are used to supply landlocked countries affected by changes of supply routes for Russian gas.