Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/274 of 5 February 2026 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council, following a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036

• (134) As indicated in recital 103, the Commission considered that the benchmark for labour obtained from Türkiye was sufficiently reliable to be considered for the calculation of the normal value. Regarding the increase in the benchmark for labour costs, the Commission points out to Annex II of the Second Note, showing that the increase results from the indexation of labour cost, as reported by the Turkish National Institute for Statistics. Moreover, comparison with domestic prices in the PRC does not allow for any meaningful conclusion, given the significant distortions in the Chinese market, as explained in section 3.2.1. The claim was therefore rejected.

3.2.6.4.   Electricity

• (135) The Commission used the electricity price statistics published by the Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority [^ntr37-L_202600274EN.000101-E0037] in its regular press releases covering tariff tables based on electricity bills for industrial users, which are published quarterly, allowing for an exact coverage of the IP.

• (136) Following the final disclosure, Hunan Hualian Group claimed that the Commission should use Eurostat data instead of data from the Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority. The party asserted that the Turkish authority does not provide energy costs differentiated by electricity consumption levels, whereas Eurostat offers such data on a six-monthly basis.

• (137) The Commission accepted the claim and revised its calculations based on Eurostat’s report of electricity prices for non-household consumers for Türkiye [^ntr38-L_202600274EN.000101-E0038]. Consequently, the benchmark price for electricity was set as follows:

Consumption bracket	Undistorted value
Consumption less than 20 MWh – band IA	0,88 CNY/KWH
Consumption from 20 MWh to 499 MWh – band IB	0,8 CNY/KWH
Consumption from 500 MWh to 1 999 MWh – band IC	0,74 CNY/KWH
Consumption from 2 000 MWh to 19 999 MWh – band ID	0,69 CNY/KWH
Consumption from 20 000 MWh to 69 999 MWh – band IE	0,65 CNY/KWH
Consumption from 70 000 MWh to 149 999 MWh – band IF	0,62 CNY/KWH

3.2.6.5.   Natural gas

• (138) The Commission used the price of gas for industrial users in Türkiye as published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority in its 2023 & 2024 Natural Gas Market Sector Report [^ntr39-L_202600274EN.000101-E0039]. The Commission used the data of the industrial gas prices in the corresponding consumption band in TRY/Sm3 covering the last semester of 2023 and the first semester of 2024.

3.2.6.6.   Liquified natural gas (‘LNG’)

• (139) In its comments to the Second Note, the applicant claimed that the benchmark established on the basis of the natural gas prices in Türkiye was erroneously based on the generic price of natural gas for industrial use, rather than on the price of LNG, which is the predominant method of importation on natural gas in China and had been used in other investigations. The applicant therefore requested that the Commission use the latter, as it would be more representative of the situation of exporting producers in China.

• (140) Hunan Hualian Group rebutted that the data relating to the prices of natural gas in Türkiye is more detailed and is calculated without considering other costs, such as the special consumption tax. Additionally, it claimed that differentiating between pipeline-imported natural gas and LNG would be against the established Commission practice, and moreover, that it was impossible for companies to know which source of gas their providers sourced from.

• (141) The applicant further stressed its claim that the Commission should use the benchmark for LNG in the investigation, arguing that (1) official data on LNG prices is more detailed than for generic natural gas prices, and would allow the deduction of the special consumption tax, (2) such choice would be consistent with the Commission’s practice, and (3) Hunan Hualian Group’s claim that producers had no information as to the source of the natural gas purchased was rendered without merit by their own claim that Hunan Hualian Group did, in fact, purchase gas that was not imported as LNG.

• (142) Hunan Hualian Group submitted additional comments reiterating its previous claims and noted that only 0,96 % of the natural gas distributed in Türkiye is LNG, and claimed that LNG prices as reported in Türkiye were thus not representative. Hunan Hualian Group also claimed that the applicant’s consideration that the use of a benchmark based on LNG prices was more appropriate than the use of a benchmark based on pipeline natural gas was evidence that Türkiye was not an appropriate representative country.

• (143) The Commission remined both parties that pursuant to GC case-law, past administrative practice cannot be used to question the legality of legal interpretation and related decisions.

• (144) The Commission examined Ceramie Unie’s claim on the sourcing of natural gas in China and found that during the review investigation period LNG imports constituted around 58 % of all natural gas imports into China [^ntr40-L_202600274EN.000101-E0040], and that there was an increasing trend on its pipeline gas imports [^ntr41-L_202600274EN.000101-E0041]. On the other hand, during the verification process, the Commission observed that, for the most part, parties were aware of the method of sourcing their purchased natural gas, and therefore, distinction was possible.

• (145) The Commission considered that the applicant’s request to observe LNG prices as a more appropriate benchmark did not stem from a lack of appropriateness of the available data in Türkiye, but rather from a more detailed assessment of the Chinese market.

• (146) Therefore, the Commission decided to apply distinct benchmarks for natural gas and LNG, as reported by the sampled companies and verified in their premises.

• (147) The Commission used the sales price of LNG in Türkiye as published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority in its periodical Natural Gas Market LNG/CNG Price Reports List [^ntr42-L_202600274EN.000101-E0042]. The Commission carried out the appropriate adjustments to construct the benchmark net of taxes.

3.2.6.7.   Manufacturing overhead costs, SG & A costs and profits

• (148) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

• (149) The manufacturing overheads incurred by the sampled exporting producers were expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by these exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

• (150) In the First Note on the sources, the Commission informed all parties that it intended to use the financial data for Kütahya Porselen as extracted from its publicly available financial records for establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG & A costs and profit.

• (151) Clerical errors pointed out by interested parties were examined, resulting in a revised SG & A margin of 36,25 % expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold.

• (152) After careful consideration of all comments received, the Commission selected the financial data of Kütahya Porselen as extracted from its readily available financial records for the investigation period for establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG & A costs and profit.

• (153) Following the final disclosure, CCCLA, Fun Lin Wah Group, Hunan Huazhi Group, Hunan Hualian Group and several importers criticised the calculation of sales, general and administrative expenses, and profits solely based on the financial records of Kütahya Porselen, a single company. The producers considered that the data was limited by the company’s own particularities and cannot represent the industry.

• (154) Hunan Huazhi Group requested the Commission to substitute more representative and reasonable SG & A costs and profit data as the figures drawn from only one company inevitably reflect company-specific circumstances that may not prevail across the market. It argued that the Commission supplied no evidence that this solitary undertaking would be representative of the Turkish export-oriented, labour-intensive ceramic producers as a whole. Adopting these high cost, high-profit figures inflates the normal value and artificially magnifies the dumping margin, contrary to the fundamental principles of the anti-dumping instrument. In Hunan Huazhi Group’s view, should the final determination switch to Thailand, the weighted average SG & A ratios and profit margins derived from multiple Thai producers should be used.

• (155) Furthermore, CCCLA and the exporting producers Fun Lin Wah Group and several unrelated importers, argued that Kütahya Porselen produced mainly high-end decorative ceramic products, which are not in scope of the investigation.

• (156) The Commission noted that the use of the financial data of Kütahya Porselen was communicated in the First Note and it was considered representative for the production of the product concerned, as explained in recitals 79 to 87. Interested parties provided no concrete evidence demonstrating that either the profit or the SG & A costs rates derived from Kütahya Porselen would lead to values that were not ‘undistorted and reasonable’ within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a). Therefore, the claim was dismissed.

• (157) Following the final disclosure, one unrelated importer and Hunan Hualian Group argued that Kütahya Porselen is not merely a manufacturer but also operates an extensive retail network. As such, the structure of Kütahya Porselen’s SG & A costs differs fundamentally from that of the Chinese producers, which do not engage in direct-to-consumer retail sales. Hunan Hualian further contended that in the Sinopec judgment, the General Court underscored the necessity of establishing normal value and export price at the same level of trade to ensure a fair and comparable analysis. The importer requested to exclude commission expenses, as well as rental and advertising expense not incurred by Chinese exporters selling to importers.

• (158) The Commission assessed the claim and concluded that any reduction in SG & A costs would result in an equivalent increase in profit margins, thereby not affecting the calculation of the dumping margin. Furthermore, the claim was not substantiated, as demonstrated by the analysis of financial statements. The Commission therefore dismissed the claim, as it failed to provide a valid basis for adjusting the SG & A costs.

• (159) Furthermore, the aforementioned unrelated importers and Hunan Hualian Group claimed that the Commission should exclude income from other activities and include monetary losses when calculating Kütahya Porselen’s profit value.

• (160) The Commission reviewed the claim and concluded that income from non-core activities should be excluded from the total profit calculations. This exclusion ensures that the profit margin accurately reflects the profitability of the product under investigation. The same principle applies to net monetary losses, which are unrelated to the production and sale for the product in question and therefore cannot be deducted from profit derived from its sales. Monetary losses are explicitly categorized under ‘Finance Income and Costs’ in the income statement for the relevant reporting period, typically arising from inflationary adjustments. While this account is recorded as a loss in the income statement, its ultimate impact is on the balance sheet through adjustments to retained earnings.

• (161) Importantly, the presentation of the income statement clarifies that monetary losses are excluded from the operating margin calculations. This metric is critical for assessing the efficiency of a company’s core operations in generating profit. Monetary losses are excluded from operating profit because they are inherently non-operating items, arising from external factors (e.g., currency fluctuations, inflation) rather than from sales, production, or administrative activities. This distinction ensures the operating margin remains a reliable indicator of operational efficiency, unclouded by one-off or peripheral financial events.

• (162) Moreover, Turkish tax law distinguishes between standard business expenses and accounting adjustments required by IFRS/IAS. The specific ‘Gain (Loss) on Net Monetary Position’ line item recognized in IFRS financial statements to account for lost purchasing power is treated as not an ‘ordinary and necessary expense’ in the eyes of the Turkish tax authorities and therefore excluded when establishing the total profit value as it can be calculated based on Kütahya Porselen financial statements.

• (163) Hunan Hualian Group criticised also that the Commission seems to downplay the impact of Turkish hyperinflation on the costs of factors of production, arguing that such an impact is neutralised merely because the benchmarks are expressed in CNY. At the same time, however, the Commission acknowledges that the correlation between exchange rates and inflation is not linear. The exporting producer criticised that the approach used for currency adjustment do not fully reflect the inflation in Türkiye, which rose by 50 %, while the Turkish Lira depreciated only by 18 % against the Chinese Yuan. As concluded above in recital 103, the Commission determined that hyperinflation had a limited impact on the establishment of the benchmarks. The claim was therefore dismissed.

• (164) An imported further claimed that all income and expenses recorded as ‘foreign exchange gains/losses’ should be disregarded as part of the financial result of Kütahya Porselen, as they reflect exporting operations, beyond the ex-works level. Moreover, the importer argued that, in the reconstruction of the financial information for the IP, the Commission had incoherently compared figures expressed in nominal Turkish lira for the first half of 2023 and inflation-adjusted figures for the full year 2023.

• (165) The Commission noted that while exchange rate gains/losses evidence international transactions, these transactions are not limited to export sales, and could correspond, at least partially, to international procurement practices. Regarding the combination of nominal and inflation adapted figures, the Commission noted that regardless of the level at which financial figures were reported, the comparison between them was done after adjusting them to the inflation levels of June 2024, therefore bringing them to the same level of comparison. Moreover, the Commission notes that the financial report for June 2024 includes the inflation adjusted values for June 2023 ‘for comparison’, proving that comparison between the figures after adjusting for inflation is not only mathematically sound, but also common practice. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

• (166) Based on this reasoning, the Commission adjusted the profit margin, expressing it as a percentage of the cost of goods sold (i.e., 19,8 %).

3.2.7.   Calculation

• (167) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (168) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the sampled exporting producers. These consumption rates were verified during the verification. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country, as described in section 3.2.3.1.

• (169) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, SG & A costs, profit and depreciation as noted in recital 149. They were determined on the basis of the financial statements of Kütahya Porselen for the investigation period as explained in recital 79.

• (170) SG & A costs expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 36,25 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 20,42 %.

• (171) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

3.3.   Export price

• (172) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies acting as traders.

• (173) For the sampled exporting producers that exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

3.4.   Comparison

• (174) Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

3.4.1.   Adjustments made to the normal value

• (175) As explained in recital 171, the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG & A and for profit, which had been adjusted to that level of trade.

3.4.2.   Adjustments made to the export price

• (176) In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of: customs duty, other import charges, freight, insurance, handling loading and ancillary expenses.

• (177) Allowances were made for the following factors affecting prices and price comparability: credit cost and bank charges.

3.5.   Dumping margins

• (178) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

• (179) On this basis, the dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Exporting producer(s) Group	Definitive Dumping margin (%)
Fun Lin Wah Group	444,7
Hunan Hualian Group	80,9
Hunan Huazhi Group	226,7
Dumping margin of the single entity	138,28

3.6.   Lasting nature of changed circumstances in the partial interim review

• (180) In accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation, the Commission analysed whether the change in circumstances regarding dumping were of a lasting nature.

• (181) Given the non-cooperation of the GOC, as explained above in recital 51 the findings of this section were based on facts available, namely the information provided in the review request and the information collected during the investigation.

• (182) In the request, the applicant identified recent efforts by Chinese local and municipal authorities to foster a major re-consolidation of the ceramic industry through the cluster-based industry development strategies. The Commission examined the reconsolidation of the ceramic industry around key leading large companies, supported by the Chinese authorities. These clusters also denominated ‘High Technology Areas’ or ‘Parks’, offer favourable conditions for resource-oriented and energy intensive industries and generous promotion schemes as incentives to potential entrants [^ntr43-L_202600274EN.000101-E0043].

• (183) Recent plans have focused on optimizing the production process and the industry structure by developing a more concentrated industry, centred around larger competitive flagship companies. Key importance has been given to the creation of new patents and the promotion of research and innovation activities within these flagship companies [^ntr44-L_202600274EN.000101-E0044].

• (184) This central strategy is confirmed in numerous planning documents focused on the ‘daily ceramics’ [^ntr45-L_202600274EN.000101-E0045] industry issued at provincial and municipal level.

• (185) The Guandong, Fujian, and Hunan provinces, as well as the Liling municipality provide good examples.

• (186) The 2020 Chaozhou Action Plan for Building a Hundred-billion-yuan Level Ceramic Industry Cluster (Guangdong Province) not only contains detailed provisions to scale up the region’s ceramic industry, but also lays out investment programs to support the creation of economies of scale:

• — ‘Comprehensively sort out the list of key ceramic enterprises, establish an enterprise development echelon, and carry out key support in accordance with the “one enterprise and one policy”, and deepen the cultivation of large-scale backbone enterprises. mergers and acquisitions of enterprises, vigorously develop the headquarters economy, promote the construction of headquarters bases, and strive to enhance comprehensive competitiveness’ [^ntr46-L_202600274EN.000101-E0046];

• — ‘Scientifically plan the positioning of the industrial park, and give priority to ensuring the high-end space of the ceramic industry. […] and promote the formation of a large platform to attract large projects and drive large projects.’ [^ntr47-L_202600274EN.000101-E0047];

• — ‘Appropriately adjust the prices of water, electricity and gas for enterprises, and use price policies to help enterprises reduce production costs. Guide financial institutions to optimize and adjust the direction of capital investment, expand the scale effect […] and provide high-quality financial products and services for enterprise mergers and acquisitions, upstream and downstream resource integration, capital increase and production expansion.’ [^ntr48-L_202600274EN.000101-E0048].

• (187) Similarly, the 2022 Plan of the Fujian Provincial department contains concrete measures to strengthen leading and key enterprises and lower fixed costs by scaling up production:

• — ‘Explore the creation of Haisi Ceramics Innovation Pilot Zone, promote the scale of the ceramic industry to exceed 100 billion yuan as soon as possible, and become an important ceramic production base in the country and competitive industrial clusters […] support the construction of public platforms such as ceramic R & D and design centres, rapid proofing centres, printing centres, clay processing centres, and raw material centralized procurement and supply centres to improve platform service levels.’ [^ntr49-L_202600274EN.000101-E0049].

• (188) Furthermore, the plan details investment efforts by the local authorities to support key enterprises with over 30 million yuan between 2023 and 2025 [^ntr50-L_202600274EN.000101-E0050].

• (189) In Zhuzhou City (Hunan province), an industry cluster was established in 2023 under the name of ‘Liling Ceramic Industry Cluster’ [^ntr51-L_202600274EN.000101-E0051] fostering the growth of ad hoc high-tech large ceramic groups [^ntr52-L_202600274EN.000101-E0052] [^ntr53-L_202600274EN.000101-E0053].

• (190) Accordingly, the municipal authorities of Hunan province received directives to ‘promote industrial capacity expansion, quality improvement, and efficiency enhancement’ throughout several projects, including support for the construction of new plants and other means of capacity expansion, as outlined in the first and second batches of Key Projects for Industrial Enterprise Capacity Expansion and Upgrading in Hunan Province [^ntr54-L_202600274EN.000101-E0054].

• (191) Under this strategy, the Chinese authorities together with the heavy state support have led to a severe re-shape of the Chinese ceramic industry by encouraging mergers and expanded the size and productivity of larger players.

• (192) The verification of the sampled companies allowed for a clear demonstration of this dynamic, as it was observed how regional champions identified in the aforementioned plans and strategies had absorbed the production capacity of several companies in their same industrial park in recent years.

• (193) In the previous expiry review investigation, which partially overlaps with the current interim review investigation period, it was found that China had a production capacity of 87 billion pieces of ceramics in 2023, with a spare capacity of 18,7 % [^ntr55-L_202600274EN.000101-E0055], showing a steady increase since the last review.

• (194) The evidence found highlights the efforts by Chinese local and municipal authorities to foster a major re-consolidation of the ceramic industry through cluster-based industry and development strategies around several key large enterprises. The plans listed above identified and endorsed regional champions with strong R & D departments and an established supplier network and crafted the conditions for them to increase their production capacity. Under this strategy, Chinese local authorities with heavy state support have led to a severe re-shape of the Chinese ceramic industry by encouraging mergers and expanded the size and productivity of larger players’.

• (195) Moreover, as evidenced by the governmental strategies as well as the planning documents issued at a provincial and municipal level (see recitals 184 to 190), and information obtained during the verification of the sampled companies, since the original investigation, the Chinese industry of ceramic tableware has been transforming through progressive industry concentration and focus on significant investments into infrastructure and research.

• (196) This consolidation is of a magnitude that proves it structural and irreversible, reflecting a lasting shift in the industry’s configuration and supply chains. As a result, it constitutes a fundamental and enduring change of circumstances that merits the re-examination of dumping margins.

• (197) In addition, Chinese export statistics to the Union, provided in the review request, show decreasing prices of about 15 % since 2019. Given that in the recent expiry review of the measures, Chinese prices were found to undercut the Union industry prices by more than 38 %, further potential price drops enabled by the restructuring of the sector and consequent use of economies of scale would undoubtedly harm the Union industry.

• (198) In view of the above and in view of the level of imports in the review investigation period of the last expiry review, made at very low dumped prices, the Commission concluded that the requirement in Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation, i.e. the ‘existing measure is […] no longer, sufficient to counteract the dumping’ was met.

• (199) Following disclosure, several importers disagreed with the findings on the structural changes of lasting nature detailed above. They claimed that the price decrease for Chinese imports was due to higher efficiency, economies of scale and that input prices reflect market conditions. Several other importers claimed even an opposite trend, arguing that prices remained stable or increased due to higher production and logistics costs. Importers criticised also the change to a country-wide duty, one importer claiming that the structural characteristics of the Chinese ceramics sector and the alleged distortions have already been examined in earlier reviews and demanding additional information.

• (200) The importers did not provide any substantive evidence to support their claims. They were therefore rejected.

4. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

4.1.   Form and level of the duties

• (201) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission in this partial interim review limited to dumping, pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, an anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC should be amended.

4.1.1.   Practicability of imposition of individual duty rates

• (202) During the course of the investigation the Commission found considerable evidence putting seriously into question the practicability of imposition of individual duty rates pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.

• (203) First and foremost, the analysis of the significant distortions, as presented in section 3.2.1, evidenced the close supervision of the Chinese authorities over the ceramics sector (See recitals 58 to 70).

• (204) The sampling exercise made it evident that the ceramic tableware and kitchenware industry in China is deeply intertwined, and further analysis highlighted strong and complex links between producers, traders and the public authorities, structural to the sector and ingrained in the supply chains throughout the industry.

• (205) During the verification visits it was observed that all sampled producers had purchased goods falling under the description of the product under investigation during the review investigation period from other producers and exported them to the Union market. This reinforces the Commission’s assessment that this practice of re-sales is a usual export pattern in the sector. Moreover, during verification it was observed that all sampled producers also engaged in re-sales of products manufactured by other companies for export, and that the supply chain that followed had one or more intermediate steps of unrelated traders before the goods arrived in the Union. In fact, all companies subject to verification had, in some instance, failed to provide the appropriate set of signed declarations as required in annexes 2 and 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131.

• (206) Following the final disclosure, Hunan Huazhi Group claimed that while it purchased products from other manufacturers, these were not all exported to the EU. The company claimed that the Commission failed to verify the destination countries of these purchases and wrongly assumed they were for the EU market. Moreover, Hunan Huazhi Group clarified that its related trader bought goods from non-cooperating suppliers, which were subject to the residual duty rate and thus shipped without signed declarations (as required only for cooperating companies). All products manufactured by Hunan Huazhi Group itself and exported to the EU did include the required signed declarations, confirmed during verification. Therefore, the Commission cannot conclude that ‘all companies failed to provide declarations’, and doing so ignores these distinctions and misrepresents the facts.

• (207) The Commission notes that the fact that not all resales of finished product were destined to the Union market does not negate the recurrence of this practice, nor its structural nature. Regarding Hunan Huazhi Group’s second claim, the Commission acknowledges that it failed to verify the validity of the invoices signed by the related trader Liling Leyi Home Trading on the resale of finished products manufactured by Hunan Huazhi Ceramics.

• (208) The application of the individual anti-dumping duty rates for the companies mentioned in paragraph 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 during the review investigation period was conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of the aforementioned signed declarations. Given that the practice of multi-sourcing occurs at the level of the producers, any system of presentation of documents at the Union border is considered not to be sufficiently effective in this case, irrespective of any other additional requirements that could be introduced.

• (209) Moreover, in 2019, the Commission initiated an anti-circumvention investigation and found channelling among exporting producers with individual (lower) duty rates. Following this investigation, an additional layer of security was set in place for benefiting from an individual duty rate. However, the evidence gathered during the investigation puts into question the appropriateness and effectiveness of the requirements currently in force as described in recital 205.

• (210) The fragmentation of the Chinese industry together with the changes in the structure following the lasting re-consolidation make the individual company approach of the current system inviable going forward. This is shown, on one side, by the significant number of Chinese companies which started exporting and requested a New Exporting Producer Treatment (‘NEPT’) to be granted a more beneficial duty rate, and, on the other side, by the high number of Chinese companies with an individual duty rate that have not exported in the review investigation period (more than 50 out of 400 companies granted an individual duty rate), suggesting that they might no longer be operative.

• (211) Based on the above findings and considerations, the Commission concluded that the imposition of individual duty rates has proven to be impracticable for this particular sector and product and would jeopardize the effectiveness of the measure. A country wide duty rate would be more appropriate in the case at hand in accordance with Article 9(5), second paragraph of the basic Regulation.

• (212) After disclosure, Hunan Hualian Group contested the legal grounds for the application of a country-wide duty. Hunan Hualian Group claimed that Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation covers three possible scenarios: (1) impossibility to calculate individual dumping margins, in which case the application of a county-wide duty is warranted, (2) single-economic entity between producers, or producers and their suppliers, in which case a single duty can be applied to all the companies considered as a single-entity, and (3) single-economic entity between producers and the state, in which case a single duty may be applied to these producers.

• (213) Hunan Hualian Group further argued that the application of country-wide duty, as per Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation, is limited to situations where it is ‘impracticable’ to calculate an individual dumping margin for each supplier, regardless of the efficiency (or lack thereof) of their enforcement. Therefore, wherever the calculation of individual duty margins is determined, an individual duty rate must be applied, as per the WTO Appellate Body Report in EC – Fasteners (China) [^ntr56-L_202600274EN.000101-E0056] Since Hunan Hualian Group claimed that it would be entitled to an individual duty lower than 79 %, the application of a country-wide duty would be discriminatory for them. Moreover, the company argued that the Commission failed to show that Hunan Hualian Group, or any other exporting producer, should be considered as a single entity with the State or with other suppliers. Hunan Hualian Group went on to argue that even if these links were proven, the relevant WTO jurisprudence [^ntr57-L_202600274EN.000101-E0057] required that if particular exporters are related and constitute a single supplier, the Commission would be required to determine an individual dumping margin for the single economic entity at issue which should be based on the average export prices of each individual exporter. This party also argued that if a country-wide duty would be applied in this situation based on the existence of significant distortions in the PRC, then such a duty would be applicable in all anti-dumping cases concerning the PRC.

• (214) Additionally, Hunan Hualian Group denied any involvement in circumvention practices and objected to the conclusions reached by the Commission on the basis of a single episode, which is not representative of a deliberate and systematic plan to circumvent the existing measures. Such alleged practices do not constitute a basis for the application of a country-wide duty, and the existence of circumvention practices that render the existing measures ineffective is, however, not a ground for the application of the country-wide duty pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.

• (215) Moreover, and since the review was limited to examination of dumping, Hunan Hualian Group noted that the injury margins calculated in the context of the original investigation (AD586) continued to be valid and applicable. Consequently, the Commission’s decision to apply a country-wide duty of 79 % de facto targets only and exclusively Hunan Hualian Group, and it will be detrimental only and exclusively for Hunan Hualian Group, since Hunan Hualian Group is the only company with an injury margin lower than 79 %, and therefore, the only company which would benefit from an individual duty lower than 79 %. It follows that, according to Hunan Hulian, the Commission’s proposal to impose a country-wide duty is discriminatory, other than groundless.

• (216) The Commission recalled that, as Hunan Hualian Group rightly acknowledged, among the relevant factors contemplated in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation to apply a country-wide duty there is ‘the existence of control or material influence by the State in respect of pricing and output, or the economic structure of the supplying country.’

• (217) The current wording of the Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation was introduced by Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [^ntr58-L_202600274EN.000101-E0058] in order to implement the findings of the WTO report in EC-Fasteners. As explained in recital 4 of that amending regulation, the determination of a single dumping margin and a single anti-dumping duty for a number of exporters is linked to the existence of situations indicating that two or more exporters, albeit legally distinct, are in such a relationship that they should be treated as a single entity. Such situations may include: (i) the existence of corporate and structural links between the exporters, such as common control, shareholding and management; (ii) the existence of corporate and structural links between the State and the exporters, such as common control, shareholding and management; (iii) control or material influence by the State in respect of pricing and output as well as the economic structure of the supplying country as specified in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.

• (218) At the outset, the Commission noted that most of the arguments put forward by Hunan Hualian Group are based on selectively quoting the Appellate Body report in EC-Fasteners, simply ignoring that it has been swiftly and fully implemented into the basic Regulation and fully complied with since then. Hunan Hualian Group failed to mention that the Appellate Body report in EC-Fasteners also recognised that an investigating authority might have to take into account factors and positive evidence other than those establishing a corporate or commercial relationship in assessing whether the State and a number of exporters are a single entity and that, therefore, the State is the source of price discrimination. These, for instance, may include evidence of State control or instruction of, or material influence on, the behaviour of certain exporters in respect of pricing and output. Furthermore, the economic structure of a WTO Member may be used as evidence before an investigating authority to determine whether the State and a number of exporters or producers subject to an investigation are sufficiently related to constitute a single entity such that a single margin should be calculated and a single duty be imposed on them [^ntr59-L_202600274EN.000101-E0059]. These criteria could show that, even in the absence of formal structural links between the State and specific exporters, the State in fact determines and materially influences prices and output and that exporters or producers subject to an investigation are sufficiently related to constitute a single entity. The Appellate Body report also clearly stated that ‘if the State instructs or materially influences the behaviour of several exporters in respect of prices and output, they could be effectively regarded as one exporter for the purposes of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and a single margin and duty could be assigned to that single exporter’ [^ntr60-L_202600274EN.000101-E0060].

• (219) In the case at hand and as explained in section 3.2.1 in the context of the analysis of significant distortions and in recital 194, the investigation confirmed by way of a wealth of evidence that there is control and material influence by Chinese authorities over the ceramics sector, as well as pervasive State influence on the economic structure of this sector. As explained in recital 70, the Commission concluded that, in the ceramic sector, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist [^ntr61-L_202600274EN.000101-E0061], but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms [^ntr62-L_202600274EN.000101-E0062]. All this evidence is relevant also in the context of the analysis pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation to impose a country-wide duty, because it already clearly shows how the GOC controls and materially influences the pricing and output in the tableware sector, and how the economic structure of this sector is affected by all these policies and plans implemented by GOC. Contrary to what Hunan Hualian Group asserts, the Commission relied on all this evidence to substantiate its conclusion, as also referred to in recitals 203 to 204.

• (220) Moreover, Hunan Hualian Group omits to acknowledge and address the latest policy developments showing how pervasive the State influence at the different layers of the administration (i.e. national and provincial) in the ceramics sector is. The evidence in Section 3.6 shows the recent GOC strategy, inter alia, to consolidate the sector by creating national champions, scale up production and capacities, and provide finance to implement this strategy has been verified to have an immediate impact on the sampled companies.

• (221) With regard specifically to Hunan Hualian Group, the Commission noted that it was explicitly included and named in the beneficiary list of ‘Key Projects for Industrial Enterprise Capacity Expansion and Upgrading in Hunan Province’ mentioned in recital 190 above. Furthermore, the beneficiary companies listed in this plan (i.e. including Hunan Hualian Group) are requested to follow the requirements of the ‘Notice on the Issuance of the Second Batch of Key Projects for Industrial Enterprise Capacity Expansion and Upgrading in Hunan Province’ (Xiang Gongxin Investment [2023] No 429 [^ntr63-L_202600274EN.000101-E0063]) and implement the efficiency gains pursued by the government immediately.

• (222) Hunan Hualian Group did not submit any evidence contradicting all these findings and the underlying evidence, and has not shown that it is not affected or not subject to such control or material influence by the GOC. Consequently, there were no reasons to treat Hunan Hualian Group differently than any other exporting producer of tableware in China. In sum, the totality of the evidence concerning the control or material influence by the Chinese State in respect of pricing and output in the ceramic tableware sector, as well as the economic structure and policies of the GOC in the same sector, lead to the conclusion that the application of a country-wide duty is appropriate in the case at hand. Their claims were therefore rejected.

• (223) With regard to Hunan Hualian Group’s claims that the group was not found as circumventing the country-wide duty rate and that if based on the assessment on significant distortions the application of a country-wide duty would apply in all the anti-dumping investigations concerning the PRC, the Commission disagreed. The Commission noted that its decision to impose the country-wide duty in this case was based on all the elements explained in this regulation showing the control and material influence by the GOC on the ceramics sector including on pricing and output, as well as on the particular economic structure of the country as a result of the GOC policies and influence. This conclusion was based not only on the assessment on the existence of significant distortions in Section 3.2.1, but on a number of other relevant elements as set out namely in recitals 205 and 208–211, which are peculiar to the specific product and sector subject to this investigation, and may not all affect specifically Hunan Hualian Group’s while still being relevant for the country-wide finding. These elements show this specific intervention by the GOC, as well as the peculiarity of the tableware sector being extremely fragmented and currently subject to the opposite GOC policy to consolidate it, the peculiarity that exporting producers re-exported to the EU products purchased by other producers, the significant number of NEPTs and the history of circumvention. On this basis, it rejected Hunan Hualian Group’s arguments.

• (224) With regard to Hunan Hualian Group’s claim based on the WTO EC – Fasteners jurisprudence that when an individual dumping margin has been calculated, one single duty can be applied to different suppliers constituting a single exporter, the single duty should be based on the average export prices of each individual exporters, the Commission disagreed. First, the Commission recalled that the country-wide duty set in this investigation was based on the injury margin and not on the dumping margin, as explained in Section 4.1.2, since the former was lower than the dumping margin. Furthermore, as specified in Section 3.5, the average dumping margin reflecting the export prices of the three sampled producers that was considered to be representative of the single entity amounted to 138,2 %, thus above the new applicable country-wide duty of 79 %. In fact, the Commission did not determine the individual margins of dumping but rather it first established intermediary margins for each sampled exporting producer which were considered representative of the single entity. This was a necessary intermediate step on the basis of which it then calculated the dumping margin of single entity. Therefore, these claims were dismissed.

4.1.2.   Level of the measures

• (225) Anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of product originating in countries concerned, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins established in the original investigation and the dumping margins established in recital 179 above. As the dumping margin found in this review investigation is higher than the injury margin established in the original investigation, the new level of measures shall be based on the lower of the two margins, hence the level of the underselling margin.

• (226) To this effect, and in accordance with the impracticability of the application of individual duties and the fact that all individual dumping margin were above the injury margin, the Commission decided to compare the country wide dumping margin established in this partial interim review with the level of injury applicable to the average of the sample in the original investigation.

• (227) Following the final disclosure, CCCLA and the Fun Lin Wah Group argued that the injury margin established during the original investigation is no longer relevant to the current context. According to both parties, the Commission should reassess the injury level based on the prevailing conditions during the interim review period to ensure accuracy and reflect the actual market dynamics.

• (228) Moreover, CCCLA and the Fun Lin Wah Group claimed that the proposed new anti-dumping duty applies the same rate to all companies in China, regardless of whether they cooperated with the investigation. Fun Lin Wah Group argued that this was unfair to cooperative Chinese companies, especially those selected for sampling (like Fun Lin Wah Group), and could discourage future cooperation with EU investigations. The Fun Lin Wah Group further argued that the lack of differentiation may harm the Commission’s ability to conduct effective investigations in the future, and urged the Commission to: (a) acknowledge the strong cooperation from participating companies (especially sampled ones), (b) apply different duty rates based on cooperation levels (lower rates for cooperating companies), and (c) offer more favourable rates to sampled companies as a reward for their cooperation.

• (229) CCCLA and Fun Lin Wah Group claimed that increasing anti-dumping duties in the EU would harm EU importers, disrupt supply chains, and cause economic losses. Both parties claimed that the Chinese and the Union industries are complementary to each other, and do not compete, since EU producers focus on high-end branded products, while China supplies cost-effective, mass-market ceramics. CCCLA and Fun Lin Wah Group further argued that higher duties would ultimately affect consumers and worsen inflation, and that the current operational division between Chinese producers and Union importers was benign and ensured product quality, cost-efficiency, and consumer satisfaction. The parties concluded that the proposed duties threaten EU economic stability, consumer welfare, and the mutually beneficial China-EU trade relationship, undermining long-term interests.

• (230) Following disclosure, a high number of unrelated importers submitted comments to the investigation, in line with the remarks expressed by CCCLA and the Fun Lin Wah Group.

• (231) The importers claimed further that the increased duty will lead to increased costs for importers and increased prices for consumers and downstream sectors, leading to substantial financial and job losses and insolvencies. Importers criticised that in particular small and medium sized enterprises will be affected.

• (232) Importers claimed that the European industrial capacity cannot replace the Chinese import volumes, which consequently would lead to supply disruptions and shortages. Several importers deemed Türkiye unsuitable as alternative production location due to lacking technological capabilities to meet the European standards. One importer criticised that the measure would cause the relocation of production to other third countries, such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, or Türkiye. Importers criticised also that due to increasing retail prices, consumers may buy increasingly directly from China through purchasing channels such as Temu. Several submissions claimed also an environmental impact of the changed measures, as consumers would turn to plastic tableware.

• (233) Several importers criticised that the flat rate duty did not reflect the diversity on the market, fearing that it could eliminate entire product categories and lead to a lack of competition and price increases by producers in the EU and third countries. Some importers considered it as unlikely that an increase of the anti-dumping duty would revive EU ceramic production, referring to structural and long-term challenges like changes in consumer habits, demographic trends, or higher energy, environmental and labour costs.

• (234) Several importers called also for a transitional arrangement for existing long-term contracts that are subject to penalties for non-delivery or delayed delivery, have fixed delivery conditions, and do not allow for contractual price adjustments.

• (235) Holst Porzellan claimed the double investigation of the expiry review and the interim review were a violation of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, referring to the injury findings of the expiry review. Several importers argued that the interim review should have referred to the results of the expiry review that confirmed that Union manufacturers had suffered injury due to an undercutting margin of 38 % and criticised the increase of the duty with the interim review to 79 %.

• (236) With respect to the above claims, the Commission would like to recall that interim review is limited to the scope of dumping. The analysis of injury and Union interest are therefore not covered by the investigation. Furthermore, none of the interested parties cooperated, following the initiation of the investigation, providing questionnaire replies. Considering also that no substantial evidence was provided to support the claims, they were rejected.

4.2.   Definitive dumping duties

• (237) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
Country-wide dumping margin	138,28	79,0	79,0

• (238) The anti-dumping duty rate specified in this Regulation was established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, it reflects the situation found during the investigation. This country-wide duty applicable to all companies is then applicable to all imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC.

• (239) Following the final disclosure, Hunan Huazhi Group and several importers claimed that the proposed duty level violates the WTO principle of proportionality. The European Commission’s decision to impose a uniform 79 % duty on all exporters is inconsistent with this principle, as less restrictive and equally effective alternatives were available. Hunan Huazhi Group argued that the rate would disproportionately harm downstream industries and end consumers – particularly those reliant on affordable ceramic tableware and kitchenware – exceeding what is proportionate to address the dumping harm. Such a measure risks overcompensating for dumping while inflicting unnecessary economic damage to sectors and consumers. Moreover, Hunan Huazhi Group requested the Commission to calculate the injury margin, impose duties only at the level needed to eliminate injury, ensuring duties are not excessive. This approach would prevent over-protection of EU producers and ensure fair, proportionate measures.

• (240) As specified in the Notice of Initiation, the scope of the interim review was limited to the examination of dumping therefore the injury margin for this proceeding is the one established in the regulation imposing the original measures. As explained in recital 225 the duty was established based on the lower between the dumping and the injury margin, in accordance with article 9(4) of the Basic Regulation. Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

5. FINAL PROVISIONS

• (241) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr64-L_202600274EN.000101-E0064], when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (242) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion on the measures provided for in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1981 is replaced as follows:

‘Article 1

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware, currently falling under CN codes ex 6911 10 00 , ex 6912 00 21 , ex 6912 00 23 , ex 6912 00 25 and ex 6912 00 29 (TARIC codes 6911 10 00 90, 6912 00 21 11, 6912 00 21 91, 6912 00 23 10, 6912 00 25 10 and 6912 00 29 10) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

1. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 shall be as follows:

Country of origin	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
People’s Republic of China	79,0

1. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.’.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 February 2026.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

[^ntr1-L_202600274EN.000101-E0001]: OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

[^ntr2-L_202600274EN.000101-E0002]: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1072/2012 of 14 November 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 318, 15.11.2012, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1072/oj).

[^ntr3-L_202600274EN.000101-E0003]: Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 of 13 May 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 131, 15.5.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2013/412/oj).

[^ntr4-L_202600274EN.000101-E0004]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1932 of 23 October 2017 amending Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 412/2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 273, 24.10.2017, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2017/1932/oj).

[^ntr5-L_202600274EN.000101-E0005]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 of 12 July 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (OJ L 189, 15.7.2019, p. 8, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1198/oj), as last amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/571 of 24 April 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China, as amended by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 and repayment of duties collected (OJ L 132, 27.4.2020, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/571/oj.

[^ntr6-L_202600274EN.000101-E0006]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 of 28 November 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 321, 12.12.2019, p. 139, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/2131/oj).

[^ntr7-L_202600274EN.000101-E0007]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1981 of 7 October 2025 imposing a definitive antidumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2025/1981, 8.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1981/oj).

[^ntr8-L_202600274EN.000101-E0008]: OJ C, C/2024/7456, 19.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7456/oj.

[^ntr9-L_202600274EN.000101-E0009]: See Note to the File on the open version (Sn t25.002029).

[^ntr10-L_202600274EN.000101-E0010]: Note to the file of 21 February 2025, document numbered t25.002338 (available in the open file).

[^ntr11-L_202600274EN.000101-E0011]: Document numbered t25.008995.

[^ntr12-L_202600274EN.000101-E0012]: Note to the file of 21 May 2025, document numbered t25.005523 (available in the open file).

[^ntr14-L_202600274EN.000101-E0014]: Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ C 117, 12.4.2017, p. 12).

[^ntr15-L_202600274EN.000101-E0015]: China State Council – Guiding Opinions of Five Departments on Promoting High-Quality Development of Light Industry; available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-06/19/content_5696665.htm (accessed on 16 October 2025).

[^ntr16-L_202600274EN.000101-E0016]: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology – Interpretation of Work Plan for the Steady Growth of Light Industry (2023-2024); available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202307/content_6895224.htm (accessed on 16 October 2025).

[^ntr17-L_202600274EN.000101-E0017]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493 of 12 February 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2024/493, 13.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/493/oj).

[^ntr18-L_202600274EN.000101-E0018]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recitals 99-137.

[^ntr19-L_202600274EN.000101-E0019]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recital 104.

[^ntr20-L_202600274EN.000101-E0020]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recital 135.

[^ntr21-L_202600274EN.000101-E0021]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recital 108.

[^ntr22-L_202600274EN.000101-E0022]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recital 127.

[^ntr23-L_202600274EN.000101-E0023]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recital 128.

[^ntr24-L_202600274EN.000101-E0024]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/493, recital 129.

[^ntr25-L_202600274EN.000101-E0025]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1981.

[^ntr26-L_202600274EN.000101-E0026]: Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024 (SWD (2024) 91 final).

[^ntr27-L_202600274EN.000101-E0027]: World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income (https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income).

[^ntr28-L_202600274EN.000101-E0028]: IAS 29 – Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies – provides guidance for companies operating in economies experiencing hyperinflation. The standard requires restatement of financial statements to reflect changes in the general purchasing power of the local currency, as historical data can become misleading in such environments.

[^ntr29-L_202600274EN.000101-E0029]: Product Catalogue: https://kurumsal.kutahyaporselen.com/tr/urunler.

[^ntr30-L_202600274EN.000101-E0030]: The NACE category C234 includes the following subcategories:

• — C-2341 ‘Manufacture of ceramic household and ornamental articles’,

• — C-2342 ‘Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures’.

[^ntr31-L_202600274EN.000101-E0031]: World Economic Outlook (April 2025) – Inflation rate, average consumer prices.

[^ntr32-L_202600274EN.000101-E0032]: E.g. Judgment of 2 July 2025, PT Permata Hijau Palm Oleo and PT Nubika Jaya v European Commission, Case T-187/23, ECLI:EU:T:2025:663, paragraph 95.

[^ntr33-L_202600274EN.000101-E0033]: In the second FOP Note the Commission identified commodity codes 2510 10 00 90 11 and 2510 10 00 90 12 as appropriate benchmarks for phosphates of calcium. Following the verified information received during the verification visits of the exporting producers, the Commission concluded that the code 2835 26 was more appropriate.

[^ntr34-L_202600274EN.000101-E0034]: The source used provides a range of benchmark prices dependent on total electricity consumption. See Eurostat: Electricity prices for non-household consumers – bi-annual data. For more detailed explanations, see recitals 130 to 131.

[^ntr35-L_202600274EN.000101-E0035]: Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

[^ntr36-L_202600274EN.000101-E0036]: TÜİK – Veri Portalı (tuik.gov.tr) and TÜİK – Veri Portalı (tuik.gov.tr).

[^ntr39-L_202600274EN.000101-E0039]: EPDK | Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu.

[^ntr42-L_202600274EN.000101-E0042]: EMRA | Energy Market Regulatory Authority.

[^ntr43-L_202600274EN.000101-E0043]: Think!Desk China Research and Consulting, Report Part II, ‘Development and Policy Guidance of the Chinese Daily-use Ceramics Industry’, 12 January 2024, p. 10.

[^ntr44-L_202600274EN.000101-E0044]: Fujian Provincial Department of Industry and Information Technology, ‘Notice from the Fujian Provincial Department of Industry and Information Technology and seven other departments on several measures to support the high-quality development of the “China White·Dehua Porcelain” industry’, 8 November 2022.

[^ntr45-L_202600274EN.000101-E0045]: In official Chinese statistics and documents the production of ceramic tableware and kitchenware is often observed under the ‘daily ceramic’ sector, which also comprises other domestic ceramic items.

[^ntr46-L_202600274EN.000101-E0046]: Chaozhou Local Government, ‘Chaozhou action plan to build a hundred billion worth ceramic cluster’, 5 August 2020, p. 6.

[^ntr47-L_202600274EN.000101-E0047]: Ibidem, p. 9.

[^ntr48-L_202600274EN.000101-E0048]: Ibidem, p. 32.

[^ntr49-L_202600274EN.000101-E0049]: Fujian Provincial Department of Industry and Information Technology, ‘Notice from the Fujian Provincial Department of Industry and Information Technology and seven other departments on several measures to support the high-quality development of the “China White Dehua Porcelain” industry’, 8 November 2022, p. 1.

[^ntr50-L_202600274EN.000101-E0050]: Ibidem, p. 3.

[^ntr51-L_202600274EN.000101-E0051]: ST Daily, press release, ‘World Porcelain Capital’ Fujian Dehua: Intelligent manufacturing leads the way, and the entire chain supports industry upgrading’, 22 November 2022, p. 1.

[^ntr52-L_202600274EN.000101-E0052]: Hunan’s Government, press release, ‘Millennium Porcelain City’ creates a 100-billion-dollar ceramics industry cluster’, 10 March 2022.

[^ntr53-L_202600274EN.000101-E0053]: Hunan Government, press release, ‘Hunan Has Five New SME Industrial Clusters’, 19 October 2023.