Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/319 of 12 February 2026 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of valine originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (104) Following provisional disclosure, Huaheng Group claimed that the Commission had not taken into account the economic reality when deciding whether to use corn or corn starch as a relevant factor of production for calculating its cost of production. Huaheng Group added that the Commission’s choice had discriminated Huaheng Group as compared to the other sampled exporting producer.

• (105) The Commission noted that it used as factors of production all those inputs which had been purchased for producing valine and it therefore took into account the economic reality. The Commission used the same approach for the other sampled exporting producer and therefore did not discriminate between producers. The Commission dismissed the claim.

• (106) Following provisional disclosure, Huaheng Group claimed that corn starch should not have been subjected to an adjustment for genetically modified (‘GMO’) corn starch since there were almost no imports from the USA, where the adoption rate of GMO products is high [^ntr24-L_202600319EN.000101-E0024]. Huaheng Group argued that the high price level of corn starch in Colombia suggested that these imports were non-GMO, that, as set out in recital 224 of the provisional Regulation, is more expensive than GMO corn starch.

• (107) The Commission agreed that the volume of imports of corn starch from the USA into Colombia was low. However, the Commission did not agree that the price level of corn starch in Colombia suggested that imports were non-GMO. In fact, the investigation showed that the corn grown in the three countries from where Colombia sourced most corn starch (up to 89 %) was largely GMO: 90 % in Brazil [^ntr25-L_202600319EN.000101-E0025], 99 % in Argentina [^ntr26-L_202600319EN.000101-E0026] and 80 % in Paraguay [^ntr27-L_202600319EN.000101-E0027]. The Commission therefore maintained the adjustment and dismissed the claim.

• (108) Following provisional disclosure, the complainant requested confirmation that the benchmark for corn included the post-importation transport costs.

• (109) The Commission explained in recitals 220, 222 and 230 of the provisional Regulation that it added inland transport costs to the undistorted benchmarks for raw materials.

• (110) The complainant also requested the Commission to clarify the difference between the benchmark for corn reported in Table 1, including the non-GMO premium, and the benchmark for corn reported in the relevant annex to the pre-disclosure.

• (111) As indicated in recital 103, the Commission corrected the value reported in Table 1. In addition, as explained in recital 224 of the provisional Regulation, the non-GMO premium is an addition to the benchmark of 5,7 % of the value of the benchmark reported in the relevant annex to the pre-disclosure. The resulting undistorted value is reported in Table 1.

• (112) Following provisional disclosure, CJS contested that the Commission added to the import price of the factors of production in Colombia the ratio of the transport cost on the purchase value of the inputs reported by CJS, rather than the actual transport cost reported by CJS, claiming that, thus, the Commission disregarded its actual transport cost without due justification. In particular, CJS alleged that the Commission did not show that its transport costs were distorted and that it deducted the actual domestic handling, loading and transport costs from the export price, without replacing them with a benchmark and, thus, considering such costs reliable.

• (113) The Commission determined, when applying Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, that it is not appropriate to use domestic Chinese prices and costs due to the existence of significant distortions in China. Therefore, the Commission constructed the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks. For this the Commission resorted to the import price of the factors of production into Colombia as a benchmark to replace the price of the same factors of production for China. In accordance with its common practice, the Commission resorted to the ratio of the transport cost on the actual purchase value of the inputs reported by the Chinese exporting producers as an estimate for the transport costs in Colombia. During the investigation CJS did not positively establish that its transport costs were not distorted. As a consequence, the estimate of the transport cost in Colombia based on the ratio of such cost on the actual purchase value of the imports as reported by the Chinese exporting producers, was considered accurate. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

3.2.3.2.   By-products

• (114) Following provisional disclosure, CJS made a claim on the reference used by the Commission to calculate the benchmark for the by-products. In the confidential version of its submission, CJS elaborated in more details this claim.

• (115) The Commission rejected this claim. More details regarding the Commission’s assessment were provided to CJS in its specific disclosure as it included confidential information.

• (116) Following provisional disclosure, the complainant claimed that the transformation of corn starch into glucose did not generate protein powder as a by-product, as the protein part of the corn had already been removed in the previous steps of the dry milling process. Moreover, according to the complainant, protein-rich by-products tended to have a different value than protein containing mainly carbohydrates.

• (117) The Commission confirmed during the on-spot verification visit that when using certain input materials for producing valine, protein powder was a by-product. As regards the value of protein powder, the Commission recalled that the methodology used to value by-products, described in recital 246 of the provisional Regulation, did not take into account the price at which such by-products were traded. The Commission also noted that the complainant did not further clarify how the value of protein powder should be established. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (118) Furthermore, the complainant questioned whether the basis for the ratio of the by-products calculated by the Commission should not be different. However, it did not further explain this claim and which basis for the ratio between the price of the by-products in China and the price of the main input material in China should have been used instead. Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

3.2.3.3.   Comments after final disclosure

• (119) Huaheng Group claimed that the Commission had not addressed one of its comments following the provisional disclosure. In particular, Huaheng Group claimed that the Commission’s approach to use as a factor of production corn starch instead of corn was at odds with the requirement in Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation to construct the normal value at the level of the investigated party, that is, Huaheng Group instead of BHB.

• (120) The Commission disagreed that it had not addressed the claim. The Commission summarised this claim in recital 104 and addressed it in recital 105 on the basis of information made available in the non-sensitive version of the comments submitted by Huaheng Group. As regards the method to establish the constructed normal value, and as explained in recital 105, the Commission considered as factors of production all the inputs that the actual exporting producer BHB had purchased to produce valine. Although BHB’s original reply to the questionnaire (before deficiency letters and verification) included both corn and corn starch as factors of production, the Commission found that BHB had not purchased corn but only corn starch from related and unrelated suppliers. Therefore, the Commission asked BHB to submit the cost of manufacturing tables starting from their purchased materials, including corn starch. This way of identification of the factors of production corresponds to the production process of the exporting producer for which the normal value is determined. This was also the information verified on-site by the Commission and to which Huaheng Group did not object that the Commission should have considered a different factor of production. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

• (121) Eurolysine claimed that the coal benchmark used by the Commission was not representative due to the structure of the Colombian coal market. It submitted that Colombia is predominantly an exporter of thermal coal in very large volumes, while imports are marginal, limited to specific grades such as metallurgical coal and coke, and amount to a negligible share of domestic production. According to the Eurolysine, the low volume and heterogeneous quality of these imports render import prices statistically unreliable and likely biased downwards. It further noted that in a recent anti-dumping investigation on lysine originating in China, concluded by the Commission on 11 July 2025 [^ntr28-L_202600319EN.000101-E0028] (‘lysine investigation’), where similar market conditions were observed, the Commission applied a global coal benchmark, and argued that adopting the same approach in the present investigation would ensure consistency.

• (122) The Commission examined the claim and noted that the materials provided consisted of general statistical sources on Colombian coal production and exports. While these confirm the predominance of thermal coal exports, they do not provide product-specific information on the coal types imported into Colombia or evidence that the import prices used in the benchmark would be unrepresentative or biased. The claim therefore did not establish a link between the general structure of the Colombian coal market and the benchmark applied. The Commission further observed that the reference to the lysine investigation concerned a different coal grade and was therefore not of decisive relevance. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (123) Eurolysine argued further that the benchmark for water used by the Commission did not reflect actual industrial water costs. It claimed that the value relied upon appeared to correspond to sewage rather than water supply, and that such value did not include fixed subscription charges or the costs of wastewater treatment.

• (124) However, this claim was based on data for a different region than the one used in the investigation. As described in recital 213 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission relied on information from the water supplier of Bogotà, the capital of Colombia, Acueducto S.A., whereas Eurolysine referred to figures for Soacha. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (125) Eurolysine also claimed that the Commission’s calculation of the cost of electricity covered only variable consumption costs and did not reflect the fixed charges borne by industrial users. It submitted that the tariff structure of the Colombian supplier ENEL includes several non-optional fixed components applicable to large consumers, such as basic monthly charges, system availability and administrative fees, contracted demand charges and network-related costs. These, Eurolysine claimed, should be added to the benchmark. They further noted that in the lysine investigation, where Colombia and ENEL were likewise used as sources, the Commission included fixed electricity charges in the undistorted value and argued that applying the same approach here would ensure consistency.

• (126) The Commission examined the claim and noted that the argument relating to fixed electricity charges was based on an incorrect reading of the approach taken in the lysine investigation. Indeed, in that case, as in the present one, the benchmark relied on ENEL’s published Nivel 3 tariffs for the industrial sector (sector no residencial). Moreover, as explained in recital 194 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/74 [^ntr29-L_202600319EN.000101-E0029], no additional charges were added as the price reported covers all the expenses. Thus, the approach adopted in the lysine investigation and in the current investigation were consistent, since in neither of the two investigations additional charges were added. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (127) In the absence of any other comment on the sources used to establish the costs and benchmarks for the determination of the normal value, the Commission confirmed its conclusions in recitals 209–261 of the provisional Regulation.

3.3.   Export price

• (128) Following provisional disclosure, CJS claimed that a credit note had not been properly taken into consideration in the calculation of the export price as the Commission only deducted the value of the credit note but not the corresponding volume from the reported transactions.

• (129) The Commission noted that the credit note referred to a transaction where the volume indicated on the delivery document did not correspond to the volume received by the customer, which was less. Therefore, CJ Europe GmbH (‘CJE’) issued a credit note for the value of the missing volume, without mentioning the volume itself. The evidence on the record shows that the missing volume in question did leave the facility of CJE, and therefore the original volume reported in CJE’s tables remained the correct quantity. Thus, this claim was rejected.

• (130) CJS also claimed that the profit based on which the Commission made the adjustment under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation relied on an old investigation concerning imports of PVA originating in China [^ntr30-L_202600319EN.000101-E0030]. In the confidential version of its submission, CJS elaborated in more details this claim. CJS further pointed out that both Quimidroga and Millenis SAS (‘Millenis’) replied to the questionnaire for unrelated importers.

• (131) The Commission rejected this claim. More details regarding the Commission’s assessment were provided to CJS in its specific disclosure as it included confidential information.

• (132) The Commission noted that, despite receiving questionnaire replies from two importers, one was incomplete and did not allow the establishment of the profit margin. The second company provided a full set of data and the profit related to the product under investigation and, following the imposition of provisional measures, agreed to the verification of its questionnaire reply, the disclosure of its profit margin in the investigation period and its use in the calculation.

• (133) Following the verification of the data and information provided by the company, the investigation established that the importer has been exclusively purchasing amino acids, including the product under investigation, from one of the sampled exporting producers for more than 10 years, acting as its exclusive distributor in one Member State. This exclusivity is based on an oral agreement between the parties. As a result of such exclusivity, the importer cannot source from other suppliers. The facts established by the investigation confirm this. Indeed, the importer bought valine solely from this producer and sold it only in that Member State [^ntr31-L_202600319EN.000101-E0031]. The investigation also determined that, during the IP, the importer’s profit margin was, by the importer’s own admission, particularly low, as it had to sell some of the imported goods at a loss, barely breaking even. Such a low profit was due to the impossibility for the importer to source valine from any other Chinese exporting producer that sold at cheaper prices, which in turn would have allowed it to then resell with higher profits, as well as to the overall adverse market situation characterized by large volumes of cheap dumped imports competing with the importers sales. Consequently, the Commission found that the profit margin realised by this importer in the IP could not be considered as representative of the profit that an independent importer, with no kind of association to exporting producers and consequently able to source from all suppliers, would make. Indeed, as noted above and acknowledged by the company, its profit during the IP was particularly low because of the exclusivity agreement combined with the sharp increase of volumes of cheap imports at decreasing prices from other Chinese producers. In view of the above elements, the Commission concluded that such a profit cannot be considered a reasonable profit within the meaning of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. On the other hand, the profit margin used at provisional stage in the current investigation is representative of such activity, for the reasons explained in recital 265 of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, CJS’s claim was rejected, and the Commission relied on a profit of 6,89 % that was considered reasonable in the lysine investigation [^ntr32-L_202600319EN.000101-E0032] and in the previous PVA investigation [^ntr33-L_202600319EN.000101-E0033].

• (134) Following final disclosure, CJS reiterated its claim that the Commission should have taken into consideration in the calculation of the export price not only the value of a credit note but also the corresponding volume from the reported transactions. CJS disagreed with the Commission’s statement that the missing volume did leave the facility of CJE, citing a lack of evidence to support this conclusion.

• (135) The Commission recalled the two elements of the evidence on the record collected during the on-spot verification, which supported its finding that the missing volume in question left the premises of CJE. First, the delivery document, included at page 7 of Verification Exhibit 14 showed that the weight of the valine loaded in the truck included the volume in question. Second, the credit note showed that it was issued solely for the value of the missing volume, without any corresponding adjustment for the volume. The Commission therefore concluded that the valine did indeed leave the facility of CJE, regardless of whether it was received by the client. As CJE itself, after that its customer flagged the inconsistency, did not deem it appropriate to adjust the volume of valine in its stock, the Commission cannot be required to perform an adjustment not done by the company in first instance. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

• (136) Following final disclosure, CJS claimed that the Commission should not use the outdated profit of the PVA investigation to construct its export price, but rather the profit margin of [1–5] % used in a recent anti-dumping investigation on imports of epoxy resins originating in China, Taiwan and Thailand [^ntr34-L_202600319EN.000101-E0034] (‘epoxy resins investigation’).

• (137) The Commission noted that the profit margin used in the epoxy resins investigation was based on the profit of a single cooperating unrelated importer [^ntr35-L_202600319EN.000101-E0035]. The importer in question agreed that the Commission could use its profit for the calculations in the epoxy resins investigation, but did not agree to the publication of its profit, and indeed the profit was provided as the range [1–5] % in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/393. On the contrary, the profit margin used in the PVA investigation was based on the profit margin of three cooperating unrelated importers [^ntr36-L_202600319EN.000101-E0036]. The average of that profit, 6,89 %, then free from confidentiality concerns, was published in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336. The Commission could not use the profit margin provided by a single cooperating unrelated importer in a separate investigation but not published due to its company-specific confidentiality, when a profit margin free from confidentiality concerns is publicly available in another investigation Finally, the Commission noted that CJS did not explain why the profit margin of the epoxy resins investigation would lead to more reasonable amounts for profit than the profit margin used in the PVA investigation, besides the fact that it has been established in a more recent investigation. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (138) In the absence of other comments on the determination of the export price, the Commission confirmed its conclusions in recitals 262 to 263 of the provisional Regulation.

3.4.   Comparison

• (139) The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis. Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability.

3.4.1.   Adjustments made to the normal value

• (140) Following provisional disclosure, CJS claimed that contrary to the Commission’s statement in recital 270 of the provisional Regulation, Sucroal’s SG & A costs included distribution costs and requested the Commission therefore to deduct them from the normal value in order to make a fair comparison at an ex-works level.

• (141) In recital 270 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission intended to refer to transport costs, rather than to distribution costs. This can be seen by the sentence following the statement to which CJS referred to, and where the Commission referred to ‘unsubstantiated claims that amounts for SG & A costs […] contain transport costs. The Commission’s statement in recital 270 highlighted the fact that there was no information available showing that the Sucroal’s SG & A costs, and specifically the item for distribution costs, included any transport cost, which should be deducted from the normal value. Indeed, the accounting category ‘distribution costs’ does not necessarily correspond to physical freight or delivery charges incurred after the ex-works level. In line with common accounting practice, such costs may cover a range of commercial and administrative expenses, including warehousing, logistics management, sales staff, and marketing, which are part of the SG & A costs at the ex-works level and should not be deducted from the normal value. Such SG & A costs, including commercial and administrative expenses, may indeed legitimately remain in the normal value at ex-works level, provided they are not shown to overlap with costs that were deducted from the export price. The breakdown of Sucroal’s distribution costs or of the item ‘other costs’ were not publicly available, nor did CJS provide any evidence that the ‘distribution costs’ in Sucroal’s accounts corresponded exclusively to downstream freight or handling charges comparable to those deducted from their export price. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (142) Therefore, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 267 to 271 of the provisional Regulation.

3.4.2.   Adjustments made to the export price

• (143) As set out in recitals 272 and 273 of the provisional Regulation, adjustments were made for customs duty, other import charges, freight, insurance, handling loading and ancillary expenses, packing, credit costs, commissions, and bank charges, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

• (144) Following provisional disclosure, CJS pointed out that the Commission deducted packing expenses and bank charges borne by CJE from the export price twice. CJS requested the Commission to ensure that these expenses were only deducted once. The Commission found this claim justified and adjusted its calculation.

• (145) Following provisional disclosure, Huaheng Group claimed that the Commission had double counted a certain expense when calculating the export price. The Commission found this claim justified and adjusted its calculation.

• (146) After the publication of the provisional Regulation, Huaheng Group claimed that the Commission did not meet its burden of proof to make the adjustment to the export price pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation for sales made from the producer to a related company and then exported to the Union, as set out in recital 274 of the provisional Regulation. In particular, Huaheng Group claimed that (i) the Commission did not explain why making a profit or why trading a broad array of goods turned the related trader into having functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis; and (ii) why making such adjustment was necessary for price comparability between the export price and the normal value.

• (147) The Commission did not find the claim justified. In recital 275 of the provisional Regulation the Commission concluded that Huaheng Group used a company within its group for trading purposes. More details regarding the Commission’s assessment were provided to Huaheng in its specific disclosure as it included confidential information. On the basis of this assessment, the Commission concluded that the related trader Anhui Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd (‘AHB’) was carrying out functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis. Therefore, an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was warranted.

• (148) Following provisional disclosure, CJS claimed that the conditions to apply the adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation with respect to its related trader CJ CheilJedang Corp. (‘CJCJ’) were not met and provided confidential details of the operations carried out by CJCJ in support of the claim.

• (149) The Commission analysed carefully CJS’s claims and found them justified. The Commission, however, analysed whether the specific setup of the group regarding export sales was a factor that affected price comparability for the purpose of carrying out a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation.

• (150) The investigation established that CJS sold to the Union through a related trader in the investigation period and that this trader incurred costs and realised profits that could be allocated to Union sales. On the other hand, the normal value for the product concerned was constructed in accordance with Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, thus including an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG & A costs and for profits. As noted in recital 254 of the provisional Regulation, those costs and profits were found to be reasonable for the ex-works level of trade and therefore could not include the costs and profits of a related trader.

• (151) It follows that the comparison between that normal value and that export price was not fair, as the export price included costs and profits of a related trader and the normal value was constructed net of such elements. This created an asymmetry that affects price comparability between normal value and export price. Consequently, the Commission concluded that an adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation was warranted.

• (152) In view of the above, to ensure a fair comparison between normal value and export price, the Commission deducted from the export price those SG & A costs and profits of the related trader that were not included in the normal value, from the export price. In the specific setup of the export sales channel of the group, the adjustment was carried out using the actual SG & A costs borne by CJCJ, and, given the relationship and profit allocation between CJCJ and CJS, which tainted the profit achieved, the notional profit of 6,89 % referred to in recital 133.

• (153) Following the final disclosure, CJS claimed that, in order to apply an adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation, the Commission had to demonstrate how the involvement of CJCJ in the invoicing process of export sales affected the price comparability with the normal value. CJS further claimed that, despite acknowledging that the conditions to apply an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation were not met, the Commission applied the same adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation without showing that CJS’s customers paid different prices on the domestic market because of the involvement of CJCJ in the export sales of the product under investigation to the Union. In the confidential version of the submission, CJS added further details as regards the SG & A costs and profit adjustments.

• (154) It is uncontested that CJS sells to the Union through a related trader: CJCJ. A portion of that trader’s SG & A costs can reasonably be allocated to the sales of the product concerned on the Union market. CJCJ also generates profit.

• (155) In the CCCME judgment, the General Court noted that a normal value constructed under Article 2(6a) ‘is not generally affected by factors which might damage its comparability because it has been artificially established’ [^ntr37-L_202600319EN.000101-E0037]. In other words, if an element for which an adjustment is sought cannot be positively shown to have been used in the construction of the normal value, the adjustment cannot be made. Considering that, as noted in recitals 253 and 267 to 271 of the provisional Regulation, the normal value in the case at hand was constructed by, among other, using SG & A costs that were found to be reasonable for ex-works level of trade, it follows that, by definition, these costs could not include costs of a related trader.

• (156) It is difficult to demonstrate an impact on price comparability between the export price and the normal value more clearly than by showing that an element, in this case the SG & A costs of a related trader, is present in the former and absent from the latter. In other words, by showing that the export price and the normal value are asymmetrical. The concept of price comparability between the export price and the normal value is intrinsically linked to the notion of symmetry between them. The Court explained this in Dashiqiao Sanqiang [^ntr38-L_202600319EN.000101-E0038] as follows: ‘The case-law has further established that it is apparent from both the wording and the scheme of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation that an adjustment to the export price or the normal value may be made only in order to take account of differences in factors which affect the prices and therefore their comparability. That means, in other words, that the purpose of an adjustment is to re-establish the symmetry between the normal value and the export price, with the result that, if the adjustment has been validly made, that implies that it has re-established the symmetry between the normal value and the export price.’ [^ntr39-L_202600319EN.000101-E0039]

• (157) The Court then concluded that ‘[i]n any assessment of the fairness of the comparison method used, the concept of symmetry between the normal value and the export price thus constitutes a key element reflecting the need to establish the comparability of prices within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the basic Regulation’ [^ntr40-L_202600319EN.000101-E0040].

• (158) Asymmetry between the normal value and the export price in the context of an adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) was considered by the General Court in Sinopec. The Court first recalled the Commission’s finding of asymmetry between the export price and the normal value created by the presence of non-refundable VAT in the former and its absence in the latter [^ntr41-L_202600319EN.000101-E0041] to then conclude that ‘the Commission did demonstrate the need to make the […] adjustment at issue’ [^ntr42-L_202600319EN.000101-E0042]. Whilst the Court found that the adjustment could not have been made under Article 2(10)(b), and that the Commission had therefore committed an error of law, it also held that ‘that error had no decisive effect on the assessment made by the author of that act’ [^ntr43-L_202600319EN.000101-E0043]. This was because, according to the Court, Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation ‘allowed the Commission to make the […] adjustment at issue in order to re-establish the symmetry between the normal value and the export price of the product concerned and to ensure a fair comparison between those two values’ [^ntr44-L_202600319EN.000101-E0044]. In other words, the Court confirmed that the assessment made by the Commission, which was limited to the finding of asymmetry (similar to the assessment made in the case before this Court) was sufficient to make the adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation.

• (159) In view of the foregoing, the Commission noted that the adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation was necessary in order to re-establish the symmetry between the normal value and the export price, and thus to ensure a fair comparison. Indeed, the comparison must be made on an ex-works basis, as explained in recital 117. While the normal value was established at ex-works level, an export price including the SG & A costs and the profit of a related trader cannot be considered at ex-works level. Therefore, the Commission must eliminate the cost borne by CJCJ and the notional profit in order to compare the normal value and the export price at the same level. CJCJ’s involvement, which is limited to export sales, results in costs and profits which have thus to be taken into account. Indeed, CJS cannot benefit from the economic activity of CJCJ and the tax advantages that it allows and, at the same time, claim that the absence of such an activity would not change anything in the sales channel. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (160) Furthermore, CJS claimed that the Commission violated the principle of Union law of the lex specialis, according to which a Union Institutions cannot circumvent a more specific provision by relying on a general one. CJS claimed in this regard that Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation would be a general provision, while Article 2(10)(i) would be a specific provision.

• (161) The Commission rejected this claim, since Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation is not a general provision compared to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, but rather a different case under which adjustments can be made. Indeed, Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation referred to ‘other factors not provided for under points (a) to (j)’. CJS claimed and the Commission agreed that Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation could not apply in this case as there was no commission within the meaning of that provision being paid. The Commission, rather than circumventing a specific provision by relying on a general one, simply attributed the correct qualification to the facts of the case. Moreover, such approach is in line with the judgement of the General Court in Sinopec, summarised in recital 158. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (162) Finally, should the Commission maintain its adjustment on the basis of Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation, CJS claimed that such an adjustment could not be the equal to the one made under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, because the two adjustments are not the same and because the Commission established that the conditions to apply an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) were not met. As a consequence, CJS requested the Commission to quantify how the involvement of CJCJ in the export sales invoicing process affected the price comparability with the normal value. In particular, if the Commission considered that CJCJ’s profit affected the price comparability, CJS claimed that such profit should be at most 2 %, as the profit used in the anti-dumping investigation on certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Egypt, Japan and Vietnam [^ntr45-L_202600319EN.000101-E0045] (‘HRF investigation’).

• (163) The Commission noted that, in calculating the adjustment for the SG & A costs, the Commission already excluded from the SG & A costs items which were not relevant for sales of the product under investigation to the Union, as indicated in recital 165. Therefore, the Commission considered for the SG & A costs adjustment only those items stemming from CJCJ’s role which affected the price comparability. As regards the profit, the Commission could not rely on the actual profit of CJCJ, as it is a profit between related entities, and relied on the notional profit of the PVA investigation, as the most reliable source of information available in this case, as established in recital 265 of the provisional Regulation and in recitals 133 and 137. CJS did not show why the profit used in the HRF investigation would be more appropriate, besides the fact that it is a lower profit. In addition, such profit was established in the HRF investigation for a different economic sector, the steel sector, and is not related to the chemical sector as the notional profit established in the PVA investigation. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (164) CJS also submitted a claim concerning the quantification of the adjustment based on the deduction of CJCJ’s SG & A costs originally pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, and at this stage pursuant to Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. In particular, this claim concerned five items relevant for establishing the SG & A costs of CJCJ. In the confidential version of its submission, CJS elaborated in more details this claim.

• (165) The Commission found this claim partially justified for three of the five items and deducted them from the SG & A costs relevant for the adjustment accordingly. The claim was rejected for the remaining two items. More details regarding the Commission’s assessment were provided to CJS in its specific disclosure as it included confidential information.

• (166) Finally, CJS submitted a claim concerning the quantification of the adjustment based on the deduction of a reasonable profit of 6,89 % originally pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, and at this stage pursuant to Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. In the confidential version of its submission, CJS elaborated in more details this claim.

• (167) The Commission rejected this claim. As explained in recitals 149 to 152, the Commission resorted to maintain the adjustment for a notional profit of 6,89 %, established as discussed in recital 133. More details regarding the Commission’s assessment were provided to CJS in its specific disclosure as it included confidential information.

• (168) Following the final disclosure, Huaheng Group claimed that the Commission had not addressed the claim following the provisional disclosure that the Commission had not justified why adjusting the export price was necessary to ensure price comparability between the normal value and the export price. In this regard, Huaheng Group claimed that expenses linked to services performed by AHB were deducted from the export price but that the expenses for the same services had been included in the normal value and should have been deducted. Huaheng Group also claimed that the findings set out in recital 141 that certain SG & A costs may indeed legitimately remain in the normal value at ex-works level, provided they are not shown to overlap with costs that were deducted from the export price, would be further evidence of that asymmetry.

• (169) The Commission found that it was warranted to adjust the export price since the Commission had concluded in recital 147 that AHB had functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis. As explained too in recitals 274 to 276 of the provisional Regulation, AHB received a mark-up on the resales of the product concerned and since it was found to perform functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis, an adjustment for commissions was warranted. This was so since, as explained in recital 261 of the provisional Regulation, the normal value was constructed on ex-works basis. In other words, as explained in recitals 156 and 157, the presence of an element (a commission) in the export price and its absence from the normal value created an asymmetry between the two that must be corrected in order to make the comparison between the normal value and the export price ‘fair’ within the meaning of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Regarding the quantification of the adjustment for commissions, as confirmed by the General court in Çolakoğlu [^ntr46-L_202600319EN.000101-E0046], the Commission may take into account the relationship between the manufacturer and the related trader when determining the appropriate amount of the adjustment to be made. In case of an association between the manufacturer and the trader, the Commission may quantify the adjustment by applying Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation by analogy. In such cases the adjustment is made for a commission constructed on the basis of the SG & A costs of the trader in question and a notional profit. Considering that BHB and AHB were part of the Huaheng Group, and that their relationship was found not to be at arm’s length, as supported by the provisions in the written agreement between BHB and AHB, the adjustment was based on the SG & A costs incurred by the related trader and a notional profit. Therefore, since the Commission did not adjust for SG & A costs and profit but for a commission which was constructed based on SG & A costs and a notional profit, the Commission did not find applicable the claim that adjusting for SG & A costs had resulted in an asymmetry between the normal value and the export price. At no point during the investigation did Huaheng Group argue that a commission was present in the constructed normal value, let alone substantiating or quantifying such claim, as required by the case-law referred to in recital 269 of the provisional Regulation. Indeed, as noted in recital 168, the normal value was constructed net of any commissions. In any event, even if the Commission had to adjust for SG & A costs and profit, the Commission did not consider that it would have needed to deduct expenses from the SG & A costs to ensure comparability between from the normal value and the export price. First, the Huaheng Group did not submit any evidence showing that the SG & A costs used to construct the commission had been included in the normal value. Second, the SG & A costs contained in the normal value were those actually incurred by a producer, in particular, those incurred by Sucroal in Colombia. Third, the SG & A costs deducted from the export price were those actually incurred by AHB in its functions as a related trader. Since the SG & A costs related to different activities (exporting producer and related trader), no expenses from the SG & A costs of the Colombian producer Sucroal would have had to be deducted from the normal value. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

• (170) Following the final disclosure, Huaheng Group further claimed that the Commission had not met the necessary burden of proof for adjusting the export price within the meaning of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation and in particular that no adjustment could be made in cases where legally separate companies were internal sales departments forming an SEE.

• (171) The Commission provided in recital 147 the reasons why it considered AHB as a trader having functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis. Furthermore, the Commission found that this finding was sufficient for making an adjustment to the export price under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation and no further proof was necessary in this context. In addition, Huaheng Group had never claimed that AHB and the exporting producer were forming an SEE. It is recalled that according to case-law where the Commission has adduced consistent evidence that a distributor affiliated to a producer carries out functions comparable to those of an agent working on a commission basis, it will be for that distributor or that producer to adduce evidence that an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic regulation is not justified, for example by demonstrating that they form a single economic entity [^ntr47-L_202600319EN.000101-E0047].

• (172) In the absence of other comments on the adjustments to the export price, the Commission confirmed its conclusions in recitals 272 to 276 of the provisional Regulation.

3.5.   Dumping margins

• (173) As described in recitals 144 to 145 and 164 to 165, following claims from interested parties, the Commission revised the dumping margins.

• (174) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Definitive dumping margin (%)
CJ (Shenyang) Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	31,3
Bayannur Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	53,8
Other cooperating companies	42,2
All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	53,8

4. INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (175) In the absence of comments on the determination of the Union industry and Union production, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 281 to 283 of the provisional Regulation.

4.2.   Union consumption

• (176) In the absence of comments on the Union consumption, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 284 to 289 of the provisional Regulation.

4.3.   Imports from the country concerned

• (177) In the absence of comments on the imports from the country concerned, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 290 to 294 of the provisional Regulation.

4.3.1.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

• (178) In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 295 to 301 of the provisional Regulation.

• (179) Having regard to the correction in the calculation as specified in recital 195, the result of the price comparison, expressed as a percentage of the Union industry’s theoretical turnover during the investigation period, has been revised and showed a weighted average undercutting margin of between 15,0 % and 22,2 % by the imports from the country concerned on the Union market.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

• (180) In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 302 to 306 of the provisional Regulation

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (181) In the absence of comments concerning production, production capacity and capacity utilisation, recitals 307 to 310 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

• (182) In the absence of comments concerning sales volume and market share, recitals 311 to 313 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.2.3.   Employment and productivity

• (183) In the absence of comments concerning employment and productivity, recitals 314 to 316 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.2.4.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (184) In the absence of comments concerning magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping, recitals 317 to 318 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (185) In the absence of comments concerning prices and factors affecting prices, recitals 319 to 321 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

• (186) In the absence of comments concerning labour costs, recitals 322 to 323 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

• (187) In the absence of comments concerning inventories, recitals 324 to 326 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (188) In the absence of comments concerning profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital, recitals 327 to 332 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.   Conclusion on injury

• (189) In the absence of further comments the Commission concluded, based on the findings disclosed in the provisional Regulation, that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation and recitals 333 to 338 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (190) In the absence of comments, recitals 339 to 341 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

• (191) In the absence of comments, recitals 342 to 343 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (192) In the absence of comments, recitals 344 to 347 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (193) In the absence of comments, the Commission concluded, based on the findings disclosed in the provisional Regulation, that the dumped imports from the PRC caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate or break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. Recitals 348 to 352 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Injury margin

• (194) In the absence of comments, recitals 353 to 359 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (195) In the absence of comments, recital 360 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed. However, the Commission noted that the prices of one exporting producer were not adjusted to the Union frontier level for the price comparison. The Commission corrected the calculation accordingly and the final injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

Country	Company	Definitive injury margin (%)
People’s Republic of China	CJ (Shenyang) Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	118,1
People’s Republic of China	Bayannur Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	141,0
People’s Republic of China	Other cooperating companies	129,2
People’s Republic of China	All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	141,0

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (196) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Country	Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
People’s Republic of China	CJ (Shenyang) Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	31,3	118,1	31,3
People’s Republic of China	Bayannur Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	53,8	141,0	53,8
People’s Republic of China	Other cooperating companies listed in the Annex	42,2	129,2	42,2
People’s Republic of China	All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	53,8	141,0	53,8

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (197) In the absence of comments, recitals 363 to 366 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

• (198) In the absence of comments, recitals 367 to 369 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.3.   Interest of users

• (199) In the absence of comments, recitals 370 to 374 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (200) In the absence of comments on Union interest, recital 375 of the provisional Regulation was confirmed

8. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.   Definitive measures

• (201) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

• (202) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
People’s Republic of China	CJ (Shenyang) Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	31,3
People’s Republic of China	Bayannur Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	53,8
People’s Republic of China	Other cooperating companies	42,2
People’s Republic of China	All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	53,8

• (203) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

• (204) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission [^ntr48-L_202600319EN.000101-E0048]. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

• (205) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

• (206) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (207) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

• (208) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

• (209) Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

8.2.   Definitive collection of the provisional duties

• (210) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation.

8.3.   Retroactive collection

• (211) As mentioned in section (1.2), the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

• (212) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

• (213) The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. For this analysis, the Commission compared the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period which were at the level of [1 750–2 417] MT/month, with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures (1 455 MT/month). Also, when comparing the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation up to and including the month in which provisional measures were imposed (1 320 MT/month), no increase could be observed.

Period	IP	January – July 2025	January – August 2025
The monthly average import volumes (MT/month)	[1 750 –2 417 ]	1 455	1 320

• (214) On that basis, the Commission concluded that the conditions as set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation for the retroactive application of the definitive anti-dumping duty were not met.

• (215) In the response to the final disclosure, the complainant disagreed with the Commission’s assessment and claimed that based on data from the specialised market intelligence provided in the complaint and questionnaire replies, which the Commission also used to establish the volumes of imports of the product concerned during the investigation, that the conditions for retroactive collection of duties had been met. According to this data, the complainant argued that the monthly imports of the product concerned increased significantly after the IP. Specifically, the complainant claimed that in the year 2024, monthly shipments were on average in between one and 2,5 tons of valine, the shipments then reached up to six times in February 2025 and that very high volumes were sent to the Union in February and March 2025, which indicated that stocks were being built up. This surge of exports from China to the Union after the IP would demonstrate that the conditions for retroactive collection of duties have been met, and therefore the complainant requested that the Commission imposes duties retroactively.

• (216) When establishing import volume, the Commission adjusted the data provided by the complainant from the specialized market intelligence, as described in recitals 287 and 290 of the provisional Regulation, by corrections resulting from cross-checked data submitted by the cooperating exporters verified on spot. Furthermore, since the initiation of the investigation, there has been a separate TARIC code for the product concerned, allowing the Commission to fully rely on the import statistics provided by Member States. The Commission did not find any reason to discredit this data and therefore compared the average monthly imports reported by Member States with the average monthly imports determined for the IP, as per set out in section 4.3 of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, the Commission does not find the complainant’s claim to be substantiated and confirmed its conclusion that conditions as set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation for the retroactive collection of the definitive anti-dumping duty were not met.

9. FINAL PROVISION

• (217) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr49-L_202600319EN.000101-E0049], when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

• (218) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Country of origin	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)	TARIC additional code
People’s Republic of China	CJ (Shenyang) Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	31,3	89TX
People’s Republic of China	Bayannur Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd.	53,8	89TY
People’s Republic of China	Other cooperating companies listed in the Annex	42,2
People’s Republic of China	All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China	53,8	8999

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1737 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

• (a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024);

• (b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

• (c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 February 2026.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

[^ntr1-L_202600319EN.000101-E0001]: OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

[^ntr2-L_202600319EN.000101-E0002]: Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of valine originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C, C/2024/7460, 19.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7460/oj).

[^ntr3-L_202600319EN.000101-E0003]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/326 of 18 February 2025 making imports of valine originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/326, 19.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/326/oj).

[^ntr4-L_202600319EN.000101-E0004]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1737 of 13 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of valine originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2025/1737, 14.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1737/oj).

[^ntr5-L_202600319EN.000101-E0005]: Provisional Regulation, recital 187.

[^ntr8-L_202600319EN.000101-E0008]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/698 of 10 April 2025 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/633 on imports of monosodium glutamate originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of monosodium glutamate consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not (OJ L, 2025/698, 11.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/698/oj), recital 18.

[^ntr9-L_202600319EN.000101-E0009]: Ibidem, recital 60.

[^ntr10-L_202600319EN.000101-E0010]: Ibidem, recitals 63-64.

[^ntr11-L_202600319EN.000101-E0011]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336 of 25 September 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain polyvinyl alcohols originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 315, 29.9.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/1336/oj).

[^ntr12-L_202600319EN.000101-E0012]: Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj).

[^ntr14-L_202600319EN.000101-E0014]: Notice of Initiation of Investigation and Interim Measures – EAPA Consolidated Case 7950, 9 July 2024, p. 3.

[^ntr15-L_202600319EN.000101-E0015]: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/698, Table 4.

[^ntr16-L_202600319EN.000101-E0016]: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120 of 12 October 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China OJ L, 2023/2120, 13.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2120/oj, recital 133.

[^ntr17-L_202600319EN.000101-E0017]: After excluding China and the countries in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2015/755.

[^ntr18-L_202600319EN.000101-E0018]: Until 6 digits as defined in the Harmonized System of the World Customs Organization (WCO).

[^ntr19-L_202600319EN.000101-E0019]: While relevant codes include also 1005 90 10 , 1005 90 90 , 1005 90 99 and 100590000019, GTA data were retrieved only under code 1005 90 11 .

[^ntr20-L_202600319EN.000101-E0020]: Price adjusted to reflect the premium of non-GMO corn, see recital 224 of the provisional Regulation.