Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/479 of 3 March 2026 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of biodiesel originating in the Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 18 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) By Regulation (EU) 2019/2092 (2) (‘the Definitive Regulation’), the Commission imposed a definitive countervailing duty on imports of biodiesel originating in Indonesia (‘the country concerned’) (‘the original measures’). The investigation that led to the imposition of the original measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.

(2) By Regulation (EU) 2025/1883 (3) , the Commission corrected the Definitive Regulation to include CN codes ex 2710 19 11 , ex 2710 19 15 , ex 2710 19 21 , ex 2710 19 25 and ex 2710 19 29 and the corresponding TARIC codes for sustainable aviation fuels (‘SAF’). The amendment did not have any impact on the product scope of the measures in force.

(3) Following the publication of the notice of impending expiry of the countervailing measures in force (4), the Commission received a request for the initiation of an expiry review of the countervailing measures pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation (‘the request’).

(4) The request was submitted on 8 September 2024 by the European Biodiesel Board (‘EBB’ or ‘the applicant’) on behalf of the Union industry of biodiesel in the sense of Article 10(6) of the basic Regulation. The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the countervailing measures would likely result in the continuation or recurrence of subsidisation and injury to the Union industry.

(5) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, the Commission announced on 6 December 2024, by a Notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union (6) (‘the Notice of Initiation’), the initiation of an expiry review of the countervailing measures applicable pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(6) Prior to the initiation of the expiry review, and in accordance with Article 10(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission notified the Government of Indonesia (‘GOI’) that it had received a properly documented review request and invited the GOI for pre-initiation consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation as regards the contents of the review request and arriving at a mutually agreed solution. The GOI accepted the offer of consultations which were subsequently held on 5 December 2024. During the consultations, no mutually agreed solution could be arrived at.

(7) The GOI submitted comments on the initiation of the investigation. It claimed that (i) neither the Oil Palm Plantation Fund (‘OPPF’) nor the GOI’s provision of crude palm oil (‘CPO’) for less than adequante remuneration are subsidies within the meaning of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures (‘WTO SCM agreement’) and that (ii) the termination of the countervailing duty on imports of biodiesel from Indonesia to the EU would not cause injury or possible recurrence of injury to the EU biodiesel producers.

(8) The evidence provided regarding the continuation of subsidisation in Indonesia was sufficient at initiation stage. Concretely, the request provided evidence that the schemes mentioned by the GOI in its submission are still in place, constitute subsidies as they were found to be countervailable in previous EU investigations, and are available for producers in the sector. No evidence at the Commission services’ disposal at the time of initiation contradicted the evidence regarding subsidy schemes in the request which led to the initiation of the investigation.

(9) Equally, the evidence provided regarding the likelihood of recurrence of injury was sufficient at initiation stage. Concretely, the request contained evidence on the biodiesel capacity in Indonesia, the attractiveness of the Union market for Indonesian producers and the injurious price level at which Indonesian imports would enter the Union if the measures were repealed. On the basis of these elements, the request provided sufficient evidence that the repeal of the measures would likely result in recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(10) The GOI provided no evidence to the contrary in its submission during the pre-initiation consultation process. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the evidence presented in the request was sufficient to justify the initiation of the expiry review investigation. The claim was therefore rejected.

(11) The investigation of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidisation covered the period from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of the trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(12) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, the known Union producers, the known unrelated importers in the Union, unrelated users in the Union known to be concerned, the known producers in Indonesia and the authorities of Indonesia about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate.

(13) Interested parties were invited to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence within the time limits set out in the Notice of Initiation. Interested parties were also granted the opportunity to request in writing a hearing with the Commission investigation services and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. No such a request was received.

(14) In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 27 of the basic Regulation.

(15) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers, in accordance with Article 27 of the basic Regulation. Prior to the initiation, 32 Union producers had provided the information requested for the selection of the sample and expressed their willingness to cooperate with the Commission. On that basis, the Commission provisionally selected a sample of four producers, which were found to be representative of the Union industry in terms of volume of production and sales of the like product in the Union. The sampled Union producers accounted for approximately 12 % of the estimated total production of the Union industry and for approximately 13 % of the total sales volume of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union during the review investigation period. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received and the provisional sample was thus confirmed.

(16) In order to decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. None of them came forward.

(17) To decide whether sampling was necessary with regard to the exporting producers and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Indonesia to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(18) No exporting producer returned the sampling form. Subsequently, on 8 April 2025 the Commission informed the GOI that there was no cooperation by exporting producers in Indonesia and thus it may base its findings with regard of the continuation and recurrence of subsidisation and injury on facts available within the meaning of Article 28 of the basic Regulation. No comments were received.

(19) The Commission sent questionnaires to the four sampled Union producers, the applicant and the GOI. Questionnaires for the Union producers, unrelated importers, users and the exporting producers in Indonesia were also made available online (7), on the day of initiation of the investigation.

(20) Replies to the questionnaires were received from the four sampled Union producers and the applicant.

(22) On 24 November 2025, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on which basis it intended to maintain the countervailing duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(23) EBB and the GOI provided comments on the final disclosure. EBB agreed with the Commission’s intention to maintain the countervailing duties. The comments of the GOI are analysed in the relevant sections of this Regulation. No parties requested a hearing.

(24) The product under review is the same as the one in the original investigation, that is fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters and/or paraffinic gasoils obtained from synthesis and/or hydro-treatment, of non-fossil origin, in pure form or as included in a blend (‘the product under review’), currently falling under CN codes ex 1516 20 98 (TARIC codes 1516 20 98 21, 1516 20 98 29 and 1516 20 98 33), ex 1518 00 91 (TARIC codes 1518 00 91 21, 1518 00 91 29 and 1518 00 91 33), ex 1518 00 95 (TARIC codes 1518 00 95 21, 1518 00 95 33), ex 1518 00 99 (TARIC codes 1518 00 99 21, 1518 00 99 29 and 1518 00 99 33), ex 2710 19 11 (TARIC code 2710 19 11 10), ex 2710 19 15 (TARIC code 2710 19 15 10), ex 2710 19 21 (TARIC code 2710 19 21 10), ex 2710 19 25 (TARIC code 2710 19 25 10), ex 2710 19 29 (TARIC code 2710 19 29 10), ex 2710 19 42 (TARIC codes 2710 19 42 21 and 2710 19 42 29), ex 2710 19 44 (TARIC codes 2710 19 44 21, 2710 19 44 29 and 2710 19 44 33), ex 2710 19 46 (TARIC codes 2710 19 46 21, 2710 19 46 29 and 2710 19 46 33), ex 2710 19 47 (TARIC codes 2710 19 47 21, 2710 19 47 29 and 2710 19 47 33), 2710 20 11 , 2710 20 16 , ex 3824 99 92 (TARIC codes 3824 99 92 10, 3824 99 92 14 and 3824 99 92 17), 3826 00 10 and ex 3826 00 90 (TARIC codes 3826 00 90 11, 3826 00 90 19 and 3826 00 90 33) (8).

(25) The original investigation established that biodiesel produced in Indonesia is primarily palm oil methyl ester (‘PME’), which is derived from palm oil (9). The current investigation did not bring not light any information which would have devaluated this finding.

(26) Biodiesel is mainly used in the transport sector, namely in diesel engines, and can be blended with mineral diesels or used in its pure form.

(27) The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in Indonesia (‘the product concerned’).

(29) In accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, and as stated in the Notice of Initiation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of subsidisation.

(30) On 7 March 2025, the Commission sent the anti-subsidy questionnaire to the GOI together with a specific appendix (‘Appendix A’), consisting of a questionnaire for input suppliers.

(31) No reply to the questionnaire nor to the Appendix A was submitted either by the GOI or any Indonesian biodiesel exporting producer or input supplier.

(32) On a submission dated 21 March 2025 the GOI notified the Commission that it would not cooperate in the investigation, explicitly stating that ‘both the GOI and the Indonesia biofuel producers will focus on the DS618: European Union – countervailing duties on Imports of Biodiesel from Indonesia litigation process, which is still ongoing at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) WTO. Therefore, we do not submit responses to the investigation questionnaire’ (10).

(33) The absence of cooperation prevented the Commission from collecting the information it considered relevant for its findings in this investigation. For example, the Commission could not obtain from the GOI any information on the palm oil market based on direct information provided by CPO suppliers nor did it have information regarding the role of PT Perkebunan Nusantara (‘PTPN’), a CPO producer fully owned by the GOI, with regard to the biodiesel industry.

(34) Consequently, as explained in recital 18, the Commission informed the Indonesian authorities by Note Verbale of 8 April 2025 that, due to the non-cooperation from the GOI and the Indonesian exporting producers, the Commission intended to make its findings on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 28(1) of the basic Regulation. The GOI and Indonesian exporting producers were also informed that a finding based on facts available may be less favourable than if they cooperated.

(35) No comments in this regard were received. In the absence of any information from the GOI or the input suppliers, the Commission relied on facts available for its findings to establish the continuation of subsidy practices of Indonesia in the biodiesel industry in accordance with Article 28 of the basic Regulation.

(37) To establish whether there was continuation of subsidisation, the Commission examined whether the subsidies countervailed in the original investigation continued to confer benefit to the exporting producers of biodiesel from Indonesia. Subsequently, the Commission analysed whether the Indonesian biodiesel producers benefitted from subsidies which were not countervailed in the original investigation (‘additional subsidies’) as alleged in the request (11).

(38) At the outset it must be noted that in this regulation the Commission refers to the OPPF rather than Biodiesel Subsidy Fund. The latter is a term used by the complainant in the original complaint and again by the applicant in the request. However, the official name of the subsidy scheme is OPPF.

(40) The original investigation established that all Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers chose to partake in the procurement of biodiesel and were therefore under the obligation to sell the monthly quota to the petrofuel entities operating the blending mandate (20). It was also established that the biodiesel reference price was higher than the diesel reference price, hence resulting in payments from the OPPF in favour of the Indonesian biodiesel producers (21). It follows that there existed no real market price for biodiesel in Indonesia because of the GOI’s intervention to regulate and distort the whole Indonesian CPO-biodiesel value chain (22). Indeed, the biodiesel reference price set by the GOI did not reflect what the price would be under undistorted market condiditons without the GOI’s intervention (23).

(41) The Commission also found that the GOI created the OPPF and expressly entrusted the Management Agency to make payments to the biodiesel producers (24). Also, the qualification of the OPPF as a public body was undisputed (25). The OPPF funds, financed through the normal fiscal and public revenue collecting activity of the GOI (26), constituted public funds collected pursuant to a compulsory export levy (27), and the OPPF disbursment in favour of the Indonesian biodiesel exporting producers constituted a direct transfer of funds in the form of grant (28).

(42) The Commission’s analysis of the legal framework implementing the OPPF expressly confirmed that the OPPF funds were meant for the benefit of the Indonesian biodiesel producers (29), without expecting anything in return (30). To that end, the GOI both granted the Management Agency the right to use CPO export levies and imposed the duty to procure and use biodiesel (31).

(43) In the request the applicant claimed that the biodiesel subsidy fund is the most important subsidy programme available to the Indonesian biodiesel producers since 2015. The biodiesel subsidy fund was envisaged to implement the blending mandate established by the GOI, which dates back to 2006 with an initial blend of 1 % biodiesel and 99 % diesel fuel (‘B01’) and is deemed one of the most aggressive worldwide (32). According to the evidence put forward by the applicant, as of 2023 the GOI had introduced a blending mandate of 35 % biodiesel and 65 % diesel fuel (‘B35’) (33). In this regard, the applicant observed that since 2018 the GOI has extended the blending mandate also to non-public service obligations (‘PSO’) sectors, resulting in a massive increase in subsidisation now available to both PSO and non-PSO (34).

(44) The biodiesel subsidy fund is part of the OPPF, as set forth by the Presidential Regulation No 61/2015. The OPPF consists in a sum of money collected by the Management Agency (35), a public body established by the GOI with the specific purpose of collecting, administering, managing, storing and distributing the OPPF funds (36). By virtue of the underlying legal basis, the funds include export levies on CPO commodities and/or their derivatives (37). In this regard, the applicant pointed out to the legal provision pursuant to which ‘[t]he use of funds […] is intended to close the gap between the market index price of diesel fuel oil and the market index price of biodiesel biofuel on certain types of fuel oil’ (38).

(45) The applicant argued that, according to the subsidy scheme, Indonesian biodiesel producers wishing to partake in the programme had to sell on the Indonesian domestic market the quota of biodiesel to the petrofuel entities, Pertamina and AKR, at a reference price of mineral diesel instead of the actual biodiesel price (39). By so doing, the Indonesian producers received in exchange grants from the GOI. Those grants were equal to the difference between the reference price for biodiesel as set by the GOI and the reference price for mineral diesel, i.e. the price at which oil companies purchased biodiesel. According to the applicant, grants stemmed from the export levies imposed on palm oil commodities and conferred a benefit to the Indonesian biodiesel producers in the meaning of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.