Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/270 of 4 February 2026 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of 1,4-Butanediol originating in the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 7 thereof,

After consulting the Member States,

Whereas:

(1) On 6 June 2025, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of 1,4-Butanediol (‘BDO’) originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’ or ‘China’), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (‘Saudi Arabia’) and the United States of America (‘USA’ and, together with China and Saudi Arabia, ‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 24 April 2025 by INEOS Solvents SA (‘the complainant’ or ‘Ineos’). The complaint was made by the Union industry of BDO in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1718 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainants, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the authorities of the countries concerned, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

(5) Qore LLC, a producer of BDO in the United States, requested to be registered as an interested party in the proceeding as, it argued, the procedure might affect it. According to Article 6(7) of the basic Regulation, interested parties are defined as Union producers, trade unions, importers and exporters and their representative associations, users and consumer organisations, as well as the representatives of the exporting country. Since Qore had no exports to the EU, it did not meet the criteria of an interested party as defined in the basic Regulation. Its request was therefore rejected. Qore and the United States Federal Government (‘USG’) submitted that the Commission should accept Qore as an interested party irrespective of the export activity, arguing that the latter is not a requirement to be considered an interested party under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’). The Commission noted that nothing in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement or in the WTO jurisprudence contradicts the Commission’s decision to refuse interested party status to producers not exporting to the Union. Indeed, Article 6.11 ADA requires two categories of producers to be included in the definition of ‘interested parties’ within the meaning of the Agreement: a ‘foreign producer […] of a product subject to investigation’ (Article 6.11(i) ADA) and ‘a producer of the like product in the importing Member’ (Article 6.11(ii) ADA). Qore LLC being a foreign producer of a like product does not fall within any of the two categories. Thus, the USG failed to demonstrate why the Commission should accept Qore as interested party under the law governing this proceeding, i.e. the basic Regulation.

(6) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(7) Lyondell Chemie Nederland B.V. (‘LYB’), Sahara International Petrochemical Co. (‘Sipchem’), Helm AG (‘Helm’), Qore LLC (‘Qore’), the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (‘GKSA’) and the USG provided comments on the complaint and the initiation of the investigation.

(8) At the outset, the Commission noted that it carried out its examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation and concluded that the requirements for initiation of an investigation were met, i.e. that there was sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation.

(9) According to Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, a complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the complainant. The legal standard of evidence required for the purpose of initiating an investigation (‘sufficient’ evidence) is different from that which is necessary for the purpose of a preliminary or final determination of the existence of dumping, injury or of a causal link. Therefore, evidence which is insufficient in quantity or quality to justify a preliminary or final determination of dumping, injury or causation, may nevertheless be sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.

(10) Pursuant to Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation, a complaint is considered to ‘have been made by, or on behalf of, the Union industry’ if it is supported by Union producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 % of the total production of the like product produced by Union industry expressing their position on the complaint – be it in favour or against, and, second, it is supported by of the Union producers accounting for more than 25 % of the total production of the like product produced by the Union industry.

(11) LYB took issue with the Commission’s analysis of the degree of support for the complaint (‘standing analysis’). Concretely, it claimed that the investigation should have not been initiated with respect to Saudi Arabia and the USA, as the complainant fell short of the standing requirement under Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation, given that LYB alone accounted for more than half of the production of the product concerned among those Union producers which expressed their position about the investigation and expressed a ‘neutral’ position to the initiation of the investigation because it had ‘[n]o concerns with regards to imports from Saudi Arabia & the USA’, and it was ‘[i]n favor of investigating imports originating in China’.

(12) Sipchem also argued that the investigation should be discontinued as concerns BDO imports from Saudi Arabia and the USA. Concretely, Sipchem claimed that the Commission erred twice in its standing analysis: first, deeming LYB neutral regarding the investigation as concerns BDO imports from Saudi Arabia and the USA, and, second, concluding that the complaint complied with Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, Sipchem concluded that the investigation was wrongfully initiated as concerns BDO imports from Saudi Arabia and the USA, and, consequently, requested the Commission to terminate it immediately except for China.

(13) The GKSA also claimed that the complainant failed to demonstrate that it accounted for a major proportion of the BDO Union production in the IP, hence it did not comply with the requirement on standing. GKSA underlined that the complainant itself indicated that it represented 39,1 % of the total Union production of the product concerned during the investigation period. It followed that without any evidence demonstrating the other two Union producers’ position, i.e. LBY and Novamont, it cannot be assumed, according to GKSA, that the 50 % threshold for the standing exercise was met.

(14) Regarding the standing analysis, on 2 June 2025 the Commission issued a note for the file on standing (‘Note on standing’) for inspection by interested parties. The analysis established that companies supporting the complaint represented between 45 % and 46 % of the total EU production in 2024, that no producer expressing opposition came forward and that one producer expressed a neutral position. The Commission therefore concluded that the conditions of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation to consider that a complaint had to been made by, or on behalf of, the Union industry were met. LYB expressly stated a neutral position. The claims were therefore rejected.

(15) Second, according to LYB, imports from the USA should be addressed separately from imports from Saudi Arabia and China since they were supposedly not subject to the same conditions of competition and hence should not be cumulated with imports from the USA. According to LYB, (i) BDO imports originating from the USA were exclusively undertaken by two Union producers only, i.e. LYB itself and BASF; (ii) most of those imports were likely for captive consumption by the Union industry, and (iii) the remaining volumes were not imported for direct sale to independent customers on the Union market. Sipchem made similar claims regarding imports from Saudi Arabia.

(16) The Commission found that the conditions for cumulation of the countries concerned at the stage of the complaint were met on the basis of the available information and statistics.

(18) Therefore, the Commission dismissed the claims that imports from the countries concerned should not have been cumulated at initiation. In addition, comments on cumulation were addressed in section 4.3 ‘Imports from the countries concerned’ of this regulation.

(19) LYB argued that any injury suffered by the Union industry was directly caused by imports of BDO from China. Consequently, LYB argued that the pricing behaviour of the Chinese BDO industry was responsible for the situation of the Union industry. As a result, the Union industry could only follow the pricing behaviour of the Chinese BDO industry, as so to not be flooded by the surge of Chinese BDO imports. In LYB’s view, there was a direct coincidence in time between the surge in Chinese BDO imports in 2023 with, in parallel, a meaningful drop in production of the Union industry, which then reversed in 2024 when the Union industry began to recover. As to the decline in Chinese BDO imports, LYB asserted that it was not a systematic change in the dumping practices of the Chinese industry, but rather it was due to the BASF’s decision to divest from its joint ventures in China. Specifically, LYB contended that the decrease in Chinese imports was accompanying the relative stable flux of imports from the USA in 2023 and 2024, given that, to overcome the loss of supply from China, BASF had to resort to BDO imported from the USA. However, LYB underlined that such trend was artificial given that BASF used US BDO imports for captive consumption only.

(20) The Commission does not dispute that Chinese dumped imports and price behaviour contributed to the Union industry injury. However, it could not be concluded that only Chinese imports were at fault based on the complaint submitted. The complaint provided sufficient evidence on the role of US and Saudi Arabia imports in causing an injury to the Union industry, such as for example the significantly increasing volume of imports and market shares in the Union, combined with substantial and continuously reduced prices from imports from the USA and Saudi Arabia in the period used in the complaint. In addition, based on the complaint the Commission could observe underselling, undercutting and dumping from the countries concerned. Finally, these comments were also further analysed as part of the injury assessment and causation.

(21) LYB claimed that anti-dumping measures against the USA would directly harm the Union interest, as LYB deemed US BDO supply as a ‘vital lifeline for the Union industry’ given that it was closely integrated with EU production, serving BASF for captive use and LYB in exceptional circumstances to overcome production shortfalls. Qore claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures on BDO imports from the USA would harm Union downstream users. Chimica Organica Industriale Milanese S.p.a. (‘COIM’), a Union user of the product concerned, raised similar claims, namely that the imposition of measures would be against the interest of the Union as it would (i) have a negative impact due to the cumulation with potential anti-dumping duties on adipic acid from China, (ii) injure the Union downstream industry, (iii) make Union users dependant on the Complainant, and (iv) prejudice the position of Union users against competitors from third countries. Because of the alleged lack of Union interest, COIM called for the Commission to terminate the investigation without imposing any measures.

(22) Union interest considerations are irrelevant for the initiation of an investigation. These claims were therefore addressed under section 7.3 ‘Interest of users’ of this regulation.

(23) LYB asserted that the Commission should ensure the economic reality of US BDO imports be properly reflected when determining the injury margin. LYB submitted that the Commission should establish the injury margin at the level of undercutting margin, and, consequently, should not adjust the US BDO export price pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, nor construct ‘an artificial and entirely hypothetical’ (4) export price at the Union border. Consequently, LYB concluded that the price comparison should be done through the actual price paid by the first independent customer in the EU.

(24) Such claim was irrelevant for the initiation of the investigation. It was therefore dismissed.

(25) Qore submitted that (i) the Union industry did not suffer any material injury; (ii) the complainant failed to demonstrate that BDO US imports harmed the Union industry; and (iii) price and volume trends as presented in the complaint are better explained by internal decisions by the Union industry itself, downstream market shifts and cost-driven volatility.

(26) Qore failed to provide any evidence supporting its claim, which were hence unsubstantiated. In addition, based on the complaint, there was sufficient evidence of injury such as for example significant reduced volumes, market shares and sales prices combined with a significant negative profitability due to dumped imports. Therefore, Qore’s claims were rejected.

(27) The GKSA submitted that the complaint did not satisfy the requirements to initiate an anti-dumping investigation because it lacked sufficient evidence on dumping, injury and the causal link.

(28) The analysis of the evidence provided by the complainants has yielded the result that the complaint contained sufficient prima facie evidence of dumping of BDO in the EU market. Indeed, the complaint provided sufficient evidence on both normal values and export prices for all countries concerned and, on this basis, established dumping margins of 87 % for the PRC, 27 % for Saudi Arabia and 57 % to 78 % for the United States. Regarding injury and causality, in accordance with the principles of Article 2 of the basic Regulation, the complaint provided prima facie evidence injury suffered by the Union industry from the dumped imports of the countries used in the complaint, for example a substantial loss of market share of the Union was accompanied with substantial increase in market share form the countries concerned in the Union, offered at continuously reduced prices in the period considered. Resulting in prices being lower than the cost of production and of significant losses by the Union producers. In addition the complaint provided sufficient evidence of underselling and undercutting.

(29) The USG claimed that the Commission erred in including bio BDO in the product scope together with fossil BDO because of the fundamental differences between the two. The USG referred to the submission of Qore and BASF, which both requested the Commission to exclude bio BDO from the product scope of this investigation. Lastly, the USG contended that bio BDO should be examined as a separate domestic like product from BDO. Chimica Organica Industriale Milanese S.p.a. (‘COIM’), a Union user of the product concerned, at the outset stressed that bio BDO fundamentally differs from fossil BDO. The request for the exclusion of bio BDO from the product scope is addressed in section 2.4 ‘Claims regarding product scope’ of this regulation.

(30) At the initiation of the investigation, COIM argued that the Union industry does not suffer any material injury because they alleged that there is no significant difference in prices between the Union-produced BDO and BDO imported from the countries concerned. In any event, any alleged injury is not attributable to BDO imports from the countries concerned, but solely to the Union industry’s increasing costs of production.

(31) The Commission took note of COIM’s claims. However, COIM failed to provide evidence for any of the claims it raised. In accordance with the principles of Article 3 of the basic Regulation, the complaint provided sufficient evidence of injury suffered by the Union industry from the dumped imports of the countries considered, for example a substantial loss of market share of the Union was accompanied with substantial increase in market share form the countries concerned in the Union, offered at continuously reduced prices in the period considered. In addition, the complaint provided prima facie evidence of underselling and undercutting. Therefore, COIM’s claims were dismissed.

(32) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

Sampling of Union producers

(34) The sampled Union producers accounted for more than 70 % of production and sales quantities on the Union market. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received on the sample. The sample was deemed representative of the Union industry.

Sampling of unrelated importers

(35) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(36) No unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. Industrial user/importers which came forward in this process as interested parties were directed to complete user questionnaires. In view of this, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary.

Sampling of exporting producers

(37) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in China and the USA to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, the Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the European Union and the Mission of the United States of America to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.